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In this article the authors aim to understand the specificity of violence against Black women in Brazilian politics through the analysis of testimonies of Black politicians in different administrative positions and various regions of Brazil. Adopting the "Violence Against Women in Politics" (VAWIP) analytical model developed by Mona Lena Krook, the goal of this approach is to highlight the forms that this violence takes in the Brazilian context when gender and race intersect. In doing so, the article pursues two objectives. First, it offers an overview of violence against Black women in Brazilian politics, demonstrating how this phenomenon manifests itself in the analysis of these cases. Second, it observes how the testimonies of Black women politicians go beyond the analytical model proposed by Mona Lena Krook (2020), thus accounting for the intersectional specificities of political violence. In diesem Artikel wird die Besonderheit der Gewalt gegen Schwarze Frauen in der brasilianischen Politik durch die Analyse von Zeug*innenaussagen Schwarzer Politiker*innen in verschiedenen Verwaltungen und Regionen Brasiliens analysiert und nachgewiesen. Anhand des von Mona Lena Krook entwickelten Analysemodells "Gewalt gegen Frauen in der Politik" (VAWIP) wollen die Autor*innen die Formen dieser Gewalt im brasilianischen Kontext aufzeigen, insbesondere wenn sich gender und race überschneiden. Damit verfolgt der Beitrag zwei Hauptziele. Das erste besteht darin, einen Überblick über die Gewalt gegen Schwarze Frauen in der brasilianischen Politik zu geben und so zu ermitteln, wie sich diese manifestiert. Das zweite Ziel besteht darin, zu beobachten, wie die Zeug*innenenaussagen Schwarzer Politikerinnen über das von Krook vorgeschlagene analytische Modell hinausgehen und so die intersektionalen Besonderheiten politischer Gewalt berücksichtigen.

Background Based on a feminist approach, we analyzed the experiences of workplace bullying suffered by women front-line healthcare professionals dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic. We start from studies that show that women make up 70% of the global health workforce, 85% in the area of nursing, and 90% in the case of social care workers. An unequivocal need thus exists to address gender issues regarding the composition of the labor force in the health area. The pandemic has aggravated recurring problems involving healthcare professionals at the various caregiving levels, such as mental harassment (bullying) and its effects on mental health. Methods Data were gathered from an online survey of a convenience (non-probability) sample composed of 1,430 volunteer respondents, all women that work in the public health system in Brazil. The analyses and discussions involved the responses to a questionnaire containing 12 closed-ended questions and one open-ended question. Results The results revealed a context of workplace bullying aggravated by precarious material, institutional and organizational conditions in the area of health services against the backdrop of the Covid-19 pandemic in Brazil. This context has variously led to aggression, isolation, heavy workloads, and invasion of privacy, humiliation, persecution and fear as it was possible to see, mainly, in the answers to the study’s open-ended question. This situation degrades both work relations and the integrity of the healthcare professionals who work on the front line to treat Covid-19 cases. Conclusion We conclude that bullying is a psychosocial phenomenon that heightens the oppression and subordination still experienced by women in the contemporary context, but with new hues in a scenario of frontline response to Covid-19.

Die Außen- und Handelsbeziehungen Brasiliens zu Subsahara-Afrika (SSA) gehen bis auf den portugiesischen Sklavenhandel zurück. Von den 9,5 Millionen Menschen, die zwischen dem 16. und 19. Jahrhundert in Afrika gefangen genommen und in die Neue Welt gebracht wurden, landeten fast 4 Millionen in Rio de Janeiro, d.h. zehnmal mehr als alle Sklaven, die in die Vereinigten Staaten geschickt wurden. Noch heute sehen sich etwa 51 % der Bevölkerung Brasiliens als schwarz oder gemischt. Rassenungleichheit ist in vielerlei Hinsicht nach wie vor tief verwurzelt, insbesondere in Bezug auf die anhaltende Ungleichheit. Dennoch wurden Unterdrückung und Marginalisierung schwarzer Brasilianer in den modernen brasilianisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen weitgehend ausgeblendet. Stattdessen durchdrang ein ausgeprägter Nationalismus das politische Leben Brasiliens. Es bestimmte auch seine Außen- und Handelsbeziehungen und definierte, wie die Brasilianer die Chancen afrikanischer Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen nutzten. Erst Brasiliens Präsident Lula da Silva bekannte sich während seiner ersten Amtszeit als Präsident von 2003 bis 2011 zu den gemeinsamen historischen Wurzeln. Tatsächlich verdankte er seine Wahl der überwältigenden Unterstützung der Afrobrasilianer. Die Handelsbeziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts beschränkten sich weitgehend auf Südafrika, auf das 90 % des afrikanischen Handels Brasiliens entfielen. Brasilias Außen- und Handelspolitik konzentrierte sich in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren auf Nigeria, einen wichtigen Öllieferanten, sowie die fünf ehemaligen portugiesischen afrikanischen Kolonien (PALOP) und das 1996 gegründete Lusophone Commonwealth (CPLP). Der Handel mit Westafrika blieb, mit Ausnahme von Nigeria (34 % des afrikanischen Handels Brasiliens), recht bescheiden. Dennoch spielten Ghana und Senegal in den frühen Stadien der afrikanischen Unabhängigkeit eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Gestaltung der brasilianisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen. Da Brasilien mittlerweile über beträchtliche eigene Energie- und Rohstoffressourcen verfügt, ist sein Ansatz im afrikanischen Handel weniger rohstoffgetrieben als der chinesischer oder europäischer Investoren, sondern orientiert sich an Ressourcendiversifizierung, nachhaltiger Entwicklung und Kooperation zur Erschließung dieser Ressourcen, z.B. Bioethanolanlagen in Ghana. Daher sehen afrikanische Regierungen ihre Beziehungen zu Brasilien eher auf gegenseitiger Partnerschaft gegründet. Korrupte politische afrikanische Eliten selbst drängten jedoch die brasilianische Regierung und Unternehmen oft zu informellen politischen und geschäftlichen Praktiken, mit umstrittenen und korrupten Investitionen in Rohstoffgewinnung, Infrastruktur und Landraub. Abgesehen davon versuchte Brasilien, eine Nische für brasilianische Managementdienstleistungen, Wissens- und Technologietransfer zu schaffen, der angeblich hervorragend für tropische Märkte geeignet war. Brazil's foreign and trade relations with Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) date back to the Portuguese slave trade. Of the 9.5 million people captured in Africa and brought to the New World between the 16th and 19th centuries, nearly 4 million landed in Rio de Janeiro, i.e. ten times more than all those sent to the United States. Still today, about 51 % of the population see themselves as black or mixed. Racial inequality remains deeply engrained in many respects, notably concerning persistent inequality. Nonetheless, oppression and marginalization of black Brazilians have been largely ignored in modern Brazilian-African relations. Instead, a pronounced nationalism suffused Brazil's political life. It guided Brazil's foreign and trade relations and defined how Brazilians interpreted the opportunities of African independence movements. Only Brazil’s President Lula da Silva acknowledged the common historical roots during his first time as president from 2003 to 2011. In fact, his election was driven by the overwhelming support of Afro-Brazilians. Trade relations in the first half of the 20th century were largely limited to South Africa, which accounted for 90 % of Brazil's African trade. Brasilia's foreign and trade policy since the 1960s focussed on Nigeria, an important oil supplier, and the five Portuguese-speaking former Portuguese African colonies (PALOP) and the Lusophone Commonwealth (CPLP), founded in 1996. Up to date, Brazilian's trade relations in West Africa, apart from Nigeria (34 % of Brazil’s African trade) remained fairly modest. Nevertheless, Ghana and Senegal played a decisive role in shaping Brazil-African relations in the early stages of African independence since the 1960s. Because Brazil has meanwhile considerable energy and commodity resources of its own, its approach concerning African trade is less commodity driven than the Chinese or European, but orientated at resource diversification, sustainable development and cooperation to develop these resources, e.g. bioethanol plants in Ghana and other African countries. Therefore, African governments see a greater sense of mutual partnership and reciprocity in their relationship with Brazil. However, corrupt political African elites themselves urged the Brazilian government and companies often into informal political and business norms, with controversial and corrupt investment in commodity extraction, infrastructure and land-grabbing. Apart from that, Brazil tried to create a niche for Brazilian management services, knowledge and technology transfer, suited supposedly exceptionally well for tropical markets. Les relations étrangères et commerciales du Brésil avec l'Afrique subsaharienne (ASS) remontent à la traite négrière portugaise. Sur les 9,5 millions de personnes capturées en Afrique entre le XVIe et le XIXe siècle et amenées dans le Nouveau Monde, près de 4 millions se sont retrouvées à Rio de Janeiro, soit dix fois plus que tout les esclaves envoyés aux États-Unis. Aujourd'hui encore, environ 51 % de la population brésilienne se considère comme noire ou métisse. L'inégalité raciale reste ancrée à bien des égards, en particulier en ce qui concerne l'inégalité persistante. Néanmoins, l'oppression et la marginalisation des Brésiliens noirs ont été largement ignorées dans les relations modernes entre le Brésil et l'Afrique. Au lieu de cela, un nationalisme fort a imprégné la vie politique brésilienne. Il a également déterminé ses relations extérieures et commerciales et défini comment les Brésiliens ont saisi les opportunités présentées par les mouvements d'indépendance africains. Seul le président brésilien Lula da Silva, au cours de son premier mandat présidentiel de 2003 à 2011, a reconnu leurs racines historiques communes. En fait, il doit son élection au soutien écrasant des Afro-Brésiliens. Les relations commerciales de la première moitié du XXe siècle se limitaient en grande partie à l'Afrique du Sud, qui représentait 90 % du commerce africain du Brésil. La politique étrangère et commerciale de Brasilia dans les années 1960 et 1970 s'est concentrée sur le Nigeria, un important fournisseur de pétrole, ainsi que sur les cinq anciennes colonies africaines portugaises (PALOP) et la Communauté lusophone (CPLP), créée en 1996. Le commerce avec l'Afrique de l'Ouest est resté assez modeste, à l'exception du Nigeria (34 % du commerce africain du Brésil). Néanmoins, le Ghana et le Sénégal ont joué un rôle crucial dans l'élaboration des relations entre le Brésil et l'Afrique dans les premiers stades de l'indépendance africaine. Étant donné que le Brésil dispose désormais de ressources considérables en énergie et en matières premières, son approche du commerce africain est moins axée sur les matières premières que celle des investisseurs chinois ou européens, mais orientée vers la diversification des ressources, le développement durable et la coopération pour développer ces ressources, par ex. usines de bioéthanol au Ghana. Par conséquent, les gouvernements africains considèrent leurs relations avec le Brésil comme davantage basées sur un partenariat mutuel. Cependant, les élites politiques africaines corrompues elles-mêmes ont souvent fait pression sur le gouvernement brésilien et les entreprises d’appliquer des pratiques politiques et commerciales informelles, avec des investissements controversés et corrompus, p.ex. concernant l'extraction des ressources, les infrastructures et l'accaparement des terres. En dehors de cela, le Brésil s'efforçait de se tailler un créneau pour les services de gestion brésiliens, le transfert de connaissances et de technologie qui était, disait-on, spécialement adapté aux marchés tropicaux.

In a press conference in Buenos Aires in October 2022, Josep Borrell, the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, declared that 2023 must be the year of Latin America in Europe and of Europe in Latin America. There is renewed European interest in Latin America as a strategic partner, but many Latin American governments prefer an active non-alignment in international politics. The Spanish EU Council Presidency in the second half of 2023 will open a window of opportunity for deepening EU-Latin American and the Caribbean relations. A summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the first since 2015, is planned to be held from 17-18 July 2023 in Brussels. As the EU is pursuing open strategic autonomy, Latin America is perceived as a possible strategic partner supportive of its agenda in international politics. Strategically important raw materials are imported from Latin America, and the latter's countries have the potential to become important producers and exporters of green hydrogen. While Europe has lost ground as a trading partner with Latin America to China, European companies are still a leading investor in the region, and Europe has still soft power or power of attraction in Latin America. The results of the recent elections in Latin America, especially the victory of Lula da Silva in Brazil, open new possibilities for EU cooperation with the region. It will be easier to find common positions on climate change and the protection of the Amazon rainforest. But Latin American governments will demand more protection for their domestic industries in free trade agreements and expect more European funding for measures against climate change and for environmental protection, and they will not automatically support European positions in international politics. If the EU wants to win over Latin America as a strategic partner, it must also act strategically. The signing of the association agreement with Mercosur should take highest priority, even in the face of resistance from within Europe. The upcoming EU-CELAC summit offers an opportunity to adopt a new agenda of bi-regional cooperation.

Lateinamerika mit sehr diversen Entwicklungsständen ist einerseits als Kontinent heterogener Länderhistorien zu betrachten, zugleich aber auch Sammelbecken dezentralisierter Bildungssysteme, aus denen stark differenzierende Karrierewege resultieren. In kaum einem gesellschaftlichen Bereich haben soziale Disparitäten einen solch starken Einfluss auf die Mobilität wie in der Bildung, sie sollen exemplarisch anhand von Brasilien und Kolumbien mithilfe von Lebensverlaufsanalysen gezeigt werden. Wenn Ungleichheiten, die auf Herkunft und Milieu zurückgehen, nicht durch institutionelle Bildung kompensiert, sondern, wie anhand der Darlegung der Bildungssysteme Kolumbiens und Brasiliens, verschärft bzw. konzediert werden, ist der individuelle Bildungsaufstieg herausfordernd und gelingt nur wenigen. Vielmehr manifestiert sich in diesen Ländern eine Reproduktion sozialer Disparitäten, bedingt durch die institutionelle Diskriminierung, die Aufstiegsprozesse und Habitustransformationen kaum begünstigen. Latin America, with its very diverse levels of development, is both a continent of heterogeneous country histories and also a reservoir of decentralized educational systems from which highly differentiated career paths are established. There is hardly an area of society in which social disparities have such a strong influence on mobility as education, as is shown based on life course analyses drawing on examples from Brazil and Colombia. If inequalities based on origin and milieu are not compensated by institutional education, but are exacerbated or conceded, as in the case of the education systems in Colombia and Brazil, then individual educational advancement is challenging, and only few succeed. Rather, social disparities are reproduced in these countries as a result of institutional discrimination, which hardly favours processes of advancement and habitus transformation.

Die Außen- und Handelsbeziehungen Brasiliens zu Subsahara-Afrika (SSA) gehen bis auf den portugiesischen Sklavenhandel zurück. Von den 9,5 Millionen Menschen, die zwischen dem 16. und 19. Jahrhundert in Afrika gefangen genommen und in die Neue Welt gebracht wurden, landeten fast 4 Millionen in Rio de Janeiro, d.h. zehnmal mehr als alle Sklaven, die in die Vereinigten Staaten geschickt wurden. Noch heute sehen sich etwa 51 % der Bevölkerung Brasiliens als schwarz oder gemischt. Rassenungleichheit ist in vielerlei Hinsicht nach wie vor tief verwurzelt, insbesondere in Bezug auf die anhaltende Ungleichheit. Dennoch wurden Unterdrückung und Marginalisierung schwarzer Brasilianer in den modernen brasilianisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen weitgehend ausgeblendet. Stattdessen durchdrang ein ausgeprägter Nationalismus das politische Leben Brasiliens. Es bestimmte auch seine Außen- und Handelsbeziehungen und definierte, wie die Brasilianer die Chancen afrikanischer Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen nutzten. Erst Brasiliens Präsident Lula da Silva bekannte sich während seiner ersten Amtszeit als Präsident von 2003 bis 2011 zu den gemeinsamen historischen Wurzeln. Tatsächlich verdankte er seine Wahl der überwältigenden Unterstützung der Afrobrasilianer. Die Handelsbeziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts beschränkten sich weitgehend auf Südafrika, auf das 90 % des afrikanischen Handels Brasiliens entfielen. Brasilias Außen- und Handelspolitik konzentrierte sich in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren auf Nigeria, einen wichtigen Öllieferanten, sowie die fünf ehemaligen portugiesischen afrikanischen Kolonien (PALOP) und das 1996 gegründete Lusophone Commonwealth (CPLP). Der Handel mit Westafrika blieb, mit Ausnahme von Nigeria (34 % des afrikanischen Handels Brasiliens), recht bescheiden. Dennoch spielten Ghana und Senegal in den frühen Stadien der afrikanischen Unabhängigkeit eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Gestaltung der brasilianisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen. Da Brasilien mittlerweile über beträchtliche eigene Energie- und Rohstoffressourcen verfügt, ist sein Ansatz im afrikanischen Handel weniger rohstoffgetrieben als der chinesischer oder europäischer Investoren, sondern orientiert sich an Ressourcendiversifizierung, nachhaltiger Entwicklung und Kooperation zur Erschließung dieser Ressourcen, z.B. Bioethanolanlagen in Ghana. Daher sehen afrikanische Regierungen ihre Beziehungen zu Brasilien eher auf gegenseitiger Partnerschaft gegründet. Korrupte politische afrikanische Eliten selbst drängten jedoch die brasilianische Regierung und Unternehmen oft zu informellen politischen und geschäftlichen Praktiken, mit umstrittenen und korrupten Investitionen in Rohstoffgewinnung, Infrastruktur und Landraub. Abgesehen davon versuchte Brasilien, eine Nische für brasilianische Managementdienstleistungen, Wissens- und Technologietransfer zu schaffen, der angeblich hervorragend für tropische Märkte geeignet war. Brazil's foreign and trade relations with Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) date back to the Portuguese slave trade. Of the 9.5 million people captured in Africa and brought to the New World between the 16th and 19th centuries, nearly 4 million landed in Rio de Janeiro, i.e. ten times more than all those sent to the United States. Still today, about 51 % of the population see themselves as black or mixed. Racial inequality remains deeply engrained in many respects, notably concerning persistent inequality. Nonetheless, oppression and marginalization of black Brazilians have been largely ignored in modern Brazilian-African relations. Instead, a pronounced nationalism suffused Brazil's political life. It guided Brazil's foreign and trade relations and defined how Brazilians interpreted the opportunities of African independence movements. Only Brazil’s President Lula da Silva acknowledged the common historical roots during his first time as president from 2003 to 2011. In fact, his election was driven by the overwhelming support of Afro-Brazilians. Trade relations in the first half of the 20th century were largely limited to South Africa, which accounted for 90 % of Brazil's African trade. Brasilia's foreign and trade policy since the 1960s focussed on Nigeria, an important oil supplier, and the five Portuguese-speaking former Portuguese African colonies (PALOP) and the Lusophone Commonwealth (CPLP), founded in 1996. Up to date, Brazilian's trade relations in West Africa, apart from Nigeria (34 % of Brazil’s African trade) remained fairly modest. Nevertheless, Ghana and Senegal played a decisive role in shaping Brazil-African relations in the early stages of African independence since the 1960s. Because Brazil has meanwhile considerable energy and commodity resources of its own, its approach concerning African trade is less commodity driven than the Chinese or European, but orientated at resource diversification, sustainable development and cooperation to develop these resources, e.g. bioethanol plants in Ghana and other African countries. Therefore, African governments see a greater sense of mutual partnership and reciprocity in their relationship with Brazil. However, corrupt political African elites themselves urged the Brazilian government and companies often into informal political and business norms, with controversial and corrupt investment in commodity extraction, infrastructure and land-grabbing. Apart from that, Brazil tried to create a niche for Brazilian management services, knowledge and technology transfer, suited supposedly exceptionally well for tropical markets. Les relations étrangères et commerciales du Brésil avec l'Afrique subsaharienne (ASS) remontent à la traite négrière portugaise. Sur les 9,5 millions de personnes capturées en Afrique entre le XVIe et le XIXe siècle et amenées dans le Nouveau Monde, près de 4 millions se sont retrouvées à Rio de Janeiro, soit dix fois plus que tout les esclaves envoyés aux États-Unis. Aujourd'hui encore, environ 51 % de la population brésilienne se considère comme noire ou métisse. L'inégalité raciale reste ancrée à bien des égards, en particulier en ce qui concerne l'inégalité persistante. Néanmoins, l'oppression et la marginalisation des Brésiliens noirs ont été largement ignorées dans les relations modernes entre le Brésil et l'Afrique. Au lieu de cela, un nationalisme fort a imprégné la vie politique brésilienne. Il a également déterminé ses relations extérieures et commerciales et défini comment les Brésiliens ont saisi les opportunités présentées par les mouvements d'indépendance africains. Seul le président brésilien Lula da Silva, au cours de son premier mandat présidentiel de 2003 à 2011, a reconnu leurs racines historiques communes. En fait, il doit son élection au soutien écrasant des Afro-Brésiliens. Les relations commerciales de la première moitié du XXe siècle se limitaient en grande partie à l'Afrique du Sud, qui représentait 90 % du commerce africain du Brésil. La politique étrangère et commerciale de Brasilia dans les années 1960 et 1970 s'est concentrée sur le Nigeria, un important fournisseur de pétrole, ainsi que sur les cinq anciennes colonies africaines portugaises (PALOP) et la Communauté lusophone (CPLP), créée en 1996. Le commerce avec l'Afrique de l'Ouest est resté assez modeste, à l'exception du Nigeria (34 % du commerce africain du Brésil). Néanmoins, le Ghana et le Sénégal ont joué un rôle crucial dans l'élaboration des relations entre le Brésil et l'Afrique dans les premiers stades de l'indépendance africaine. Étant donné que le Brésil dispose désormais de ressources considérables en énergie et en matières premières, son approche du commerce africain est moins axée sur les matières premières que celle des investisseurs chinois ou européens, mais orientée vers la diversification des ressources, le développement durable et la coopération pour développer ces ressources, par ex. usines de bioéthanol au Ghana. Par conséquent, les gouvernements africains considèrent leurs relations avec le Brésil comme davantage basées sur un partenariat mutuel. Cependant, les élites politiques africaines corrompues elles-mêmes ont souvent fait pression sur le gouvernement brésilien et les entreprises d’appliquer des pratiques politiques et commerciales informelles, avec des investissements controversés et corrompus, p.ex. concernant l'extraction des ressources, les infrastructures et l'accaparement des terres. En dehors de cela, le Brésil s'efforçait de se tailler un créneau pour les services de gestion brésiliens, le transfert de connaissances et de technologie qui était, disait-on, spécialement adapté aux marchés tropicaux.

Moving beyond the legal and historical hegemonic definitions of the quilombo, this paper investigates continuities in gendered racial violence in Brazil by evoking the political and poetic of the quilombo. Inspired by the works of the historian and poet Beatriz Nascimento, the multifaceted notion of quilombo is conceptualized as an ongoing praxis of fugitivity and coalition that draws on the interconnectedness of anti-colonial, feminist, and anti-racist struggles. In exploring geopolitical breaks and epistemological ruptures, this paper fosters a necessary conversation between theory and practice by engaging with the living archives of three Afro-Brazilian writers and activists: (i) Beatriz Nascimento’s fundamental contributions on the political, material and symbolic dimensions of quilombo; (ii) the legacy and vision of Marielle Franco focusing on the necessity to ocupar the institutional politics like a growing seed; (iii) the work of Erica Malunguinho and Mandata Quilombo through the praxis of aquilombar the constitutional democracy, based on the alternation in representative power and repossession. Dieser Artikel geht über die hegemonialen rechtlich-historischen Definitionen des Quilombo in Brasilien hinaus und untersucht die Kontinuitäten in der geschlechtsspezifischen rassistischen Gewalt, indem er die politischen und poetischen Genealogien des Quilombo heraufbeschwört. Inspiriert von den Arbeiten der Historikerin und Dichterin Beatriz Nascimento wird der facettenreiche Begriff des Quilombo als eine fortlaufende Praxis von Flucht bzw. Flüchtigkeit und Koalition konzeptualisiert, die sich auf die Verflechtung von antikolonialen, feministischen und antirassistischen Kämpfen stützt. In dem Artikel werden geopolitische und epistemologische Brüche erforscht und ein notwendiges Gespräch zwischen Theorie und Praxis gefördert, das sich mit den lebenden Archiven dreier afro-brasilianischer Schriftsteller und Aktivisten beschäftigt: (i) Beatriz Nascimentos fundamentale Ausarbeitungen zu den symbolischen und materiellen Dimensionen des Quilombo als Territorium; (ii) die Arbeit von Marielle Franco, die sich auf die relationale Ubuntu-Maxime und die Notwendigkeit der Überwindung der institutionellen Politik konzentriert; (iii) die Interventionen von Erica Malunguinho, die den Quilombo durch die Praxis des aquilombar erweitert und die auf dem veränderten repräsentativen Demokratie sowie der Wiederinbesitznahme von Land, Gemeinschaften, Körpern, Erinnerungen, Aufständen, Befreiung beruhen.

This article presents an analysis of the use of populist framing mechanisms by grassroots right-wing organizations. It brings together the social movement literature on framing and the populist literature to understand how actors build an emergent field of activism in a highly contentious context. Based on the analysis of a sample of 4,574 Facebook posts published by 5 civil society organizations during the campaign to oust Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, it argues that two mechanisms, reductionism and antagonism, enabled actors to focus on similar targets and diagnostics while maintaining relevant differences when seeking to motivate followers and present prognostic frames. These were key mechanisms used by all the actors, albeit with different contents, depending on the frame task. This article contributes to filling gaps in the framing and populist literatures and sheds light on the relevance of populist communication in the rise of right-wing activism.

Paraphrasing the German poet Bertolt Brecht's 1949 poem "Wahrnehmung", it can be said that for Latin American regionalism, the fatigue of the summits has been left behind; it must now cope with the labors of the plains. The days when Latin American presidents socialized frequently at summit meetings are long gone. In the golden age of summitry, between 2004 and 2012, four Summits of the Americas, six Latin American summits, 29 South American summits (including the Southern Common Market-Mercosur), nine Andean summits, 18 Caribbean summits, 52 Central American summits, 18 Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) summits, and eight Ibero-American Summits were held, for a total of 144 summits in 9 years. It was the time when Chilean President Sebastián Piñera complained ironically that Latin America had so many summits it looked like a mountain range. Christopher Sabatini argued in Foreign Policy that, "the Western Hemisphere has a strong claim to the title of summit capital of the world," adding that, "if the number of summits were a measure of the quality of diplomacy, Latin America would be a utopia of harmony, cooperation, and understanding."

Zusammenfassung Inwiefern pragen biookonomische Agenden den Ubergang weg von der fossilen Abhangigkeit im Kontext der Sud-Sud-Beziehungen? Wie stellen sich Akteure aus dem Globalen Suden das Konzept und die Umsetzung der Biookonomie vor? Besitzt die Biookonomie das Potential, die Landschaft globaler Ungleichheiten durch die aktive Beteiligung von Akteuren aus dem globalen Suden umzustrukturieren? Der Artikel behandelt diese Fragen anhand einer kritischen Analyse der Handelsbeziehungen zwischen China und Brasilien im Zeitraum 2000-2018. Der chinesisch-brasilianische Fall wird als eine wichtige Achse der Sud-Sud-Beziehungen im Kontext der entstehenden Biookonomie interpretiert. Dabei zeigt sich, dass sich die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen beiden Landern trotz gruner Politiken keineswegs in Richtung einer kohlenstoffarmen Transition entwickeln. Obwohl die chinesisch-brasilianischen Handelsstrome einen Ausdruck der Sud-Sud-Kooperation darstellen, geht mit ihnen kein Abbau der klassischen Produktionshierarchien zwischen Zentrum und Peripherie einher. Dagegen entstehen neue Ungleichheiten mit hoher Relevanz fur die Biookonomie. Schlagworter: Sud-Sud-Beziehungen, China, Brasilien, okologisch ungleicher Tausch, Handel, Biookonomie ----- South-South Relations and Bioeconomy. The Chinese-Brazilian Trade Axis Abstract China became Brazil’s most important trading partner in 2009. For the South American country, this new situation implies lower levels of economic dependency on the USA. But does this new situation automatically translate into a more equitable axis of South-South relations? And, to what extent can Sino- Brazilian trade be reconciled with the vision of a global, low-carbon bioeconomy? This article addresses these questions by means of a qualitative analysis of the trade relations between China and Brazil over the period 2000-2018. The Sino-Brazilian case is interpreted as an important axis of South-South relations in the context of the emerging bioeconomy. The paper shows that, despite greening policies on both sides, trade relations between the two countries are by no means developing in the direction of a low-carbon transition. Although Sino-Brazilian trade is treated bilaterally as an expression of South-South cooperation, its constitutive elements and dynamics do not break with classical centre-periphery hierarchies. Instead, the article highlights the construction of new inequalities, with much relevance for the bioeconomy in the making. Keywords: South-South, bioeconomy, China, Brazil, unequal exchange ----- Bibliographie: Rodriguez, Fabricio: Sud-Sud-Beziehungen und Biookonomie. Die chinesisch-brasilianische Handelsachse, PERIPHERIE – Politik • Okonomie • Kultur, 3+4-2020, S. 360-383. https://doi.org/10.3224/peripherie.v40i3-4.07

The 1975 nuclear cooperation agreement between Brazil and West Germany had a considerable impact on the mid-Cold War nuclear non-proliferation regime. This article analyses Bonn's interests in that agreement, as well as the negotiation process leading to it and third-party pressures on both countries. It also covers the follow-up negotiations with Urenco partners for a safeguards agreement. Based on extensive archival research and secondary literature, the author delineates three main West German interests in concluding the 'Brazilian Atomic-Deal': (1) strengthening the ruling socio-liberal coalition; (2) boosting the West German nuclear industry; and (3) making viable the jet-nozzle technology.

Why do legislators introduce impeachment resolutions against the president, even though most of these resolutions never succeed? We explore two possible answers to this puzzle, which are linked to the legislative functions of oversight and representation. First, legislators initiate impeachment procedures to expose (real or alleged) presidential misdeeds, an action that may weaken the president's approval rates, even if an impeachment process remains unlikely. Second, legislators introduce impeachment resolutions to express their constituents' outrage in the context of corruption scandals or poor economic performance- that is, in response to an exogenous decline in presidential approval. To test these hypotheses, we analyze 274 impeachment resolutions introduced against the presidents of Argentina and Brazil since the transition to democracy. We estimate models predicting presidential approval and impeachment resolutions using time-series and simultaneous equations estimators. Our results strongly support the representation hypothesis.

Leseprobe ----- Zusammenfassung Die Forschung zu Abschiebungen verdeutlicht, dass diese leidvoll sind und schwerwiegende Folgen fur Betroffene und ihre Familienangehorigen haben. Es gibt jedoch relativ wenige Studien daruber, wie sich die Erfahrungen zwischen verschiedenen nationalen Kontexten unterscheiden. Ausgehend von 81 Interviews mit dominikanischen und brasilianischen Abgeschobenen argumentieren wir, dass ihre Reintegration von Makro-, Meso- und Mikrofaktoren beeinflusst wird. Darunter zahlen individuelle Merkmale wie kulturelle Anpassung und Humankapital (mikro), nationale und transnationale Bindungen (meso) sowie soziale und wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen, unter denen Abgeschobene aufgenommen werden (makro). Das Forschungsdesign des vorliegenden Artikels arbeitet diese Faktoren heraus und zeigt, wie sie voneinander abhangen. Je ungunstiger sich der Aufnahmekontext auf die Reintegration auswirkt, desto relevanter werden Faktoren auf der Meso- und Mikroebene. Dominikanische Abgeschobene werden von Regierung und Gesellschaft stigmatisiert und sind daher mehr auf transnationale Bindungen und ihre eigene Resilienz angewiesen. Im Gegensatz dazu stosen brasilianische Deportierte auf einen weniger feindlichen Kontext, was bedeutet, dass sich Personen mit lokalen Bindungen und Humankapital einfacher reintegrieren. Schlagworter: Abschiebung, Transnationalismus, Reintegration, Dominikanische Republik, Brasilien ----- Macro-, Meso-, and Micro-Level Factors Shaping Deportees’ Reintegration Experiences: The Case of Dominicans and Brazilians Deported from the United States Abstract Scholarship on deportation makes it clear that deportations are painful and have severe consequences for deportees and their family members. However, there is relatively little scholarship on how post-deportation experiences vary from one national context to another. Drawing on 81 interviews with Dominican and Brazilian deportees, we argue that post-deportation experiences are shaped by macro-, meso-, and micro-level factors. Micro-level factors include individual characteristics, such as acculturation and human capital. Meso-level factors include national and transnational ties. Macro-level factors include the context of reception – the social and economic conditions into which deportees are received. We put forward a framework that both highlights these factors and shows how they are interdependent. The more adverse the context of reception, the more likely that deported people rely on other factors, such as transnational ties or human capital. Dominican deportees face stigmatisation from government and society, and, thus, depend more on transnational ties and their own resilience. In contrast, Brazilian deportees encounter a friendlier context, meaning that those deportees with more local ties and human capital are able to reintegrate with fewer challenges. Keywords: transnationalism, integration, Dominican Republic, Brazil, deportation, context of reception ----- Bibliographie: Golash-Boza, Tanya/Navarro, Yajaira Ceciliano: „Ruckfuhrbarkeit fordern“. Das Zusammenwirken von freiwilliger Ruckkehr und Abschiebungen in Nordafrika, PERIPHERIE – Politik • Okonomie • Kultur, 3-2019, S. 369-388. https://doi.org/10.3224/peripherie.v39i3.03

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (known broadly as "Lula") has defeated incumbent Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil's presidential election. As the Global South giant emerges from the isolation and loss of influence imposed by Bolsonaro's right-wing anti-globalist agenda, how can Germany and Europe best engage it with a view to resuming a key strategic partnership? Brazil's relations with the EU and Germany are at a historical postwar low. Normative differences with a Bolsonaro government driven by extreme right-wing domestic constituencies have stalled trade and climate negotiations, led to clashes on human rights and deforestation, and caused what were once regular high-level contacts to ebb to a trickle. The election itself was decided by a razor-thin margin and marred by voter suppression, contestations of its legitimacy, and pervasive electoral violations by Bolsonaro. The incumbent has not formally conceded, and his supporters were still in the streets a week after the vote. Assistance in asserting the functioning of the country's democratic institutions is urgently needed. Lula will realign the country with its multilateral diplomatic traditions and seek to reinstate social policies cancelled by Bolsonaro, such as poverty reduction, human rights, and safeguards for minorities, as well as environmental protection and sustainable development. This will align Brazil increasingly with Europe. But today's scenario is different from Lula's first two terms in office between 2003 and 2011: the National Congress is hostile to Lula's agenda, there is no commodity boom, and a polarised and unequal international system has less room for the rise of an emerging power. Germany and Europe should actively and regularly engage Brazil and assist in its moves to consolidate its democracy, combat inequality, protect the rainforest and safeguard minority rights. To do so, it should use trade policy as an incentive, reinforce civilian control over the armed forces, engage subnational partners, and assist in combatting fake news.

Am 1. Januar 2023 tritt Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva seine dritte Präsidentschaft in Brasilien an. Damit endet gleichzeitig die von vielen politischen Beobachtern als destruktiv eingestufte Amtszeit von Präsident Jair Bolsonaro. Vieles deutet darauf hin, dass es zu einem geordneten Prozess der Übergabe des Präsidentenamts kommen wird, obwohl Bolsonaro seine Niederlage bislang nicht eingestanden hat und seine Anhänger Protestkundgebungen angekündigt haben. Der gewählte Präsident wird seine Regierungspolitik auf neue Grundlagen stellen müssen. Eine Rückkehr zu den Leitlinien seiner früheren Präsidentschaft wird nicht möglich sein, denn die Verwerfungen der Regierungszeit Bolsonaros lassen sich nicht ignorieren. Angesichts der komplexen innenpolitischen Lage - nicht zuletzt die für ihn ungünstigen Mehrheitsverhältnisse im nationalen Parlament - wird es für Lula schwierig werden, die starke Ablehnung seiner Person im eignen Land zu mindern und zudem die hohen inter­natio­nalen Erwartungen an eine geordnete Regierungsführung zu erfüllen. (Autorenreferat)

This book deals with the role of experts in the modernization efforts of Latin American states in the 19th and 20th centuries. Understanding expert knowledge as the application of academic knowledge in non-academic contexts, a vast number of new research questions have opened up. These refer to tensions between the supply, demand and implementation of specialist knowledge as well as to the mechanisms by which knowledge is transferred. The production of expert knowledge took place in transnational settings characterized by power asymmetries, different national traditions, and multiple histories of professionalization. Latin American societies were not mere receptors of foreign expertise. Local experts actively took part in global transfers of knowledge and external expertise was always subject to complex adaptations in new contexts.

The COVID-19 pandemic's onset imposed the need for immediate political reactions to protect the domestic population. For some months, decision-making was delegated to the executives while legislatures lost temporary influence. In such a situation, courts have an important role in checking the excesses of executive power. Latin American high courts decided on a broad range of pandemic-related cases and showed the willingness - when not the ability - to control executives also under the exceptional situation of the pandemic. Given the region's long history of intermediate judicial independence, one that is characterised by political interference, many expected such actions would only propel democratic backsliding during the pandemic. However, the active role of courts has largely underscored the continued relevance of institutional checks and balances. The highest courts were central to keeping in check two illiberal presidents, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, albeit with different outcomes. Whereas in Brazil the attempts to undermine judicial autonomy would be unsuccessful (and Bolsonaro eventually lost the electoral contest), Bukele's party used its majority in the Legislative Assembly to pack the court as soon as it obtained the legislative votes to do so. Unless presidents have legislative majorities to successfully manipulate an independent court, they rely on informal means of interference such as harsh rhetoric, defamation of judges on social media, or joining demonstrations against these institutions. Strong courts that control executives' power excesses bear the risk of attack by illiberal presidents. During emergencies like the current pandemic, this danger increases given the need for immediate decision-making. To overcome adversity, courts need to find allies in other institutions. Regional and international observers can help if they strongly condemn political interference with judicial independence and publicly denounce attacks against courts that may help undermine democracy.

The War in Ukraine has highlighted the divisions within and between Latin American countries. Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine goes against international norms endorsed by Latin American countries, the conflict seems remote and evokes long-standing rejection of United States policies. Notably, both regional powers, Mexico and Brazil, were reluctant to join the Western condemnation of Russia. Both the left-leaning Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador as well as Brazil's far-right president Jair Bolsonaro have maintained the traditional position of autonomy and neutrality that has characterised their countries' diplomatic histories. The Russian argument that NATO went too far in penetrating its security perimeter finds broad echo in Latin America. Paradoxically, such realist reasoning accepts the old geopolitical theory of great powers' "spheres of influence," which contradicts the autonomist theories historically endorsed by Latin American governments vis-à-vis US power. The war, and especially the sanctions on Russian hydrocarbons, have triggered fuel-price hikes, stimulated a rapprochement of the US with Venezuela, and altered the latter's tense relationship with neighbouring Colombia, easing conditions for the restoration of bilateral relations. Those interested in maintaining relations with Latin America should take note of the divide among the region's governments, many showing only reluctant support for the West's anti-Vladimir Putin policies. The insistence on foreign policy autonomy here cannot be understood as an articulated regional project but rather serves as a discursive framework which allows each government international room for manoeuvre, favouring relations with multiple external actors.

Vorhergegangene Studien, welche die Beziehung zwischen Wirtschaftswachstum, finanzieller Entwicklung und Innovation untersuchten, vernachlässigten die lateinamerikanischen Länder. Die Verbindung der drei Dimensionen hat erst kürzlich an Bedeutung gewonnen, allerdings liegt der Schwerpunkt auf den europäischen und OECD-Ländern. Ziel dieser Studie ist es daher, die kausale Beziehung zwischen Innovation, finanzieller Entwicklung und Wirtschaftswachstum in Brasilien, Chile, Kolumbien, Mexiko und Peru zwischen 2000 und 2019 zu untersuchen. Auf der Grundlage einer quantitativen Analyse, die auch vektorautoregressive (VAR) Modelle umfasst, wurde bestätigt, dass in dem trivariaten Nexus in den fünf lateinamerikanischen Ländern über den untersuchten Zeitraum von 20 Jahren bidirektionale Granger-Kausalitäten bestehen. Die Analyse kommt zu dem Schluss, dass Nachahmungs- und Innovationspolitiken, die sich auf den Schutz des geistigen Eigentums, Bildung, Wissen, institutionellem Wandel und technologischem Aufholprozess konzentrieren, notwendig sind, um Innovationen zu fördern und somit das Wirtschaftswachstum und die finanzielle Entwicklung zu unterstützen. Ein offener, wettbewerbsfähiger Finanzsektor in Verbindung mit makroökonomischer Stabilität, verbesserten Rechten von Gläubigern und Investoren, der Durchsetzung von Verträgen, der Zugänglichkeit von Krediten und der Rechnungsprüfung zusammen mit Berichtsstandards für börsennotierte Unternehmen stärken die finanzielle Entwicklung. Diese Faktoren können in Verbindung mit staatlichen Subventionen, Zuschüssen oder steuerlichen Innovationsanreizen dazu beitragen, die Schaffung von geistigem Eigentum zu fördern und das Wirtschaftswachstum anzukurbeln. Schließlich erhöhen Verbesserungen beim Zugang zur Infrastruktur, hohe Transparenz, die Beseitigung von Handelsbarrieren, politische Integrität und die Verbesserung der Qualität politischer und wirtschaftlicher Institutionen, die wirtschaftliche Effizienz und unterstützen folglich die finanzielle Entwicklung und die Innovationsfähigkeit. Damit die politischen Implikationen Wirkung zeigen können, ist eine starke rechtliche und institutionelle Infrastruktur von entscheidender Bedeutung, während Korruptionsprobleme nicht übersehen werden dürfen. Little focus was put on Latin American countries when examining the relationship between economic growth, financial development, and innovation. The connection of the three dimensions has only recently gained importance, however, the main focus lies on the European and OECD countries. Thus, the aim of this research is to investigate the causal relationship between innovation, financial development, and economic growth in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru between 2000 and 2019. Based on a quantitative analysis, including vector autoregressive (VAR) models, it was confirmed that bidirectional Granger-causalities are present in the trivariate nexus in the five Latin American countries over the investigated time span of 20 years. The paper concludes that imitation and innovation policies focusing on IP protection, education, knowledge, institutional change and technological catch-up are necessary to foster innovation and therefore support to increase economic growth and financial development. An open, competitive financial sector combined with macroeconomic stability, improved creditor and investor rights, contract enforcements, credit accessibility and auditing together with reporting standards for companies listed on the stock market strengthen the financial development. These factors connected with governmental subsidies, grants or tax incentives towards innovation can help to increase the IP creation and boost economic growth. Finally, improvements in infrastructure access, high transparency, removing trade barriers, political integrity and increasing the quality of political as well as economic institutions raise the economic efficiency and consequently support financial development and innovation capabilities. In order for the policy implications to have an impact, a strong legal and institutional infrastructure is vital while corruption issues must not be overseen. Lara Hanna Weitgasser Masterarbeit FH JOANNEUM 2022

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won Brazil’s most recent presidential election with a very tight result. Lula will take office in January 2023, and there are many expectations for the upcoming period, including how well the Brazilian society and especially the security forces could react to it.

Brazil’s Bolsa Família Programme (BFP) aims to combat poverty and social inequalities through monetary transfers to families. A much-discussed indirect effect of the programme was its correlation to the fertility of the beneficiary families. In this paper, we use a cohort fertility approach with parity progression ratios that differs from existing literature, which mainly used period fertility measures, to better understand the relationship between fertility and the BFP. This study analyses the relationship between the BFP and the reproduction of Brazilian women. We use data from the 2010 Brazilian micro-censuses, the only census after the start of the BFP in 2004, to reconstruct the childbirth history of women with incomplete reproductive cycles (women aged 25 to 29), and estimate parity progression ratios (PPRs) and cohort fertility rates (CFR). In addition, we estimate propensity score matching (PSM) models comparing fertility outcomes of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the programme. Our results show distinct differences in CFRs and PPRs. On average, BFP beneficiaries had more children than women not covered by the programme. This finding remained consistent even after controlling for educational gradients and other covariates. Our empirical findings show that women opt for a “rational” strategy, where they tend to have children in more rapid succession up until three children. These findings contradict the recent literature that has not found any correlation between BFP and fertility. The results also suggest that cohort analyses may fill certain gaps left by previous studies of period fertility. This paper is one of a few that have analysed the relationship between a conditional income transfer programme and cohort measures in Brazil.

Em julho de 2017, o Senado brasileiro aprovou a reforma trabalhista mais ampla no país, desde o surgimento da Consolidação das Leis Trabalhistas de 1943 (CLT). A reforma provocou acalorados debates e sua aprovação enfrentou resistências. Os sindicatos, por exemplo, convocaram duas greves gerais: a primeira, em abril de 2017, obteve uma quantidade significativa em termos de participação, enquanto a segunda, em junho, terminou com a participação caindo significativamente abaixo das expectativas. Apesar da rejeição generalizada do governo Temer, a própria a lei de reforma, em junho, os sindicatos foram surpreendentemente incapazes de chegar a uma estratégia comum para contrastar a aprovação da reforma. A presente pesquisa visa explorar este paradoxo por meio de uma survey e uma série de entrevistas não estruturadas, com líderes sindicais e manifestantes; as informações permitem estabelecer uma sólida base empírica para traçar hipóteses sobre o modelo sindical brasileiro e sua evolução. On July 2017, Brazil’s Senate approved the country’s most extensive labor reform since the emergent 1943’s Consolidation of Labor Law (Consolidação das Leis Trabalhistas, CLT). The aforementioned reform provoked heated debates and its approval faced resistance. Unions, for instance, convened two general strikes: the first, on April 2017, garnered a significant amount of participation, while the latter, on June, ended with participation falling significantly below expectations. Despite the widespread rejection of Temer’s mandate and the content of the law, on June, unions were surprisingly unable to agree on a common strategy regarding a proposal on labor reform. The present research aims to explore this paradox. A survey-based analysis, along with a series of unstructured interviews with union leaders and protesters, establishes a solid empirical base from which to draw hypotheses about the Brazilian state corporatist union model and its evolution.

Jair Bolsonaro's presidency has been characterised by a sharp increase in deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions, support for agribusiness, and the repression of indigenous peoples and environmental activists. At the Glasgow COP26 climate conference this November, however, Brazil presented itself as more willing to compromise. Yet, the reasons for new pledges do not indicate a changed mindset, but rather an increasing commodification of climate protection that serves economic interests. Brazil's contribution to international climate protection is urgently needed. At first sight, the promises made by the Brazilian government at the Glasgow climate conference seem surprising, as Jair Bolsonaro's presidency has been marked by increasing deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions and reduced climate protection measures. A closer look at the government's record and its new pledges reveals that they do not represent a real shift in the country's climate policy. Greenwashing rhetoric aside, the latest pledges also need to be understood as an attempt to secure profits from financialised conservation mechanisms such as voluntary carbon markets. Chances for a real turnaround in Brazil's domestic and international climate approach will come only with a change of president in the upcoming elections in October 2022. Until then, the hopes for climate action lie with Brazil's federal states and with civil society organisations, both of which have been implementing climate initiatives on the subnational level and demonstrated strong unity and commitment at the Glasgow summit. Until a new federal government is putatively elected in 2022, European policy­makers and non-governmental organisations should actively support indigenous communities and subnational and civil society initiatives working towards sustainable and socially just ways of climate protection. European banks and enterprises should avoid investing in "greenwashing initiatives" and instead support sustainable and socially responsible projects that contribute to climate protection in the long term.

Joe Biden's election has raised many expectations. However, due to long-established legacies and predominant bipartisan consensus around the United States' Western Hemisphere policy, changes will be in tone rather than in substance. Four topics will shape the agenda. Post-COVID-19 reconstruction: With the pandemic raging across the region, a return to a "business as usual" approach will not meet the Latin American people's urgent economic, political, and social needs. COVID-19 has further brought to light the region's structural problems, including but not limited to poverty, inequality, and insecurity. Migration: Biden has promised to boost the resources sent to Central American countries by USD 4 billion in the hope of reducing immigration to the US. The president wants to carry out a so-far-abstract and light migration reform as well. However, there is no discernible strategy to deal with the rest of the hemisphere's challenges (e.g. the Venezuelan crisis). Democracy: Not every president is happy with the election's result. From Mexico to Brazil, passing through Central America, some governments identified with Donald Trump's confrontational rhetoric and profited from his disregard for their internal affairs. Among them, far-right leaders fear the end of the "free pass" granted to their heavy-handed and anti-democratic words and deeds. Regional and global scenario: in the context of China's increasing economic and diplomatic presence in the region, Biden's appeal to restore US "hemispheric leadership" appears hollow. Trump's actions and the political cleavages he helped deepen have turned the US into a less reliable partner. As a consequence, Latin America will have to find its own answers, and new strategic partners to implement them. The region is essentially alone in weathering the COVID-19 and the structural problems the crisis exacerbates. In this context, Latin America and the European Union will need to undertake more relevant, autonomous joint strategic initiatives or resign themselves to being bystanders in others' commercial, technological, and geopolitical endeavours.

Joe Bidens Wahl hat viele Erwartungen geweckt. Politische Traditionen und der vorherrschende überparteiliche Konsens über die US-Politik für die westliche Hemisphäre lassen Veränderungen eher im Ton als in der Substanz erwarten. Vier Themen werden die Agenda bestimmen. COVID-19: Angesichts der Pandemie, die in der Region wütet, wird eine Rückkehr zu "business as usual" den drängenden wirtschaftlichen, politischen und sozialen Bedürfnissen der lateinamerikanischen Bevölkerung nicht gerecht. COVID-19 hat die strukturellen Probleme der Region offengelegt, einschließlich, aber nicht nur, Armut, Ungleichheit und Unsicherheit. Migration: In der Hoffnung, die Einwanderung in die USA zu reduzieren, hat Biden versprochen, die Mittel für die zentralamerikanischen Länder um 4 Mrd. USD zu erhöhen. Der Präsident will eine bisher noch nicht definierte, vermutlich leichte Migrationsreform durchführen. Eine Strategie für den Umgang mit den übrigen Herausforderungen der Hemisphäre (z.B. der Krise in Venezuela) ist jedoch nicht zu erkennen. Demokratie: Nicht jeder Präsident ist mit dem Ergebnis der Wahl zufrieden. Von Mexiko über Mittelamerika bis hin zu Brasilien identifizierten sich einige Regierungen mit Donald Trumps konfrontativer Rhetorik und profitierten von seinem fehlenden Interesse an ihren internen Angelegenheiten. Rechtsextreme Machthaber fürchten das Ende des "Freifahrtscheins" für ihre antidemokratischen Worte und Taten. Regionales und globales Szenario: Im Kontext der zunehmenden wirtschaftlichen und diplomatischen Präsenz Chinas in Lateinamerika, klingt Bidens Anspruch, die "hemisphärische Führungsrolle" der USA wiederherzustellen, hohl. Trumps Handeln und die politischen Gräben, zu deren Vertiefung er beigetragen hat, haben die USA zu einem weniger verlässlichen Partner gemacht. Lateinamerika muss daher eigene Antworten und neue strategische Partner finden. Bei der Bewältigung seiner strukturellen Probleme und der COVID-19-Krise ist die Region auf sich gestellt. Lateinamerika und die Europäische Union müssen entweder mehr relevante, autonome gemeinsame strategische Initiativen ergreifen oder sich damit abfinden, bei den handelspolitischen, technologischen und geopolitischen Bemühungen anderer, nur Zuschauer zu sein.

El presente texto es el resumen de un extenso estudio sobre las estrategias políticas de los expertos religiosos en los Estados Unidos y América Latina. En el pasado reciente, los dirigentes de organizaciones religiosas han venido ejerciendo una influencia cada vez mayor en la política de las Américas. Esto tiene consecuencias, como es evidente en el caso de los presidentes Trump y Bolsonaro, que fueron elegidos con un importante apoyo de personas y organizaciones religiosas. El presente estudio se centra en los discursos y prácticas de los expertos religiosos en el ámbito político, sin mantener la lupa solo sobre las elites conservadoras. Más bien, examina las tensiones entre los actores de las más diversas direcciones religioso-políticas. Después de una introducción metodológica, el estudio analiza primero los EE.UU., Guatemala, Brasil y México. Luego se abordan temas controvertidos. Por último, sacamos conclusiones en aras de orientar la cooperación cultural internacional., The present text is a highly condensed version of an extensive study on the political strategies of religious experts in the USA and Latin America. In the recent decades, leaders of religious organisations gained a growing influence on politics in the Americas. Consequences can be seen through the Presidents Trump and Bolsonaro, who were elected with the significant support of religious individuals and organisations. The present study focuses on the discourses and practices of religious experts with regard to the political field. But the magnifying glass will not only be turned towards conservative elites. The tensions between actors of divergent religious-political orientations are also under scrutiny. After a methodological introduction, the USA, Guatemala, Brazil and Mexico will be studied as cases. Then, we address controversialissues. Finally, conclusions are drawn for international cultural cooperation.

Impeachment is an important check on executive authority in presidential democracies. It is the constitutional tool for removing power-hungry presidents who threaten democracy, break the law, or get involved in corruption or other scandalous behaviour. Further, the mere existence of impeachment as a constitutional check on presidents may deter presidential misconduct. However, as recent examples in Latin America show, impeachment also opens the door for partisan interests and opportunistic political behaviour. Impeachment is a real threat for presidents without a legislative basis of support, while those with majorities are shielded, despite likely wrongdoings. In Brazil, the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016 generated popular disillusionment with all political actors, paving the way for right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro as president. In turn, despite a large and increasing number of impeachment requests on very serious grounds uncovered by congressional investigations, President Bolsonaro has thus far averted an impeachment process. In Peru, political polarisation, fragmentation, and continued presidential instability shows that impeaching a president may be an ineffective and even a counterproductive tool when the problem at hand is deeper and broader than the misconduct of the chief executive. Finally, whereas an impeachment may successfully remove a president, it does not provide a successor, often the vice-president, with a legitimate mandate or political backing to lead the country out of the crisis. It may actually reduce rather than enhance the legitimacy and governance capacity of the executive. External actors, such as the United States or the European Union, must be aware that impeachments are not an "easy fix." On the contrary, they may not address personal misbehaviour; instead, deep structural problems may lie behind the severe political crisis upon which impeachments mount. Therefore, external actors need to decode the underlying crisis, which could be one of representation, and address it by supporting constructive solutions that emphasise the accountability of political actors and institutions as well as responsive public policies.

Die hohen COVID-19-Inzidenzen unter Beschäftigten in fleischverarbeitenden Betrieben im Süden Brasiliens markieren einen neuen Punkt auf der langen Liste von Problemen der globalen fleischverarbeitenden Industrie. Bereits bekannte Probleme sind Arbeitsunfälle, das Repetitive-Strain-Injury-Syndrom, Arbeit mit kontaminierten Abfällen sowie immunologische und psychiatrische Störungen. Zudem ist die Industrie geprägt von prekärer Arbeit, Rassismus und Speziesismus sowie der Hervorbringung ungesunder Ökologien. Diese nähren entstehende Krankheitserreger und bilden gemeinsam eine Szenerie chronischer Zerstörung, welche Menschen, Tiere und Umwelten ausbeutet und krank macht. In diesem Artikel untersuchen wir, wie in der aktuellen Situation - ausgelöst durch die unheilvolle Aktivität des Agrobusiness - zentrale Themen des Anthropozäns zusammenfallen und sich in neuen Konfigurationen die vernichtenden, historischen, sozialen, gesundheitlichen und ökologischen Bedingungen wiederholen, von denen Brasilien seit der Kolonialzeit betroffen ist. The high incidence of COVID-19 among workers in southern Brazilian slaughterhouses comprises a new facet in the long list of problems facing the global meat processing industry. Known problems include occupational accidents, repetitive strain injury syndrome, working with contaminated waste, and immunological and psychiatric disorders. In addition, the industry is characterised by precarious work, racism, speciesism, and the production of unhealthy ecologies that contribute to emerging pathogens and constitute a scenario of chronic destruction and exploitation that makes people, animals, and environments sick. In this article, we examine how the current situation, caused by the sinister activities of agribusiness, synthesizes central themes in the debate on the Anthropocene and refl ects on new confi gurations in the devastating historical, social, sanitary, and ecological conditions that have aff ected Brazil since colonial times.

Russland sei nach Lateinamerika zurückgekehrt, stellte der damalige Präsident Medwedew 2010 fest. Wie diese Intensivierung der Beziehungen zwischen Russland und drei Ländern Lateinamerikas - Ecuador, Kuba und Brasilien - zustande kam, untersucht die Studie anhand eines multidimensionalen geopolitischen Ansatzes. Basierend auf Erkenntnissen aus der praktischen Politik und akademischen Arbeiten liefert die Autorin eine Definition für das bis dato vage Konzept 'strategische Partnerschaft' und zeichnet mithilfe einer prozessorientierten Methode die Entwicklung dieser Partnerschaften im Zeitraum 1992-2017 nach. In der gegenwärtigen Fülle an außenpolitischen Kooperationsmöglichkeiten werden einige bilateralen Beziehungen von den außenpolitischen Akteuren als strategische Partnerschaft besonders hervorgehoben. Dadurch wird in der Außenpolitik seit dem Ende der 1990 Jahre eine qualitative Ausdifferenzierung vorgenommen. Die Beziehungen zwischen Russland und Lateinamerika haben nachdem sie Anfang der 1990er Jahre an Bedeutung verloren hatten sich seit 1996 wieder schrittweise angenähert. Diese Tendenz wurde mit dem Machtantritt Wladimir Putins im Jahr 2000 besonders deutlich. Eine neue Etappe in den russisch-lateinamerikanischen Beziehungen kündigte 2010 der damalige Präsident Dmitri Medwedew offiziell an, indem er erklärte, dass Russland nach Lateinamerika zurückgekehrt sei. In den Folgejahren wurde der privilegierte Status einiger lateinamerikanischer Länder in der russischen Außenpolitik mit ihrer Bezeichnung als strategische Partner betont. Die Autorin geht der Frage nach, warum die Beziehungen zwischen Russland und den drei ausgewählten lateinamerikanischen Ländern im 21. Jahrhundert eine Intensivierung erlebten.

Korruption und Straflosigkeit sind zwei zentrale Probleme des Rechtsstaats in Latein­amerika und damit auch von Qualität und Stabilität der Demokratie in dieser Region. Weil ihre eigenen Handlungs­möglichkeiten erschöpft waren, versuchten einige Regie­rungen, gemeinsam mit internationalen Organisationen dagegen vorzugehen. Dafür wurden Sondermechanismen eingerichtet, die außerhalb staatlicher Ermittlungs- und Strafverfolgungsbehörden, aber zugleich mit ihnen ver­schränkt daran arbeiten, Netz­werke der Korruption aufzudecken. In Guatemala, Honduras, Mexiko und Nicaragua sind solche Bemühungen zur Durchsetzung von Recht und Menschenrechten vor Kurzem abgebrochen worden, in Ecuador und El Salvador stehen vergleich­bare Ver­suche noch am Anfang. Nur wenn sie umfassend lokal eingebettet und (zivil)gesell­schaftlich verankert sind, werden sie erfolgreich sein können. (Autorenreferat)

Since the 1970s a religious change has occurred in Latin America. As a proportion of the population, Catholics have greatly diminished, and Evangelicals rapidly increased. These developments are causally linked. In the course of this demographic transformation, the Catholic Church has lost its special position in society and its privileged access to politics. It has been replaced by a large number of diverse and autonomous Evangelical churches, above all the Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal. The substantial social weight of the Evangelical churches is connected, inter alia, to their importance as “problem solvers” in precarious sections of society. Faith communities are increasingly extending this commitment into the political sphere. The increasing social relevance and political power of the Evangelical churches has come to prominence in a particularly striking way in Brazil. Since 1 January 2019, Jair Messias Bolsonaro, a former soldier who was baptised in the Jordan by an Evangelical pastor, has been heading its government. (Autorenreferat)

Die durch das Coronavirus ausgelöste Krise breitet sich in Lateinamerika aus – und gleichzeitig bzw. in ihrem Schutz eine Version des Autoritarismus, die den Ausnahme­zustand als neue Normalität nimmt. Im Schatten der Krise werden politische Macht­fragen "geklärt", ohne internen Kontrollen unterworfen zu sein und unter Aus­nutzung der durch die Pandemie erzwungenen Demobilisierung der Bürgerschaft. Am Krisenmanagement der Präsidenten Brasiliens, Jair Bolsonaro, und El Salvadors, Nayib Bukele, lassen sich zwei verschiedene Wege aufzeigen, um zum gleichen Ziel zu gelangen: die Stärkung der präsidialen Macht auf Kosten der Gewalten­teilung. Der Protest auf der Straße gegen autoritäre Tendenzen ist gegenwärtig eingeschränkt. Dies ermöglicht Verschiebungen der Macht zugunsten autori­tärer Muster, die nur schwer einzuhegen oder zurückzudrängen sind. (Autorenreferat)

The death of George Floyd at the hands of the police in the United States has sparked the largest protests against police violence and racism since the 1960s. In numerous countries around the world people have taken to the streets in support of the protests in the US and to criticise police brutality in their own countries. Racism also persists in Brazil, where violence against Afro-Brazilians is on the rise. Police brutality, by which Afro-Brazilians are particularly affected, is increasing alarmingly in Brazil. President Jair Bolsonaro and other extreme-right politicians are further encouraging police violence with tough-on-crime discourses and policies. Lethal violence against Afro-Brazilians, in general, is intensifying: every 23 minutes a young Afro-Brazilian is killed. A death that reverberated internationally was the political murder of Marielle Franco in 2018, who was a Rio de Janeiro councilwoman and outspoken critic of police violence. The Brazilian black movement has been mobilising against police violence and racism for over 40 years now. Activists denounce the systematic exclusion of blacks that makes them more prone to losing their lives and limits their opportunities to fully realise their social, economic, and political rights. The black movement has achieved some progress over the last few decades with regards to anti-discrimination and equality policies. But the problem of violence and police brutality against blacks has never been tackled efficiently. The Brazilian government must implement a national programme to reduce the homicide rate, and federal and state authorities need to introduce measures to combat police violence. Also, public policies to fight racism and to promote the equality of Afro-Brazilians need to be advanced. The German government, the European Union, and other international actors should call on the Brazilian government to guarantee the human rights of Afro-Brazilians.

Do parties target individuals or groups? Although this question is fundamental to understanding clientelism, the literature does not offer an answer. This paper argues that, depending on certain conditions, brokers target individuals when they are identifiable, and groups when brokers need to rely on the spillover effects of clientelism. Both identifiability and spillovers depend on individual poverty, group poverty, and political competition. Though the theory I outline focuses on targeting, I also argue that structural factors, such as the density of the poor, should be considered in the vote-buying literature. Structural factors are one of the few observables upon which brokers can base their decision regarding investing in clientelism. Using survey and census data from Brazil, the paper exploits variations in personal incomes within contexts of differing levels of municipal poverty. I find that political parties engage in segmented or ad-hoc strategies, targeting individuals when identifiability is high, and groups when there are economies of scale. Importantly, non-poor individuals can also be offered clientelism., ¿Los partidos apuntan a grupos o individuos? Aunque esta pregunta es fundamental para entender el clientelismo, la literatura no ofrece una respuesta clara. Este trabajo argumenta que, dependiendo de ciertas condiciones, los compradores de votos apuntan a individuos cuando pueden identificar a sus blancos, y a grupos cuando necesitan utilizar los efectos indirectos que provee la lógica del clientelismo. Tanto la identificación individual como los efectos indirectos del clientelismo grupal, dependen de los niveles de pobreza individual, pobreza grupal, y los niveles de competencia partidista. Aunque la teoría de este trabajo se concentra en los blancos clientelares (grupales e individuales), también argumenta que factores estructurales, como la densidad de pobreza, deberían ser considerados en la literatura acerca de la venta de votos. Estos factores estructurales son de los pocos observables sobre los cuales los compradores de votos basan su decisión acerca de si invertir en clientelismo o no. Usando datos de opinión pública y censos de Brasil, el trabajo examina las variaciones en rentas individuales dentro de diferentes contextos de pobreza a nivel municipal. Los resultados sugieren que los partidos políticos emplean estrategias segmentadas o ad-hoc, apuntando a individuos cuando son altamente identificables, y a grupos cuando se presentan situaciones de economías de escala. Además, individuos que no están en situación de pobreza también pueden recibir ofertas clientelares.

Since the 1980s, the number of Pentecostal candidates elected to the Brazilian legislatures has grown remarkably. Literature has argued that the phenomenon is related to Pentecostal churches’ support for particular candidates. To date, however, this claim has been based only on ethnographies or studies relying on a few cases of elected candidates. Drawing from a new data set of Evangelical (Protestant) candidates for the Federal Chamber of Deputies and state legislative assemblies, I try to answer the following questions: Do Pentecostal candidates raise fewer campaign resources than other candidates? What is the effect of being a Pentecostal candidate on the vote in Brazilian legislative elections? Is the structure of the church relevant to this effect? Using OLS regression models, I show that being a Pentecostal has a negative, though not significant effect on campaign spending. Additionally, there is a positive statistical relationship between being a Pentecostal and receiving votes, and between having the support of more centralized churches and receiving votes. Qualitative evidence of six Pentecostal politicians who lost their churches’ support at some point between elections, attempted reelection, and performed considerably worse than before reinforces the importance of having the support of a Pentecostal church., Desde a década de 1980, o número de candidatos pentecostais eleitos para os legislativos brasileiros têm crescido de maneira notável. Estudos anteriores argumentaram que o fenômeno está relacionado ao apoio das igrejas pentecostais a candidatos específicos. Até hoje, no entanto, essa afirmação tem sido baseada apenas em etnografias ou estudos baseados em poucos casos de candidatos eleitos. Com base em um novo banco de dados de candidatos evangélicos (protestantes) para a Câmara dos Deputados e Assembléias Legislativas, tento responder às seguintes perguntas: Candidatos pentecostais arrecadam menos recursos de campanha do que outros candidatos? Qual é o efeito de ser um candidato pentecostal sobre o voto nas eleições legislativas brasileiras? A estrutura da igreja é relevante para esse efeito? Usando modelos de regressão OLS, mostro que ser pentecostal tem um efeito negativo, embora não significativo, sobre os gastos de campanha. Além disso, há uma relação estatística positiva entre ser pentecostal e votos e entre o apoio de igrejas mais centralizadas e votos. Evidências qualitativas de seis políticos pentecostais que perderam o apoio de suas igrejas em algum momento entre as eleições, tentaram a reeleição e se saíram consideravelmente pior do que antes, reforçam a importância de contar com o apoio de uma igreja pentecostal.

The social dimensions of economic integration have become an increasingly significant feature of trade agreements, particularly those between developing countries. In the Brazilian case trade-related labour standards have not become a major feature outside of the regional organization Mercosur (Common Market of the South), yet we know relatively little about the reasons for this discrepancy. Paradoxically one of the main stakeholders in this debate, Brazilian trade unions, has broadly supported social and labour clauses in the regional context but union activists have opposed labour provisions in trade negotiations between asymmetric partners. A comparative analysis of the labour campaigns in Mercosur and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations explains this ambiguity in terms of Brazilian labour strategies towards free trade negotiations and explores their implications for evaluations of labour attitudes to trade-related labour standards in developing countries. The labour movement’s own conflicting perspectives on the trade–labour connection are a key explanation of these outcomes, reinforcing the need for a greater appreciation of the complexity of trade union views in the debate on labour standards.

From a theoretical and empirical perspective, the article analyzes an experience in art education developed with students of the public school system in Uberlândia city, Minas Gerais State, at the University Museum of Art - MUnA, Brazil. With a qualitative approach and a descriptive and interpretative character, the research found that the contact with an art museum allows the student not only to broaden his knowledge of the world, but also to enrich his cultural education and improve his capacity for expression. It also provides students a greater interaction with the social environment in which they live. Knowledge in art is an apprenticeship that starts from the observation of a work of art, reading and artistic practice. The readings and behaviors that each student has when appreciating a work of art are related to his experience with different artistic manifestations. It is indispensable that schools, art teachers and educational actions in museums be important mediators for the art knowledge production to students. Building this knowledge from the constant access to these artistic and educational spaces, as well as the development of artistic activities in these spaces, may allow the student to broaden his understanding of the national culture. We also verified that the students produced significant artistic works during the educational action in the museum, which contributed to their greater experience with art.

O presente artigo faz referência ao resultado de uma pesquisa desenvolvida sobre consumo e cuidado ambiental a partir das narrativas de jovens universitários residentes no Litoral de São Paulo. A abordagem dessa pesquisa se centrou nas identidades, práticas e imaginários desses jovens, interpretadas através de suas narrativas e relatos de vida, pelas quais é possível compreender questões mais amplas sobre o consumo e questões ambientais, ainda mais por residirem no Litoral de São Paulo e estarem mais próximos desse cenário natural. Analisamos as narrativas juvenis em seu caráter político, em que os jovens assumem-se como sujeitos de discurso e com voz, compreendendo de que forma questões ligadas à sustentabilidade estão presentes em suas ações, memórias e no cotidiano, como item importante da agenda política juvenil em meio ao consumo na contemporaneidade.Palavras-chave: narrativas juvenis; consumo; cuidado ambiental. Abstract: This article presents the results of a research on consumption and environmental protection from narratives of young university students living on the coast of the State of São Paulo. The research was focused on understanding consumption and environmental-related issues through those young students’ identities, activities and social imaginaries, based on their narratives and life stories, especially because they live in the coastal areas of the State of São Paulo and are, therefore, closer to a natural setting. We analyzed their narratives from a political viewpoint, where young people assume themselves as subjects in a speech and have a voice, to understand how sustainability issues are present in their actions, memories and daily life as an important item of the youth political agenda in the midst of consumption in contemporary times. Keywords: young students' narratives; consumption; environmental protection. Resúmen: Este articulo presenta los resultados de una investigación sobre consumo y cuidado del medio ambiente en las narrativas de jóvenes universitários que viven em la costa de São Paulo. La investigación se centró en las identidades, prácticas y imaginários de estos jóvenes, interpretadas a través de sus narrativas y relatos de vida, en los quales se puede comprender questiones más amplias sobre el consumo y las questiones ambientales, además porque viven en la costa de São Paulo y estan más cerca de los escenarios de la naturaleza. Analisamos las narrativas juveniles en su carácter político, por lo qual los jovenes se asumen como sujectos de discurso y con voz; buscamos compreender de que formas questiones ligadas a la sustentabilidade están presentes en sus acciones, memorias y em sus vidas cotidianas, subrayando un importante elemento de la agenda política del juvenil e del consumo en lo contemporâneo.Palabras-clave: narrativas juveniles; consumo; cuidado del medio ambiente

A formalizacao da autonomia do estado do Tocantins, pelo texto da Constituicao Federal Brasileira de 1988, refere-se ao processo com a palavra “criacao”. Este principio e reforcado na ideia de um espaco vazio, bem como de discursos legitimatorios do controle politico por alguns individuos. O ato comunicativo expresso na criacao, usando perspectivas da Historia Oral, Ecologia, Filosofia, por conceitos como a biossemiotica e a autopoiese urbana, convergem na complexidade envolvida das intencoes e imprevisibilidade de processos que envolvem sistemas humanos. A partir dessa inferencia, Palmas, num estudo das caracteristicas de seu Plano Diretor, e compreendida a partir de seus observadores, seus criadores imediatos e da emergencia de propriedades que impossibilitaram a previsao de ocupacao, crescimento e relacoes materiais. Palavras-chave: Palmas, criacao, oralidade, autopoiese urbana. ABSTRACT The autonomy formalization of the Brazilian state of Tocantins, by the Federal Constitution of 1988, refers to process using the word "creation". The principle is reinforced by the idea of an empty space, as well as political speeches control justified by some individuals. The communicative act expressed in creation, using Oral History, Ecology, Philosophy, through concepts like biosemiotics and urban autopoiesis, converge in the intricacies of intentions and unpredictability of processes that involve human systems. From this inference, Palmas, in a study of the characteristics of its Pilot Plan, is understood from its observers, its immediate creators and the emergence of properties which prevented the occupation, growth and material relationships. Keywords: Palmas, creation, orality, urban autopoiesis. RESUMEN La formalizacion de la autonomia del estado de Tocantins , el texto de la Constitucion Federal de Brasil de 1988, se refiere al proceso con la palabra "creacion". Este principio se refuerza la idea de un espacio vacio, asi como legitimatorios discursos de control politico por unos pocos individuos. El acto comunicativo expresa en la creacion, el uso de puntos de vista de la historia oral, Ecologia, Filosofia, por conceptos como biosemiotica y autopoiese urbanas converger en las intenciones y la imprevisibilidad de los procesos que implican sistemas humanos complejidad. De esta inferencia, Palmas, por un estudio de las caracteristicas de su Plan Maestro, se entiende a partir de sus observadores, sus creadores inmediatos y la aparicion de propiedades que hacian imposible prevision de ocupacion, el crecimiento y las relaciones materiales. Palabras clave: Palmas, creacion, oralidad, autopoiesis urbana. Disponivel em: Url: http://opendepot.org/2779/ Abrir em (para melhor visualizacao em dispositivos moveis - Formato Flipbooks ): Issuu / Calameo

Este artigo tem o objetivo de responder a seguinte indagação: Os estudantes brasileiros, candidatos ao Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio (Enem), idolatram o Estado ou o demonizam? Esta indagação surge em razão do profícuo debate ente Melo (2016) e Souza (2015; 2016) sobre a demonização ou não do Estado na sociedade brasileira. Como tal debate carece de dados empíricos, buscamos, inicialmente, em Almeida (2007) e Lamounier e Souza (2010) argumentos para responder a indagação proposta. Porém, os argumentos dos autores citados nos conduzem a interpretar as opiniões dos candidatos do Enem. Pesquisa de opinião pública realizada entre estes candidatos nos conduzem a resposta ao problema proposto., This article aims to answer the following question: Brazilian students, candidates for the National Secondary Education Examination (Enem), idolize or demonize State? This question arises from the fruitful debate being Melo (2016) and Souza (2015; 2016) about the demonization or not the State in Brazilian society. As such debate lacks empirical data, we sought initially in Almeida (2007) and Lamounier and Souza (2010) arguments to answer the question proposed. However, the arguments of these authors lead us to interpret the opinions of candidates Enem. Public opinion survey conducted among these candidates lead in the response to the proposed problem., En este artículo se pretende dar respuesta a la siguiente pregunta: estudiantes brasileños, los candidatos para el Examen Nacional de Enseñanza Media (ENEM), idolatran o demonizan Estado? Esta pregunta surge de la discusión fructífera siendo Melo (2016) y Souza (2015; 2016) sobre la demonización o no del Estado en la sociedad brasileña. Como tal debate carece de datos empíricos, hemos tratado inicialmente en Almeida (2007) y Lamounier y Souza (2010) argumentos para responder a la cuestión propuesta. Sin embargo, los argumentos de estos autores nos llevan a interpretar las opiniones de los candidatos Enem. encuesta de opinión pública realizada entre estos candidatos plomo en la respuesta al problema propuesto.

Zusammenfassung Der Artikel bietet eine Diskussion uber die Rolle des Sports als einer Alltagspraxis zur (Neu‑)Verhandlung der raumlichen Genderbeziehungen in Rio de Janeiro, Brasilien. Als Sport von nationaler Bedeutung pragen Raume des Fusballs die Architektur und das tagliche Leben in der Stadt. Vor dem Hintergrund einer Geschichte aus Exklusion und Diskriminierung haben Frauen erst in den letzten Dekaden des 20. Jahrhunderts begonnen, diese Raume zu nutzen. Indem er seinen Blick auf Frauenamateurfusball in Rio de Janeiro richtet, analysiert der Artikel ungleiche Gender-Beziehungen in Sport und urbanem Raum. In den letzten paar Jahren wurde Frauenamateurfusball popularer; es entstanden neue Vereine, Teams und Wettbewerbe. Doch obwohl heutzutage Manner Fusballraume mit Frauen teilen, mussen Frauenteams und fusballbezogene soziale Projekte immer noch darum kampfen, dass fur Frauen und Madchen mehr Sportraume in der Stadt eingerichtet werden. Schlagworter: Geschlechterverhaltnisse, Stadtraum, Sport, Amateurfusball, Brasilien ----- Women’s Amateur Football in Rio de Janeiro – A Contested Urban Sport Space Abstract This article offers a discussion on the role of sport as an everyday practice for the (re)negotiation of gendered spatial relations in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. As the national sport, football spaces dominate the urban architecture and everyday life in Rio de Janeiro. Due to a history of exclusion and discrimination, women only started to use football spaces in the last decades of 20th century. Through focusing on women’s amateur football in Rio de Janeiro, the article analyses unequal gender relations in sport and in urban space. In the last few years, women’s amateur football has become more popular and new clubs, teams, and competitions have been created. Yet while today men share football spaces with women, women’s teams and football related social projects still struggle to make more sporting space for women and girls in Rio de Janeiro. Keywords: Gender, urban space, sport, amateur football, Brazil ----- Bibliographie: Has, Julia: Frauenamateurfusball in Rio de Janeiro – Umkampfter Sport- und Stadtraum, PERIPHERIE, 1-2016, S. 57-72. https://doi.org/10.3224/peripherie.v36i141.22865

Objetivos: Conhecer os elementos presentes na face do professor que determinam o processo de ensino-aprendizagem no cenário tutorial e analisar suas implicações na formação de enfermeiros. Método: Trata-se de um estudo qualitativo realizado em um centro universitário particular localizado na região serrana do estado do Rio de Janeiro. Os participantes deste estudo foram onze estudantes regularmente matriculados no sétimo período da graduação no ano de 2014. O estudo foi aprovado pelo Comitê de Ética em Pesquisa com protocolo n.º 568.300. Resultados: Os dados convergiram para a construção de três categorias que dispõem de forma particular sobre os seguintes elementos da face do professor que implicam de forma agradável e desagradável aos olhos dos estudantes: expressões faciais, sobrancelhas, olhos e boca. Conclusão: Esperamos que as reflexões sobre os elementos conhecidos no corpo do professor disparem novos estudos em outros espaços de investigação institucional sobre criação do papel de ser enfermeiro.

Objetivo: Discutir as condições de saúde e trabalho de pescadores artesanais da colônia de pescadores do Gradim Z-08, na comunidade Cassinú. Método: Pesquisa de campo, de caráter quanti-qualitativo, realizada no período de janeiro a maio de 2013, com pescadores artesanais de uma colônia situada na comunidade Cassinú, RJ. Resultados: Foram entrevistados 35 pescadores com idade prevalente entre 40 e 55 anos, 34,3% estudaram até o Ensino Fundamental 1, 42,9% recebem renda mensal entre 1 e 2 salários mínimos,71,4% utilizam EPI’s de forma parcial, 91,4% sofreram algum ferimento na profissão. Identificou-se pelos depoimentos e observações locais, precárias condições de trabalho e riscos associados à poluição ambiental. Conclusão: O estudo demonstrou que há riscos de ferimentos e contaminação por microrganismos na água pela utilização parcial de EPI’s, más condições habitacionais e saneamento ineficaz. Condições estas agravadas por falta de proteção trabalhista, pela informalidade do trabalho artesanal, baixa escolaridade e baixa renda obtida com a atividade. Além disso, alertou para que enfermeiros e outros profissionais da saúde se preocupem com as populações “invisíveis”, desenvolvendo ações e investigações que gerem reflexões sobre estratégias que favoreçam melhorias na educação e saúde. Descritores: Condições de Trabalho, Poluição Ambiental, Enfermagem.

Objetivo: Avaliar a padronização das salas de vacinas da cidade de Caxias, Maranhão. Métodos: Trata-se de um estudo exploratório, observacional, transversal de cunho descritivo, com abordagem quantitativa, realizado no período de maio a agosto de 2014, em 21 salas de vacinas das Unidades Básicas de Saúde do município do Caxias-MA. As salas de vacinas foram avaliadas em relação ao espaço físico, ao material permanente, ao material de apoio e consumo, ao material para atividade de vacinação extramuros aos impressos e manuais. Resultados: Das 21 salas de vacinas, 05 não estavam em funcionamento. Portanto, avaliou-se de 16 salas de vacinas. Dessas, 62,5% foram consideradas boas e 37,5% alcançaram índice ruim. Conclusão: No presente estudo, observaram-se falhas em diversas salas de vacinas, dificultando a prestação de um serviço de proteção adequado, padronizado pelo Ministério da Saúde. Descritores: Avaliação de serviços de saúde, Vacina, Programas de Imunização.

Der Artikel befasst sich mit dem globalen Wiedererstarken von Aufstandsbekämpfung im urbanen Süden, indem er Brasiliens Erfahrung mit Konzept der Befriedung im Kontext von MINUSTAH (United Nations Mission in Haiti) und dessen weitere Anwendung in Rio de Janeiros marginalisierten Regionen, den favelas, untersucht. Die Autoren legen dar, dass der transnationale Export-Import von "Favela-Befriedungserfahrung" eng mit den geopolitischen Ansprüchen des Landes verknüpft ist. Indem die Autoren ihre Argumentation empirisch mit den Perspektiven lokaler AkteurInnen auf die Implementierung dieser Befriedungsstrategie in zwei marginalisierten Vierteln der Stadt, Maré und Alemão, fundieren, zeichnen sie deren Modifikationen und lokalen Anpassungen nach. Ferner weisen sie nach, dass das koloniale Befriedungsprojekt, das ein zentraler Aspekt der Aufstandsbekämpfung in Städten ist, die innerstaatlichen Kompetenzen des brasilianischen Militärs ausweitet. Durch Entfaltung dieses Arguments trägt der Artikel dazu bei, die weithin vernachlässigte Rolle von Staaten aus dem Globalen Süden als zentralen Akteuren bei globaler Aufstandsbekämpfung aufzuzeigen., This paper addresses the global reemergence of counterinsurgency in the Urban South by focusing on Brazil’s pacification experience in the context of the MINUSTAH (United Nations Mission in Haiti) and its ongoing application in Rio de Janeiro’s marginalized areas, the favelas. We argue that the transnational export-import of 'favela-pacification experience' is closely connected to Brazil 's geopolitical aspirations. By empirically grounding our argument in the perspectives of local actors on the implementation of this pacification strategy in two marginalized areas of Rio de Janeiro, Maré and Alemão, we trace the strategy's modifications and local adaptations and demonstrate that the colonial project of pacification, which is central to urban counterinsurgency, extends the domestic competences of the Brazilian military. In developing these arguments, this paper contributes to the largely neglected role of states from the Global South as central actors in the making of global counterinsurgency.

The present paper has the objective of analyzing students' conceptions about the supervised curricular internship in the Licentiate degree in Rural Education with qualification in Arts and Music, at the Federal University of Tocantins, Campus Tocantinópolis, Brazil. We also propose with this text to address the historical and pedagogical aspects of this course, as well as to discuss the importance of the Internship for the educators’ training of to work in countryside schools. This case study was based on the qualitative approach, with documentary research and semi structured interviews with students of this course as data collection instruments. The type of data analysis - theoretical and empirical - followed the perspective of the interpretative research technique. The results demonstrated that in order to overcome the challenges faced by students and teachers of the Licentiate degree in Rural Education with qualification in Arts and Music of UFT in Tocantinópolis, demands elaborating a proposal of joint training between the training institutions and the school, in the sense to guarantee actions that will attend the various subjects, especially those of the Rural Education.