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Following the recent Russian aggression in Ukraine, a significant part of the international community imposed sanctions against Russia and selected individuals. Russia is subject to sanctions already from its aggression against Ukraine in 2014. However, recently adopted measures are much more powerful. Sanctions in international law represent an important tool for its enforcement given to the hands of the members of the international community. This contribution explains the position of this legal concept in the system of international law and the conditions for its legal application. It also offers a brief insight into the legal framework of the EU and the Czech Republic, including the recent developments in Czech legislation. The contribution also offers short reflections on selected legal issues - confiscation of property as an international sanction and admissibility of thirdparty countermeasures in international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented which discusses the application of economic sanctions as countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful acts. Topics explored include the legitimacy of economic sanctions under international law, the significant contributions of the late law professor David D. Caron to the analysis and interpretation of international law, and the controversies associated with the economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. government on Iran.

In a global environment where most unfriendly acts between nations fall below the threshold of a use of force, the doctrine of countermeasures can be an important tool for states. However, in the realm of cyber operations, the rules governing the application of countermeasures result in unrealistic constraints on states. Particularly when compared with the much lesser constraints on the exercise of selt-defense, limitations such as the prohibitions on anticipatory and collective countermeasures, the requirement to provide prior notice, and the unavailability of countermeasures to confront non-state actors highlight this imbalance. Cyber countermeasures are uniquely situated to become an effective means of countering cyber threats and remedying violations of international law, but the limitations disincentivize states from employing them and encourage resort to more aggressive responses by redefining opposing state and non-state actions as more serious to avoid such limitations and provide greater freedom of action. Relaxing the limitations on cyber countermeasures is one way to allow states to take more proportional and less forceful actions to prevent otherwise illegal acts, and bring violators back into compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationship between international law and World War I from a basic perspective. The first question is whether, and to what degree, international law can or should be regarded as a contributing cause for the outbreak of World War I. Three aspects of international law prior to World War I are discussed: the silent 'alliance' between the ius ad bellum and social Darwinism, the lack of individual accountability of the members of the political and military elites under international law, and the role of the law of reprisal as a 'fire accelerant' of conflicts. The second focal point lies on central questions of international law during the war. Again, three aspects are addressed: the relationship between international law and new weapons as well as new methods of warfare, legal issues related to long-term occupations and the role of international law with respect to prisoners of war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The international law doctrine of countermeasures was formulated by international jurists to provide a lawful means by which states could respond to violations of their rights without provoking retribution or resorting to external means of enforcement. This paper critically analyses the theoretical value of countermeasures in safeguarding international peace and stability in light of the lukewarm responses to the doctrine by states. It examines the sparse precedent of states invoking the doctrine, as well as comments from various governments upon the International Law Commission's attempts to codify the doctrine, and subsequently identifies a number of key failings that problematise the use of countermeasures. This paper concludes that countermeasures, as presently formulated, suffer from being both overly restrictive and too uncertain in their application, leaving states unwilling to risk committing a prima facie wrongful act. Attempts to remedy this by either further codifying the doctrine's elements or giving their application greater flexibility seem unlikely without more discourse in the international legal community about the failings of the doctrine, which prevent it from effectively serving as a self-help tool of peaceful enforcement for states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) two most famous decisions, Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL, are commemorated on their fiftieth anniversaries, attention has also turned to another of the ECJ's early decisions. On November 13, 1964, in Commission v. Luxembourg & Belgium, the Dairy Products case, the ECJ rejected the use of "self-help" countermeasures in the Community legal order, and therefore marked the fundamental distinction between European law and general international law. Drawing on writings by Robert Lecourt, Paul Reuter, and Paul Kapteyn, this paper demonstrates that a direct causal link between these three cases was recognized by ECJ judges and legal scholars as early as 1965. The historical evidence presented here therefore supports previous comparative analysis that has argued that these three decisions-- Van Gend, Costa, and Luxembourg & Belgium--should be acknowledged as profoundly interconnected, in that national court application of European obligations should be understood as a substitute for the enforcement of European obligations through inter-state countermeasures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-help doctrines pervade the law. They regulate a legal subject's attempts to cure or prevent a perceived wrong by her own action, rather than through a mediated process. In their most acute form, these doctrines allow subjects to take what international lawyers call countermeasures--measures that would be forbidden if not pursued for redressive ends. Countermeasures are inescapable and invaluable. They are also deeply concerning, prone to error and abuse and to escalating cycles of vengeance. Disciplining countermeasures becomes a central challenge for any legal regime that recognizes them. How does American constitutional law meet this challenge? This Article contends that a robust set of unwritten, quasi-legal norms shapes and constrains retaliation as well as cooperation across the U.S. government, and it explores how these conventions of self-help correspond to regulatory principles that have emerged in public international law. Re-envisioning intragovernmental conflict through the lens of self-help gives us new descriptive and critical purchase on the separation of powers. By attending to the theory and practice of constitutional countermeasures, the Article tries to show, we can advance familiar debates over legislative obstruction and presidential adventurism, and we can develop richer models of constitutional contestation within and beyond the branches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the legality of retaliatory cyberattacks and explains the destructive and disruptive forms of computer network attacks (CNA) and the threats posed by them to the U.S. in light of the destruction caused by Stuxnet computer worm in 2009-2010 to Iran's computer network system. It describes the two existing doctrines in international law including retorsion and reprisal that provides guidance on validity of a counter CNA.

The implementation system of the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body is an important component of the WTO dispute settlement procedure. Where there is any disagreement between disputing parties as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings, a winning party may refer the matter to a compliance panel and the Appellate Body. If a losing party is found to have failed to comply with the recommendations and rulings, DSB may authorize the winning party to retaliate. This article analyzes the implementation system of the WTO dispute settlement procedure in comparison with other systems of 'second-order' compliance in international law. Also, attention will be directed to the relationship between the WTO retaliation and countermeasures in general international law. Countermeasures under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in particular, have a legal nature akin to that of countermeasures under the law of State responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the treatment of non-reciprocal countermeasures by adjudicatory bodies of limited jurisdiction, with emphasis on the academic debate on the fragmentation of international law. It notes that the doctrinal role of a lawfully taken countermeasure is to serve as a defense for the state's suspension of its international obligations. It illustrates cases of treaties with compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms, which raise concerns over the complication of jurisdictional relationships and systems of applicable law.

The article explains the concept of proportionality of countermeasures in international law. According to the author, the mainstream of international proportionality discourse is encountered when one party has taken an action thought to be unlawful by another, and that second party has resorted to countermeasures. The author reveals that the proportionality principle can also arise in the midst of military conflicts pitting states against each other and in interstate trade disputes and when states that are seeking to protect national security or public health restrict internationally protected human rights.

Summarizes China's position on the issue of State responsibility in times of war under international law, as of October 2000. Draft articles on countermeasures by States other than the injured State; Introduction of the concept of State crimes into international law; Deletion of all articles dealing with dispute settlement procedures.

In 2001 the International Law Commission finally adopted on second reading the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with commentaries, bringing to an end nearly 50 years of ILC work on the subject. This article reviews the final group of changes to the text, focusing on the definitions of ‘injury’ and ‘damage’, assurances of non‐repetition in the light of the LaGrand case, procedural aspects of countermeasures and the controversy over measures taken in response to a breach by states which are not individually injured. The focus of debate now turns to the UNGA Sixth Committee, which will have to decide what to make of the Draft Articles. The ILC itself recommended an initial resolution taking note of the Articles, with subsequent consideration (after a period of years) of a possible diplomatic conference with a view to concluding a convention. This modest proposal allows for further reflection on the text and may help to avoid possibly divisive and inconclusive debate in the Sixth Committee. At the same time it allows time for better understanding of the many changes made as compared with the first reading text (1996). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

It is not contended in legal literature and jurisprudence that proportionality constitutes a basic requirement of the unilateral response to wrongful conduct. Still, its role and content in the system of state responsibility remains unclear. In the prevailing opinion, proportionality is viewed as a quantitative link between the wrongful conduct and the response thereto. In a different theoretical perspective, the author suggests that the function of the response must rather be taken into account. However, the analysis of international practice proves the existence of a plurality of instruments and tools of self‐redress, each of them having a proper nature and function. In the second part of the article, it is therefore argued that proportionality should be assessed on the basis of different standards, which correspond to the different functions pursued by countermeasures. A distinction is thus made between countermeasures having respectively normative, retributive, coercive and executive function. In determining the proper function of countermeasures, and, consequently, the standard to be adopted for assessing the proportionality of the response, due consideration must be given to the structure of the breached rule and to the consequences of the breach. The theoretical and practical consequences of this conclusion are dealt with accordingly. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Comments on the draft articles regarding state responsibility by the International Law Commission in the United States. List of states entitled to invoke responsibility; Discussion on the concept of an injured State, reparation and countermeasures; Modes of reparation; Relationship between forms of reparation available to injured and other states.

Caesius comments on the article by Simma, also in this issue, on the legitimacy of the use of force by NATO in the Kosovo crisis. The author agrees with Simma that NATO's action falls outside the scope of the United Nations Charter and, by that token, is illegal under international law. This breach is not a negligible one and it is not to be countenanced merely by referring to its exceptional character and by stating that it should not be seen as setting a precedent. The author explores the notion that NATO's action may nevertheless be taken as evidence of an emerging doctrine in international law allowing the use of forcible countermeasures to impede a state from committing large-scale atrocities on its own territory, in circumstances where the Security Council is incapable of responding adequately to the crisis. The author argues that where a number of stringent conditions are met, a customary rule may emerge which would legitimize the use of force by a group of states in the absence of prior authorization by the Security Council. This is subject to various caveats, including the need to bear in mind the threat to global security which is inevitably involved in the use of force without such authorization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]