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This paper examines the human rights legal foundation for ‘information intervention’ or ‘media intervention’ conceived of as a part of rebuilding post-conflict societies. The media space is a critical site for post-conflict reconstruction, particularly when factional conflict and violence persist after the war, as in the present case of Iraq. Media / information intervention refers to the means of getting involved in a humanitarian crisis where there is evidence that the mass media have been manipulated to incite hatred and violence. It will be demonstrated that media intervention as a practice has ambiguous legal support in international law, due to the conflict between the jus cogens principle of non-intervention and the limited derogation of that principle provided by Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and by exceptions to allow restriction of speech provided in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). A review of the legal framework in international law that has an impact on media intervention campaigns will be provided. Reference will be made to media intervention experiences in previous post-war situations, e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Rwanda, Cambodia. It will be argued that between an absolute prohibition of intervention and a set of specific conditions allowing derogation to non-interventionism, lies a small window of opportunity – a ‘limited exceptionism’ – for cultivating a media space that respects human rights. The stakeholders involved in rebuilding the media space should grasp the significance of this narrow opportunity to establish peace and security in post-conflict zones. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bush is a liar and unless Americans own up to this fact America as a country will lose its credibility as a force for justice in world politics. The situation is so tenuous in fact that when Secretary of State Colin Powell went before the UN Security Council to demonstrate his irrefutable proof that Iraq was hiding weapons of mass destruction, American diplomats asked that a tapestry depicting the horrors of war be covered up by the Security council flag?as if the artwork itself would be more convincing than Powell. As the art historian Robert Hughes notes, Guernica is the most powerful invective against violence in modern art. When the Fascists bombed the independent Basque republic’s capital city of Guernica in 1937, killing nearly 1,600 civilians, the world saw the action as a symbol of Fascist barbarism. Picasso’s artwork is unmistakable as Maureen Dowd notes, Mr. Powell can’t very well seduce the world into bombing Iraq surrounded on camera by shrieking and mutilated women, men, children, bulls and horses. But it seems unlikely that Powell could seduce anyone of war, unless that is they are already committed to war. The problem, according to columnist John Nichols, is that Substantial portions of the report that Powell used to support his critique of Iraq were lifted from an article written by a postgraduate student who works not in Baghdad but in Monterey, California, and who based much of his research on materials left in Kuwait more than a dozen years ago by Iraqi security services. Thus, the covering of Geurnica represents a greater covering of the debates that are raging in the United States and around the world the direction of the war on terrorism. The covering of the Guernica tapestry summarizes the conflict between war and peace but also depicts the relationship between the forces on either side: those opposed to preemptive war are simply covered over. But power, like Machievelli’s fortune often acts in fickle ways, independent of those who claim it for themselves. Asking the question, are we safer today than we were on September 11th, 2001? This paper seeks to understand the rhetoric of what I refer to as the popular realists of the Bush administration and the theoretical and normative foundations of realism in international affairs (what I refer to as the sophisticated realist following the work Alan Gilbert). In order to understand the claims of realism it will be helpful to discuss the work of two scholars who attempt to save realism from itself. Alan Gilbert and David Goldfisher have recently attempted to look back into the past in order to discover the implications of various interpretations of realist and neo-realist international relations theory. Goldfischer and Gilbert argue similarly that realism has an ethical core that is often overlooked in the particular interest of ruling elite. In such a context of historical and political amnesia, it is easy to forget that important realist figures from Thucydides to Hans J. Morgenthau argue that corruption (lack of a concern for the common good) cancels the realist’s moral core (defense of national survival, the life of each citizen?against aggression ). This paper follows in three parts. First I discuss the popular realist position of the Bush administration in an attempt to make the best case for Bush by employing texts from Bush’s speeches. Second, I discuss the sophisticated realist position and its subsequent analysis of the popular realist position. Finally, I conclude with an analysis of realist security versus insecurity following from the Bush administration’s leadership and directorship of the war on terrorism. I also offer policy recommendations following from the sophisticated realist paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares and contrasts the George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton and George W. Bush administrations’ development and implementation of foreign and security policies toward Iraq from 1989-2003. It does so in the context of the long-standing debate among scholars of international relations--historians and political scientists alike--over the potential of individuals to drive events within the international system. In particular, the paper addresses the following five research questions: First, to what extent has personal diplomacy proven indispensable to the development and implementation of American foreign and security policies toward the Persian Gulf generally and Iraq specifically since 1989? Second, which general presidential policymaking model--one plus one, one plus a few, or one plus many--did the Bush I, Clinton and Bush II administrations, respectively, utilize in dealing with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein? Third, which of these approaches proved most useful and why? Could any of the above administrations have pursied US interests in the Persian Gulf more effectively by switching to one of the two models it did not choose to employ? Fourth, what were the Bush I, Clinton and Bush II administrations’ most significant strengths and weaknesses in their use of personal diplomacy as a means to minimize the threats posed by Saddam’s regime to US interests at home and abroad? Fifth, given those strengths and weaknesses, what type of policymaking approach is likely to prove most effective in future American dealings with Persian Gulf states in general and Iraq in particular? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey's decision on its role in the Iraq war in 2003 illustrates the power -- and limits -- of parliaments as actors in foreign policy. Traditionally, national assemblies are not seen as important players in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies. Instead, the cabinet is generally considered the locus of policymaking authority. Parliaments are seen as forums for debate, and if the government enjoys a parliamentary majority, legislatures are expected to support the cabinet, if they are brought into the process at all. In Turkey, the president and the military have also been considered more important actors than parliament. But the March 1, 2003 vote by the Turkish parliament to not allow the United States to use Turkey as a base challenges this conventional wisdom on parliamentary influence (in addition to interest-based explanations of foreign policy). This paper examines this decision in the context of the role of legislatures in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies and explores the relationships between parliamentary influence, leadership, intraparty politics, and public opinion. This paper uses this case to offer ideas on when and how parliaments are influential in foreign policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper proposes a theoretical framework for understanding border/boundary practices of past empires and the emerging informal Empire in contemporary world politics. Hardt and Negri locate the source and mover of contemporary imperial practices in the emergence of a new sovereign rule that brings about a specific order with no spatial and temporal boundaries, seeking to take over "social life in its entirety" and dedicated to "perpetual and universal peace", we argue that both these recently observable developments and their difference from past colonial practices can be further refined by relying on a more closely Foucauldian theoretical framework based on the nature, operation and interplay of sovereignty and governmentality. In this context governmentality and sovereignty are viewed as two different modalities of power, which are presumed to combine with each other in various ways at different sites and events of world politics. In this sense "non-war", our master metaphor, can be conceived of as a particular intersection of sovereign and governmental practices that on the one hand, stands in contrast with "war proper" but also depends on (as it remains definable only through) the traditional concept of war. Additionally, it also makes accessible to analysis some features and specificities related to the current manifestations and articulations of (imperial) power. Following a conceptual circumscription of non-war embedded in a Foucauldian theory of power, the paper proceeds by elaborating and illustrating the theoretical and empirical relevance of the undertaking through a narrative presentation of selected historical examples ranging from early colonial Spanish theorizing about Amerindians through British imperial practices in Afghanistan and India to the recent US operations in Iraq. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While there always are exceptions, much of the current work in peace studies and conflict resolution is marginalized and considered outside the mainstream of international relations (IR). One little-considered issue may be the extent to which peace studies and conflict resolution assume a "therapeutic stance" toward situations of protracted conflict, such as with the current situation in war-torn Iraq. Such terms as "reconciliation," "political forgiveness," and "restorative justice," may reflect certain moral, religious, and cultural assumptions that go against mainstream social scientific notions of value neutrality. Indeed, some have questioned the appropriateness of conflict resolution and peace researchers who have a commitment to social change. This observation leads to a related series of questions: whether, when and how to blend therapeutic concerns with empirical research. While these issues are valid, the primary focus of this paper is upon the assumption of healing that often is embedded in reconciliation work. Thus, this paper will: 1) explore different rhetorical commonplaces of healing and consider whether the issue goes beyond a problem of language, 2) discuss current scholarship on mechanisms of healing, and 3) more concretely, how these may apply to the current situation in Iraq. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the wars that the West are currently fighting are becoming 'endless'. Tracing the collective consciousness of a postmodern West, this paper shows how the loss of a teleological worldview undermines the West's ability to relate past, present and future to one another and shows how this has consequences for contemporary wars, with reference in particular to Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, I speculate on the consequences of living in an 'endless present'. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ten years ago, I published a book entitled World Opinion and the Emerging International Order. While this publication was not an auspicious event in and of itself, the ten-year time period since its appearance provides a good opportunity for reflection upon the concept of “world opinion.” Several specific questions arise: is world opinion still a viable and important concept? Can it be a force even against the most powerful nationsâ€"for instance, in the case of condemnation of the United States for the invasion of Iraq? Are we closer to the acceptance of the “imagined international community” described in the book? Finally, can we actually measure patterns in world opinion beyond the traditional content analyses, or combined survey analyses, often used to this end?The paper concludes that world opinion has actually become a more critical force in the past ten years, to the point where it can influence the decisions and image of a superpower like the United States. The paper also discusses Christopher Hill’s question about whether world opinion deals with the opinions of nations (as usually reflected by their leaders or their nation’s “official position” on an issue) or the opinions of individuals (as reflected by international polls in individual countries). It resolves this question methodologically using global polls where the correlations between attitudes in individual nations become variables to be analyzed on the international level. The paper argues that this method allows one to detect global attitudinal patterns, and the beginnings of a potential “global culture.” ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many explanations have been advanced in the face of the obvious failures of the official British and U.S. explanations to account for the war being waged on Iraq. In the U.K., discussion has tended to focus almost exclusively on the United States, with British involvement treated as tangential or at most supplemental, and explained largely with reference to aspects of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s personality or some broadly conceived U.K. national interest in maintaining close political relations with the United States. Missing from the discussion is recognition of recurrent features of U.K. foreign policy towards the Middle East and their relation to fundamental aspects of British political-economy, the increasing integration of British and U.S. capital, and the largely Anglo-American-led project of global economic re-structuring currently taking place. This paper focuses on British and U.S. interests in Iraq and larger Anglo-American ambitions that divide the U.K. and U.S. from France, Germany, and other EU and non-EU countries. Part I of the paper briefly reviews the history of British and U.S. foreign policies towards Iraq and the culmination of these policies in the invasion and take-over of the country. Part II places these events in the context of the political-economy of U.K.-U.S. relations and an on-going Anglo-American project of global reconstruction. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often thought that success impedes substantial change in the ideas underpinning and the discourses legitimating foreign policy and that failure is necessary, although not sufficient, for such change. Yet, when viewed through the lens of narrative, this proposition is not borne out by the history of US foreign policy in the latter half of the twentieth century. The Korean War, made possible by the emerging Cold War, was widely seen as a failure, but it led to the consolidation of the so-called Cold War consensus, not its rejection. The debacle of Vietnam led to only the partial unraveling of that consensus, as substantial elements remained intact through the 1970s and facilitated Reagan’s rise. The Iraq fiasco does not appear to have opened up great fissures in the edifice of the War on Terror, to which the administration had bound it so tightly. The greatest changes in America’s foreign-affairs narratives have in fact come in the wake of unalloyed victory, as previous narratives came to seem less illegitimate or wrong than irrelevantâ€"such as after the Second World War and the Cold War. The proposed paper seeks to explain why policy failure has not led to wholesale narrative change, even when it might have been expected. The key lies in the rhetoric of opposition elites, to which mass audiences turn as the policy’s supporters lose credibility. Because policy failures typically reveal themselves as such only in stages, opposition elites early on have incentives to depart only from elements of the existing dominant narrative, and consequently their criticism reproduces much of that narrative. Later, once the fiasco is well established and opposition elites wish to depart from the narrative that had sustained the failure, they find themselves locked into that narrative whose core they had themselves recently reproduced, and they find the path to meaningful narrative change blocked. To substantiate these claims, the paper will explore empirically the dynamics of political opposition during America’s wars in Korea, Vietnam, and, if space permits, Iraq. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is now considered important for IR to better understand how states as complex collectives come to act on the world stage. Toward that end, this paper examines how the United States reached a collective decision to attack Iraq and what it means and does not mean to call that decision a collective one. In the process, the paper will illustrate how a critical realist perspective permits a synthesis of two approaches normally considered opposed: political economy and discourse analysis. The decision-making process will be shown to have been a de-centered one, dependent on rhetorical maneuvers among elite actors within a field of structured power relations and against a background of public inattention. The picture will hardly accord with the traditional IR conception of nation states as simple rational actors pursuing clear national interests. Called into question as well is the traditional Kantian confidence in the moral behavior of democracies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I start the process of analyzing the rhetoric and discourse about Iraq's WMD program in the 1990s. I start from the premise that there are institutional and ideational factors which are jointly necessary for determining foreign policy choice. The fact of the matter -- that Iraq had a WMD program -- was not in dispute, either in the 1990s or even during the 2002 run-up to the March 2003 invasion. What was in dispute was the substantive meaning of Iraq's WMD program. In this paper I draw on the public policy literature on problem definition and on the constructivist and discursive literatures in international relations to analyze the way the "Iraq Problem" was defined and assessed and, therefore, the relationship of that assessment to the Bush administration's campaign in 2002 and 2003 to portray Iraq as a clear-and-present danger that required a military, as opposed to diplomatic, solution. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the turbulent years following Israel's creation, successive generations of policy makers and government elites heeded David Ben Gurion's advice to ally with non-Arab states flanking an Arab dominated Middle East. Although Israel found several partners for its "Doctrine of the Periphery" none was more beneficial than Iran. United by their distrust of their Arab neighbors and shared strategic concerns, Tel Aviv and Tehran developed a mutually beneficial de facto alliance spanning several important dimensions of diplomacy including trade, information sharing, and military cooperation. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, after the Shah's overthrow, dissolved the once fruitful alliance. Saddam Hussein's revanchism, however, resulted in a massive Iraqi offensive aimed at capitalizing on Iran's post-revolutionary weakness. Shortly after, Iran and Israel revived their de facto alliance in the form of covert arms sales and intelligence sharing despite Tehran's bellicose rhetoric vis-à-vis the Jewish state. This paper applies the poliheuristic theory (PH) of decision making to Israel's choice to support Iran during its eight year conflict with Iraq. Making use of primary and secondary sources, this project examines Israel's decision along political, economic, diplomatic, and military dimensions. This paper addresses why Israel elected to reconstitute its relations with a rhetorically anti-Semitic Iran and well as how this decision was made. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some of the most intense debates surrounding the war in Iraq have been between its neoconservative supporters and its Realist critics. This paper examines the differing positions of these two schools of thought. The first two sections examine the neoconservative case for the war, and the Realist criticisms of those claims. The final section examines how part of the power of neoconservatism in the run-up to the war lay in its capacity to adopt rhetorical strategies and mobilise social constituencies in a direct assault upon Realists. The paper concludes tht these events have important implications for both Realism and for the relationship between theories of international politics and debates over foreign policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this paper is to elucidate Jordanian foreign policy in the two US-led wars against Iraq, and in the process to shed light on foreign policy-making in non-democratic regimes in the Arab Middle East. The second image of international relations, which stipulates that domestic politics is most responsible for generating foreign policy, is borne out in the Jordanian case. Public opinion, economic pressures, and leadership at the top (especially that of the late King Hussein) played the most salient roles in shaping Jordanian foreign policy in the two conflicts. Thanks to a liberalized domestic political structure that existed in Jordan from 1989 to 1993, public opinion was able to strongly influence Jordanian foreign policy in the first Gulf war in 1990-91 in the direction of close relations with Iraq. After a fundamental reorientation in foreign policy toward peace with Israel and a strong alliance with the United States after the first Gulf war, Jordan became dependent on the US for trade and aid. This economic factor pushed Jordan to discreetly offer the US-led coalition the use of facilities in Jordan during the second Gulf war in 2003. As for monarchical leadership, King Hussein and his son, King Abdallah II, each imprinted Jordanian foreign policy with his own leadership style. After examining each of these key factors which influenced Jordanian foreign policy in the two Gulf wars, the paper goes on to look at alternative explanations and their shortcomings: namely, neo-realism, international law, and public sphere theory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that policies of the Bush administration since 11 September 2001, have had -- perhaps inadvertently -- the effect of generating "facts on the ground" that have led to the self-fulfilling realization of realities corresponding to Samuel Huntington's contentious concept of the "clash of civilizations" in relations between the Western and Islamic worlds. One of the significant indicators of this phenomenon has been the counterproductive, self-defeating impact of the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq on the "war on terror," with all available information, even from the CIA and other U.S. governmental sources, agreeing that the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq has actually become more a part of the problem than of the solution. In addition to documenting the perhaps counter-intuitive impact of Bush's policies on exacerbating the factors making for global terrorism -- and enhancing the motivation of those who are prepared spiritually to give up their lives in the execution of acts of catastrophic terrorism -- the paper will explore policies that could turn this situation around. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International relations between the U.S. and Europe and their manner of representation and reinstitution through the media has drawn much attention in the turbulent period following the terrorists attacks of September 11 and the following military attack of Iraq. The American-led military operation in Iraq came into being in a concrete symbolic universe of war and diplomacy, sovereignty and coalition, friend and foe, power and universal values. The current paper asks about how American media, in particular the New York Times, represented international relationship between the U.S. and Europe in the period between the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, leading up to the current war in Iraq, and up until the U.S. official declaration on end of combat operations in Iraq in May 2003. The paper also asks how this representation has changed over time. Data includes 1390 New York Times articles published between September 11, 2001 (attack on the World Trade Center in New York) and May 12, 2003 (End of combat operations in Iraq as announced by the occupying forces). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effects of economic sanctions policy towards Iraq since 1990 and argues that the policy directly strengthened Saddam Hussein's leadership and allowed him to expand his domination over the Iraqi people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bush administration has formulated a foreign policy that combines elements of realism with liberal internationalism as part of its strategy to fight the War on Terror. Tenets of American exceptionalism provide a resonant political cultural resource for sustaining an inherently contradictory policy. This paper analyzes elite media com-mentary and editorials prior to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to see if these tenets are successful in drawing support for US military action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite heady approval ratings in the wake of 9/11, the growing domestic criticism in response to Bush Administration policies on the Second Gulf War have belied the truism that presidential popularity rises after a successful military incursion. Internationally, continued opposition to US plans for rebuilding Iraq, rising ill will from Muslim nations, and the surge of terrorism within Iraq reveal that winning the war does not equate with winning the peace. In fact, we argue, the Bush Administration faces a set of public expectations, or paradoxes, that threaten its ability to maneuver politically and raise questions about Bush’s electoral chances in 2004. The paradoxes include the desire for a safe and controlled homeland but with freedom for all; war and military domination without casualties, expense, disruption, or long term timelines; vengeance against terrorists without transgressions against civil rights, instantaneous transformation of despotic societies into modern democracies, and certainty in an uncertain world. Unable to meet these expectations substantively, the Administration has pursued a propaganda (i.e. public relations and public diplomacy) strategy as a way to resolve opinion disjuncture and paradox at home and abroad. In place of the usual tools of foreign policy: building alliances, engaging allies in policy debate, conducting diplomacy, etc., the Bush Administration approach seeks to use symbols, arguments, and rhetoric to conduct foreign policy and thereby “win the peace.” This paper examines the Bush Administration’s approach to “winning the peace” by: (1) Illustrating how the current administration communication strategy corresponds to historical patterns described in propaganda scholarship (2) Discussing the paradoxical expectations that public relations and public diplomacy attempt to resolve based on a content analysis of world/national media coverage on the war and its aftermath, (3) Reviewing and assessing the debate over the use of public diplomacy to “fix” international opinion, also noting the strategies employed by other nations in what has become a global media battle (4) Providing an assessment of possible impacts of the Bush Administration propaganda strategy for both international and domestic politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contrasts the factors that shape soft line US security strategy in Northeast Asia with its hard line strategy in the Persian Gulf. There are structural constraints that moderate the US policy toward North Korea. These are: US-Japanese alliances, US-South Korea economic relationship, and rising China. The US policy towards Iraq, on the other hand, is hardened by the US concern to guarantee the continuous flow of oil and by its relationship with Israel. Consequently, the US has adopted appeasement and engagement policies in northeast Asia while containment, regime change, and war resolution in the Persian Gulf. The US policy in these two regions has generated a number of challenges that neither the US nor the international community is sure yet how to address them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to test the effects of two-sided messages on public support for the president’s foreign policies (Zaller 1992). Two-sided messages are an important, yet understudied, aspect of the study of public opinion. Presidents need public support for their foreign policy initiatives, but they compete for the public’s attention with members of Congress, a potentially hostile media, and international events. With so many voices competing for the public’s attention and support, how successful are presidents in influencing public opinion for their foreign policies? I address this question by looking at public support for Operation Iraqi Freedom in three separate stages. The first stage measures public support for the president’s foreign policy before the initiation of war in Iraq, the second stage measures support during the war, and the third stage measures post-war support for the president’s foreign policy in Iraq. I code the president’s foreign policy speeches and control for the effects of two-sided messages on public support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. I measure two-sided messages through tone and intensity of nightly news coverage of the war and opposition to the president’s Iraq policy in Congress. I hypothesize that the fewer countervailing foreign policy messages transmitted to the public, the higher the support for the president’s war in Iraq, controlling for international events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the development of the American Foreign Policy from the early 80`s until the Iraq war from a structurationist point of view. The analysis is focused on the definition of the agents and their actions. Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory, interpretations of it by Jabri, Emirbayer and Mische and the works of other scholars of the theory is used to explain or describe the Iraqi case along with relativist explanations. An agency-modelled description of the preceding period, the war and its aftermath is provided. A special emphasis is placed on the duality of the structure: that is the precondition and the unintended consequences of peoples’ agencies. The ongoing interaction between the agency and the structure is analysed in terms of the goal-orientedness, attachment to power, differentiation from the institutions and the projective qualities of agencies within the context of Iraq war.Paper ends with a discussion whether the outcome of the analysis is an explanation or a description of the conflict behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper contends that private military contractors supporting American military operations in Iraq will come under intense international scrutiny. Various factors have led to the substantial private presence and the Iraq case reveals shifts in international dynamics from state to private actors. However, the private presence raises concerns that will have to be considered due to the fishbowl qualities of the Iraq case. How the state/contractor relationship is managed will likely have a significant impact upon American policy in Iraq and upon how American military hegemony is perceived, produced, and applied in the future. Indeed, there are many problems and it is not entirely clear that the United States is prepared to handle the effects stemming from its heavy reliance upon military contractors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have long argued that the robust marketplace of ideas in mature democracies serves to help them avoid risky foreign policy adventures by weeding out policy proposals based on dubious justifications and claims based on dubious evidence. This paper examines the extent of the threat inflation and other myths of empire that accompanied the American invasion of Iraq and asks whether these should undercut our confidence in the virtues of the marketplace of ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the beginning, the war on terrorism has been waged in the name of women’s liberation. With the dropping of bombs on Kabul, women in North America and Afghanistan were told a story about liberation and freedom that would result from ‘rooting out the terrorists and those that harbour them’. After the Taliban were ousted from power and the new interim government installed, Bush declared: today, women in Afghanistan are free. Just as the war on terrorism continues, so too does this discourse of women’s rights as the motivation for and outcome of war. At an International Women’s Day reception in 2002, Colin Powell declared women’s issues to be central to American foreign policy, and particularly to the war on terrorism. In fact, Powell stated the United States of America is a champion of the human rights and well being of women and minorities worldwide. Less than a year later, the US invaded Iraq under the veil of liberating the Iraqi people from the human rights abuses perpetrated by Hussein’s regime. It is this story about the US administration’s fight for women’s rights that is the central concern of this paper. To begin, I examine how feminist discourse has been co-opted by the US administration to construct a story claiming that the war on terrorism will lead to the liberation of women worldwide. My goal is to disrupt this story by inserting that which has been conveniently left out. Through an examination of the inconsistencies that have been written out of the official story, this article upsets what the administration had hoped would be a morally irreproachable tale of liberation. In so doing, I extend my earlier thesis that women’s rights were strategically co-opted to sell the war and argue that Bush’s embrace of women’s issues is part of a right-wing, anti-feminist backlash that seeks to redefine women’s rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The National Security Strategy laid the groundwork for the war in Iraq. This statement comes as no surprise. What is surprising is that international law gives no guidance for states suffering from terrorist attacks to fight back. The NSS alleviates this problem through its policy shift. This paper focuses on the issue of redefining American national security policies in regard to threats to national and international security. What are the implications of foreign policies stemming from the implied linkage being made between terrorism and rogue states? Does the link stick? How may this tendency, if more widespread and persistent, affect international security in the near- and long-term future? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Major divisions emerged amongst the NATO allies over a war with Iraq that go to the very heart of where NATO is heading and what role NATO will have in the future. This paper examines the various faultlines in turn and assesses how they will impact upon NATO’s evolution post-Prague. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post 9/11 world has generated renewed interest in the problematic implications of asymmetrical conflictual interaction between states and non state actors. This paper seeks to contribute to the growing literature on asymmetrical warfare by focusing on ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper, part of a broader research project, is concerned with the question of how military intervention as part of the 'war on terror' was justified in the three core members of the 'Coalition of the Willing': the US, UK and Australia. In particular, we focus on the ways in which interventions in Iraq were justified to domestic audiences across these states. Building on critical constructivist understandings of security, we suggest the importance of conceiving of security discourse and policy as an intersubjective realm. Within this realm, the ability to legitimise or enable particular foreign and security practices is related to the extent to which these practices are located within dominant narratives of history, culture and identity within the political communities concerned. While political leaders in these three states therefore defined the need for intervention in broadly similar terms, subtle differences in emphasis and argumentation are potentially important not only in communicating how the military interventions themselves are made possible in different contexts, but also in illuminating the possibilities and constraints for discourses and practices of security in global politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The variety and frequency of analogical reasoning in the public discourse surrounding the invasion of Iraq is remarkable. Perhaps most remarkable is the comparison that has been made between the U.S. Civil War and the Iraq civil war. The purposes of this paper are to show why the American Civil War analogy was deployed by advocates of "staying the course" in Iraq, consider what effect this discursive strategy may have had on American policy in Iraq, and finally to compare the U.S. Civil War and Iraq civil war using an analytical framework derived from civil war theory. In moving toward achieving these goals, I employ cognitive and constructivist theories on the role of ideas in foreign policy, as well as theories of the causes of civil wars. The central findings have both academic and policy relevance. First, several Bush administration officials and certain public intellectuals have used the American Civil War analogy (and other rhetorical devices) to shape policy in the short-run and American collective identity in the long-run. Second, the U.S. Civil War analogy does not provide useful guidance for American policy in Iraq. Policy makers and analysts should not allow the memory of the American experience with internal conflict affect their understanding of current and future civil wars. Third, current theories of internal war can provide a useful lens for understanding both 'old' and 'new' civil wars, but are much better suited to explaining recent civil wars. This finding suggests that unlike international relations theory, internal war theories are time-bound. It is striking that modern theories of internal war cannot explain one of the most important civil wars of the past 200 years. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current American Empire confirms Thucydides'opinion that there are three essential motives that cause states to seek to expand their influence abroad: gain (defined as power and wealth), security and honour. But while the first two factors have received the lion's share of analytical attention so far (see inter aliaZakaria, 1999; Kagan, 2003; Mearsheimer, 2001; Gaddis, 2003), honour construed as the search for prestige in world politics deserves further examination.It is frequently stated (Layne, 2006; McDougall, 1997; Morgenthau, 1952; Kennan, 1951)that too a great extent the US expansion abroad, of which the current involvement in Iraq is but the latest episode, represents a direct result of the desire inherited from the days of Woodrow Wilson to spread democracy to other shores. Accordingly, these accounts contend that the principal problem of American foreign policy consists of a naive legal-moralistic concern with reshaping the world in America's own image, which leads to a dangerous and costly overextension of the US resources to areas that do not warrant in strategic terms a commitment of such magnitude. More often than not, the prescription offered is for the US to give up its illusions, acknowledge the harsh realities of international politics, and follow a moderate course of action by embracing either offshore balancing or selective engagement.However, by contrast to this engrained view, I am arguing that another and substantially different form of idealism may be at work in the US expansionist actions. Rather than seek to advance the cause of democracy all over the globe, this version of idealism is concerned with enhancing and preserving US prestige in relation to other states. Unlike the doctrine of Woodrow Wilson, which was advocating employing collective security, international norms and multilateral organizations for the benefit of all humankind, prestige-seeking encourages unilateralism and is self-promoting in the sense its sole concern lies in projecting abroad the image of continual American success. Moreover, since prestige is essentially intangible, the advantage sought is symbolic and at odds with realpolitik logic (Morgenthau 1985). Recent analyses (Kohut, Stokes, 2006; Mead, 2003) have hypothesized in a similar vein the existence of a so-called Jacksonian security subculture in American foreign policy, whose chief aim would be the vindication of American image in the world.My paper seeks to take this insight further by linking the Jacksonian approach to the quest for prestige, by identifying its main defining features, and tracing it through the historical record of American foreign policy. The tentative conclusion reached is that on the one hand, a policy of prestige is less benevolent and more aggressive than Wilsonian idealism and that, on the other hand, it is considerably difficult to discount as realist scholars would advise because of its considerable and enduring grip over the American national psyche. Appeals to moderation are therefore not likely to work unless prestige is also taken into consideration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Democratic Peace Theory in its simplest incarnation is that democracies do not fight wars against each other. While many political scientists have developed elegant theories and analyses to support or oppose this thesis, political leaders in most countries have viewed it with a jaundiced eye. In spite of strenuous efforts by the United States, especially in Iraq, democracy has not taken hold and the Democratic Peace Theory appears to be strained when the United States attempts to work with other democratic states. The problem with the thesis is not that democratic institutions will not encourage nonmilitary resolution of conflicts, but rather a failure to understand what democracy actually is. Karl Popper wrote that democracy is a system whereby governments can be changed peacefully. Robert Dahl defined democracy as a system in which the people participate in the selection of their political leaders. Both definitions are incomplete. The lack of a generally recognized definition of democracy has led to false lessons and disastrous policy choices by political leaders in many states. For the Democratic Peace Theory to be a legitimate tool of political theory, we must understand what democracy really is. This paper is an outline of a more complete definition of democracy. Without it the policy makers of the 21st century cannot hope to achieve peace and the Democratic Peace Theory is an empty hope. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an analysis of the events surrounding the courts-martial of Sabrina Harmon, one of the "seven bad apples" associated with the detainee abuse cases at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq. Specifically, we use a Parsonian framwork to discuss the many "instrumental" and "expressive" role themes that emerge from our research at the trials at the Ft. Hood Army Base in Killeen, Texas. We discuss events as they were described in the courtroon and at Abu Ghraib prison, sworn statements and testimony, conditions at Abu Ghraib prison, US Government Reports, treatment of the detainees, as well as the now infamous photographs depicting the conditions at Abu Ghraib and in Iraq. Throughout this discussion, we show that the Parsonian distinction between instrumental and expressive roles served a multitude of functions simultaneously, and especially given the masculinist code of the military. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a paper on whether the U.S. should pursue regime change in North Korea prepared for the 2005 annual conference of the International Studies Association in Honolulu, Hawaii in March. It notes that the U.S. failure in Iraq may encourage North Korean President Kim Jong II to increase aggressive behavior. It suggests to the U.S. and its allies to develop a multi-faceted strategy that will remove threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons. It proposes a policy which is based on the assumption that North Korea already have nuclear weapons.

Consumer boycotts by citizens of one state against products of another are little studied, and of uncertain influence or impact upon international affairs. They fit neither in the statist model of foreign policy making with its large literature on sanctions nor fully within a liberal theory that generally can not locate international trade in a consumer choice that is not market driven. Yet calls for such boycotts have grown in recent years, motivated by concerns ranging from the environment and human rights to that of high politics. The dispute over the war with Iraq generated the largest recent efforts at consumer trade boycotts in the U.S., in Europe, and in the Middle East. French wines and American bourbon, symbolic products, bore the brunt of the boycott effort. This paper investigates the success and the political impact, if any, of this boycott effort. Time-series analysis of the trade of these products finds no evidence that this boycott has had an impact on their international sales. This finding may allow for speculation on the current or future power of consumer boycotts within international affairs [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global governance is dependent on factors that are beyond the reach of many contemporary nationstates, including the current hegemon, the United States. Many global issues these governments face have a time span that is multi-generational. Much of the focus of leaders however is on the now. The recent elections in the United States and the war in Iraq illustrate how addicted contemporary governments are to" the now." The rate of temporal change is accelerating and the ability to deal with larger longer scale questions is as of yet undeveloped. This paper argues that contemporary hegemons and would be world leaders must develop new strategies and capacities to manage future time and change. The schedules of leaders worldwide inhibit their abilities to look at longer-term questions. Contemporary international governmental organizations threaten to sink under the weight of their scheduling commitments. Lastly, emphasis on a "just in time" world cripples the ability to look at the longer-term problems. Assessing the temporal dimension of global governance is crucial to further efforts to address many international issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper "American Vincibility in the Aftermath of the War in Iraq: Future Challenges in the Domestic and Foreign Policy Arenas" presented at the "46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It examines the impact of the 9-11 terrorist attacks and the Iraq invasion on the political and economic terms of the U.S. It emphasizes that the present U.S. policies are insufficiently advancing the interests of the country in the era of globalization and national vulnerability.

The article presents the conference paper "Blair's War: Institutional and Individual Determinants of the British Choice in Iraq" prepared for presentation at the "46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association" in Honolulu, Hawaii. The author utilizes the core executive approach in assessing the British central government and emphasizes the specific form it takes in foreign policy matters. It says that British Prime Minister Tony Blair scored very highly in need for power and in terms of his belief in ability to control events.