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Your search keyword '"Negretto, Gabriel L."' showing total 3 results
Start Over Author "Negretto, Gabriel L." Topic latin america Topic political science
3 results on '"Negretto, Gabriel L."'

1. The Durability of Constitutions in Changing Environments: A Study on Constitutional Stability in Latin America.

Author

Negretto, Gabriel L.

Subjects
*CONSTITUTIONS, *POLITICAL stability, *SOCIAL stability, *POLITICAL science
Abstract

Political scientists often consider constitutions and their various designs as key variables for explaining a wide range of relevant outcomes, such as the stability and quality of democracy, economic performance, or the rate of policy change across political regimes. The validity of this claim rests on the assumption that constitutions are a stable set of rules that become self-enforcing over time. Constitutional stability, however, is subject to variation across time and space. I argue that this variation depends both on institutional configurations and on the relative stability of the political environment that the constitution is supposed to regulate. Using a duration analysis of constitutions in 18 Latin American countries between 1946 and 2000, this paper shows that while the lifespan of constitutions is negatively affected by political and social instability, some of the institutions that prevent the concentration of power and protect the constitution as a "fundamental law" decrease the risk of constitutional replacement. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2006

2. La reforma constitucional en México Apuntes para un debate futuro.

Author

Negretto, Gabriel L.

Subjects
*POLITICAL systems, *ELECTIONS, *SEPARATION of powers, *LEGISLATIVE bodies, *POLITICAL science, MEXICAN politics & government
Abstract

Since 2000, Mexican politics has changed in two important ways. First, the PRI's defeat in the 2000 elections has ended a 70-year long one-party system. Second, the president no longer holds a majority in either chamber of a bicameral congress. In what is likely to be a new era of divided government, constitutional engineers proposed a multitude of constitutional reforms to promote good governance under a separation of powers system. While some reforms attempt to decrease the likelihood of minority presidents, others aim at strengthening the constitutional powers of the president. This paper argues that a viable and desirable strategy of constitutional change should avoid these two extremes. Instead, reforms should generate incentives to promote inter-branch cooperation during divided government. This paper discusses the benefits of a partial reform consisting of two parts: 1) electoral rules that promote correspondence between the preferences of citizens and those of policy makers and 2) constitutional powers that encourage coordination between the president and the congress in the process of policy making and cabinet formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2006

3. The reform of presidentialism in Latin America. Towards a hybrid model

Author

Gabriel L. Negretto and Negretto Gabriel L., Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Sociales

Subjects
separation of powers, poder presidencial, separación de poderes, Latin America, América Latina, presidential power, constitutional reform, Political science, reforma constitucional, PRESIDENCIA, PODER EJECUTIVO, General Earth and Planetary Sciences, Humanities, General Environmental Science
Abstract

Resumen: Este artículo analiza los cambios constitucionales que han alterado el poder de los presidentes en América Latina entre 1978 y 2014. Se argumenta que las tendencias de reforma en esta materia se han movido en direcciones opuestas. Se han incorporado reglas que reducen la probabilidad de que el presidente cuente con un apoyo mayoritario en el Congreso, con otras que incrementan su poder de negociar con los legisladores. Por otra parte, mientras muchas reformas se orientan a fortalecer la capacidad del Congreso para supervisar las facultades de gobierno del Ejecutivo, se adoptaron otras que concentran Poder Legislativo en manos del presidente. En este diseño híbrido, las reformas adoptadas coexisten en tensión y tienen un impacto contradictorio en el poder real de los presidentes, de modo tal que es tan incorrecto hablar de un avance del hiperpresidencialismo como de una disminución sistemática del poder de los presidentes en todas sus dimensiones. Summary: This article analyzes the constitutional changes that have altered the power of presidents in Latin America between 1978 and 2014. It argues that reform trends in this matter have moved in opposite directions. Rules that reduce the likelihood that the president will have majority support in Congress have been incorporated, along with other rules that increase the president’s power to negotiate with legislators. On the other hand, while many reforms are aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Congress to supervise the governing powers of the Executive, other reforms that concentrate Legislative Power in the hands of the president were adopted. In this hybrid design, the adopted reforms coexist in tension and have a contradictory impact on the real power of the presidents, in such a way that it is as incorrect to speak of an advance of hyperpresidentialism as of a systematic reduction of the power of the presidents in all its dimensions.

Published
2018

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