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The existing historiography on relations between Britain and the states of Lower Gulf after British withdrawal from 'East of Suez' in 1971 suggests that the former imperial power successfully established an informal role in the 1970s and beyond which amounted to empire in all but name. While Britain certainly sought to retain as much of its influence and as many of its interests in the economically important Lower Gulf as possible, an analysis of Anglo-Qatari relations after 1971 demonstrates that Britain's former exclusive position was substantially eroded. British economic weakness, fierce competition from Britain's industrial rivals, and the encroachment of the Arab world into the affairs of Qatar all militated still further against the preservation of British influence and interests, let alone the establishment of an informal imperial relationship with Qatar. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Post-communist politics is linked with regional development through an investigation of the formulation of strategic plans at various levels. It is found that the communist period and the post-communist transformation left distinctive features that created barriers to the emergence of the 'standard' EU pattern, thereby justifying the continued use of the 'post-communist' label.

A COMMON FEATURE OF SEVERAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS in post-communist East-Central Europe is the development of a tripartite structure which seeks to integrate social bargaining between business, labour and government into [...]

Adrian Smith, Reconstructing the Regional Economy: Industrial Transformation and Regional Development in Slovakia. Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 1998. xvii + 434 pp., [pounds]59.95. THIS BOOK IS WELCOME for [...]

This article provides the framework for the contributions to this special issue. It first puts the theme into context and outlines the main issues that justify further analytical engagement with European Union (EU)–North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) relations to the extent we propose here. We then provide some historical background to frame the discussion, and in doing so also outline the current state of interaction between the EU and NATO. We then briefly contextualise the changing strategic environment shaping the relationship, including recent proposals to implement their declared “strategic partnership”. This introduction then presents an overview of the existing literature to set the stage for a renewed look at the research agenda that has emerged over the last two decades. We close with an outline of the individual contributions to this special issue, which are presented in two sections: one focusing on theoretical and conceptual approaches to the study of EU of EU–NATO relations, and one on the inter-organisational relationship in practice, followed by a concluding synopsis and outlook. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Studies of the relationship between the EU and NATO often focus on the limitations of cooperation, be it at the political or the operational level. However, little is known about the functioning of the political institutional linkages between the EU and NATO. This article therefore studies the main decision-making bodies of the two organisations at the political, ambassadorial level, namely the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in NATO, as well as their joint meetings. The article employs an inductive Grounded Theory approach, drawing on open-ended interviews with PSC and NAC ambassadors, which reveal direct insights from the objects of analysis. The findings emphasise the impact of both structural and more agency-related categories on decision-making in these three fora. The article thus addresses both the paucity of study on these bodies more broadly and the complete lacuna on joint PSC–NAC meetings specifically, warranting the inductive approach this article endorses. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Despite the apparent similarities in Britain's relationship with the Sheikhdoms of the Lower Gulf and the traditional states of southern Arabia, British policy-makers pursued contrasting policies towards the two sets of territories in the era of decolonization. As regards South Arabia, Britain followed a policy of amalgamating the states into a ‘Whitehall’ federation. The fact that the Federation of South Arabia remained dependent on British backing, and in consequence became ineffably associated with British imperialism in an era of anti-colonial Arab nationalism, fatally damaged its chances of longevity. Applying the lessons of failure in South Arabia, the British were far more inconspicuous in the discussions which led to the creation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Indeed, the fact that the UAE essentially emerged from the initiative of Sheikhs Zaid of Abu Dhabi and Rashid of Dubai, rather than the British, was one of the key factors in its survival. By contrast, the Federation of South Arabia collapsed ignominiously once the ballast provided by the British had been removed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Maritime engagement in the Gulf of Aden is a puzzling case for anyone interested in the political and institutional problems underlying European Union–North Atlantic Treaty Organization (EU–NATO) cooperation. Although the EU’s operation NAVFOR ‘Atalanta’ and NATO’s ‘Ocean Shield’ operate in the same theatre and with similar mandates, there is no formal link between them. No joint planning has been envisaged, and no official task-sharing takes place. As this article aims to show, cooperation and coordination between EU and NATO forces at the operational and tactical levels have nevertheless worked surprisingly well. Two faces of EU–NATO cooperation become apparent: the political level is dominated by a permanent deadlock, while on the ground and at sea staff have developed a modus operandi that allows them to deliver fairly successfully in complementing yet detached operations. Based on 60 interviews with EU and NATO officials (2010–2013), this article illustrates how the operational and tactical levels have developed ways of coordinating efforts informally despite the lack of a formal framework. It aims to show to what extent and how they succeed at bypassing organizational boundaries and at overcoming political limitations. Although these practices are becoming increasingly institutionalized, it remains to be seen whether this will translate into formal changes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Britain's attempt to distance itself from Israel as London sought to conciliate the Arab world in the aftermath of the Six-Day War has entered the historiography of Anglo-Israeli relations. A neglected aspect of the development of British policy towards Israel has been the intense debates among British decision-makers regarding the supply of tanks to Israel following the 1967 conflict. British reluctance to export the powerful Chieftain tank to Israel stemmed not only from an unwillingness to fuel an arms race in the Middle East, but also from a determination to protect ongoing and extensive British economic interests in the Arab world, especially oil supplies. In keeping with efforts to dissociate itself from Israel, Britain also sought to downplay, and even conceal from the Arab world, ongoing sales of the less sophisticated Centurion tank to Israel. In many ways, British policy towards Israel culminated in the decision during the 1973 Yom Kippur War to maintain an arms embargo to the region which, while not extending to all Arab countries, hit Israel especially hard as it desperately sought ammunition and spares for its Centurion tanks. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although EU-NATO institutional relations have been evolving since the Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998, efficient and coherent cooperation is still lacking. This article goes beyond the narrative of blockage caused purely at the political level in order to illustrate both formal and informal EU-NATO cooperation at both the centre (Brussels) and on the ground (missions). This article addresses cooperation in terms of the actors involved at three different levels: state actors, international staff, and military personnel. Although, much has been done to advance cooperation between international staffers in Brussels and between those on the ground in common mission areas, the lack of a political agreement - one that moves beyond the limited scope of Berlin Plus - is causing severe fatigue, most notably at the level of international staff. Furthermore, the informal and ad hoc cooperation that has been the underlying facilitator of synergy between the two organisations could start to atrophy if a grand or intermediary bargain is not achieved in the near future.1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1971 South Asia crisis demonstrated that Britain, despite the contemporaneous discussions which were taking place over British accession to the European Economic Community, continued to possess global interests. After a brief period of neutrality in the growing conflict between India and Pakistan, the government of Edward Heath leaned decisively towards the former. This contrasted with the American 'tilt' in the other direction, towards Pakistan. The resulting differences of approach between the Heath government and the Nixon White House reflected a wider pattern of division between British and American policy makers over Asia rather than any attempt by Heath to underscore his European credentials by distancing himself from the USA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The extraordinary expansion in Kuwait's oil revenues in the 1950s presented Britain with a formidable challenge. Britain's relative indifference to Kuwait before 1939 had allowed the Shaikhdom to develop a strong sense of independence, especially in the conduct of internal affairs. Local autonomy, however, conflicted with Britain's determination to manage the economy of Kuwait in a manner which would bring maximum benefit to the sterling area, while minimising the potential damage which Kuwait's sudden acquisition of oil wealth could inflict on sterling. Britain's support for Kuwaiti independence from the late 1950s did not signify a decline in the value which Britain placed on the sterling area in general, or on Kuwait in particular. Instead, it reflected a belief that an independent Kuwait represented the best means of preserving British economic interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the theory of neocolonialism in the relationship between Kuwait and Great Britain after Kuwait's decolonization. Kuwait's reliance on British military assistance in 1961; Terms and scale of oil exports to Britain; Domination of five British firms; Anti-British feeling in Kuwait; Decline of British exports; Kuwait's repositioning within the Arab world.

The article reviews the book "Issues in EU and US Foreign Policy" edited by M. Cebeci.