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Germany must define its national interest in order to properly pursue it in the post-Cold War era, particularly with regard to the use of force and power. Its allies increasingly expect Germany to take part in UN and other peacekeeping or intervention activities. Furthermore, Germany recognizes destabilization in Eastern and Central Europe, especially Russia, as the most potentially threatening possibilities for its security. It can only act by leading multilateral groups, as its allies fear nationalist tendencies.

Russia must redefine itself and develop new foreign policy objectives in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and of Communism's hold over Eastern Europe. Developing new foreign policy objectives is especially difficult in a country with severe economic and social problems. Although it is unlikely that Russia could again pose a military threat for the West, any Russian attempts to dominate former Soviet Republics should be taken seriously. The West should forestal such attempts by extending NATO membership to countries that once belonged to the Soviet bloc.

The nature of international arms control efforts changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the communist regimes of other East European countries in 1989. The American-Russian Charter of Jun 1992 stated that the US and Russia would, as the two key nuclear powers, cooperate to keep the world at peace and to prevent any hostile countries from developing nuclear capability. The START 2 Treaty was signed in Jan 1993 and will, if implemented, cut nuclear arsenals to about one-third of their 1991 levels.

Germany still believes in collective defense in the context of the NATO alliance. The last 40 years have seen the evolution of an anti-militaristic attitude in Germany, which along with certain German constitutional provisions precludes German involvement in foreign conflicts such as the Gulf War. Public opinion on shouldering some of the military risks of the 'new world order' is in flux and may change with time. Other European countries may also become less tolerant of the German aversion to bearing some of these military risks.

The Bush national security team took pride in its radicalism, abandoning the Cold War approach while the administration was not ready to deal with the importance of the new wars emerging as the main threat to security and stability. Bush wants to reduce US responsibilities abroad and focus on national interest instead of building collective global security.

Purpose--This paper develops a novel approach to understanding North Korea's nuclear policy on the basis of conflict transformation theory. Design, Methodology, Approach--By conceptualizing the situation on the Korean peninsula as a protracted conflict (either between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea or North Korea and the United States), new insights into the nature of the protracted cycle of engagement and conflict with North Korea can be developed. In this context, the role and trajectory of the nuclear program can be analyzed and both the failure of and the need for arms control negotiations understood. Findings--The paper shows that the use of conflict transformation theory provides an analytically coherent explanation of North Korean security policy and foreign policy behavior that fits the empirical evidence more closely than alternative approaches. Practical Implications--The paper assesses the current policy of "strategic patience" vis-à-vis North Korea and demonstrates how it is based on false assumptions and involves risks that need to be addressed by the United States and the international community. Originality, Value--This paper presents a novel approach to analyzing the puzzle of North Korean foreign policy behavior with important implications for understanding the nature of the conflict and possible conditions for its resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fergus Carr (ed.), Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998, xii + 208 pp., [pounds]42.50. The metaphor of the 'Cold Peace' was introduced by El'tsin at the Budapest OSCE summit as a response to [...]

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the dispersion of its nuclear weapons arsenal among several independent countries greatly increases the risk of accidental or intentional misuse of such weapons. Weapons that have been repatriated to Russia from other republics might be stored insecurely and might not be properly maintained due to social and economic unrest. The Ukraine, which has retained a number of such weapons, cannot financially manage the service and maintenance of the arsenal. The could lead to environmental damage or the creation of a for-profit smuggling ring.

In a recent paper Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas J. Wheeler have posited that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an example of several 'trusting relationships'. The authors assert that 'since the end of the 1990s the trusting relationships embodied in the NPT have come under strain' and that this accounts for the fact that the 'treaty is facing growing pressures that are eroding what has been an effective barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation'. This article questions the assumptions underlying this analysis. It argues that the approach taken by Ruzicka and Wheeler fundamentally misconceives the dynamics of nuclear non-proliferation. The policy implications generated by this approach are impractical and downright dangerous as they fail to address the causes of proliferation and instead exacerbate the problem further. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses foreign relations between North and South Korea, which have become strained in 2010 because of the sinking of the South Korean Navy vessel Cheonan by North Korea and its nuclear program. Particular attention is paid to North Korea's foreign relations strategy regarding its neighbor, the military policy of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to increase forces, and economic conditions within the nation. The foreign policy of the United States regarding North Korea and its reaction to its nuclear weapons are discussed as is the possibility of a unified Korea.

Comments on the article "Iraq: Blair's Mission Impossible," by Paul Hoggett published in a 2005 issue of "The British Journal of Politics & International Relations." Confusion raised by Hoggett's use of the term imminent; Views of the arms control community and the intelligence community on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; Misrepresentation of the global strategic case.

This paper is concerned with the second North Korean nuclear crisis and the Six-Party Talks. It seeks to explain the collapse of the Agreed Framework resulting from the shift in U.S. policy under the Bush administration and the decision by North Korea to resume nuclear activities. It discusses the origins, the course and the failure of the Six-Party Talks prior to their resumption in July 2005. It shows how the political philosophy of the Bush administration led it to adopt tactics that were unsuitable for the achievement of the objective of disarmament. Likewise, Pyongyang proceeded from assumptions that were erroneous, and Washington proved to be impervious to its threats and brinkmanship. Thus, while North Korea strove to improve its bargaining power, it had no strategy of how to make use of it, having lost the gains achieved under the Agreed Framework. The article elucidates the structural impediments to a successful outcome, which consist in the divergent objectives among the parties to the talks, the problem of dealing with a nuclear program that is claimed not to exist (the HEU program), the disagreement with North Korea about the modalities of disarmament and the unwillingness of Pyongyang to finally renounce all nuclear activities. It is argued that the nuclear crisis is merely a symptom of the fundamental crisis of the lack of sustainability of the North Korean state and that the nuclear issue, while urgent in itself, cannot be dealt with apart from the future of the Korean peninsula as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the various reasons that led to the start of cold war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It mentions that the origin of the cold war is viewed from varied perspectives including traditionalist, revisionist and post-revisionist. According to the traditionalist perspective, Soviet Union's foreign policy to maximize its security led to the cold war, revisionist perspective states that the growing atomic power of the U.S. initiated the cold war and according to the post-revisionist approach, perception of Soviet threat by Western policymakers caused the cold war. It further discusses the political strategy of the U.S. President Harry S. Truman and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.

In this article, the author replies to a commentary by Alec de Montmorency about his paper on the 1982 war in the southwest Atlantic and the controversies that preceded and followed it. According to the author, the statement that no transfer of sovereignty title from France to Spain over the Isles Malouines was ever recorded is not a fact to be of any importance. He asserts that de Montmorency does not draw any conclusions from his argument. However, the author agrees with de Montmorency that the Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly are not necessarily legally binding in terms of international law.