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The growth of Taiwan's manufacturing investments in China has bred an emerging cross-border industrial park development. This paper investigates the processes involved by exploring the interactive relations between the nation-states and actors concerned. In the context of the cross-border political tensions between Taiwan and China, the roles played by the two states are extensively examined. A case study of Kunshan Science Park in Suzhou is also discussed in detail. It is concluded that the industrial park development across Taiwan Strait is socially constructed through the interactions of vertical and horizontal governance within interfirm, intrafirm and extrafirm networks, upon which the states and related political economies across the Strait have imposed particular influences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The situation across Taiwan Straits is unique in that it has undergone different phases of conflict, hostility, tension and relaxation, which is linked with interrelations between tourism development and political interactions. The research framework is based on the conceptual and theoretical implications of tourism development among partitioned states raised by two Canadian geographers Richard Butler and Baodi Mao. The methodology adopted by this study includes statistical analysis and historical comparison. The paper examines the interrelations between tourism development and political interactions across Taiwan Straits through relevant literature and current events. It deduces the conceptual model of interactions between tourism development and political relations among partitioned states so as to check the conceptual and theoretical implications raised by Butler and Mao. The conceptual model shows that after the policy allows people to travel between partitioned states, visiting can promote contacts and understanding among people, which contributes to the political relations to be gentle in initial stage, helps facilitate both sides to achieve conciliation in middle period, and creates the advantages of peaceful coexistence in a long term. Tourism is not just the facilitator of peace but the beneficiary of peace. Gentle political relations not only contribute to the sustainable development of tourism, but also strengthen Track Two Diplomacy (people-to-people) and Track One Diplomacy (government-to-government), and then could build the atmosphere which is good to political conciliation and normalized relations. Governments might take measures of warning or limiting people not to go to some particular tourist destinations because of the political taboo, ideology and tourism safety problems. The actions could make people misunderstand each other and lead to tense relationships of the two sides, and furthermore evolve into a situation of confrontation or conflict, thus we can find that tourism displays a political character. There has been no military conflict across Taiwan Straits since 1979; the sum of personnel exchanges was about 7 000 000 in 2011; even though it is not complete peace, the situation is in the reconciliation status. Tourism increased opportunities of contacts between people in stable situation of Taiwan Straits, and accomplished the fact of peace. Political peace is favorable for developing tourism. Tourism can also play a Track Two Diplomacy function in tense situations, provide an alternative channel to increase understanding, and affect Track One Diplomacy gradually. Removing political factors, it is attractive to people between partitioned states to visit another side, especially in those states which have the same consanguinity and culture. Political policies may be able to stop travel exchange temporarily, but when the bans are lifted, tourist flows will increase rapidly. Since June 28, 2011, people from Mainland China can visit Taiwan as individual travelers, the policy has a positive meaning to promote mutual understanding and maintain friendly and peaceful relations between the People of Taiwan and Mainland China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper starts with a literature review of cross-Strait relations studies. It then evolves into a proposal for an analogical model and a new research agenda. After pointing out the shortcomings of the dominant approaches in the field for not grasping the defining features of Taiwan-mainland relations (power asymmetry and sovereignty claims based on ethnic ties), it then argues that the cross-Strait relations are structurally similar to the relations between the Russian Federation and the "near abroad" countries. Taiwan, like Ukraine or the Baltics, can choose between balancing and bandwagoning under power asymmetry and sovereignty claims by a potential aggressor. Democratization and the resultant rise of Taiwanese nationalism have prompted the government to pursue balancing, while the increasing costs associated with such a strategy have given rise to political forces advocating reconciliation and bandwagoning. The learning curve derived from the Russian case is heuristic in pointing out the possible development of Taiwan's mainland policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The southeast coast military operation starting from 1954 took place amid keen antagonism between China and the United States because of the Korean War and America's increasing entanglement in the Taiwan question. The People's Liberation Army's (PLA) military actions towards the Chiang-controlled offshore islands had an obvious defensive cast from their conception to their later unfolding in practice. The 1958 Shelling of Jinmen (Quemoy) was part of a plan drawn up by the PLA to seize the islands occupied by Chiang Kai-shek's forces off Mainland China's southeast coastline and a continuance of a military operation that had been evolving since the spring of 1954. This occurred against the backdrop of special domestic and international settings at the time, which were endowed by Mao Zedong with special political significance at some stage. The cautious, defensive nature embodied in both the strategic and operational planning was the key factor leading to the complexity of decision-making motivation and process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses China's diplomatic and military endeavors since the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996 in an attempt to discourage U.S. involvement in a cross-strait war. It is suggested that the Chinese government has indicated the importance it attaches to resuming control of Taiwan by constructing combat systems capable of holding U.S. naval assets at risk in Asia. It is argued that China's use of coercion and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait are a matter of communication and diplomatic signaling rather than military maneuvering of strategic forces. The skillful non-use of military force and the erecting of a "contested zone" are analyzed.

The article discusses several issues regarding the cross-strait relationship between Taiwan and China. It explores the factors that contribute to the increasing tensions across the Taiwan Strait, including the scheduled dual national elections in Taiwan and its decision to join the United Nations which evokes condemnation from Beijing, China and the U.S. for trying to change Taiwan's international status. It is argued that understanding the reason on the change in Taiwan's mood can enable Beijing and the U.S. to act wisely in order to make use of the opportunity to put triangular Taiwan Strait relationship on a declining tension.

Long-term political, economic, and military trends are reshaping the security environment in the Taiwan Strait in potentially destabilizing ways and undermining the "one China" framework. The United States has become more deeply involved in cross-strait relations to maintain stability and preserve the status quo, but this approach may not be sustainable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of Taiwan and relations across the Taiwan Strait is not only of fundamental interest to China, but also crucial to peace and stability in the Asian Pacific, thereby also making it of key concern to major players such as the United States and Japan. Beijing has faced enormous challenges over how to solve its dilemma. I would like to achieve reunification with Taiwan through a peaceful path, but perceive that it must be prepared for a war scenario if Taiwan insists on breaking from the mainland for its independence. The dilemma facing Beijing in terms of war or peace with Taiwan has become more acute since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) moved to power in 2000. This article analyses Beijing's dilemma over the above policy choices by examining five stages of Beijing's assessment toward regime change in Taiwan from late 1999 to early 2005. It also illuminates the potential impact on major power relations in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the regime change and the People's Republic of China's Taiwan policy in the Democratic Progressive Party era. Context definition of regime change; Information on the historical legacies and maintenance of the One China principle as a firm political principle; Developments in Taiwan and cross-Strait economic integration.

Focuses on military and nonmilitary confidence-building measures (CBM) for the Taiwan Strait. Relations between Taiwan and China; U.S. government's view of CBM for the strait; Condition for the resumption of cross-strait dialogue.

The Taiwan problem is the most enduring and dangerous of the East Asian flashpoints. Conflicting notions of sovereignty, deeply rooted in Taipei and Beijing, preclude a diplomatic breakthrough under present conditions. With cross-Strait tensions likely to persist well into the twenty-first century, Taiwan faces the daunting challenge of maintaining its de facto autonomy in the shadow of growing Chinese economic and military power. The threat of the People's Republic of China (PRC) conquering Taiwan through military invasion or economic coercion is often overstated, but the PRC's determination and capability to bring extreme pressure on Taiwan through military means other than invasion should be respected. Instead of focusing on short-term solutions to the impasse, the best course is a careful management of the status quo, with Taiwan refraining from undue provocation of Beijing, allowing time for a future generation of Chinese to re-evaluate the relationship between formal Taiwanese independence and China's security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the impact of the 2000 presidential elections in Taiwan on the cross-strait relations. Overview of the cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan; Goal of China to reunify Taiwan to the mainland; Analysis of the government toward President Chen Shui-bian.

Examines the outcome of the 1998 Koo-Wang Meeting regarding the Taiwan Strait in Taiwan. Conflict between China and Taiwan regarding the ownership of the Taiwan Strait; Threat of China over Taiwan; Investigation on the impact of the change of policy of Taiwan on the issue.

In June 1995 a private visit to the United States by Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui generated a wave of acrimonious rhetoric and bellicose activity by China. Tensions in the Taiwan Strait, which by the early 1990s appeared to be at a four-decade low, suddenly escalated In mid 1995 and. early 1996 China conducted missile tests in the waters around Taiwan and conducted large scale military exercises off the Chinese coast in the vicinity of the island But just as suddenly as tensions had heightened, they dissipated following the conclusion of Taiwan's first-ever direct presidential election in March 1996 China acknowledged the result, the re-election of President Lee, and urged Taipei to resume a dialogue with Beijing. The recent confrontation between China and Taiwan is one that is not easily explained or predicted. This article contends that the recent China-Taiwan tensions can best be explained by factoring in ethnicity and irredentism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]