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This article analyzes the relationship between a judicial review of legislation and the principle of political legitimacy understood as the capacity of a legal and political system to generate support for the implementation of laws and policies, even among those who are opposed to them on their merits. The article claims that, despite the existence of multiple forms of judicial review, as well as diverse and respectable sources of legitimacy, judicial review is not designed to generate political legitimacy. In this sense, given the impossibility of solving this 'democratic difficulty,' the article proposes different approaches that might help to mitigate it, as is the case of judicial super-majorities to strike down legislation, following a strong presumption of constitutionality or offering explicit reasons for addressing these democratic concerns. Finally, the article calls for civility in constitutional litigation in order to prevent demonization of the opponent and to open the door to political legitimacy in the context of judicial review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the logical arguments about judicial review and the legitimate authorities of legislators who are acting as judges to the legislatures. Accordingly, when a statute restrict the liberties and individual rights of the people, the parliamentary supremacy overrules the rights-violation. It adds that the final arbitration rests with the legislature whether to amend or repeal the law in response to any complaint which effectively judge the legislature as an institution in a dispute.

Debates about judicial authority-including debates about the desirability of judicial review of legislation-sometimes turn on the question of whether judges have superior skills when it comes to addressing what are, essentially, moral issues about rights. This paper considers the possibility that the answer may be "no," not because judges are inept morally, but because the institutional setting in which they act and the role that they adopt both require them to address questions about rights in a particular legalistic way-indeed, in a way that, sometimes, makes it harder rather than easier for essential moral questions to be identified and addressed. Of course, what we want is for moral issues to be addressed, not as one would make a personal moral decision, but in the name of the whole society. Perhaps the judicial mode of addressing them satisfies that description, but there are other ways of satisfying it too-including legislative approaches, which proceed by identifying all the issues and all the opinions that might be relevant to a decision, rather than artificially limiting them in the way that courts do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's response to criticisms on his book "Law and Disagreement." The book is about disagreements on thoughts about political legitimacy and legal and political institutions. It is argued that a liberal theory and a theory of politics should be formed. The author claimed that the practice of judicial review of legislation in the U.S. is not an appropriate or respectful of way of resolving good faith disagreements about rights in a modern democratic community.

Discusses the status of the legitimacy of judicial review of legislation in constitutional jurisprudence in the United States. Comments on the book `Freedom's Law,' by Ronald Dworkin; Effect of constitutional adjudication on the character of public debate.

Comments on the urge to a judicial review of democracy in the U.S. Right of the public to deserve a forum for working through the disagreements on the issue; Processes involved in the approach of the Supreme Court in reaching decisions involving constitutional controversies; Differences between the courts strategy of coming up with a decision and the approach of legislators in giving their votes.