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The Brief Loquaciousness and Interpersonal Responsiveness Test (BLIRT) measures the extent to which people respond to others quickly and effusively. The BLIRT displays desirable psychometric properties and distinguishes people who should theoretically score high (e.g., car salespersons) from those who should score low (e.g., librarians). Scores on the scale predict (a) the amount and rapidity of people's verbal responses in an unstructured interaction, (b) how likable and competent people's classmates perceive them to be early in the semester, (c) how quickly people respond to an obnoxious cell-phone user and how physiologically aroused they become, and (d) how quickly and emphatically people respond to a series of personal insults as well as their degree of physiological arousal. Converging evidence indicates that blirtatiousness is unique in its ability to amplify people's qualities, making these qualities more readily observable to perceivers.

When spouses received feedback that disconfirmed their impressions of their partners, they attempted to undermine that feedback during subsequent interactions with these partners. Such partner verification activities occurred whether partners construed the feedback as overly favorable or overly unfavorable. Furthermore, because spouses tended to see their partners as their partners saw themselves, their efforts to restore their impressions of partners often worked hand-in-hand with partners' efforts to verify their own views. Finally, support for self-verification theory emerged in that participants were more intimate with spouses who verified their self-views, whether their self-views happened to be positive or negative.

A cross-sectional study of dating partners and a longitudinal study of college roommates revealed that the confidence and accuracy of their impressions were often dissociated. For example, relationship length and degree of involvement tended to increase the confidence of people's impressions, but neither variable consistently increased the accuracy of their impressions of their partners' sexual histories, activity preferences, and so on. A third study showed that relationship length and involvement increased the richness of impressions, and richness fostered confidence. The authors conclude that although confidence-accuracy dissociations are surely problematic in some instances, their apparent pervasiveness raises the possibility that confidence may sometimes contribute to relationship quality even when it is unrelated to accuracy.

The authors report two longitudinal studies of new college roommates (Ns = 69 and 95 pairs). In both studies, targets' initial self-views predicted changes in perceivers' appraisals of them, and perceivers' initial appraisals predicted changes in targets' self-views, although few dyads displayed both effects. The perceiver-driven and target-driven effects occurred when appraisals and self-views were negative as well as positive. Implications for self-verification theory and symbolic interactionism are discussed, and a less restrictive model of how appraisals influence self-views is proposed.

Whereas earlier research suggests that the fruits of introspection may promote error and misperception, this research suggests that thinking about the self may sometimes foster self-insight. Participants who had opportunity to reflect on themselves were particularly inclined to display self-insight by (a) rating feedback that confirmed their self-views as self-descriptive (Experiments 1 and 3), (b) rating themselves in ways that matched their friends' appraisals of them (Experiment 2), and (c) choosing a self-verifying interaction partner rather than an overly favorable one (Experiment 4). These effects were moderated by the nature of the introspective activity (Experiment 3) and by its duration (Experiment 4). Implications of these findings for the nature of self-knowledge and the worlds people construct around themselves are discussed.

We propose that people with negative self-views are rejected because they gravitate to partners who view them unfavorably. In relation to nondepressed college students (n = 28), depressives (n = 13) preferred interaction partners who evaluated them unfavorably (Study 1). Similarly, in relation to nondepressives (n = 106), depressives (n = 10) preferred friends or dating partners who evaluated them unfavorably (Study 2). Dysphorics (n = 6) were more inclined to seek unfavorable feedback from their roommates than were nondepressives (n = 16); feedback-seeking activities of dysphorics were also associated with later rejection (Study 3). Finally, people with negative self-views (n = 37) preferentially solicited unfavorable feedback, although receiving such feedback made them unhappy, in comparison with people with positive self-views (n = 42; Study 4). It seems a desire for self-verification compels people with negative self-views to seek unfavorable appraisals.

Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham (1992) suggested that depressed and dysphoric persons verify their self-conceptions by seeking rather negative appraisals. Hooley and Richters (1992) and Alloy and Lipman (1992) have worried that (a) idiosyncratic features of Swann et al.'s participants and design may have produced their effects and (b) Swann et al. presented no evidence that self-verification strivings are motivated. We address these issues empirically. Study 1 showed that 20 dysphoric participants preferred interacting with a person who appraised them unfavorably over participating in another study, in comparison with 30 nondysphorics. Study 2 revealed that 26 dysphoric persons responded to feedback that challenged their negative self-view by working to reaffirm their low self-esteem, in comparison with 47 nondysphorics. These findings support the notion that at some level depressed and dysphoric persons want rather negative appraisals.

Although people with negative self-views want to be liked at some level, they repeatedly enact behaviors that alienate their relationship partners. Why? One possibility is that such persons reside in social environments that offer them little insight into what they are doing wrong. Although persons who had negative self-views elicited unfavorable reactions, they did not appreciate this fact because their interaction partners concealed their aversion behind a facade of kind words. To be sure, the interaction partners of people with negative self-views tended to leak their disdain nonverbally. These negative nonverbal messages proved to be uninformative, however, because people with negative self-views overlooked them. These data imply that people with negative self-views may live in social worlds in which they are deprived of corrective feedback that could allow them to improve themselves.

Why do people choose interaction partners who see them as they see themselves? Self-verification theorists propose that a desire to bolster perceptions of predictability and control underlies such activities. In contrast, advocates of positivity strivings argue that people choose such interaction partners in the hope of making themselves feel good. Two studies tested these competing explanations by examining the spontaneous verbalizations of participants as they chose interaction partners. The results suggested that positivity as well as self-verification strivings caused participants with positive self-views to choose partners who appraised them favorably. The epistemic considerations underlying self-verification processes, however, best explained why people with negative self-views chose partners who appraised them unfavorably.

When a perceiver forms an expectancy about a target individual that is discrepant with that target's self-conception, whose viewpoint will triumph? Although research on behavioral confirmation argues that perceivers will "win" by causing targets to confirm the expectancy, research on self-verification argues that targets will "win" by bringing perceivers to treat them in a manner that confirms their self-conceptions. The research reported here sought to reconcile these competing viewpoints by considering the certainty of perceivers' expectancies and targets' self-conceptions. Perceivers first formed relatively certain or uncertain expectancies about targets that were inconsistent with targets' self-conceptions. They then interacted with targets, who possessed relatively certain or uncertain self-conceptions, in a series of three successive interview sessions. Analyses of the behavior or targets indicated that self-verification always occurred when targets were certain of their self-conceptions. Self-verification also tended to occur when both perceivers and targets were uncertain of their beliefs. Behavioral confirmation tended to occur only when perceivers were certain of their expectancies and targets were uncertain of their self-conceptions. At the end of the experiment, perceivers had generally abandoned their expectancies, but targets revealed no self-rating change. The conditions under which self-verification versus behavioral confirmation occur are discussed.

We proposed that people's intimates may insulate them against self-discrepant feedback. Individuals who possessed low or high self-esteem (targets) reported to the laboratory accompanied by persons with whom they were involved in intimate relationships (intimates). Some intimates perceived targets in a manner that was congruent with targets' self-conceptions; others perceived targets in a manner that was incongruent with targets' self-conceptions. Targets received bogus feedback that was discrepant with their self-esteem and interacted with either their intimate or a stranger. Targets then completed a measure of self-esteem. As expected, targets changed their self-ratings in the direction of the discrepant feedback when they interacted with either an incongruent intimate or a stranger but not when they interacted with a congruent intimate. Moreover, congruent intimates were just as effective in insulating low self-esteem targets against positive feedback as they were in insulating high self-esteem individuals against negative feedback. Finally, the more targets discussed the feedback, the less self-rating change they experienced. Implications for social support processes and attempts to cope with traumatic events are discussed.

We propose that people simplify their perceptions of their interactions by organizing them into discrete casual chunks. Once formed, these chunks presumably influence the extent to which people are aware of their influence on others, as well as their impressions of others. We anticipated that people would form self-causal chunks (e.g., my action causes my partner's action) when they possessed an offensive set and other-causal chunks when they possessed a defensive set. We also expected that a self-causal chunking strategy would make salient people's influence on their partners and thereby discourage them from concluding that their partner's behaviors reflected underlying dispositions. In contrast, we anticipated that an other-causal chunking strategy would obscure people's influence on their partners, thereby encouraging them to infer that their partners' behaviors reflected underlying dispositions. We tested these hypotheses by inducing participants to develop either a defensive or an offensive set prior to interacting with another person in a simulated arms race. After the interactions, we assessed the manner in which participants chunked their interactions, as well as their impressions of partners. The results supported our predictions. The implications of these findings for understanding conflict and misunderstanding in interpersonal relations are discussed.

Self-consistency theory assumes that people want others to treat them in a predictable manner. Self-enhancement theory contends that people want others to treat them in a positive manner. We attempted to help reconcile the two theories by testing the hypothesis that people's cognitive responses conform to self-consistency theory and their affective responses conform to self-enhancement theory. We presented individuals who possessed either positive or negative self-concepts with either favorable or unfavorable social feedback. We then measured cognitive reactions to the feedback (e.g., perceived self-descriptiveness) and affective reactions to the feedback (e.g., mood states). Cognitive responses were primarily driven by the consistency of the feedback and affective responses were controlled by how enhancing it was. We propose that conceptualizing cognition an affect as partially independent mental systems helps resolve some long-standing paradoxes regarding people's responses to self-relevant social feedback.

This research tested the hypothesis that individuals who tend to form vivid visual images of others (vivid imagers) have more accurate social memories than those who form relatively nonvivid visual images of others (nonvivid imagers). In the first investigation, vivid imagers outperformed nonvivid imagers in remembering details concerning the attitudes, activities, and life history of a woman whom they observed being interviewed. Investigation 2 provided more definitive evidence for the link between visual imagery and social memory by demonstrating that vivid imagers had more accurate memories after seeing an interviewee answer questions, whereas seeing the interviewee had no impact on the memories of nonvivid imagers. The discussion considers the impact that imagery processes may have on a variety of social thought processes.

This article traces a program of research on the interplay between social thought and social interaction. Early investigations of the impact of perceivers' expectancies on the actions of target individuals illuminated the contribution of perceivers to the identity negotiation process but overlooked the role of targets. The research discussed here is based on the assumption that targets play an active role in the identity negotiation process. Specifically, just as perceivers strive to validate their expectancies, targets seek to verify their self-views. The nature and antecedents of the processes through which people verify their self-conceptions as well as the relationship of these activities to self-concept change and self-enhancement processes are discussed. This research suggests that perceivers and targets enter their interactions with independent and sometimes conflicting agendas that are resolved through a process of identity negotiation. The identity negotiation process therefore provides a theoretical context in which the interplay between other-perception and self-perception can be understood.