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In this article, the author studies the strategic interaction between employee stakeholders, in particular labor unions, and top management, and he evaluates the effect of the two parties' inherent competitive rent-seeking behavior on CEO pay. Using a panel of firms listed on the S&P/TSX Composite Index, the author shows that CEO compensation withstood the financial crisis (2008-2011) despite lower and even negative corporate performance. Further, highly unionized companies were associated with higher CEO pay in terms of non-equity elements such as salary and pension allocations. The presence of unions had no observed effect in reducing bonuses, stock options, and restricted stock units. These findings have implications for the debate on income inequality and the power of unions to bring about change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The general decline of strikes does not necessarily imply that workers are demobilised. A dormant strike potential can be present. Drawing on strikes as 'experience goods', this article sheds light on this point by studying pro-strike attitudes among employees in 24 countries who have never been on strike. The variation in pro-strike attitudes is explained by both contextual (collective bargaining coverage, economic conditions and freedom of rights and liberties) and individual (union membership and confidence in unions, political values and household financial situation) factors. Deeper analyses of three countries highlight the potential impact of specific repertoires of contention developed over time on the formation of pro-strike attitudes. Implications for the labour conflict literature and union strategies are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategic managers are consistently faced with decisions of how to allocate a company's scarce resources to meet the demands of shareholders and other powerful and legitimate stakeholders. This article analyses whether higher union density at company level pushes management to engage more in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Drawing from stakeholder theory and the resource allocation approach of CSR as well as union voice and monopoly models, this article finds that companies have to substitute non–employee‐oriented CSR with employee‐oriented CSR as union density increases but is still at low levels. At higher levels of union density, companies can complement both types of CSR. This perhaps represents a reinforcement of mutual interests between management and organized labour, which has implications for managerial prerogatives as well as union positioning in the labour and political process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]