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In the aftermath of the Cold War, both scholars and experts frequently questioned the political relevance of security alliances, given the declining intensity of armed conflicts and the decreasing probability of major interstate wars. However, the post-bipolar international reality marked by the burgeoning of new alliances and coalitions, with old associations being reformed and/or expanded in membership rendered these questions obsolete. In fact, states not only continue to consider military alliance as an important foreign policy tool but actively develop new forms of alliances and coalitions. The article identifies the key trends in the evolution of military and political alliances over the period from the 1990s till the 2010s. Firstly, the authors highlight the waning interest of the leading powers towards formalized allied relations, since they increasingly perceive the latter as an unnecessary burden. At the same time, the researchers note that the leading powers adhered to different approaches to alliance and coalition building in the post-bipolar period. While the United States strengthened the transatlantic core (NATO) in the U.S.-centered network of alliances, relying on more flexible plurilateral formats in other regions of the world, Russia, India, and China did not seek to expand their respective blocs, providing collective security guarantees selectively. That said, all major powers share interest in promoting and developing asymmetric alliances both as tools to deter potential opponents and leverages over junior partners amidst the struggle for spheres of influence. Secondly, the authors conclude that the key feature of the post-Cold War coalition-building is the so-called ritual alliance, when military and political commitments are included in the agenda of regional integration groupings as an addition to substantive issues of cooperation rather than the reverse. Finally, in the 1990s and 2010s, the range of formats of an alliance expanded: from the traditional priorities of territorial defense, the focus has shifted towards expeditionary operations as a part of coalitions, the latter including not only sovereign states but also non-state patronage networks. In conclusion, the authors note that the major powers will continue to promote combined forms of alliances, as the loyalty of partners becomes of increasing strategic importance against the background of growing interstate rivalry.

One of the most important defining features of Japan's "Free and Open Indo‐Pacific" (FOIP) vision is coalition‐building. Given the Yoon administration's strong political will to commit to the Indo‐Pacific affairs and improve its ties with Japan, can Japan and South Korea finally forge cooperation in the Indo‐Pacific region? I argue that Japan has not incorporated South Korea in its FOIP vision because of four main factors: timing, leadership transition, commitment to regional and global strategic affairs, and differing perspectives on China. Particularly, the negative impact of South Korea's leadership change and its fluctuating commitment to regional and global affairs have nurtured Japan's skepticism toward South Korea's potential role in the Indo‐Pacific region. In this context, the key to overcoming such difficulties and incorporating South Korea into the Indo‐Pacific network depends on the Yoon administration's conceptualization and institutionalization of its Indo‐Pacific strategy and Japan's support for South Korea's current diplomatic activism [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Argentina, as in many transition economies, the maintenance of monetary management and policy options while also maintaining the autonomy of national currencies has been severely constrained, becoming increasingly dependent on and conditioned by the financial globalisation process. So far, the dominant view within International Political Economy has too often assumed the existence of a process of convergence amongst different financial markets. I question this view by arguing that this process of convergence does not always hold if we look at the multifarious experiences of particular countries for explaining policy responses and outcomes as a result of very specific instances of distributional conflict and political bargaining. This paper argues that in searching for strategies, such as monetary policy, developing countries have constantly been compelled to introduce policies requiring (a) openness to international financial flows; (b) consensual and mutually advantageous relationships with states (and market actors) that provide and/or control international reserve currencies; and (c) domestic stabilisation and the re-articulation of socio-political coalitions around the policy choices implied by (a) and (b). In search of a strategy, the Argentine government adopted in 1990 a rigid exchange rate mechanism via a currency board using the US dollar as an anchor, labelled the Convertibility Plan. Such a strategy required not merely economic adaptation but, more significantly, a re-articulation of the political process around different groups and interests. In Argentina, I identify a pattern of initial stability and credibility undermined by compromises with key coalition partners and with powerful opponents of the policy which eventually destabilised its credibility and sustainability, leading to a very protracted crisis and eventual abandonment of the policy in 2001 and the return to a managed exchange rate system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes the catalysing effect of the Iraq War for the 'coming-of-age'of Germany and its foreign policy after decades of having a defensive and pacifist approach in general and of playing the part of a loyal and helpful junior partner to the United States in particular. Germany's political emancipation was a result of the reunification and the disappearance of the threats connected to the East-West confrontation. Following the Cold War, subordination under the American security umbrella no longer seemed necessary for German survival. Nonetheless, it took a dozen years for Germany to transform from a 'consumer'to a 'producer' of security - in Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, Kuwait and elsewhere - until the Red-Green (Social Democratic and Green Party of Germany) coalition of 2002 was convinced Germany had the 'right' to be consulted by its partners before they undertook far-reaching political and military initiatives and that it had the 'right' to a differing opinion. Since the political convictions and biographies of the initiators of the 'German Way' seem to have had a decisive influence on their handling of the Iraq War controversy, a second foreign policy of similar calibre -this time under Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leadership - would be necessary to convince sceptics of the irreversibility of Germany's emancipation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]