Search

In surveys, Europeans routinely express high levels of support for a common security and defence policy of the European Union. Do these responses reflect real demands or superficial support that would crumble if the issue was politicised? This article provides new answers to this question. We conducted pre-registered survey experiments with more than 40,000 respondents from 25 European countries in which we randomly varied whether respondents received information about potential costs of two hypothetical cooperative activities: military operations and defence procurement. Support for these activities was systematically lower when costs were mentioned. We conclude that, in the event of politicisation, there is considerable potential for shifts in opinion and that caution is required in deriving a mandate for specific activities from high approval rates for cooperation in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When member states of the European Union face serious international threats, does this serve as a catalyst or obstacle for European integration in the security and defence domain? To gain purchase on this question, this paper examines public opinion from a common instrument fielded in 24 EU member states (and the United Kingdom) with a total sample size of more than 40,000 respondents.We argue that theoretical accounts of perceived threat produce rival hypotheses. Threats might have either uniform or differential effects on different groups of citizens and could lead to either convergence or divergence of public opinion. We show that perceptions of foreign threats are associated with more favourable views on integration in the security and defence domain. Importantly, this association is as strong among Eurosceptics as among Europhiles. The findings presented here are consistent with the view that functional pressures may temporarily convince Eurosceptics to accept integration in the foreign and security domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold War, the EU aims to advance to a relevant and autonomous actor in international politics—especially concerning security and defense politics. Scholars interested in whether the EU member states actually converge in their security and defense preferences often analyze strategy papers qualitatively, focusing on selected countries at specific points in time. In this article, we propose a dictionary approach for analyzing the development of security and defense preferences within the EU over the last three decades using quantitative text analysis. We make use of 163 strategy papers, published by all EU member states and the EU itself since 1994. The findings show that EU member states react similarly to international events, but do not converge substantially in their preferences. Furthermore, there is no substantial convergence to the position of the EU itself. We finally discuss usefulness and validity of quantitative text analysis in comparative research more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the nexus of public attitudes toward military missions abroad, specific beliefs about the respective missions, and political predispositions. While some studies have argued that specific beliefs such as success expectations are the most important explanatory factors of attitudes, others have stressed the role of party-related predispositions in shaping both beliefs and attitudes. Using the case of German citizens' attitudes toward the German participation in the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan, we argue that scope conditions determine the relative merit of these perspectives. With data from a representative survey conducted in 2010 we show that in this late stage of the military mission, success expectations had a substantial effect on German citizens' mission support that was not merely mediating the influence of predispositions. At the same time, foreign policy predispositions also had a substantial impact on mission support, while party identifications had only minor effects. We discuss the more general implications of these results for statements on the relative importance of predispositions and specific beliefs as explanatory factors in public opinion formation on the use of military force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]