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This study aims to analyze the original jurisdiction to the crime of bigamy in the early 17th century, when ecclesiastical jurisdiction claimed for a supremacy in that matter against Inquisition in Portuguese Empire. The methodology includes both primary sources which illustrate the debates that time and contemporary literature. As a result, we realized that many actors influenced in the attempt to find a final solution for this conflict, such as the appeal to the Pope and the mediation of the King in Church’s internal affairs, what denotes the multinormative perspective in the Portuguese colonial context and the convivence of different jurisdictions even when there was a conflict between them. O objetivo deste ensaio é analisar a discussão sobre a competência originária para o crime de bigamia no início do século XVII, em face da jurisdição eclesiástica ter entrado em confronto com a da Inquisição, que ocorreu no âmbito do império colonial português. A metodologia utilizada envolveu tanto o estudo de fontes primárias, que ilustram os debates que ocorreram acerca da temática, bem como o posicionamento de estudiosos do período. Os resultados alcançados demonstram que o processo de tentativa de encontrar uma solução definitiva para o conflito envolveu diversas esferas, destacando-se o apelo ao papa e a mediação do próprio rei em desentendimentos internos da Igreja Católica, percebendo-se que a tônica no cenário multinormativo do contexto colonial português envolveu diversas jurisdições, que não necessariamente sobrepujavam as outras envolvidas, mesmo quando entravam em conflito.

If any of Indonesia’s judiciary branches can be said to have been in constant flux before and after the one roof system under the Supreme Court, it is the Administrative Court. From limited jurisdiction—by limitation from The Administrative Court Act (ACA), (Undang-Undang Tentang Peradilan Tata Usaha Negara) and others unresponsive legal policy, establishment of new court, and supreme court decision—to expansion jurisdiction by enactment of Government Administration Act (GAA), (Undang-Undang Tentang Administrasi Pemerintahan) and establishment sectoral laws, including expansion from Constitutional Court decision, has brought dynamic changing to the Administrative Court jurisdiction. In this paper, I will discuss to what extent the Administrative Courts have indeed changed, survived, and improved the administration of justice in their field. I will first provide a short overview of the original jurisdiction on the Administrative Court Act (ACA), followed by an analysis of the legal impact of the enactment of the Government Administration Act (GAA) and other relevant Law and Regulation. This paper demonstrated that Administrative Court jurisdiction expansion urgently required harmonization between the ACA and the GAA: the existing legal gap has been not sufficiently filled by the Supreme Court Regulation (SCR) or Supreme Court Circular (SCC).

This book provides a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the ICC's jurisdiction over nationals of non-States Parties. It is within the context of developments at the Court in recent years that this work addresses the overarching question: On what legal basis is the ICC authorised to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-States Parties? Engaging with ICC jurisprudence and building upon arguments developed in legal scholarship, this book explores the theory of delegated jurisdiction and critically examines the idea that the Court might alternatively be exercising jurisdiction inherent to the international community. It argues that delegation of territorial jurisdiction and implied consent by virtue of UN membership provide a legal basis to allow the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-States Parties in almost all situations envisaged by the Rome Statute.

The exclusive jurisdiction of the traditional justice system – which in effect is based on racial classification – has been the subject of debate in South Africa since the attainment of democracy in 1994. The debate is drawn from the Constitution, which recognises the general system of customary law, and limits its application to the people who observe it. The debate is further fuelled by the non-explicit recognition of the customary court system within the judicial structure of the Republic. These courts are inferred from the concept of ‘any other courts’ in the Constitution. The inference of customary courts from ‘any other courts’, compromises the legitimate status of these courts in the resolution of disputes that arise from the system of customary law – in line with the ideals of the new constitutional dispensation. This considered, this article critically reviews the constitutional status of the customary court system in South Africa. The objective is to examine the effect of its exclusive jurisdiction in the application of the principles of traditional justice. It is also limited to the review of South Africa’s constitutional perspective on the protection of customary law relating to the advancement of the traditional justice system. It is argued, therefore, that the exclusive jurisdiction of the traditional justice system is a direct racial classification under the guise of the foundational values of the new democratic dispensation. Equally, the status given to customary courts – which is inferred from the concepts of ‘any other’ – constitutes a manifestation of the historic divide that compromises the legitimacy of these courts in the application of traditional justice. The extent, to which the exclusive jurisdiction can move towards a system that inclusively reflects the values of the new democratic dispensation, is also reviewed in general.

Since 2013 judicial reforms in China have intensified. While recent studies of the Chinese judiciary have focused on structural reforms concerning the jurisdiction of courts and internal court management, it has largely gone unnoticed that the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) has established an open-access database archiving the decisions of every court in China. On the basis of legal documents, secondary literature and interviews with experts, this study investigates the implications of the new database. We find that the database establishes new channels of communication that affect the relationship between the courts and the public, and the position of judges within the judiciary. Further, the open-access database facilitates changes in the structure of communication among legal experts, which in turn promotes legal professionalism. We argue that the SPC made use of the party policy on the direct accountability of the courts towards the people in order to pursue its institutional interest in a professional judiciary.

This study grew out of my on-the-job blogging. At both the Charleston School of Law and the J. Rueben Clark Law School, I read every opinion from the state and federal appellate courts with jurisdiction over South Carolina and Utah respectively, summarizing the binding authority and posting those summaries online at the Barrister blog and the Binding the Law blog. This has served as excellent current awareness and bar preparation service to the law school communities and a research tool to the legal community generally.

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was conceived of as an area ill-suited for full judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty confers on the Court limited jurisdiction which the recent case law has interpreted in broad terms. This article will place this case law in the broader constitutional setting of the EU legal order and will provide a critical analysis of its implications for both the EU's and domestic courts. The analysis is structured on the basis of three main themes. The first is about the position of CFSP in the EU's constitutional architecture: the article will analyse the constitutional ambivalence that characterizes this position and how it is conveyed by the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union governing the Court's jurisdiction. The second theme is about the recent case law, and the integrationist approach that the Court of Justice has adopted to the scope of its jurisdiction. The third theme is about national courts: the article will argue that recent case law has been too quick to dismiss them, and that primary law renders them an essential part of the judicial review system governing CFSP.

On 5 October 2016, the International Court of Justice (ICJ, the Court) rendered three judgments declining to take jurisdiction in the Marshall Islands cases, in which that state alleged that India, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom violated their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and customary international law. In declining to take jurisdiction, the Court further confirmed its recent shift to jurisdictional formalism, initiated in Georgia v. Russia and confirmed in both Belgium v. Senegal and the Alleged Violations (Nicaragua v. Colombia) judgment. What is more, the Court heightened the burden of proving the existence of a dispute by incorporating an ‘objective awareness’ requirement in its analysis. The present contribution critically situates the Court's judgments within the context of the law of state responsibility and global security, with particular emphasis on the broader implications going forward. It first explores the principal features of the Court's formalistic shift on jurisdictional matters in the cases, setting the stage for the subsequent discussion. The article then turns to the broader implications of these decisions for state responsibility, taking into consideration that the ‘disputes’ submitted to the Court are not strictly bilateral in nature. My ambition is also to highlight the nexus between jurisdictional issues, state responsibility law, and broader questions of access to justice in multilateral disputes. By way of conclusion, the article highlights the importance of identifying creative solutions in a post-Marshall Islands world, suggesting the UN General Assembly as a law-making facilitator and the UN Security Council as an alternate – albeit imperfect – dispute settlement forum to tackle multilateral disputes with global security implications.

This article investigates the proper ambit of trust jurisdiction clauses. The author proposes that whether a trust-related proceeding is or is not subject to any jurisdiction clause in the trust instrument should be decided according to two key criteria: the proximity of the parties to the proceeding to the drafting of the trust instrument and whether the issues under review in the proceeding are part of the routine running of the trust, an attempt to undermine the trust, or an attack on an officer’s functioning within the trust framework. Other factors to be taken into account are the likely costs of proceedings before the chosen court and elsewhere (including difficulties over security for costs), the extent to which the chosen court offers a realistic prospect of a fair hearing, and the extent to which any court orders granted, whether by the court named in a jurisdiction clause or another court, are likely to be enforceable in practice.

One of the most interesting and controversial crimes that belong to the subject matter jurisdiction of the newly to be established African Criminal Chamber is undoubtedly the crime of unconstitutional change of government. This article explores the question why this offence is upgraded to the regional level of criminal law enforcement. After all, any criminalization of the conduct at a regional level and the concomitant inclusion of the offence in the jurisdiction of regional courts raises questions about the right of foreign intervention in internal political affairs and the curtailment of the right to rebel. The crime of unconstitutional change of government is tested against these principles and it is concluded that they do not impede criminalization, nor the elevation of the crime to a regional level. In search of a positive argument in defence of the inclusion of the crime within the jurisdiction of the African Court, I contend that the best explanation is that insurgencies are not contained to single states but are inclined to spread to other countries. In view of the specific African experience, where endemic conflicts have proved to be contagious, it is clear that states have a common interest in suppressing both the dynamic and static form of unconstitutional change of government.

One of the issues that the current proliferation of international courts and jurisdictions raised in the international legal order is overlapping jurisdiction. On 27 June 2014, the Assembly of the African Union adopted a protocol on the Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights which extends the jurisdiction of the court to cover international crimes. The decision of the AU to clothe the African court with a criminal jurisdiction has brought, once again, the issue of overlapping jurisdiction to the surface. This article is an attempt to answer the questions: to what extent does the criminal jurisdiction of the African court overlap with the jurisdiction of the ICC, and is the issue of overlapping jurisdiction a common occurrence or an imminent concern? Taking the crimes under the jurisdiction of the courts and the fact that large numbers of African states are state parties to the ICC into consideration, many tend to argue that overlapping jurisdiction is inevitable and is likely to cause friction for the primacy of jurisdiction. However, this article argues that a close scrutiny of the substantive and territorial jurisdiction of the ICC and the African Court suggests that the issue of overlapping jurisdiction is both rare and of remote concern.

For effective working management of the Supreme Court, Rules have been framed under Article 145 of the Constitution conferring power on the Chief Justice to constitute benches for disposal of cases. The Supreme Court Rules, 2013 provides that the procedural aspects of civil appeals, criminal appeals, original jurisdiction, review, supervisory jurisdiction, reference, review. Article 145 gives to the Supreme Court power to frame rules including rules regarding condition on which a person can practice before the Supreme Court. Such a rule would be valid and binding and such a rule if framed would not have anything to do with the disciplinary jurisdiction of State Bar Councils.

The Intellectual Property Law No. 4 of 2019 (IPL’19) as enacted in the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) has led to creation of an office of Commissioner of Intellectual Property (CIP) which increases the uniformity in remedies of deterrent fines for intellectual property (IP) rights infringements that may occur in DIFC. Likewise, IPL’19 has also delegated jurisdiction with DIFC Courts to adjudicate on the remedies of damages and injunctions for IP rights claims brings about certainty in venue for lodging such claims. Consistency in litigation is important because it reduces uncertainty and increases the predictability of case outcomes. This reduces litigation, as it becomes clearer to potential litigants when a case is without merit. Businesses have greater confidence that their investments in innovation will be protected, allowing them to better plan their business strategy, spurring economic growth. IPL’19 applies to any person who owns or claims ownership, uses or attempts to use, or who seeks to enforce or protect an intellectual property right, or any part thereof, in DIFC. This article provides an overview as to the remedies that DIFC Courts and CIP can provide against IP rights violations in DIFC. For convenient reading the body of this article has been arranged into five parts as below. The first serves as the introduction to subject matter of this article, the second part notes the thresholds identifying the respective jurisdiction of DIFC Courts and CIP, the third part identifies the IP rights claims that have expressly been included in the original jurisdiction of DIFC Courts and CIP, the fourth part analyses the causes of action that DIFC Courts can try in its capacity as a civil court, and the final fifth part serves as the conclusion to this article.

Constitutional adjudication in Malawi only became commonplace after the adoption of a new Constitution in 1994. Like many Anglophone countries, Malawi follows the decentralised model of constitutional adjudication. Under this arrangement, the High Court has unlimited original jurisdiction to hear any civil or criminal matters, including constitutional matters. The Courts Act, however, requires the High Court to sit with an enhanced quorum when it is seized of cases that substantively relate to, or concern the interpretation and application of the Constitution. It is when the High Court sits with a reconfigured quorum that it is popularly referred to as the "constitutional court" (the Court). This article analyses constitutional adjudication in Malawi by focusing on the operation of the Court. Specifically, it analyses the scope of the Court's jurisdiction, the type of constitutional review that it conducts, the regulation of access to the Court, the forms of decisions and remedies that it grants, and the Court's independence. Keywords: constitutional law, constitutional adjudication, High Court of Malawi.

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is a unique institution. Unlike other circuit courts, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is bound by subject area rather than geography, and it was created to address a unique set of problems specific to patent law. These characteristics have affected its institutional development and made the court one of the most frequently studied appellate courts. This chapter examines this development and describes the evolving qualities that have helped the Federal Circuit distinguish itself, for better or worse, as an institution.This chapter begins with an overview of the concerns existing before creation of the Federal Circuit and then discusses the Federal Court Improvements Act of 1982, including what Congress was trying to achieve with the Federal Circuit and how the court was structured in terms of subject matter jurisdiction and the courts it replaced. Next, this chapter will describe the problem of not having a uniform patent law and how the Federal Circuit has impacted uniformity. It will describe how forum shopping was influenced and whether uniformity has affected the diversity and percolation of ideas related to patent law.This chapter then discusses how the Federal Circuit has impacted certainty and predictability of patent law. It begins by looking at where the pressure for certainty comes from. It then focuses on the Federal Circuit’s treatment of a few representative issues to determine whether the court has succeeded in providing it.Next, this chapter explores the quality of the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence, including whether the Federal Circuit is too formalistic in its decisionmaking and if it pays enough attention to policy and technological considerations and scholarship.Given the focus on the Federal Circuit as an institution, this chapter will describe how the Federal Circuit is structured, the makeup of the individual judges on the court, and how these qualities affect the court as such. The role of individual judges and types of judges on the Federal Circuit are examined as well as how internal dynamics and en banc hearings play a role in the decisionmaking process. This chapter then explores the Federal Circuit’s interactions with other institutions and examines which institutions are and should be performing what role in the development of patent law. This section notes the interesting and dynamic interactions the Federal Circuit has had with the Supreme Court, the United States Patent and Trademark Office, district courts, the Solicitor General, and Congress. Finally, this chapter closes with concluding thoughts about empirical research on the Federal Circuit and suggests further areas of exploration.

This chapter considers the actions commenced before the Court of Justice. These include actions by the European Commission and other member states against a member state (Articles 258–60 TFEU); judicial review of acts of the institutions (Article 263 TFEU); the action against the institutions for a failure to act (Article 265 TFEU); actions for damages (Articles 268 and 340 TFEU); and the right to plead the illegality of an EU regulation (Article 277 TFEU). The chapter also considers interim measures under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU and enforcement actions arising from the Commission enforcement of EU competition law against individuals.

The proposed international criminal section of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples Rights (the African Criminal Court) involves a number of progressive features. Among them is the Court’s authority to hear cases against corporations for a comprehensive list of international and transnational crimes. According to Article 46C of the African Criminal Court’s statute, entitled ‘Corporate Criminal Liability’, ‘the Court shall have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the exception of States.’ As no international criminal court has yet to exercise jurisdiction over corporations for international or transnational crimes, the African Criminal Court, should it come into operation, will necessarily tread new ground. This paper forensically examines the contours of Article 46C, with a view to elucidating its scope and to explore some of the challenges it raises.

The question of the legal and normative limitations on the competence of states to agree to a mechanism that enables foreign investors to bypass the jurisdiction of municipal courts, using legal rules that do not apply in municipal law, and thereby enabling arbitral tribunals to override municipal courts (the jurisdiction of which is original, appellate and final) has not been explored in the literature. I address this question with particular reference to Ghana. I dispute the conventional supposition that municipal courts are incapable of resolving investor-state disputes and question the justification for direct access to investor-state arbitration in customary international law. I argue that the local remedies rule and fundamental principles of Ghana’s legal system—in which the courts have jurisdiction over all legal disputes and persons, and in which separation of powers, rule of law, transparency and accountability are constitutionally entrenched—limit the state’s competence to agree to inves...

Constitutional courts in Latin America have used judicial review to enhance the relevance of international law in recent years. Some scholars even speak of a growing “constitutionalization of international law” in the region. But these domestic courts can also act as gatekeepers that blunt or entirely deflect the domestic impact of international law. This essay explores three recent episodes in which constitutional courts joined or led efforts to escape treaty obligations: the Venezuelan Supreme Court's judgment urging the Chávez Administration to denounce the American Convention of Human Rights on constitutional grounds, which Chavez then did in 2012 (a court-inspired treaty exit); the Colombian executive's 2013 petition to have Colombia's acceptance of the International Court of Justice's (ICJ's) jurisdiction under the Pact of Bogotá declared unconstitutional (a court-legitimated treaty exit); and the Dominican Republic (DR) Constitutional Tribunal's 2014 judgment holding that the DR's acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) had been unconstitutional (a court-led treaty exit).

The international penal code of law is laid upon the territorial jurisdictions. However, countries try to extend the spatial domain of their penal laws to areas outside their sovereignty in several exceptional states meaning that in case a crime is perpetrated outside its jurisdiction a country knows its rules and courts as being qualified to try it. One such a case states that if a crime perpetrated abroad jeopardizes their essential and vital interests the type of the jurisdiction that is created under such a circumstance is called “protective jurisdiction”. According to the nature and the intensity of the crimes dealt with based on the principle of protective jurisdiction, various countries do not accept any limitation and condition except the limitation of the examples of crimes subject to protective jurisdiction in regard of the international law for the execution of such an authority. The objective of the current research paper is the investigation of the crime examples subject to protective jurisdiction in the law of Iran, Egypt and France. The results obtained from the present analytical-descriptive study indicate that there are important crimes enumerated case-specifically among the crimes subject to protective jurisdiction in the statutory provisions exercised in countries like Iran, Egypt and France.

A hundred and fifty years after the judicial reform by Tsar Alexander II, the Russian judicial system is undergoing yet another significant reorganization. In 2014, the Highest Arbitrazh (Commercial) Court was abolished and its functions and authority were transferred to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. The current rules of civil and arbitrazh procedure are under review, to be consolidated in the forthcoming unified Civil Procedural Code. This Article focuses on one aspect of the reform: the adjudicative jurisdiction of Russian courts. It critically analyzes the existing rules of jurisdiction, examines their historical predispositions, and offers suggestions for improvement in light of the impending reform. The topic of international jurisdiction appears particularly relevant, given recent international developments, such as the revision of the European Brussels I Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, entry into force of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, etc. The Russian judicial reform represents a unique opportunity to improve the country’s procedural fairness, which is significant both for Russian residents and international litigants. Thus, the Article seeks to inform the international audience on current developments in the field in Russia and aims to contribute to the English legal scholarship on private international law.

The establishment of the Court of the Eurasian Economic Union has marked another attempt of theEAEU members to set up a regional integration court. Russian legal scholars have embarked theanalysis of the Court Statute and Rules of the EAU Court, including the comparison with the powersof the EurAsEC court which had operated for three years and the competence and organizational activityof the EU Court of Justice. However, some issues remain outside the scope of research in particular,the motives guided by the EAEU members approving the decision on establishing Court andassigning it with a particular jurisdiction which significantly differs from the EUCH powers and EAEUcourt competence. The author of the paper attempts to compensate the gap by examining the Statuteof the EAEU court on the one hand as the reflection of concern and doubts and concerns of themembers on the one hand as the reflection of fears, doubts of the members as to the court being established,and on the other hand as a group of measures to control the new court to avoid or minimizejudgments unwanted for them. The author concludes that seeking balance between independenceand efficiency of the EAEU court and control over the court have not been strategically justified. Thefears and doubts of the states drafting the statute of the Court leads to weakening features of thecourt, which will be instantly seen in the quality of the process of Eurasian integration. The existinglimitations in the court jurisdiction do not promote to the development of its authority and legitimacyeither for potential appellants which may seek protection of rights in other international or nationalcourts to challenge the EAEU courts in EUHRC, WTO court, investment arbitrations or constitutionalcourts of the EAEU members.

IN Lungowe v Vedanta Resources Plc [2016] EWHC 975 (TCC), the High Court allowed a claim to be heard in England against parent company incorporated in England and its foreign subsidiary in relation to the overseas subsidiary's operations. The judge considered whether the claim against the English-domiciled defendant could be stayed on the basis of forum non conveniens, and whether jurisdiction could be established over its foreign subsidiary as a necessary and proper party to the case. The overall analysis of the judgment suggests that (1) the claims against the parent company in relation to the overseas operations of the foreign subsidiary can be heard in the English courts and (2) the existence of an arguable claim against the English-domiciled parent company also establishes jurisdiction of the English courts over the subsidiary even if the factual basis of the case occurs almost exclusively in the foreign state.

Ecuador is a country with several normative systems coexisting within the same territory. Having a multiplicity of systems facilitates the clashes of jurisdiction among them. This contribution studies the applicable rules Ecuador has to allocate jurisdiction among different legal systems, and how these rules advance or halt human rights. One particular way the country deals with conflicting jurisdictions is the request to relinquish jurisdiction that indigenous authorities may submit to ordinary courts if the former believe that the latter have no jurisdiction to hear a case. The decisions of ordinary courts on the request to relinquish jurisdiction will be analysed, as well as the impressions and opinions on the matter from academics, ordinary judges and prosecutors, indigenous authorities, activists and lawyers, all of them collected during three field research trips conducted in the country. The paper concludes by arguing that jurisdiction has a human rights impact. Every person has the right t...

Whereas flag states are primarily responsible for living and labour conditions on board ships flying their flag, port state jurisdiction on board foreign-flagged ships is still uncertain from both a public and a private international law perspective. This paper focuses on the latter, to ascertain in which cases port state courts and domestic employment legislation decide on maritime employment contract matters. This may help to establish to what extent the extra-territorial exercise of port state jurisdiction is reasonable: adjudicatory jurisdiction and conflict-of-laws rules are construed on the basis of the proximity principle and thus strive to point out the state with the strongest link to the case at stake. However, the establishment of the port state legal system as the closest one to maritime employment usually amounts to setting the flag state aside, meaning that the subsidiarity principle takes over in determining the extra-territorial application of port state jurisdiction.

It is settled that any challenge to a tribunal's jurisdiction must be reheard by the court. However, the case law is inconsistent on the question whether, in the rehearing, new evidence should be admitted as of right or only in limited circumstances and with the court's permission. The inconsistency is illustrated by two recent judgments. This note argues that a party seeking to adduce new evidence should have to seek permission from the court and explain why the evidence was not put before the tribunal. This approach should encourage the parties to act in good faith during the arbitration proceeding.

Despite the explicit exclusion of its jurisdiction, the Court of Justice of the European Union exercises judicial control over Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This article examines and explains how the Court's extended jurisdiction contributes to the juridification, judicialisation and constitutionalisation of the EU's compound CFSP structures. It first lays the groundwork by explaining the link between constitutionalisation and democratic legitimation and setting out the Court's formal jurisdiction over CFSP under Article 40 Treaty on European Union and Articles 218(11) and 275(2) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The centre piece of the article then identifies how the Court's jurisdiction has expanded since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, points at additional ‘substantive’ avenues of judicial review on the basis of access to information and access to justice, and analyses the effects of the Court of Justice of the European Union's extended jurisdiction for CFSP.

This contribution deals with the most recurrent private international law issue brought before the Court of Justice (the Court) over the last six years, i.e. the determination of international jurisdiction in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, pursuant to what is now Art. 7(2) of Regulation No. 1215/2012. The crucial question in this connection is how to achieve both predictability and a sound administration of justice in a complex legal and technological environment. I argue that the Court has answered this question by embarking upon a path towards consistency between jurisdiction and conflict rules for non-contractual obligations. I seek to show that the merits of the Court’s quest for consistency outweigh the dangers and practical constraints of this approach.

Ohio Rule of Juvenile Procedure 2(Y) allows juvenile courts to do what other courts cannot: designate additional parties to an action, allowing juvenile courts to better accomplish their statutory purpose of pursuing the best interests of children. However, sometimes this can lead to confusion about juvenile courts’ actions to protect children, especially when courts invoke Rule 2(Y) to stop interference with proceedings. This article will examine the historical foundations of Ohio's juvenile courts, the unique authority that they possess, and the conflicts that can arise due to interference with juvenile court proceedings. Ohio's juvenile courts have unique authority, and they can use that authority in a way that does not conflict with constitutional rights, while still working to protect the interests of children.

Malaysia’s Shariah court system long predates the country’s Independence in 1957 and has since undergone a series of developments. Yet the Shariah court’s jurisdiction remains limited by the Parliament and the Federal Constitution. This limited jurisdiction has triggered an on-going conflict between Shariah courts and civil courts. This article discusses the jurisdiction of Shariah court prior to and after the landmark amendment inserting Article 121 (1A) into the Malaysian Federal Constitution. It also discusses the challenges faced by the Shariah courts within and outside the system. This article suggests that the present jurisdiction of the Shariah courts should be reviewed, and that the civil courts should not interfere with the jurisdiction that has been awarded to the Shariah courts, even if that jurisdiction is only implied. This article ends with a suggestion that a Special court should be set up to adjudicate cases pertaining to Islamic law but involving parties of different faiths.

IN federal court, subject-matter jurisdiction is a magic bullet. Jurisdictional problems are particularly pernicious (to the verdict winner) or useful (to the verdict loser) because they can never be waived, the court must address any potential jurisdictional defect it notices, and an incurable jurisdictional defect requires the judgment to be thrown out. We review some common defects in federal subject-matter jurisdiction and potential ways to fix them. (1) I. Why Defects In Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Can Destroy Your Victory (Or Save You From Defeat) "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction [,]" possessing "only that power authorized by Constitution and statute...." (2) At every stage of litigation, a federal court is required to confirm that it has jurisdiction, and to dismiss the claim if it lacks jurisdiction. (3) A court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has subject-matter jurisdiction. (4) If it appears that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. (5) This rule holds even after final judgment has been entered and an appeal filed. A federal appellate court is required to evaluate both its own jurisdiction and that of the district court. If the district court lacked jurisdiction, the appellate court must vacate the judgment: [E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review, even though the parties are prepared to concede it. And if the record discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the defect, although the parties make no contention concerning it. When the lower federal court lacks jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit. (6) "A litigant generally may raise a court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction at any time in the same civil action, even initially at the highest appellate instance." (7) Even if a jurisdictional defect is first discovered after trial or after judgment has been entered, it requires the case to be dismissed. (8) Jurisdiction cannot be created by consent or estoppel, or by '"the parties' litigation conduct.'" (9) Even a party that initially brought the case to federal court can attack jurisdiction. (10) Federal district courts and courts of appeals take these requirements seriously. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(4) requires appellants to explain why the district court and court of appeals have subject-matter jurisdiction. Many district courts and courts of appeals instruct their staff to confirm the court's subject-matter jurisdiction at the inception of a case. Indeed, it is not uncommon for a district court or court of appeals to issue a sua sponte order requiring the parties to explain why there is subject-matter jurisdiction, even when no one disputes it. Meticulous attention to the jurisdictional requirements is therefore critical. We outline some common pitfalls in pleading and establishing both diversity and federal subject-matter jurisdiction, and describe some ways to fix them. II. Diversity Jurisdiction A. Background Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States extends to, inter alia, controversies "between citizens of different states" and "between a state, or citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects." (11) Pursuant to this provision, the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. [sections] 1332, grants federal courts jurisdiction over suits in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the dispute is between (a) citizens of different states, (b) citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign country (excluding lawful permanent residents domiciled in the same state), (c) citizens of different states in which citizens or subjects of foreign countries are additional parties, or (d) a foreign state as plaintiff and citizens of a state or of different states. …

The jurisdictional framework of the Singapore courts has become more nuanced with the establishment of the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) on 5 January 2015 and the signing of the Hague Convention on the Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (Hague Convention) on 25 March 2015. Although the Hague Convention has yet to be incorporated in domestic law, it is expected this will happen in the near future. The SICC project, on the other hand, is part of Singapore's strategy to promote the jurisdiction as an international dispute resolution hub. In essence, the SICC is a domestic specialist court established to deal with international commercial litigation. Adapted from the arbitral model but underpinned by judicial control, central to the SICC framework are party autonomy and flexible procedural rules. The Hague Convention complements the SICC project by increasing the number of jurisdictions in which Singapore judgments will be recognized and enforced. These 2015 developments—key to establishing Singapore as the regional hub for dispute resolution—requires careful working out and an evaluation is needed of the jurisdictional regime that applies to the SICC and the internal allocation of jurisdiction as between the SICC and the Singapore High Court sans the SICC, as well as the impact of the Hague Convention. This article focuses on explaining the in personam jurisdictional rules of the Singapore High Court that now includes the SICC division. Its chief objective is to offer the international community an overview of the working framework of Singapore's version of an ‘international’ commercial court.

Decisions of the Taxation Commissioner are prima facie reviewable, pursuant to s 75(v) of the Constitution and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), for jurisdictional error. However, the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (‘ITAA 1936’) provides significant buffers to the ability of a court to review the Taxation Commissioner’s decisions. The tension between the general principle of the reviewability of the decisions of Commonwealth officers on the one hand, and the intention of Parliament to protect the Taxation Commissioner’s decisions from judicial review on the other hand, was addressed by the High Court in Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd (‘Futuris’). The context, scope and purposive approach to statutory construction, as refined by the Gleeson Court, is subtly underscored in Futuris by the policy consideration of protecting the public revenue. This is manifest in the Court’s construction of ss 175 and 177(1) of the ITAA 1936 which limits challenges to notices of assessment made under the Act. Despite refuting a privative clause construction on these provisions, the Court did not limit the protections that these provisions afford to assessments. Instead, the Court upheld the effectiveness of the provisions in both limiting and conditioning the exercise of a court’s jurisdiction to review taxation assessments. Challenging a court’s jurisdiction through the operation of a privative clause is fraught with difficulties; it is more effective to limit or condition the grounds of review.

Original jurisdiction means the power to hear and determine a dispute in the first instance. The Supreme Court has been given exclusive original jurisdiction which extends to disputes (a) between the Government of India and one or more States, (b) between the Government of India and one or more States on one side and one or more States on the other, (c) between two or more States. However, this jurisdiction shall not extend to a dispute arising out of the treaty, agreement, etc. which is in operation and excludes such jurisdiction. The jurisdiction is extremely wide, provided the dispute is a justiciable one. The intention of the Constitution-makers is that such disputes should not be subjected to several tiers of the judicial hierarchy, but should come, for once and for all, before the highest court of the land.

Brunei gained recognition as a sovereign state in 1984, ending its British protectorate status which had been established in 1888. While Brunei’s Sultan exercises absolute constitutional powers, the legal system of Brunei Darussalam reflects many aspects of the English judicial model, including the ideal of the ‘rule of law’ in its legal administration. The Brunei judiciary is presided over and supervised by the Chief Justice. The hierarchy of courts comprises of: the Court of Appeal, the High Court, the Intermediate Court and the Magistrate’s Court. The civil jurisdiction of the Brunei High Court, for example, consists of original jurisdiction and authority similar to that of the Chancery, Family and Queen’s Bench Divisions of the High Court of England. The general management of a company rests with the board of directors, and it is a basic principle of company law that the majority rule prevails.

Although not always headline grabbing, the Roberts Court has been highly interested in civil procedure. According to critics, the Court has undercut access to justice and private enforcement through its decisions on pleading, class actions, summary judgment, arbitration, standing, personal jurisdiction, and international law.While I have much sympathy for the Court’s critics, the current discourse too often ignores the states. Rather than bemoaning the Roberts Court’s decisions to limit court access—and despairing further developments in the age of Trump—we instead might productively focus on the options open to state courts and public enforcement. Many of the aforementioned decisions are not binding on state courts, and many states have declined to follow their reasoning. This Article documents state courts deviating from Twombly and Iqbal on pleading; the Celotex trilogy on summary judgment; Wal-Mart v. Dukes on class actions; and Supreme Court decisions on standing and international law. Similarly, many of the Court’s highly criticized procedural decisions do not apply to public enforcement, and many public suits have proceeded where private litigation would have failed. This Article documents successful state-enforcement actions when class actions could not be certified, when individual claims would be sent to arbitration, and when private plaintiffs would lack Article III standing.In sum, this Article evaluates state court and state-enforcement responses to the Roberts Court’s procedural decisions, and it suggests further interventions by state courts and public enforcers that could offset the regression in federal court access. At the same time, this analysis also illuminates serious challenges for those efforts, and it offers reasons to be cautious about state procedure and enforcement. Leveling down to state actors may not completely escape the political forces that have shaped federal procedure, and it may exacerbate some of the political economies that have undermined private enforcement and private rights to date.

On 27 June 2014 the African Union (au) Assembly adopted a protocol entitled ‘Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights’. This Protocol contains an annex entitled ‘Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights’. The Protocol and the Statute annexed to it provide for the establishment of a regional court in Africa to be known as the ‘African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (African Court). This Court will, among others, exercise criminal jurisdiction over a wide range of international crimes involving individual criminal responsibility and corporate criminal liability over legal persons (with the exception of States), which goes beyond any other international court or hybrid tribunal. This article considers reasons for establishing a regional court in Africa with criminal jurisdiction and examines the likely effectiveness of the African Court focussing on the wide jurisdiction conferred on the Court; the impact of immunity from criminal prosecution granted to serving au heads of State and other undefined ‘senior State officials’; and the need to strengthen national criminal jurisdictions to enable them to prosecute international crimes in Africa.

When private international law lawyers discuss jurisdiction, focus is typically placed primarily on personal jurisdiction, and secondarily on subject matter jurisdiction. This article seeks to demonstrate that there is a third matter – what we can call scope of jurisdiction, or perhaps scope of remedial jurisdiction – that needs to be considered. Scope of jurisdiction relates to the appropriate geographical scope of orders rendered by a court that has personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. This question has gained far less attention to date. This article highlights why scope of jurisdiction is of particular importance in today's society dominated by constant, substantial and fluid cross-border interaction online, and discusses whether scope of jurisdiction is a separate issue or merely a sub-component of some other concept. Finally, it examines how we may impose appropriate limits on scope of jurisdiction.