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The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine has led many commentators to remark that 'geopolitics is back'. And with geopolitics, the interest in buffer zones is back as well. Yet, International Relations scholarship on buffer zones is confusing and outdated. Scholars disagree on the definition of buffer zones and whether such zones are a vestige of the great power politics of the past or a continuous phenomenon. In this article, we take three steps to reconceptualize buffer zones and their role in international relations. First, we clarify the conceptual confusion by advancing a new definition differentiating between nominal and active buffer zones. Second, we make the case that buffer states and internal buffer zones (i.e., geographic borderlands located within states in rivalry, adjacent to the international borders between the two rivals) share much in common and therefore should be analysed in tandem. Third, we offer a typology of buffer zones with short case-studies based on the dyadic relations of rival states vis-à-vis buffer zones between them. Our goal is to provide a new analytical framework that can serve as a base for a robust research agenda on the role of buffer zones in regional and international stability and security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the past two decades, scholars have critically examined the political role of space and territory and advanced our understanding of borders with dynamic concepts based on identities and narratives. The literature, though, is divided between works that emphasize domestic politics and those that concentrate on international norms. We seek to bridge this gap by developing a general theoretical framework to understand domestic recognition, or lack thereof, of new borders that result from war losses. We use the case of West Germany post-World War II--which went from non-recognition of its new eastern border along the Oder-Neisse line to full recognition--to develop a theoretical model explaining changing border policies. We conceptualize the interaction between foreign policy priorities, domestic constituency considerations, and international norms and find that when domestic border narratives and primary foreign policy goals of the political coalition in power both point to the same policy direction (acceptance or non-acceptance of the border) then such a policy is likely to be adopted by the leadership. If, on the other hand, foreign policy goals and dominant domestic border narratives differ, we are likely to see a continuation of the border policy. In those periods of silence, however, change still takes place through a stronger influence and gradual internalization of international norms. Over time, then, we may observe a change in the dominant narrative, which could be followed by a policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Triadic deterrence is the situation when one state uses threats and/or punishments against another state to coerce it to prevent non-state actors from conducting attacks from its territory. Under what conditions is triadic deterrence successful? Some attribute outcomes to the balance of power between states. By contrast, we argue that the complex asymmetrical structure of this conflict requires attention to the targeted regime's relationship to its own society. The stronger the targeted regime, the more likely deterrent action will prove effective. Moving against non-state actors requires institutional capacity, domestic legitimacy, and territorial control, which only strong regimes are able to furnish. Whereas strong regimes can act to uphold raison d’état, weak regimes lack the political tools and incentives to undertake controversial decisions and enforce them. We illustrate this argument through analysis of between- and within-case variation in Israel's attempts to deter Palestinian groups operating from Egypt between 1949 and 1979, and from Syria since 1963. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]