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Der Beitrag befasst sich mit der Rolle, die »smarte« Technologien im Rahmen der Energiewende einnehmen können, vergleicht die Smart-Grid-Anwendungen einiger europäischer Länder und zeigt die Grenzen eines intelligenten Netzes auf.

Electricity markets depend on upstream energy markets to supply the fuels needed for generation. Since these markets rely on networks, congestion in one can quickly produce changes in another. In this paper we develop a combined partial equilibrium market model which includes the interactions of natural gas and electricity networks. We apply the model to a stylized representation of Europe’s electricity and natural gas markets to illustrate the upstream and downstream feedback effects which are not obvious on first sight. We find that both congestion and loop-flow effects in electricity markets impact prices and quantities in markets located far from the initial cause of the market changes.

Aktuell wird ein neues Strommarktdesign, die ökonomische Ausgestaltung der Energiewende, parlamentarisch diskutiert. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Veränderungen hinterfragt Maximilian Faltlhauser, Geschäftsführer der Faltlhauser Energie GmbH, München, die Lösungsansätze aus dem Weißbuch des Bundeswirtschaftsministeriums.

Die Bewertung von Strom- und Gasnetzen hat für jeden Netzeigentümer eine hohe Bedeutung. In dem Beitrag werden die relevanten Bewertungsmethoden dargestellt. Vertieft werden die Elemente für die Ermittlung des Ertragswerts unter Berücksichtigung der deutschen Netzregulierung. Für die gewichteten Kapitalkosten, den WACC, wird eine neue Formel für die Berechnung präsentiert. Auch wird die Realoptionstheorie auf die Bewertung von Energienetzen übertragen. Die Werte der bestehenden Realoptionen können den ermittelten Ertragswert erhöhen oder ihn reduzieren. Jedenfalls lassen sich Realoptionen bei den Verhandlungen für einen angemessenen Preis der Energienetze berücksichtigen. Der Beitrag schließt mit Empfehlungen für die Netzbewertung in der Praxis. The valuation of electricity and gas grids is an important task for every grid company. Starting from the relevant valuation methods the paper focuses on the elements of the earnings valuation method. Those are described based on the inputs from the German Grid regulation. For the WACC – as one key element of the earnings valuation – a new calculation formula is presented. In the paper the real options theory is transferred on the valuation of energy grids. The values from existing real options can be added to or subtracted from the calculated earnings value. In any case the real options valuation can be used as a means for negotiating the appropriate price of the energy grid. The article closes with recommendations for the valuation of grids in business practice.

A cooperative game theoretic framework is introduced to study the behavior of cooperating and competing electrical energy providers considering price-preference rational consumers. We analyze the interactions of generators in an idealized environment described by a DC load flow model where the network is lossless and is operated by an independent regulator who ensures network stability and fulfillment of consumption needs while taking into account the preferences of consumers over generators. We assume an iterative process in which the generators publish their price offers simultaneously in each step, based on which the consumers preferences are determined. The model deals with network congestion and safety as not every generator-consumer matching is allowed to ensure the fault tolerant operation of the transmission system. To make the model as simple as possible we do not deal with transmission fees, the profit of the generators is determined as the difference between their income, and their production cost which is assumed to be linearly decreasing with the produced quantity. Any non-monopolistic proper subset of the generators may cooperate and harmonize their offered prices to increase their resulting profit. Since we allow the redistribution of profits among cooperating generators, a transferable utility game theoretic framework is used. Furthermore, as cooperation affects the outsiders as well, the resulting game is defined in partition function form. The model is able to demonstrate some interesting benefits of cooperation as well as the effect of market regulations and asymmetric information on the resulting profits and total social cost.

We introduce a new class of cooperative games where the worth of a coalition depends on the behavior of other players and on the state of nature as well. we allow for coalitions to form both before and after the resolution of uncertainty, hence agreements must be stable against both types of deviations. The appropriate extension of the classicakl core concept, the Sustainable Core, is defined for this new setup to test the stability of allocations in such a complex environment. A prominent application, a game of consumers and generators on an electrical energy transmission network is examined in details, where the power in- and outlets of the nodes have to be determined in a way, that if any line instantaneously fails, none of the remaining lines may be overloaded. We show that fulfilling this safety requirement in a mutually acceptable way can be achieved by choosing an element in the Sustainable Core.

Electricity transmission has become the pivotal industry segment for electricity restructuring. Yet, little is known about the shape of transmission cost functions. Reasons for this can be a lack of consensus about the definition of transmission output and the complexitity of the relationship between optimal grid expansion and output expansion. Knowledge of transmission cost functions could help firms (Transcos) and regulators plan transmission expansion and could help design regulatory incentive mechanisms. We explore transmission cost functions when the transmission output is defined as point-to-point transactions or financial transmission right (FTR) obligations and particularly explore expansion under loop-flows. We test the behavior of FTR-based cost functions for distinct network topologies and find evidence that cost functions defined as FTR outputs are piecewise differentiable and that they contain sections with negative marginal costs. Simulations, however, illustrate that such unusual properties do not stand in the way of applying price-cap incentive mechanisms to real-world transmission expansion.

We propose a price-cap mechanism for electricity-transmission expansion based on redefining transmission output in terms of financial transmission rights. Our mechanism applies the incentive-regulation logic of rebalancing a two-part tariff. First, we test this mechanism in a three-node network. We show that the mechanism intertemporally promotes an investment pattern that relieves congestion, increases welfare, augments the Transco's profits, and induces convergence of prices to marginal costs. We then apply the mechanism to a grid of northwestern Europe and show a gradual convergence toward a common-price benchmark, an increase in total capacity, and convergence toward the welfare optimum.

In this paper we present an international cross-country benchmarking analysis for utility regulation of France and Germany, the two largest electricity distribution countries in Europe. We examine the relative performance of 99 French and 77 German distribution companies operating within two different market structures. This paper applies several parametric benchmarking approaches to assess the relative technical efficiency of the utilities, such as deterministic Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Our base model uses the number of employees as a proxy for labor and network length as a proxy for capital as inputs. Units sold and the numbers of customers are considered as outputs. Our model variations and extensions analyze the effect of different characteristics of distribution areas (e.g. population density and the choice of investment in underground cable network). We find that utilities operating in urban areas feature higher efficiency scores and that investment in underground cables increase the technical efficiency of the distribution utilities.

This study analyzes the effects of additional interconnection on welfare and competition in the Irish electricity market. I simulate the wholesale electricity markets of Great Britain and the island of Ireland for 2005. I find that in order for the two markets to be integrated in 2005, additional interconnection would have to be large. The amount of interconnection decreases for high costs of carbon, since this causes the markets to become more similar. Irish consumers obtain most of the welfare gains of interconnection. As the amount of interconnection increases, there are also positive effects on competition in Ireland, the less competitive of the two markets. Finally, it is unlikely that private investors will pay for the construction of the interconnector since they are unable to extract all its welfare benefits.

Reviewing the development of network access charges in the German electricity market since 2002 reveals significant variation. While some firms continually increased or decreased their access charges, a variety of firms exhibited discontinuous behavior with price changes in both directions. From an economic viewpoint this price setting turbulence is astonishing because grid operators are non-contestable natural monopolists, which in this time period were regulated by Negotiated Third Party Access (NTPA). Depending on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of NTPA, expected behavior would be either regulated average cost prices or monopoly prices, but not the observed turbulence. Although in 2005 NTPA scheme was replaced by a Regulated Third Party Access (RTPA) scheme with a regulator, an analysis of the factors influencing the price setting behavior within this period offers valuable information for the new regulator and the still discussed new incentive regulation, which is expected to start in 2009. Using multivariate estimations based on firm data covering the years 2000-2005, we test the hypotheses that asymmetric influence of regulatory threat, different cost and price calculation knowledge, strategic use of structural features and the obligation to publish specific access charges have influenced the electricity network access charges in Germany.

Scarce interconnector capacities are a severe obstacle to transregional competition and a unified market for electricity in the European Union. However, physically the interconnectors are rarely used up to capacity. This is due to the fact that the current allocation schemes make only limited use of the fact that currents in opposing directions cancel out. We propose a "netting" auction mechanism which makes use of this and in which even small transmission capacities can generate large competitive pressure in adjacent markets. Netting increases the usage of capacity and reduces the auctioneer's incentive to withhold capacity from the auction.

The question of third-party access to the networks has become central to the debate around the liberalisation of the European electricity markets due to the natural monopoly characteristic of the transmission network. The European Union?s electricity directive provides three institutional options for the organisation of network access: the single buyer procedure, the negotiated third-party access and the regulated third-party access. This paper analyses these regimes in a framework of an imperfect decision-making regulation authority which can commit errors when supervising the transmission tariffs. It will be shown that the equivalence of the systems required in the directive is usually not achieved. In addition, conditions for deciding between the three systems are derived under social welfare considerations. Bei der Liberalisierung der europäischen Elektrizitätsmärkte ist wegen der natürlichen Monopoleigenschaft des Übertragungsnetzes die Frage des Netzzugangs Dritter von zentraler Bedeutung. Die EU-Stromrichtline bietet drei institutionelle Alternativen zur Organisation des Netzzugangs an: Das Alleinkäufersystem, den regulierten und den verhandelten Netzzugang. Dieser Beitrag untersucht diese drei Netzzugangsregime im Kontext einer fehlerhaft entscheidenden Aufsichtsbehörde. Er kommt zu dem Ergebnis, daß die in der Richtlinie postulierte Ergebnisäquivalenz der Systeme in der Regel nicht erreicht wird. Darüberhinaus werden Kriterien für die Entscheidung zwischen den Alternativen unter Effizenzgesichtspunkten hergeleitet.