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This article sketches the emergence of visual schematisms from Immanuel Kant to Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, and Jean-François Lyotard. It demonstrates the centrality of differentiation in these visual representations, as underscored by the "bar" or so-called vinculum (a mathematical term). It ultimately concludes that the weakness or dialectical contradiction of the thus differentiated entities lies in their tendency to fold back into each other, returning to the One which it was the purpose of the schematization to exclude in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the Schematism chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason is to solve the problem posed by the "inhomogeneity" of intuitions and categories: the sensible properties of objects represented in intuition are of a different kind than the properties represented by categories. Kant's solution is to introduce what he calls "transcendental schemata," which mediate the subsumption of objects under categories. I reconstruct Kant's solution in terms of two substantive premises, which I call Subsumption Sufficiency (i.e., that subsuming an object under a transcendental schema is sufficient to subsume it under the corresponding category) and Real Possibility (i.e., that it is really possible to subsume objects under each of the transcendental schemata). These two principles, together with a trivial modal one (the Subsumption‐Possibility Link), entail that it is possible to subsume objects under categories; in other words, the argument of the Schematism is valid. The main work of the paper consists in reconstructing Kant's arguments for, and explanations of, these premises. I argue that they hinge on Kant's claim that transcendental schemata are "time‐determinations," which I interpret to mean: rules for reflexively representing the temporal relations among our own representational states. On the basis of this reading, I reconstruct Kant's argument for Subsumption Sufficiency, category by category. I also explain why Real Possibility follows almost immediately. Granting Kant the argument up to this point in the Critique, the argument of the Schematism is sound. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A Phenomenological Reading. In this article I will present a working hypothesis that combines Edmund Husserl's and Immanuel Kant's stances on the dimension of the transcendental schema. I will offer a reading that, based on the interpretative proposal of the Argentinian philosopher Martín Arias Albisu, will show how schemata, understood as schema-procedure and schema-product, exhibit a certain similarity to the work that Husserl presented in Philosophy of Arithmetic. In other words, I will describe, on the one hand, how the schema-procedure functions as a representation that encompasses the successive addition that constitutes the unity of one to one, while, on the other hand, the schema-product synthesizes (phenomenologically) empirical multiplicity, i.e., it generates a phenomenal order in accordance with understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I defend the traditional interpretations of Kant's Formula of a Law of Nature from recent attacks levelled by Faviola Rivera-Castro, James Furner, Ido Geiger, Pauline Kleingeld and Sven Nyholm. After a short introduction, the article is divided into four main sections. In the first, I set out the basics of the three traditional interpretations, the Logical Contradiction Interpretation, the Practical Contradiction Interpretation and the Teleological Contradiction Interpretation. In the second, I examine the work of Geiger, Kleingeld and Nyholm: these three commentators reject the traditional interpretations entirely, but I argue that this rejection is ill-founded. In the third and fourth, I take a detailed look at Furner's work, work in which he seeks to revise (rather than reject) the traditional interpretations. I argue that, despite his more modest aims, Furner's revision is also ill-founded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Kant posits the schema as a hybrid bridging the generality of pure concepts and the particularity of sensible intuitions. However, I argue that countenancing such schemata leads to a third‐man regress. Siding with those who think that the mid‐way posit of the Critique of Pure Reason's schematism section is untenable, my diagnosis is that Kant's transcendental inquiry goes awry because it attempts to analyse a form/matter union that is primitive. I therefore sketch a nonrepresentational stance aimed at respecting this primitivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about the use of the term schema as a mental structure of knowledge, use in in Kant's philosophical works, as an abstract representation and that provides learning and interpretations which is modified with experience and instruction. It talks about schema theory developed through accretion, tuning and restructuring, instructional technology, concept mapping as the focus of the technology and use of the term in design and learning.

Challenging the common view that categories are prior to schemata, I argue that Kant considers transcendental schemata and categories to represent different guises of the a priori rules that allow the mind to unify a manifold. Since only transcendental schemata present these rules as ways of unifying successive representations, they can be said to constitute the sensible condition of any a priori cognition of objects. I take Kant to argue, on this basis, that Wolffian metaphysics abstracted from this condition, thus unwarrantedly using categories to obtain a priori knowledge of the soul, the world as such and God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his lectures on general logic Kant maintains that the generality of a representation (the form of a concept) arises from the logical acts of comparison, reflection and abstraction. These acts are commonly understood to be identical with the acts that generate reflected schemata. I argue that this is mistaken, and that the generality of concepts, as products of the understanding, should be distinguished from the classificatory generality of schemata, which are products of the imagination. A Kantian concept does not provide mere criteria for noting sameness and difference in things, but instead reflects the inner nature of things. Its form consists in the self-consciousness of a capacity to judge (i.e. the Concept is the 'I think'). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims at analyzing the Doctrine of Method of the Critique of practical reason, and at using the results of this analysis in order to investigate the possibility of juridical morality and political virtues in Kant. With respect to the first task, we shall discuss the pages that precede the Doctrine of Method and introduce the notion of a moral schematism analogous to the transcendental one of the Critique of pure reason. In order to discuss the possibility of civic ethics in Kant we shall take into account differences and similarities between his doctrine of law and his ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immanuel Kant's "Schema" and J. G. Fichte's "Bild" are parallel figures of activity that serve as bridges. For both Kant and Fichte, it is not the image/schema taken as product that is primary, but the act of imaging. I show how Fichte leans on the Kantian argumentation of the schematism in order to attempt bridging the gulf critical philosophy leaves between theoretical and practical philosophy. My broader purpose is to indicate how two German Idealists emphasize activity as a way of solving philosophical problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers the significance of Kant's schematized categories in the Critique of Pure Reason for contemporary metaphysics. I present Kant's understanding of the schematism and how it functions within his critique of the limits of pure reason. Then I argue that, although the true role of the schemata is a relativcly late development in Kant's thought, it is nevertheless a core notion, and the central task of the first Critique can be suf- ficiently articulated in the language of the schematism. A surprising result of Kant's doctrine of the schematism is that a limited form of metaphysics is possible even within the parameters set out in the first Critique. To show this, I offer contrasting examples of legitimate and illegitimate forays into metaphysics in light of the condition of the schematized categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented examining the treatment of judgment within the writings and epistemological systems of the 18th-century philosopher Immanuel Kant. The way in which Kant viewed how judgment is formed and used is discussed. Additional concepts such as schemas, poetry, and the "Monogram of the imagination" are also introduced and explained.

This essay examines the manner in which Hilbert worked out his first formalism in his investigations on the foundations of geometry. To elucidate these views, Hilbert's position is compared with that of Kant, who set forth a constructive notion of "geometrical objects" which endured in the Philosophy of mathematics for a long time. In the first part, the author explores the way in which Kant explains the notion of proof in classical geometry and clarifies how his account relates to his theory of schematism. Next, the conception underlying Hilbert's Grundlagen der Geometrie is presented and an attempt is made to recreate the path he followed until he reached his point of view. In particular this article explores the role that projective geometry and the principle of duality played in his reflections. Finally, Kant's ideas are contrasted with those of Hilbert in his first formalism, pointing toward the view that the latter constitutes a necessary generalization of Kant's mathematical philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the concept of homogeneity (Gleichartigkeit) used by Kant in the schematism chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. I discuss two recent papers that address the same problem. I show that, according to Kant, homogeneity consists in a relation between two heterogeneous terms (the category and the empirical manifold) made possible by the introduction of a third element (the transcendental schema). I claim that such a peculiar relation of homogeneity does not entail the suppression of the heterogeneity (in the usual meaning of the word) between the terms linked by it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I deal with the passage from the Critique of Pure Reason (A 138/B 177) where Kant carries out a preliminary examination of the problem of a schematism of empirical and mathematical concepts. I show that, despite appearances, the necessity of this schematism is in no way denied in the passage in question. In doing this, I also focus on certain other difficulties of reading presented by the aforementioned passage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the philosophical view of philosopher Immanuel Kant about enlightenment. It is stated that the distinction between the public and private self is significant to Kant's reflections on a necessary space of free expression and exchange of ideas, which is also central to cosmopolitical concerns. It is stressed that Kant's philosophy aids and assists oppression by guaranteeing a homogenous world in which everything fits and has its place through a promulgation of the schematism of pure understanding that deterministic subsumption of the particular under the general.

This article examines ‘reflective schema’ within the context of its original study by Kant and Umberto Eco, and from the perspective of my own performance making as a recent practice-as-research (P-a-R) PhD candidate. This is in response to an article by Susan Melrose, where she suggests that it is through a ‘reflective schema’ that we can view performance in order to judge its value as P-a-R (2002). Melrose claims that in using such a schema we no longer need to rely on the ‘traditional thesis’ as the ‘material support’ of performance. I argue that if we include the ‘traditional thesis’ under this model of thought, then it is not simply a material support; it is seen to be essential to the creative process. Therefore, while both acknowledging it as only one possible method and pointing towards its limitations, I also argue that it is useful to understand P-a-R following a ‘reflective schema’ as it demonstrates an alternate relation between the traditional written thesis and the performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I offer a critical reconstruction of Kant's thesis that aesthetic judgement is founded on the principle of the purposiveness of nature. This has been taken as equivalent to the claim that aesthetics is directly linked to the systematicity of nature in its empirical laws. I take issue both with Henry Allison, who seeks to marginalize this claim, and with Avner Baz, who highlights it in order to argue that Kant's aesthetics are merely instrumental for his epistemology. My solution is that aesthetic judgement operates as an exemplary presentation of our general ability to schematise an intuition with a concept at the empirical level. I suggest that this counts as an empirical schematism. Although aesthetic judgement is not based on empirical systematicity, it can nevertheless offer indirect support for the latter in so far as it is a particular revelation of purposiveness in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is an investigation of parallel themes in Heinrich Hertz’s philosophy science and Kant’s theory of schemata, symbols and regulative ideas. It is argued that Hertz’s “pictures” bears close similarities to Kantian “schemata”, that is, they are rules linking concepts to intuitions and provide them with their meaning. Kant’s distinction between symbols and schemata is discussed and related to Hertz’s three pictures of mechanics. It is argued that Hertz considered his own picture of mechanics (the “hidden mass” picture) as symbolic in a different way than the force and energy pictures. In the final part of the article it is described how Harald Høffding soon after the publication of Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics developed a general theory of analogical reasoning, relying on the ideas of Hertz and Kant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the concepts of categories, logical functions and schemata based on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. His views on the theory of cognition; Overview of his book 'Transcendental Deduction'; Characterization of pure concepts; Nature of metaphysical deduction and schematism.