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"Experts" appear in the modern American courtroom on the jury as well as in the witness box, posing a dilemma for the legal system by offering a potentially valuable resource and an uncontrolled source of influence. Courts give ambiguous guidance to jurors on how they should handle their expertise in the deliberation room. On the one hand, jurors are told that they should "decide what the facts are from the evidence presented here in court." By direct implication, then, jurors should not use outside information to evaluate the evidence. Jurors are also told, however, that they should "consider all of the evidence in the light of reason, common sense, and experience." And indeed, all decision makers, including jurors, are unavoidably influenced by their own backgrounds and experiences as they evaluate evidence and reach decisions. In this Article we examine the actual and desirable behavior during deliberations of jurors with specialized expertise. We draw on three sources to assess how often citizens with specialized knowledge serve as jurors, how they behave when they do, and how legal professionals view the appropriateness of the contributions juror-experts may make. Our sources include: (i) a survey of 167 experienced trial attorneys who reported on their recent trial experience with juror "experts" (2) the actual deliberations of jurors in fifty civil trials from the Arizona Jury Project, which revealed how real jurors use their expertise in the jury room; and (3) a survey of 128 judges and attorneys who evaluated examples of "expert" juror behavior. Some scholars suggest that jurors with specialized expertise should be excused for cause. In light of our findings, we conclude that such drastic intervention is unwarranted and would inappropriately undermine the increasing heterogeneity on the jury that the elimination of occupational exemptions has worked to promote. We instead advocate a tempered response to the growing presence of juror expertise in the jury room. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experiments reveal anchoring as a powerful force, even when participants see the anchor as irrelevant. Here, we examine the reactions of real deliberating jurors to attorney damage requests and concessions in 31 cases involving 33 plaintiffs in which the jury awarded damages. Jurors were critical consumers of attorney suggestions. They reacted more negatively to, and were less influenced by, plaintiff ad damnums for pain and suffering than to damage requests in categories grounded in more objective evidence. Deliberations revealed that jurors often perceive plaintiff ad damnums not only as irrelevant, but also as outrageous, impressions reflected in their verdicts. These findings suggest that extreme plaintiff ad damnums, including those without grounding in quantitative evidence from trial, may not exert substantial undue influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes the pros and cons of the civil jury decision making under the unanimity requirement. Discussion of the emergence of the controversy over the non-unanimous jury in the case Johnson versus Louisiana in 1972 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the claim that a conviction based on the verdict violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; Tendency of juries to engage in extensive debates on the issues; Explanation on the successful deliberation of juries under the unanimity rule.

Describes the experiment carried out to evaluate a variety of opposing claims about the likely effects of permitting juror discussions during civil trials in Arizona since the 1990s. Comparison of opposing claims made about the likely effects of discussion with the actual behavior of the juries; Wide-ranging use that jurors made of the opportunity to discuss civil cases; Implications on jury innovations.