Search

Metaphors are inescapable in human discourse. Policy researchers have suggested that the use of particular metaphors by those implementing policy changes both influences perceptions of underlying reality and determines what solutions seem possible, and that exploring 'practice languages' is important in understanding how policy is enacted. This paper contributes to the literature exploring the generative nature of metaphors in policy implementation, demonstrating their role in not just describing the world, but also framing it, determining what is seen/unseen, and what solutions seem possible. The metaphor 'care pathway' is ubiquitous and institutionalised in healthcare. We build upon existing work critiquing its use in care delivery, and explore its use in health care commissioning, using evidence from the recent reorganisation of the English NHS. We show that the pathways metaphor is ubiquitous, but not necessarily straightforward. Conceptualising health care planning as 'designing a pathway' may make the task more difficult, suggesting a limited range of approaches and solutions. We offer an alternative metaphor: the service map. We discuss how approaches to care design might be altered by using this different metaphor, and explore what it might offer. We argue not for a barren language devoid of metaphors, but for their more conscious use. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives To explore the ‘added value’ that general practitioners (GPs) bring to commissioning in the English NHS. We describe the experience of Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) in the context of previous clinically led commissioning policy initiatives. Methods Realist evaluation. We identified the programme theories underlying the claims made about GP ‘added value’ in commissioning from interviews with key informants. We tested these theories against observational data from four case study sites to explore whether and how these claims were borne out in practice. Results The complexity of CCG structures means CCGs are quite different from one another with different distributions of responsibilities between the various committees. This makes it difficult to compare CCGs with one another. Greater GP involvement was important but it was not clear where and how GPs could add most value. We identified some of the mechanisms and conditions which enable CCGs to maximize the ‘added value’ that GPs bring to commissioning. Conclusion To maximize the value of clinical input, CCGs need to invest time and effort in preparing those involved, ensuring that they systematically gather evidence about service gaps and problems from their members, and engaging members in debate about the future shape of services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives: To examine the managerial behaviours adopted by commissioning managers in English primary care trusts (PCTs), and to explore the impact of these behaviours. Methods: Qualitative case studies were undertaken in four PCTs, focusing on staff engaged in the commissioning of hospital services. Both formal and informal observation were undertaken (150 hours), and 41 in-depth interviews conducted with managers and general practitioners (GPs). Results: Managers adopted many managerial behaviours familiar from the literature, including sharing information, and networking inside and outside the organization. Multiple organizational layers and unclear decision-making processes hindered this activity. In addition, some managers with responsibility for facilitating practice-based commissioning (PbC) adopted a managerial mode that we have called being an 'animateur'. This approach involved the active management of disparate groups of people over whom the manager had no authority, and appeared to be a factor in determining success. It was facilitated by managerial autonomy and was more prevalent where managers were seen to have legitimacy. Some organizational practices appeared to inhibit its development. Conclusions: From 2012/13 it is planned that GPs will be taking more responsibility for commissioning in the English NHS. This research suggests that managers of the new commissioning organizations will require a deep and contextualized understanding of the NHS and that it is important that organizational processes do not inhibit managerial behaviour. Legitimacymay be an issue in contexts were managers are automatically transferred from their existing appointments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: This paper aims to explore the nature of clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) in England as membership organizations. Utilizing the concept of meta-organization as a lens, we discuss the impact that this organizational form might have on CCGs' ability to become 'strategic commissioners'. Methods: We used a longitudinal qualitative approach to explore the adoption and implementation of primary care co-commissioning. The study was undertaken between May 2015 and June 2017 and included interviews with senior policy makers, analysis of policy documents, two telephone surveys, and case studies in four CCGs nationally. Results: CCGs operate as membership organizations with closed boundary and low stratification, whereby a consensus or majority needs to be reached by members when activities impact on membership or the CCG's constitution. While CCGs should move towards a more strategic commissioning role that is focused on local priorities agreed by their members, they are faced with a complex system of accountabilities and responsibilities, which makes this difficult to achieve. Conclusions: The nature of CCGs as membership-based meta-organizations has the potential to both help and hinder CCGs in becoming strategic commissioners. The complexities in accountability and governance that the membership approach introduces, and the potential difficulties that CCGs face with competing meta-organizations, raises questions about the future of CCGs as membership organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Little is known about how to achieve scale and spread beyond the early local adoption of an innovative health care programme. We use the New Care Model – or 'Vanguard' – programme in the English National Health Service to illuminate the process, assessing why only one of five Vanguard programmes was successfully scaled up. Methods: We interviewed a wide range of stakeholders involved in the Vanguard programme, including programme leads, provider organisations, and policymakers. We also consulted relevant documentation. Results: A lack of direction near the end of the Vanguard programme, a lack of ongoing resources, and limited success in providing real-time monitoring and evaluation may all have contributed to the failure to scale and spread most of the Vanguard models. Conclusions: This programme is an example of the 'scale and spread paradox', in which localism was a key factor influencing the successful implementation of the Vanguards but ultimately limited their scale and spread. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public-Private Innovation Partnerships (PPIPs) are increasingly used as a tool for addressing 'wicked' public sector challenges. 'Innovation' is, however, frequently treated as a 'magic' concept: used unreflexively, taken to be axiomatically 'good', and left undefined within policy programmes. Using McConnell's framework of policy success and failure and a case study of a multi-level PPIP in the English health service (NHS Test Beds), this paper critically explores the implications of the mobilisation of innovation in PPIP policy and practice. We highlight how the interplay between levels (macro/micro and policy maker/recipient) can shape both emerging policies and their prospects for success or failure. The paper contributes to an understanding of PPIP success and failure by extending McConnell's framework to explore inter-level effects between policy and innovation project, and demonstrating how the success of PPIP policy cannot be understood without recognising the particular political effects of 'innovation' on formulation and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy driven change is challenging, with a significant gap between theory and practice. A key tension in enacting such change is achieving a balance between bottom-up development of local, context-specific approaches, and top-down, centrally determined policy solutions and their mutual sequencing. Ideal type models of the policy-making process envisage a rational ordered approach, driven by evidence and accompanied by ongoing evaluation of outcomes (Parsons, 1995, p77); however, the reality is far more complex. We examine the implementation and early operation of the New Care Models (NCM) Vanguard programme in England, using Matland's (1995) ambiguity-conflict model, to explore the aims and expectations of the programme. We consider the relationship between top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy development and draw attention to the pressures coming from what was initially perceived as a permissive policy approach of encouraging experimentation, whilst also requiring rapid learning, scale and spread. We suggest that future programmes for large-scale policy implementation initiatives could be crafted differently to take account of the environment of implementation and render ambitions more realistic. Rather than aiming to create a set of definite products and templates, it may be that a set of principles for design and implementation should be developed and spread. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]