1. On the leakage-resilient key exchange
- Author
-
Janaka Alawatugoda
- Subjects
Computer science ,02 engineering and technology ,Computer security ,computer.software_genre ,Public-key cryptography ,key exchange protocols ,0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering ,QA1-939 ,Leakage (economics) ,94a60 ,Key exchange ,leakage-resilient cryptography ,business.industry ,Applied Mathematics ,020206 networking & telecommunications ,Adversary ,Computer security model ,Computer Science Applications ,14g50 ,Authenticated Key Exchange ,Computational Mathematics ,security models ,020201 artificial intelligence & image processing ,business ,computer ,11t71 ,Mathematics - Abstract
Typically, secure channels are constructed from an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which authenticates the communicating parties based on long-term public keys and establishes secret session keys. In this paper we address the partial leakage of long-term secret keys of key exchange protocol participants due to various side-channel attacks. Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange protocols have been developed over time to provide security even when the adversary learns certain secret values. This paper combines and extends the advances of security modelling for AKE protocols addressing more granular partial leakage of long-term secrets of protocol participants. Further, we fix some flaws in security proofs of previous leakage-resilient key exchange protocols.
- Published
- 2017