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Afghanistan's reversion to Taliban rule poses severe threats to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Tehran faces a dilemma over how best to respond to these dangers: it could continue to conciliate the Taliban or it could revert to the antagonistic posture it adopted towards Kabul in the 1990s. While each of these strategies can improve Iran's security situation to some extent, they also entail unintended consequences that exacerbate Iranian vulnerabilities. More importantly, whatever policy Tehran pursues has an impact on Iran's nascent alignment with Tajikistan, as well as on Tajikistan's relations with Afghanistan. The fact that Iran's decision to conciliate the new leadership in Kabul did not prompt Dushanbe to scale back its belligerence towards the Taliban poses a puzzle for Glenn Snyder's concept of the alliance security dilemma. Its solution requires a reconsideration of adversary–ally dynamics that highlights the reciprocal interaction between shifts in inter-state alignment and changes in domestic political contestation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a close ally of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, Israel participated in the September 1974 Asian Games – the 'Asian Olympics' – that were held in Tehran. Among the 18 sports in which athletes competed, football attracted the most attention, especially after Iran's historic victory over Israel in the AFC Asian Cup in 1968. As both countries reached the final of the Games' football tournament, the match came to be seen by Iranians as nothing short of war. Standing in stark contradiction to the close and multifaceted relations between Jerusalem and the monarchical regime, this public attitude was lost on Israeli decisionmakers in what foreshadowed the failure to anticipate the Islamic revolution and the attendant collapse of Iranian-Israeli relations five years later. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Strategic Review / Przeglad Strategiczny is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Iran has been waging a hybrid war against Israel since the Islamic revolution of 1979. In an era when conventional wars have given way to a different method, hybrid warfare, the main challenge facing states is how to deal with this new type of security threat. Thus, while states have previously faced security threats from regular enemy states' armies, nowadays hybrid warfare in which non-state actors play a key role has become a widespread security threat that requires democratic states to use very different strategies and tactics to overcome it. Using securitisation theory, which explores how normal issues transform into security threats, this article analyses how the State of Israel has securitised Iranian hybrid warfare which has been mainly executed through its proxy terror organisations of Hezbollah. It does so by applying a revised version of the Copenhagen School's securitisation framework, which focuses on security practices and is underpinned by an understanding of security as belonging to a continuum. The proxy terror organisations have moved towards the end point of the continuum, which is characterised by survival, existential threats, and militarisation, albeit without completely reaching the end point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contends that the international is integral to populism. Thus, it calls for populism scholarship to embrace the interconnectivity between the domestic/internal and international/external. By borrowing from Global Historical Sociology, Global International Relations and Ernesto Laclau's notion of populist discourse, the article puts forward a new conceptual framework for the study of populism that bridges the gap between Comparative Politics and International Relations. It shows how populist discourse simultaneously constructs several aspects of the social world: the actor who is articulating it and its relationship with its own population, that actor's relationship with others in the international system, and global order. To illustrate its case, it examines populist discourses of Islamic Republic of Iran elites. Their discourses articulate the need to maintain the Islamic Republic's legitimacy and populist credentials inside and outside Iran, delegitimise Israel, and construct global order. These discourses are grounded in a historical trajectory: the 1979 Revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the difficult relations between Iran and Israel from the establishment until today. It was determined the main reasons for changing relations between these countries and the role of Iran's nuclear program. Also in the article was considered and substantiated the ways of resolving the nuclear problem. The US and European countries were engaged in solving the nuclear issue. After long and difficult negotiations the world powers and Iran reached a final agreement as a part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), on July 14, 2015. However, it has not changed the position of Israeli, political leaders quickly condemned and criticized the agreement. Iran's nuclear program and the maintenance of terrorism are a major threat to the national security of Israel. The Iranian theme has become the most popular in the political life of Israel. So, it was concluded that, today Israel is radically determined to solve this issue and its policy is aimed at eliminating a nuclerar threat. Obviously, that the Iranian-Israeli confrontation in the light of recent events can lead to a full-scale armed conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bilge Strateji is the property of BILGESAM and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Iran’s nuclear programme had for more than a decade become a controversial issue between Iran and the West; it had even threatened to develop into a military confrontation between Teheran and its arch adversary, Washington. The issue was finally resolved in an agreement, after more than a year of negotiations, between the two sides in Geneva in July 2015. This was hailed as a ‘breakthrough’ and a ‘win-win’ for both parties. It is argued here that the nuclear deal has made Iran’s nuclear programme almost inoperable, and pointed out that many members of Congress are vehemently against the deal; the next administration may not honour it or may revise it. The high costs of sanctions against Iran to the sanctioning countries are also examined, with a comparison made between the meagre concessions that Iran will get and the huge concessions that the West will receive under the deal. Furthermore, Iran has acceded to very intrusive inspection of some of its military sites. It is contended that, if the Iranians hope the agreement will soon bring about the resolution of other thorny regional and international issues that exist between Teheran and Washington, they are very likely to be disappointed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Historically, Iran's military strategy has been defensive, based on deterring potential rivals, developing restraining leverage over enemies, keeping adversaries pinned down in secondary theaters, and undermining the will of potential enemies, while attempting to create both influence and a defense zone that will provide it with strategic depth beyond its borders. The goal of this essay is to consider whether as a result of the upheaval in the Middle East Iran has been drawn into a regional policy with new characteristics, and whether its "strategic toolbox" is appropriate for this new policy. The essay also examines how Israel can obstruct Iran, given the emerging lack of equilibrium between Iranian policy and the strategic tools at Tehran's disposal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1970s, while the rest of the world was undergoing recession, vast economic growth in Iran, leading to fast urbanization, generated a growing international building market in which Israeli construction firms and architects also participated, benefiting from the good bilateral relationships at the time. To examine the experience of Israeli architects working in Iran and how it influenced their professional practice, this paper focuses on two projects planned and built simultaneously by Israeli teams. The Navy project was comprised of three massive housing estates and public amenities for the Iranian Navy's troops and families on the coast of the Persian Gulf. The Eskan Towers in Tehran was a complex of residential luxury towers and a commercial centre catering for the Iranian elite. Review of these cases indicates that national knowledge was not always the basis for transnational planning, and that the international arena itself became the source of knowledge and flow. In the Navy project, the architect derived his ideas from professional practices acquired back home, while in the Eskan Towers project the team was confronted with the free-market economy and a globalized practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article, unlike the small but rapidly expanding body of literature on Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel, focuses on the role of Iranian influence as a factor strengthening the strategic partnership that has been successfully blossoming between Azerbaijan and Israel in areas of economic, cultural, developmental and more recently, military cooperation. This study aims to examine the key characteristics of bilateral cooperation between the two countries and seeks to investigate the incentives which have aided to create and cement this atypical partnernship. Among a variety of mutual interests that have allowed the Azerbaijani–Israeli partnership to flourish, this study emphasizes the pivotal role of Iranian–Israeli hostilities which correlate with Azerbaijan’s own grievances with Iran. This study argues that the discrete but strategically important partnership between Azerbaijan and Israel is encouraged not only by the existence of mutually beneficial economic incentives but also by the security threats emanating from Iran. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]