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We analyse the effects of imports on employment and earnings by distinguishing between import competition in final products and firms’ use of imports in production (offshoring). We use Finnish worker-firm data merged with product-level trade data. We focus on Chinese imports and instrument them by changes in China’s share of world exports. Both types of importing increase the job loss risk for all workers and, in particular, for workers in production occupations. An increase in import competition has larger negative effects than an increase in offshoring. Production workers suffer the largest earnings losses, while for high-skilled workers the wage-effect is positive.

We analyze short and long-term effects of worker displacement. Our sample consists of male workers displaced from Norwegian manufacturing plants. We find that displacement increases the probability of leaving the labor force by 31%. The drop-out rate from the labor force is particularly high in the first years following displacement. The average earnings effects for those who remain in the labor force are moderate, a 3% loss relative to non-displaced workers after seven years. Splitting displaced workers on within- and between-firm movers, we find that the estimated earnings loss is entirely driven by between-firm movers who experience a 3.6% loss. Transfers to other plants within multi-plant firms upon displacement are quite common. Our results support the view that human capital is partly firm specific and partly industry specific. We find no evidence suggesting that human capital is plant specific.

It is well documented that displaced workers suffer severe earnings losses, but not why this is so. One reason may be that workers are unable or unwilling to move to regions with better employment opportunities. We study this and find that job displacement increases regional mobility but, surprisingly, we also find that displaced workers who move suffer larger income losses than displaced workers who stay in the same region. This is not a selection effect, but reflects the fact that non-economic factors such as family ties are very important for the decision to migrate. Workers are less likely to move if they have family in the region where they already live, and job loss stimulates workers to relocate with parents and siblings when they live in different regions. Looking at earnings we find that the entire post displacement income difference between displaced movers and stayers is driven by workers moving to regions where their parents live or to rural areas. Furthermore, when looking at long-run family income, we find that the difference between displaced movers and stayers is very modest. With respect to selection, we find that migrants are positively selected on average, but very heterogeneous. They seem to be drawn disproportionately both from the high and the low end of the skill distribution in the region they leave.

It is well documented that displaced workers suffer severe earnings losses, but not why this is so. One reason may be that workers are unable or unwilling to move to regions with better employment opportunities. We study this and find that job displacement increases regional mobility but, surprisingly, we also find that displaced workers who move suffer larger income losses than displaced workers who stay in the same region. This is not a selection effect, but reflects the fact that non-economic factors such as family ties are very important for the decision to migrate. Workers are less likely to move if they have family in the region where they already live, and job loss stimulates workers to relocate with parents and siblings when they live in different regions.Looking at earnings we find that the entire post displacement income difference between displaced movers and stayers is driven by workers moving to regions where their parents live or to rural areas. Furthermore, when looking at long-run family income, we find that the difference between displaced movers and stayers is very modest. With respect to selection, we find that migrants are positively selected on average, but very heterogeneous. They seem to be drawn disproportionately both from the high and the low end of the skill distribution in the region they leave.

This paper analyzes the effects of job displacement on fertility using Finnish longitudinal employer-employee data (FLEED) matched to birth records. We distinguish between male and female job losses. We focus on couples where one spouse has lost his/her job due to a plant closure or mass layoff and follow them for several years both before and following the job loss. As a comparison group we use similar couples that were not affected by job displacement. In order to examine the possible channels through which job loss affects fertility we examine also the effect on earnings, employment and divorce. The results show that a woman?s own job loss decreases fertility mainly for highly educated women. For every 100 displaced females there are approximately 4 less children born. A man?s job loss has no significant impact on completed fertility.

Low-wage subsidies are often proposed as a solution to the unemployment problem among the low skilled. Yet the empirical evidence on the effects of low-wage subsidies is surprisingly scarce. This paper examines the employment effects of a Finnish payroll tax subsidy scheme, which is targeted at the employers of older, full-time, low-wage workers. The system’s clear eligibility criteria open up an opportunity for a reliable estimation of the causal impacts of the subsidy, using a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach. Our results indicate that the subsidy system had no effects on the employment rate. However, it appears to have increased the probability of part-time workers obtaining full-time employment.