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Copyright of Revista Espacios is the property of Talleres de Impresos Oma and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

As a geographical concept, 'Indo-Pacific' has existed for decades. As a political and strategic concept, it has since 2010 gradually become established in the foreign policy lexicon of some countries, especially Australia, India, Japan and the United States. However, China seems to be reluctant to identify itself as part of the Indo-Pacific; Chinese leaders believe that the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy aims to contain China's rise. While the battle between the two geographical concepts 'Indo-Pacific' and 'Asia–Pacific' may be fairly easily settled in the future, US–China strategic competition has just begun. Will the Indo-Pacific become a battlefield for US–China rivalry? How will China cope with the US 'free and open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) strategy? How will other regional actors respond to the US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific? What are the strategic implications of the 'Indo-Pacific' concept for regional order transformation? How will the Indo-Pacific be institutionalized, economically, politically and strategically? This article introduces the January 2020 special issue of International Affairs , which aims to address those questions, using both country-specific and regional perspectives. Seven articles focus on the policy responses of major players (Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and ASEAN) to the US FOIP strategy and related US–China rivalry in the region. A further three articles examine the profound implications of Indo-Pacific dynamics for regional institution-building and for geopolitical and geo-economic architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deconstructs China's Belt and Road Initiative focusing on its vision of modernity, geopolitics and global order. Topics discussed are aim of China to promote infrastructure connectivity and investment, economic and political aspects of BRI in coordination with the Modernization Vision and Common Destiny Vision founded on sovereignty and authoritarianism, potential return of Mackinder's Eurasian Heartland theory, and BRI as a geopolitical means towards Pax-Sinica.

The article focuses on the developments and new ideas of the least developed countries (LDCs) across the world. It outlines the development of Group of LLDCs, the joint pressure and lobbying group designed for land-locked LDCs in Mongolia. The exposure of the land-grabbing approach in Cambodia is also mentioned.

The two-centuries-old hegemony of the West is coming to an end. The 'revolutions of modernity' that fuelled the rise of the West are now accessible to all states. As a consequence, the power gap that developed during the nineteenth century and which served as the foundation for a core-periphery international order is closing. The result is a shift from a world of 'centred globalism' to one of 'decentred globalism'. At the same time, as power is becoming more diffuse, the degree of ideological difference among the leading powers is shrinking. Indeed, because all Great Powers in the contemporary world are in some form capitalist, the ideological bandwidth of the emerging international order is narrower than it has been for a century. The question is whether this relative ideological homogeneity will generate geo-economic or geopolitical competition among the four main modes of capitalist governance: liberal democratic, social democratic, competitive authoritarian and state bureaucratic. This article assesses the strengths and weaknesses of these four modes of capitalist governance, and probes the main contours of inter-capitalist competition. Will the political differences between democratic and authoritarian capitalists override their shared interests or be mediated by them? Will there be conflicting capitalisms as there were in the early part of the twentieth century? Or will the contemporary world see the development of some kind of concert of capitalist powers? A world of politically differentiated capitalisms is likely to be with us for some time. As such, a central task facing policy-makers is to ensure that geo-economic competition takes place without generating geopolitical conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2008, the leaders of industrialised and emerging economies have engaged in steering the global economy through the G20. Divergent national positions were to be expected based upon the different stages of economic development and according to previously existing international groups. The actual controversies in the G20 did not reflect these patterns, however, but showed divergence both between industrialised countries and between emerging economies. In explaining this puzzle, I argue that the driving forces for global economic governance have ceased to be industrialised or emerging countries' alliances and levels of development. Rather, the causes for the positions of G20 members can be found in economic interests and ideas dominant in the domestic politics of countries. These societal influences shape governmental preference formation in both industrialised and emerging countries and consequently influence their behaviour in global governance. The resulting divergences weaken previously existing groups such as the G7 and the BRICs, and create a new pattern in world politics. This societal approach to explaining governmental positions in global economic governance is exemplified on the core G20 issues of stimulus/public debt and global imbalances/exchange rates. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Climate change is literally and metaphorically bringing the Arctic in from the cold in international affairs with new economic opportunities emerging with the retreat of the ice sheets. Prominent amongst these is the prospect of previously inaccessible oil and gas sources in the High North becoming available for extraction. A spate of extended maritime claims by the states of the region and some high profile diplomatic posturing has prompted much anticipation of a new scramble of resources and even a new, more literal Cold War. The reality, however, appears to be more mundane with the Arctic oil rush proving to be more of a slow and cooperative saunter thus far, as the Arctic powers, and others, seek the new riches with a degree of caution, employing - and even sharing - lawyers and geologists rather than deploying troops. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study deals with the subject of growing economic ties between China and Pakistan over the past decade which have evolved to match the strong bilateral political and military relations between Beijing and Islamabad. While economic exchanges between the two countries were long colored by essentially political considerations, since 1999 two-way trade and investment have expanded and become both strategically and commercially driven. To understand what underlies this development, one must look at several significant domestic and external policy shifts that have taken place in China and Pakistan since 1999. The study overviews the nature of Chinese investment in Pakistan, notably infrastructure projects such as Gwadar Port and the upgrading of the Karakoram Highway, which have both commercial and possible geostrategic facets. It also examines the deepening and broadening of Sino-Pakistani trade, as a result of which China has become economically integrated with South Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Futuribles is the property of Futuribles SARL and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Australia's relationship with South Africa was founded on their being two groups of colonies, and later dominions, in the British Empire. As remote settler societies there were certain affinities, anxiously promoted by South Africa and usually resisted by Australia. Australian prime ministers played a major role in helping to bring about majority rule, but since 1994 the relationship has stiffened. For South Africa, partly for geopolitical reasons, the Commonwealth remains a functional concept; for Australia, it has lost much of its efficacy. Australia and South Africa have also exchanged two significant migrations: of Australian miners and artisans to the Rand around the turn of last century, and of South African emigrants to Australia in our own time. Trade between the two countries is increasing, and a new range and diversity in contact has occurred, with the resumption of full relations since the apartheid years. Given South Africa's disjunction from its immediate past, it is difficult at present to indicate what forms the relationship might take in future. The paper therefore sketches the whole history of interaction between the two countries, drawing attention to its phases and reconfigurations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at the speech about China and the oil industry delivered by Foreign Policy Research Institute's (FPRI) Jacqueline N. Deal during a conference held in Washington, D.C. in 2012. It says that Deal identified oil and energy security as an important factor in the geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. It also notes that Deal discussed the role of oil accessibility in global conflict, the use of an indirect approach to competition, and the importance of geopolitics.