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‘Reading Weber’s Sociology of Law’ is a review essay of Hubert Treiber’s Reading Max Weber’s Sociology of Law. It is an exploration and evaluation of Treiber’s splendid analysis of Weber’s legal philosophy. Treiber addresses the question of the dating of Weber’s manuscripts on the sociology of law and he clarifies Weber’s four stages in the development of the law and legal practices. This review essay concludes with a comparison between Treiber’s book and those by Werner Gephart and by Michel Coutu. The assessment is that Treiber’s book is an indispensable companion to the understanding of Max Weber’s sociology of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses how Ps 40 reflects a widely attested and complex discourse on how legalities relate to the human self—a discourse involving matters such as law's relation to human flourishing and perfectibility (e.g., Deut 30:6–14; Jer 31:31–34; Ps 19; Wis 6 and 9; Philo; for others views of perfectibility, cf. Gen 6:5; 8:21; Qoh 9:3). Psalm 40 combines praise and lament, with divine law as a key factor in this liturgical text's logic. After clarifying literary-historical and form-critical issues in studies of Ps 40, it will be argued that whether or not there is a literary relationship to Jer 31, these texts display divergent logic on law's relationship to human flourishing. The paper contributes to scholarly understanding of legal discourse and lament in Jewish antiquity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Jurisprudence Faculty Journal / Magallaẗ Kulliyyaẗ Al-fiqh is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Tabayyun is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Tabayyun is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The debate on alternative punishments appears to be stagnating. The impasse may be overcome if we consider humans from a different philosophical perspective. If we answer differently the question of who we are punishing, we open new possibilities regarding the question of how we punish. In particular, by applying the extended mind thesis we can arrive at interesting outcomes and reopen the debate on alternative punishments. According to this theory, external artifacts—such as smartphones—can be considered part of our minds. In this article, I defend the thesis that restricting access to personal technologies that are a part of one's self should be considered a form of punishment. Thus, a human who is considered from an extended perspective can be punished in a new way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Various authors have claimed that law has an ideal dimension owed to a claim to correctness. Against this thesis, this article argues that there are several ideal dimensions of law, namely, a moral, a legal, and an ontological one. All of them are independent of a claim to correctness. This claim can be understood in a strong and a weak way. Both versions are wanting because law claims neither that it is morally ideal nor that it is not grossly unjust. Consequently, the ideal dimension of law has to be found in features other than in a claim to correctness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Direito e Práxis is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Ancient allures the postmodern social subject trapped in the strangeness of time—the time after the end of history. For that time-beaten subject ancient is the unconscious of coherence, predictability, and certainty. Or perhaps that ancient is a glory fled. Whatsoever, ancient is generally sacralized—irrespective of the type of socialization that happened in the past—and journey to the ancient is often deemed to be a pilgrimage. When ideas of the ancient in their individuality and totality inter alia become the natural intellectual resource for rebuilding postmodern societies, discriminative ingenuity becomes an essential faculty. Any uncritical reverence of the ancient becomes antithetical to modern social and political values, inviting the risk of reproducing inequities of the past. This article problematizes such uncritical dependence on the ancient using Ancient Indian Jurisprudence, which has been looked up on as a repository of moral and legal values, as a case in point. It meditates from the experiences and perspectives of an imaginary 'teaching subject' on the many pitfalls and possibilities of the ancient as it builds a framework of teaching and learning, and a representative scheme of evaluation for Ancient Indian Jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Remarriage has been approved in Iran's jurisprudence and legal system, but its acceptance in the psychological system of Iranian women's society has faced doubts and created many challenges. Undoubtedly, failure to solve the mentioned challenges has created personal, social, cultural, and economic consequences. This has encouraged the wife to benefit to the condition of not remarrying in the marriage document. Despite this, the validity of the mentioned condition has been damaged and there is a difference of opinion regarding the implementation guarantee of the violation of the condition. The author of this research believes that the mentioned condition is correct in certain circumstances. The dimensions of psychology and the principle of fairness prove that in the same way that the husband has the right to remarry, the wife also has the authority to limit the remarriage of the husband by using the mentioned condition in the correct legal form. The main root of the disputes is the lack of correct methodology and the lack of guarantee of implementation of the violation of the condition of abandoning the legal act in the country's laws. What is important is to explain the desired performance guarantee in a suitable way in such a way that the rights of all parties are preserved. According to the findings of the present research, it seems that considering the many dimensions of the marriage contract, the interdisciplinary methodology is preferable and based on the legal point of view, if the husband violates from the condition, the second marriage of first wife is invalid and cannot be invoked and it is necessary to amend the existing laws.

The author emphasizes the importance of scientific jurisprudence in legal consciousness formation and strengthening the legitimacy of the legal order in Russia within the context of constitutional transformation and a changing socio-historical environment across the country. As the rigid separation of politics, ideology, and jurisprudence comes under criticism, it is argued that law is interconnected with social attitudes and cannot be purely non-ideological. Additionally, the risks associated with the arbitrary borrowing of foreign ideas and applying them in Russian scientific jurisprudence are discussed, such as human rights concepts and legal globalization methods. The need to create an independent system of legal ideals based on national traditions and values is emphasized. In this regard, scientific jurisprudence lags behind practical needs and the dominance of a template-schematic approach. The author comes to the conclusion that it is important to intensify the efforts that seek to strengthen the role of Russian constitutional law in the educational process, for students of law as well as students of other disciplines.

The correlation between international regulations and domestic regulations in the field of human rights and freedoms” analyses the relationship and mutual impact between international human rights norms and standards and the domestic legislation of the States. The paper investigates the importance and ways in which international regulations influence and are implemented in the domestic legislation of States to ensure the protection and observance of human rights. First of all, States have to pass appropriate domestic legislation to implement and give practical effect to international human rights norms and standards. This means that domestic regulations must be consistent with States’ international obligations and ensure the protection and respect of human rights at a national level. Secondly, international human rights regulations can serve as instruments for interpreting and applying domestic law. States can use international standards as references for interpreting and applying their domestic laws, thereby ensuring that human rights are duly observed and protected.

In this paper, I want to engage in, and move forward, a heated contemporary debate over certain normative positions within the well-known Hohfeldian table of legal relations – a table of dramatic explanatory power. After outlining the uncontroversial core of the table, I will leave the realm of uncontroversiality to enter the realm of controversy. I will enter, and stake out a stance in, a debate over the no-right position. Upon introduction of no-rights, a splinter occurs. There are two positions one might take on no-rights, which I call the Strict Hohfeldian and the Dual. My paper offers decisive reason to favour the latter. Lest there be any doubt – arising from the paper's chief focus on no-rights – the conclusion is one of great philosophical significance: by the paper's end, we will, if only at the high level of abstraction at which this paper is pitched, have a complete understanding of Hohfeld's table. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Jurnal Ilmiah Islam Futura is the property of Jurnal Ilmiah Islam Futura and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Tabayyun is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Tabayyun is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Legislative courts doctrine has become terribly tangled. When an area of law is summarized as one in which the "precedents are horribly murky, doctrinal confusion abounds, and the constitutional text is by no means clear," that area of law has become a Gordian Knot. Attempts to untangle it will prove futile. For over a century and a half, the Supreme Court has repeatedly tried to make sense of legislative courts, but to no avail. These attempts, ranging from pure formalism to functional balancing tests, have proven detrimental to individual litigants. That is where due process comes in. Despite the fundamental constitutional principle of due process and its promise of a neutral adjudicator, the Supreme Court has failed to consider the legislative courts doctrine from this perspective. The Supreme Court has provided a robust body of jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause about unacceptable pressures and influences on adjudicators. But no one has thought to introduce the two. So rather than continue to try to untangle legislative courts doctrine, we need to use the sword of due process to cut the knot. This piece aims to begin that conversation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scott Hershovitz's Law is a Moral Practice develops a bold, novel, and comprehensive account of law: the moral practice picture. Its central thesis is that legal relations (rights, duties, powers, etc.) are moral. They are real, full-fledged normative relations, connected to genuine reasons for action, and endowed with robust normativity. Nothing less than ordinary moral relations. The account is compounded with a deflationary view of theories in general jurisprudence and of the debates about them. In this vein, Hershovitz recommends that we move away from theorising about law (understood as a set of legal norms), and focus on the nature of legal relations instead. In this paper, I pursue two interrelated objectives. First, I address Hershovitz's main arguments for the view that legal relations are moral. Second, I take the issue with the asymmetry between the deflationary and inflationary stances he advocates for legal norms and relations, respectively, arguing that this different treatment is unwarranted, because the deflationary stance is, and because this very combination of attitudes is unstable. Properly understood, questions about the nature and determination of legal norms and relations can't but be seen as complementary aspects of a unified legal metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kantian legalism is now the dominant scholarly interpretation of Kant and an important approach to legal and political philosophy in its own right. One notable feature is its construal of the relationship between law and politics decisively in law's favour: Law subordinates politics. Political judgment is constrained by and only permissibly exercised through law. This paper opposes this subordination through a close analysis of an ambiguity in Kant's conception of sovereignty. Understanding this ambiguity requires seeing that, for Kant, law cannot subordinate the sovereign's political judgment because it is a condition which makes a legal system possible. Kant was not an exacting legalist, but a practical reasoner struggling with the pressures politics imposes on finite beings. Through discussion of a leading contemporary approach, and close engagement with its historical source, the paper raises new considerations about the relevance of political judgment in the relationship of law and politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a review on the two-volume book called “Comparative History of Foreign Law” written by Dmitry Poldnikov, the Professor of the Theory of Law and Comparative Law Department at MGIMO University of Russia. The authors of this review are convinced that the book is a new word in Russian legal-historical editions because it presents an unconventional analysis of the development of state and legal systems of various jurisdictions through the prism of legal values, legal traditions and legal diversity.

This study was conducted with the aim of investigating the impact of jurisprudential and legal challenges of infertility on couples' relationships in Isfahan city. According to the objective, the research style was applied and practical and the method of collecting data was descriptive and correlation type. The statistical population includes all the infertile people who were referred to the infertility treatment centers located in Isfahan city, and 201 people were selected as a sample by cluster sampling. The data collection tool included two questionnaires, one was made by the researcher and the other was the standard questionnaire on the marital compatibility of Spanier (1976). The collected data were analyzed through one-sample t-test and multiple regression with SPSS25 quantitative software. The findings of the quantitative section show that violence with an average of 4.16 is the highest and divorce with an average of 3.69 is the most minor challenge among Infertile couples. Legal challenges have a negative effect on couples' relationships, But jurisprudential challenges do not have significantly affect on couples' relationships; Therefore, it cannot be said that couples' relationships are affected by the increase or decrease of jurisprudential challenges.

The American system of rights is individualized--premised on the concept of singular, physically separate, and autonomous people. The rise of the fetal personhood movement complicates this basic understanding. If rights attach to singular, autonomous people, and fetuses are legally people, then the body of a pregnant person becomes conceptually unintelligible as it contains potentially two, interrelated people. Such a circumstance is fundamentally a contradiction within a framework that insists that rights attach to people who are, by definition, singular, separate, and autonomous. This Article argues that, as a result of this apparent contradiction, fetal personhood laws make the humanity of the pregnant person precarious. If the law has no framework for two rights holders in one body, then the pregnant person must be something else entirely. She becomes less of a subject and more of an object--a reproductive vessel, merely the container for another individual rights-holder. Reproductive justice scholars and advocates have long argued that laws purporting to endow the fetus with personhood exacerbate the "maternal-fetal conflict" and undermine pregnant people's rights. This Article argues, relying on both decades of feminist legal theory and original empirical evidence, that granting full personhood to a fetus has an even more insidious outcome--undermining the legal personhood of women entirely and recategorizing them in the eyes of the law as non-person objects. Looking across cultures and eras, it is unfortunately not difficult to ascertain what might happen when human beings are treated as objects. Such objectification results in almost certain abuse, sometimes of the most horrifying variety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the jurisprudence of transcendentalism in Antebellum America by examining the works of transcendentalists like Henry David Thoreau, George Ripley, and Theodore Parker. Other topics include the jurisprudence's negativity regarding law and legal institutions, the transcendentalists' anger about slavery and Fugitive Slave Law, and the importance of local ordinances and state statutes during the period.

Copyright of Journal of Babylon Center for Humanities Studies is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Croatian & Comparative Public Administration is the property of Institut za Javnu Upravu and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Al-Mishkat for Humanities & Social Studies / Al-Mis̆kāt li-l-ʿUlūm al-Insāniyyaẗ wa-al-IğtimāʿIyyaẗ is the property of World Islamic Sciences & Education University (WISE) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Introduction. The article highlights the main milestones of the professional development of Kharkiv University professor A. Stoyanov and his scientific activity in the field of history of law. It was found that modern researchers who, in the course of their scientific research, turned to the analysis of his works, for certain reasons, emphasize primarily the work of the scientist in the field of international law, but usually do not pay any attention to the extremely wide range of historical and legal research of the scientist, which in his scientific creativity, he himself took far from the last place in terms of importance and volume. This is what determined the topic of this article. Summary of the main results of the study. It is noted that one of the most interesting historical and legal works by A. Stoyanov's monograph "History of Advocacy among Ancient Peoples", in which the monuments of law and legal thought of Egypt, India, ancient Jews, Greeks and Romans were analyzed. The embryo of the Institute of Advocacy A. Stoyanov saw precisely in the ancient Greek synegory. His historical and legal studies "Historical analogies and points of intersection of new legislation with ancient law", "The beginnings of family law among primitive peoples", "Family law and inheritance among Jews" and published by the publishing house of Kharkiv University in separate brochures aroused considerable interest among scientists and students of that time, "Family, marriage, and the legal position of women according to the legislative monuments of India", "Customary law in the history of the most important states of Europe and especially France", "Customs of society and courts in France from the end of the 17th century. until 1789". A certain result of this stage of his studies of ancient law was the publication of the author's lectures devoted to the history of the legislation of the countries of the East. Some scientific research carried out by Professor Stoyanov at one time caused heated discussions and controversies. Among these, first of all, we can mention the work "Historical analogies and points of intersection of new legislation with ancient law", which was published in 1883 and was an extremely interesting attempt at diachronic comparative research, one of the first that was carried out in the universities of Eastern Europe. He was an ardent supporter of comparative and especially historical methods of studying legal institutions. He used them widely when writing his scientific works. The scientist published a significant part of his works in the journal "Notes of the Kharkiv University". One of the most interesting historical and legal studies, which has not lost its relevance even today, is the work "Criminal Law of Rome from the earliest times to Justinian inclusive", published here in 1895. Conclusion. The conclusion that A. Stoyanov was a bright representative of that generation of lawyers of the Kharkiv school, whose work created the foundation of the modern national science of the history of law. His works, which during the Soviet era were forgotten for ideological reasons and only briefly mentioned by researchers, contain many layers of valuable historical and legal information and deep scientific conclusions. The merits of the scientist in the future have yet to be fully assessed by the next generation of lawyers.

Legal norms serve as practical standards for individuals and officials. While this 'normative aspect' of law is widely acknowledged, its significance for theories of law remains contested. In this paper, I examine three views on the matter. First, that we should explain legal norms as reason-giving. Second, that we should explain legal discourse as being about reasons for action. Third, that we should explain law as capable of being reason-giving. I survey some challenges associated with each of these views. What they have in common is an implicit assumption about the form that normative explanation must take: that it must be a linear, non-reductive explanation. There is an alternative model for normative explanation available, however. That model explains normative notions in terms of the practices and attitudes involved in recognizing, offering, and demanding them. I highlight the potentials, and limitations, of this practice-centered alternative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existence and rights of indigenous peoples faced several challenges during this time of rapid development. Indigenous and tribal people are weak and marginalized because of these issues. This is due to how differently everyone participates in positions in communities with customary land and customary law in the framework of life in the country and state based on Pancasila and the constitution. The issue raised in this essay is how to provide progressive legal protection for indigenous and tribal peoples’ existence, while also achieving their welfare. This essay adopts a conceptual approach, with Pancasila serving as the fundamental principle for ensuring the legal protection of indigenous and tribal populations in Indonesia. This essay also makes use of Customary law communities that are protected by the current legal system, which is more static, constrained, and legalistic than it has ever been. The issue of how communities with customary law are acknowledged must be addressed in terms of legal protection. The state should enact laws and procedures to offer legal defense based on instruction and empowerment. These laws and policies are examples of progressive legal theory; they are founded on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, which positions humanity as bringing justice, wealth, and happiness to indigenous and tribal people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of legal studies is colored by the views of legal scholars who are in opposition to one another, namely views that emphasize that law is sui generis, self-sufficient, and immanent rationality as well as the view that law is not independent or can be influenced by other disciplines, such as politics and economics. Based on these differences in views, the problem to be examined is formulated, namely whether the science of law is an autonomous scientific discipline. These problems are examined based on the type of normative research with a conceptual approach. The analysis related to legal autonomy begins with examining the subject matter of jurisprudence which is nothing but an attempt to find out the nature of law or an attempt to answer the question ’what is law?’. Many jurists have provided definitions of law, including Roscoe Pound, Jeremy Bentham, Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, and John Finnis. These jurists have something in common in that law is a rule of conduct or has a normative character. Next is described a view that rigidly states that law is autonomous, namely from Ernest J Weinrib with his concept of ’law as immanent rationality’, and a view that does not rigidly state that law is autonomous, namely from Gunther Teubner and Niklas Luhmann with his concept of ’law as an autopoietic system’. The conclusion of this research is that law is autonomous, but not understood in a rigid manner, where law is closed and open at the same time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political character of law in general, basically consisting of its final orientation to the political common good, has been recognized by authoritative doctrine in the field of classical realism. Notwithstanding this, the pursuit of the common political good through law has been predominantly admitted at the level of legislative activity (mediate efficient cause of law) with some degree of oblivion regarding its presence in concrete justice and -particularly- in the judicial concrete justice (immediate efficient cause of law). Faced with the anomalous practices known as the «politicization of law» or the «judicialization of politics», it is pertinent to understand the scope and sense of a correctly conceived political character of judicial sentences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on examining the origin, legislative history, and jurisprudence surrounding the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) Act, particularly its prohibition on "unfair methods of competition" (UMC). It delves into the historical context leading to the enactment of the FTC Act, analyzes the legislative intent behind the UMC prohibition, and evaluates how courts have interpreted and applied this provision over time. It critiques the FTC's policy statement on the UMC prohibition.

Cosmetic surgery is one of the new social phenomena. For this reason, there is no trace of this matter in the earlier jurisprudential books. In recent years, both Shi'a and Sunni scholars of jurisprudence have investigated this issue. Most of Sunni jurists have considered this surgery forbidden and to prove their claim, they have cited evidence such as the forbiddence of altering God's creation and traditions prohibiting such surgery. In contrast, most of Imamiyyah jurists have not accepted the above mentioned reasons and relying on reasons such as the unconditional verses and traditions praising beauty and beautification, the rule of self-dominance, and the principle of innocence, they have considered it permissible. This article uses a descriptive-analytical method and library sources. After examining the reasons of both groups, it was concluded that the reasons of forbiddence are not complete and the reasons of permission are correct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses using of generative neural networks in education, especially in legal education, as an example, employing formal analysis in the context of the Russian legal system. Neural networks are considered as a kind of media and hence the issue of using neural networks by students is by nature a question of media education, its application, and its limits. The core question is whether it is possible to give students the opportunity to use generative neural networks when performing tasks like writing a diploma. Neural networks are considered as a kind of “new media” that must be assessed in the context of the media philosophy dichotomy between “tool” and “body”. The article reviews several scenarios of law students using neural networks and the conclusion is provided that not in all cases it is inadmissible. However, in the cases that concern the core competences that relate to understanding law as a phenomenon of information and communication, it is inadmissible. Such core competences imply command of natural language and writing reasoning skills. It is critical to take into an account the provisions of the legislation that focus on the concept and purposes of education which clarify the matter on the formal side. Ultimately, the “blackout test” is suggested to discern the cases were using of neural networks in education is not possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When legal theorists ask questions about legal interpretation—such as what it fundamentally is, what it aims at, or how it should work—they often do so in ways closely tethered to existing legal practice. For example: they try to understand how an activity legal actors (purportedly) already engage in should be done better, such as how judges can better learn about the content of the law. In this paper, I discuss a certain kind of "conceptual ethics" approach to thinking about legal interpretation, which is less tethered to existing legal practice (or the existing meaning of core pieces of legal terminology). The approach I explore asks questions about legal interpretation in a way that is tethered to what legal (or "legal‐ish") concepts people should deploy, as part of arguments on behalf of engaging in legal (or "legal‐ish") practices different from our current ones. In exploring this approach, I aim to help us better understand the landscape of philosophical issues about legal interpretation, including parts of it that I think have been underexplored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Revista Foco (Interdisciplinary Studies Journal) is the property of Revista Foco and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)