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The post-Cold War era has led to a proliferation of scholarship on U.S. policy toward four neutral European countries—Austria, Finland, Switzerland, and Sweden—during the Cold War. This article provides a survey of the latest literature on U.S. policy toward these four countries as well as general comments about the U.S. government's approach to European neutrality from 1945 to 1991. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article takes a close look at how the United States used the funding of scientific research in Sweden as a hegemonic and propaganda tool in the 1950s and 1960s. It shows that non-aligned Sweden functioned just as much as a node in the international science network set up by the Americans after the Second World War as did the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. These funds were awarded mainly to an elite network of prominent Swedish scientists. The article sheds interesting light on the controversies of such funding in Sweden during the cold war and adds important knowledge about Swedish–American relations during the cold war. The article argues that this Swedish scientific elite co-produced US hegemony in Sweden by actively seeking out American military funding and by making use of it. It also argues that US funding was intended to portray the United States as an altruistic patron of science in the world and thus serve American propagandistic purposes as well. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article deals with the relations between perhaps Sweden's most influential publicist during the Cold War, the professor of political science and editor-in-chief of Sweden's largest daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter 1946-1959, Herbert Tingsten, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), a CIA-sponsored organisation gathering the elite of the world's non-communist leftist intellectuals, Congress for Cultural Freedom and its Swedish sub-branch called 'Svenska kommitten for kulturens frihet' (SKfKF). Tingsten was a professor of political science at University of Stockholm from 1935 to 1946 and then editor-in-chief of Sweden's largest daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter from 1946 to 1959. It argues that parts of Tingsten's work both as an opinion maker and as a scholar was part of a symbiotic relationship with the CCF and the SKfKF. Tingsten was the foremost propagator for the 'end of ideology' thesis in Sweden and the article argues that this campaign was inspired by the CCF's advancement of this idea in the 1950s and 1960s. Tingsten was personally acquainted with several CCF intellectuals and he visited several of the CCF's conferences. The article also makes the case that Tingsten helped the CCF and the SKfKF's causes and furthered their agendas in a number of ways during his time as editor-in-chief of DN. For example, Tingsten allowed the SKfKF to use DN as a platform for presenting its ideas and programmes to a broader public. The article thus shows how the CCF network of intellectuals influenced opinion making in non-aligned Sweden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that previous research into how Sweden came to be eligible to purchase armaments in the United States in the early Cold War has misread the historical evidence. Instead of there being a change in US policy in early 1950, as has been argued by several Cold War scholars, this article states that it was the incremental changes of Sweden's security policy that eventually made the US government view the Swedes as possible non-aligned allies in the Cold War. The difference is crucial. The Swedish adherence to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) embargo is a critical factor when trying to understand the perceived change in the US policy, because this was a confirmation of the Swedish consent to US hegemony in Western Europe. Furthermore, this article argues that, contrary to what prior research has assumed, it was never part of US policy to get Sweden to join the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT or NATO later). The evidence for assuming that this was ever a US policy objective is simply lacking. The article thus presents a much needed re-evaluation of US-Swedish security relations during the late 1940s and early 1950s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the US government's efforts to curb the Swedish ball bearing producer SKF's exports to the East early in the Cold War, 1950-1952, and interprets this process within the framework of hegemony theory. In doing this, the article makes use of previously unutilised US archival material. The period up to mid-1951 saw increasing US pressure upon Sweden and SKF to consent to US hegemony by abiding by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) embargo. To achieve its objectives US policymakers developed a flexible 'carrot and stick' approach, and the article adds considerable detail regarding the US government's handling of SKF. US tolerance and flexibility was dependent upon Swedish consent to American hegemony in Western Europe, which was received through the signing of the Stockholm agreement - a hegemonic apparatus through which Sweden's abidance by the embargo was handled - in mid-June 1951. A small amount of exports was accepted by Washington as long as the main US objective - to deny the Eastern Bloc strategic technology - was adhered to by SKF. The article also reveals the lack of policy coordination in the Swedish government, and the conflicts between the government and SKF regarding the responsibility for adhering to the embargo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All through the 1950s and 1960s NATO had secretly utilized a secret flight path, called Amber Nine, over the southwestern part of Sweden. The Swedish government condoned the frequent overflights, despite the fact that Sweden was at the time professing to follow a policy of neutrality in the power struggle between the two superpowers. This article argues that the frequent American use of Amber Nine should be viewed as a materialization of Sweden's consent to US hegemony, and that Amber Nine effectively made Swedish airspace and airports a part of NATO's infrastructure. It also makes the case that the arrangement contributed to the eradication of the credibility of Sweden's policy of neutrality, and that NATO's routine use of a flight path over Sweden, a non-NATO country, warrants a reinterpretation of Sweden's role in the Cold War on NATO's northern flank, as well as challenging the definition of the NATO alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]