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This article addresses the involvement of the United States military in Iraq. This issue has invoked outrage among the nation since the war's inception in 2003. Democrats, Republicans and citizens alike are divided over how to best handle the eventual withdrawal of troops. The article offers five points of advice for U.S. policy makers, including cleaning out rogues, deal with Al-Sadr, bring the Sunnis back, wake up the neighbors, and lastly, get though, then get out.

Looks at the crisis in United States and United Nations (UN) relations with Iraq as of February 24,1998. Possibility that UN Secretary General Khofi Annan's agreement with Saddam Hussein will avert a war; What the deal would have to include; Possibility that the crisis might recur even with a deal; First test of President Clinton's foreign policy team of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Defense Secretary William Cohen and policy adviser Sandy Berger.

Offers the author's thoughts on the United States invasion of Iraq. The importance of U.S. alliances and treaties in promoting democracy and capitalism; The role of Soviet Union in creating instability in Europe; The influence of rhetoric comparing the cold war to the war on terrorism; Criticism of Americans for their arrogance and failure to adhere to the rule of law; Idea that radical Islam cannot be defeated with military power alone; Opinion that the Bush administration was not interested in any dialogue with the Arab world; Criticism of the U.S. for not trying to convince European countries that a war in Iraq was necessary; View that Pentagon leadership is made up of narrow-minded nationalists.

Presents news briefs related to world politics and business as of March 17, 2003. United States military plans for an invasion of Iraq, which may be countered by Iraqi suicide troops; Confrontation between North Korean jets and a U.S. reconnaissance plane; Ratification by the U.S. Senate of the Moscow Treaty, which would cut active U.S. and Russian warheads; Others.

Discusses Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's misjudgment of the United Nations (UN) and of United States President Bill Clinton. Saddam's satisfaction with the US confusion created by his August 1998 refusal to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors; Possibility that he was encouraged by US failure to attack Serbian forces in Kosovo; His surprise at his Arab neighbors' criticism of his November 1998 position; Narrowing circle of Saddam's domestic support.

The article discusses the significant progress in security and the economic, diplomatic and political lines of operation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The progress was achieved through the efforts of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) with its Iraqi counterparts and the U.S. Embassy Mission Iraq, the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq and other key elements of the international community. It remarks that progress in Iraq reflects the efforts of the Army in developing relevant and ready land forces.

The article focuses on the mission and functions of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in establishing international relations. USACE's Gulf Region Division is training Iraqi engineers to supervise its reconstruction efforts in Iraq. On the other hand, the Afghanistan Engineer District (AED) offers quality, responsive engineering and construction services to customers in Afghanistan through its dedicated soldiers and civilians.

The article focuses on the national interests of the U.S. in Iraq which include defense, economic well-being and credibility. The U.S. experience in Vietnam offers valuable insight in forming a coherent policy regarding the future of the Iraqi people. The U.S. needs to avert transformation of Iraq into an extremist training center by the Taliban regime. Enhanced regional stability in Iraq would improve the international standing of U.S. in world politics.

The article seeks to gain an understanding of what the U.S. owes to the Iraqi people as a result of the country's intervention on the affairs of Iraq. It asserts that the U.S. intervention on Iraq was uncalled for and illegitimate. It contends that the U.S. obligation to Iraq involves not restoration, but rehabilitation of the country through a morally responsible exit of American military forces. A morally responsible exit involves the return of full sovereignty to Iraq, the establishment of an Iraqi government capable of protecting itself from further political violence and presence of international forces.

The article argues that the current U.S. policy on Iraq is morally indefensible. It criticizes the decision of the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush to change its goal in continuing the American military presence in Iraq. It claims that the Bush administration has not been transparent in giving statistics related to the war in Iraq and the insurgency within the country. It considers the possibility of a civil war in Iraq.

The article presents a poll on the demand of Iraqis for U.S. troops to withdraw within a year in Iraq. According to the World Public Opinion (WPO) poll, 70 percent of the Iraqis wanted the U.S.-led forces to withdraw in such time limit. It mentions that most of the Iraqis believed that the U.S. military is provoking more conflicts than preventing them and the Iraqi Army is growing its confidence. Results are shown on the effect of U.S. military presence in the country.

The article presents a public opinion poll on the presence of the U.S. Army in Iraq and the future of Iraq conducted by Program on International Policy Attitudes. It mentions that two polls were conducted, including one on the change of attitudes as the army arrived in Iraq in January 2006 especially between the Sunnis and Shias. Related topics are further discussed.

The article focuses on the efforts of the U.S. to make sure that Iraq runs stably after the U.S. withdraws from there on June 30, 2004. The person who is most responsible to soothe Iraqi outrage at the U.S. is U.S. military's Central Command is General John Abizaid. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged at least the possibility that the grand American design for Iraq might end in failure.

With war in Iraq looming, the tension between Saddam Hussein's forces and the Kurdish fighters is intensifying. If the U.S. invades, it is widely believed the Kurds will assist American forces advancing from the north. Neighboring Syria, Iran and especially Turkey are concerned that an independent state for Iraq's 3.5 million Kurds would only increase the separatist movements among their own sizable Kurdish minorities. Despite the imminence of war--and the bitter memories of Kurds being gassed during a rebellion in 1988--the Kurdish population remains unafraid of Iraqi reprisals, largely because they live within the no-fly zone which covers the northern reaches of Iraq.

Considers the long-term consequences from a U.S.-led attack on Iraq. Likely interpretation as an attack on the entire Arab nation; Possibility of losing the friendships of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan; Future role of the U.S. in the Middle East.

Opposes the U.S. plan to use military force to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. Reasons of the U.S. for its plan to attack Iraq and oust President Saddam Hussein; Threat of Iraq President Saddam Hussein to world peace; National security policy of the U.S.; Criticism on the foreign policy of the U.S.; Negative implications of U.S. plan to attack Iraq.

Discusses the outlook for and consequences of a United States war with Iraq. Reasons to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein, including his efforts to develop a nuclear capability that would alter the balance of power in the Middle East; Idea that a U.S. invasion will prompt Hussein to use weapons of mass destruction to widen the war, especially against Israel; Role of Saudi Arabia in the rationale for not attacking Iraq; Impact of the cost of another war like Desert Storm on the U.S. economy.

Looks at the crisis in United States and United Nations (UN) relations with Iraq as of February 24, 1998. Possibility that UN Secretary General Khofi Annan's agreement with Saddam Hussein will avert a war; What the deal would have to include; Possibility that the crisis might recur even with a deal; First test of President Clinton's foreign policy team of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Defense Secretary William Cohen and policy adviser Sandy Berger. INSET: Thunder in the desert.

Comments on the apparent softening of the Democrats' stand towards the potential U.S. war against Iraq to curb expansionist tendencies of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Suggestions made by various Democrats to President George Bush to resolve the crisis; Chief factor that made Democrats change their stand from a nationalistic to a milder one; Importance given to national security in presidential campaigns; Reasons why Democrats are not credible as commanders-in-chief; View that elections are often misleading on the national issue; Democrats who are worried about their party's anti-war posture.

The verdict may still be out on U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's performance before the United Nations Security Council in New York last week. But there was no mistaking his underlying message to the other nations seated around the table. Get out of our way or we'll run you over. Jack Straw, the British foreign minister, whose boss, Prime Minister Tony Blair, seconded the emotion.Invoking the memory of the League of Nations, Straw suggested Hitler and Saddam have much in common. In Turkey, the parliament has given its permission for the U.S. to upgrade its military bases and ports there for possible use in a conflict with Iraq, providing the Pentagon with the desired option of hitting Saddam from both the north and Kuwait in the south. Although a war could come as soon as the end of the month, Michael Peters, director of research and executive vice-president of the Council on Foreign Relations, a New York think-tank, says U.S. forces could also easily wait until March or even April. What works in the short term for Bush and his party may not end up being quite so successful for the rest of us.

Reports that regime change or Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's ouster might be achieved under cover of disarming the country. Consequences of the absence of serious debate on the objectives of force; Lack of opportunity to consider what could go wrong or how to handle competing interests in the Middle East; Iraq's invitation to weapons inspections in the wake of the United States' pressure for war.

Discusses the hesitation of European Union leaders to approve of a U.S. strike against Iraq. Opposition to an assault on Iraq by leaders in Great Britain and Germany; Why European leaders want to register their objections to regime change in Iraq early; The feeling that a military attack on Iraq is an expression of American unilaterism; View that the European Union should express alternatives to an attack on Iraq.

This article is an opinion piece that discusses the Iraqi War and its similarities to the Vietnam War during the 1960s. The author compares the removal of U.S. troops in Vietnam, and the political consequences thereafter, to the situation of the U.S. military in Iraq since 2003. Arguments against staying in Iraq or immediately removing troops are discussed, as well as the stigma of admitting defeat in an effort to improve relations between the U.S. and the international community.

The article examines U.S. policies in Iraq and their often nefarious results. The author points out that recent sectarian strife may not be attributed to ancient rivalries as Iraqi history demonstrates that this pluralistic society enjoyed a peaceful, harmonious past. He argues that violence was set in motion by recent events, some provoked by Saddam Hussein, and others by the American occupation. He examines American policies with respect to the creation of an Iraqi Army while ignoring the need for national compromise and sharing of power.

Why don't my fellow hawks ever discuss U.S. history with Saddam Hussein? I mean the 1980s, when Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush armed him. The history is appalling, and it involves key officials shaping Iraq policy today. Yet barely anyone to the right of Ramsey Clark seems to care. Saddam first used chemical weapons, in particular mustard gas, in 1983, in his war against Iran. According to the book "Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq," by Financial Times reporter Alan Friedman, Donald Rumsfeld presented a letter from Reagan that proposed restoring diplomatic relations and offered U.S. military and economic assistance.Records from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and a 1994 Senate Banking Committee investigation show that during Reagan's presidency, the United States sold Iraq anthrax, bubonic plague, and botulinum toxin, all supposedly for medical research. And, when George H. W. Bush became president the following year, he doubled U.S. agricultural loans to Iraq--money that, it would later be revealed, Saddam was partly diverting to the military. As Samantha Power points out in "A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide," the Bush administration in 1989 refused to join twelve other democracies in calling for a special U.N. investigation of human rights in Iraq. So, if America's history of ignoring human rights in Iraq makes leftists cynical about our motives for war today, they should be just as cynical about France's and Russia's motives for opposing war (i.e., they'd be perfectly happy to go back to doing business with Saddam).

Offers observations on United States military policy in Iraq. President George W. Bush's 2003 State of the Union address was a bravura performance, delivered with a degree of personal comfort and authority that makes nonsense of the critics' cartoon images of a born-again cowboy, riding into the big, bad world with guns blazing. His certainty that Iraq must be confronted with evidence of its violations of United Nations Security Council disarmament regulations now is underpinned by intelligence information that the government can share with us only to the degree it does not compromise sources. Knowing how much to release, however, is a tough call. We have learned only recently, for instance, that there have been over 100 terrorist attacks aimed at the United States since 9/11. All, blessedly, were thwarted. But it is not just a question of persuading the American people; it is also world opinion, our allies, and those countries whose cooperation would help. It is ironic that the same America that has brought peace and liberty to so many millions around the world is seen by some now as a greater threat than Saddam Hussein. A good part of the European moaning is really a psychological crutch to draw attention away from weaknesses at home. Waiting much longer, then, is a fool's game. It would only strengthen Saddam's hand and weaken ours.

Present excerpts of an interview with U.S. President George W. Bush. Possibility of using the U.S. military to disarm Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein; Efforts to reform the economy and Medicare; Bush's vision for the U.S.; Views on problems in North Korea and the Mideast; Others.

Editorial. Offers observations on the war that is looming in Iraq. View that Washington must secure the firm support of foreign nations before attacking Iraq; The need for President George W. Bush and his team to convince that nation and the world of the soundness of their policies; Fading sympathy for the U.S overseas.

Discusses the impact of the Iraq crisis on the administration of President George Bush. Demonstration of Bush's instinctive grasp of international politics, and of the need for American firmness and leadership; Failure to explain to the American public why they should support him; Belief in diplomacy as a private game for senior officials; Importance of explaining why Saddam Hussein's regime constitutes a threat to the United States; Responsibility of the U.S. to lead international action to stop him.

In their anxiety to do nothing that can be construed as reminiscent of Indochina, the U.S. military authorities are avoiding anything in the nature of a "body count" for Operation Desert Storm. Saudi sources have spoken of Iraqi casualties, for soldiers only, in the range of 80,000 to 100,000. Other estimates put the toll as low as 50,000. It now seems that on their way out of Kuwait the Iraqi forces indulged in an additional saturnalia of looting and mayhem. The fantastic, exemplary bloodletting that took place after the ostensible issue of the conflict had been decided was in that tradition.