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Irrespective of their final outcome, the Arab uprisings have changed the region profoundly with important consequences for external actors as well. Since 1995, the European Union has been extremely active in the Middle East and North Africa with a number of policies put in place to achieve often contrasting objectives. The uprisings have exposed the problems affecting these polices and have led the EU to rethink regional relations. The scholarship on EU-MENA relations has provided over time numerous and powerful insights into the workings, shortcomings and success of the EU in the region, but the uprisings demand a radical change in the way in which the MENA is approached. This review article looks at the contribution that the scholarship has made in this field and suggests a new research agenda, which could lead to better informed and more effective policy-making.

This contribution examines the reasons behind the failure of Tunisia's opposition to forge effective coordination and collaborative links during Ben Ali's reign, focusing specifically on the inability and unwillingness of political parties to act in concert in order to challenge his authoritarian rule. Focusing on two attempts at opposition coordination in the 2000s (Rencontre Démocratique and 18 October Collectif), it demonstrates that a number of interconnected explanations are at the heart of this failure, ranging from ideological differences and strategic divergence to personal rivalries among opposition leaders. The key contention of this study is that divisions within the political opposition were as important as regime repression in sustaining the Ben Ali regime for over 20 years. In addition, the present study contends that these intra-opposition divisions and past coordination failures explain the absence of political parties at the helm of the 2011 uprising.

The uprisings of the Arab spring have highlighted the weakness of traditional opposition actors which have been unable to predict and lead the revolutions. This paper, focusing on the case of Morocco, examines how the discourses and practices of the regime shaped the complex field of Political Islam, contributing to two distinct but interlinked phenomena. On the one hand, they have managed to lead Islamists and seculars to overcome many of their previous divisions to sustain common battles in the name of democracy and human rights. On the other they have deepened rifts and divisions among Islamists themselves on the crucial issue of political reforms.

Delaney and Cavatorta discuss the conditions of Muslims in the Republic of Ireland in terms of political participation. The idea is to investigate the background for the development of a distinct cosmopolitanism amongst the Muslim minorities present in the country. This raises important questions concerning identification, negotiation and belonging.

According to a number of scholars of international relations, the transatlantic relationship is going through a very significant and possibly irreversible crisis. It is claimed that the different reactions of the United States and the European Union to both September 11th and the war in Iraq were the catalyst for a rift that had been deepening for some time, leading to competition between the two actors. The literature on the foreign policy of the US and the EU in the Middle East and North Africa also points to this rift in order to explain the seemingly contradictory policies that the two actors implement in the region, with the US being more forceful in its attempts to export democracy and in supporting Israel while the EU adopts a less confrontational attitude and is perceived to be more friendly to the Palestinians. This article, which introduces a special issue on the nature of US and EU foreign policies in North Africa, argues on the contrary that the transatlantic rift does not really exist. While there are certainly differences in discourse and policies, both the EU and the US share the same concerns and have similar strategic objectives in the region, leading the two actors towards cooperation and division of labour rather than confrontation.

Scholars and students of Islamist movements are divided over the issue of Islamists' commitment to democracy and a number of studies have attempted to discover the true nature of Islamist parties. This paper rejects this approach and argues that the behaviour of Islamist parties can be better understood through an analysis of the constraints and opportunities that their surrounding environment provides. Specifically, the paper aims at explaining the choice of the Moroccan Jamiat al-Adl wal-Ihsan neither to participate in institutional politics nor to undertake violent actions to transform the regime. This is done through an examination of its relations with the other political actors. The paper argues that Jamiat al-Adl wal-Ihsan's behaviour is as much the product of rational thinking as it is of ideology and provides evidence to support this claim. Such findings are important not only in the Moroccan context, but contribute to a growing literature claiming that Islamist movements should be treated as rational political actors operating under 'environmental' constraints and opportunities.

Contrary to both popular and academic belief, the ‘War on Terrorism’ launched by the United States has one very clear enemy: radical Islamism. The varied and complex world of Islamism has been reduced to one unitary enemy, and that enemy is being fought both militarily and ideologically. This paper analyses the impact that the War on Terrorism is having on its target and contends that the ‘simplification’ of the concept of radical Islamism by the US administration, while beneficial for the purely practical purposes of war, is very much detrimental to the understanding of such a phenomenon and leads to policy choices that deepen the fault lines between Islamists and the West. The paper concludes by arguing that the current War on Terrorism is running the risk of causing a ‘return’ of the jihadi Islamist ideology that had been comprehensively defeated within the vast Islamist world and that has been replaced by a much more pragmatic and much more peaceful approach to gaining political inclusion.

For students of EU public policy, the EU's reaction during and after the Iraq War may represent the same story of impotence that has historically plagued the EU when trying to speak with a single voice and act with a united front during a major world crisis. Despite some achievements with the EU's Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) of the early 1990s (Ginsberg 1997; Holland 1995), the Iraq War perhaps best reflects Cameron's concerns: "in handling serious political crises, especially those involving armed conflict, the Union has rarely acted as one", or acted effectively (Cameron, 1998, 66). Seeking to better understand why the EU did not act effectively during the Iraq War and to consider what lessons can be taken from this experience, the paper has three main objectives. First, the paper considers the theoretical reasons that help explain why the EU has historically failed to create a common defence and security policy. The section thereafter analyses developments during the Iraq war and tests which theoretical explanations (or combinations thereof) are of most value to understand the EU's stance. The final section then considers the future of the EU as an international actor in light of the fundamental concepts introduced by Hill (1993) regarding 'capabilities' and 'expectations' of EU foreign policy.