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Roma Hukukunda “Crimen Laesae Maiestatis” olarak adlandırılan vatana ihanet suçunun ilk defa Roma hukukunda pater familiasa karşı işlenen suçlar olarak ortaya çıktığı kabul edilmektedir. Erken dönemde ismine parricidum denilen cinayet suçu sosyal istikrarı bozacak mahiyette görüldüğünden ihanet suçu olarak kabul edilirken artık devletin kurumsallaşmasıyla içine parricidum suçlarını da alan perduellio kavramı ihanet suçlarını tanımlamak için kullanılmıştır. Perduellio olarak kabul edilen tüm eylemlerin ortak özelliği ise bir tür özel kast olan faildeki “hostilis animus” veya “topluma zarar verme niyeti”nin varlığıdır. Perduellio dışında devlete karşı en ciddi suçlar crimen laesa maiestas olarak adlandırılmaktadır. Bu suçlar MÖ 103 civarında Lex Appuleia De Maiestate ile başlayan ve Digesta ile biten özel yasalarda düzenlenen suçlar olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Roma hukukunun tesiriyle Orta Çağ Avrupası’nda kralın kutsal ve dokunulmaz şahsına karşı işlenen suçlar da vatana ihanet suçu olarak nitelendirilmiştir. XIX. yüzyılda ise bu suçlar siyasi suçlar başlığı altında incelenmiştir. Yürürlükteki hukukumuzda vatana ihanet adında bir suç yoksa da bu başlık altında tavsif edilebilecek çeşitli suçların TCK’da bulunduğunu, karşılaştırmalı hukuk ve hukuk tarihimize bakarak, söylemek yanlış olmayacaktır. Bu çalışmada öncelikle vatana ihanet suçunun çeşitli hukuk sistemlerindeki tarihi kökeni müteakiben mukayeseli hukukta vatana ihanet suçları son olarak da Türk hukuk doktrinde vatan ihanet suçu ele alınacak, sonuç kısmında ise Türk hukukunda hangi suçların vatana ihanet sayılabileceği sorusuna cevap bulunmaya çalışılacaktır.

Roman adoption is the antecedent of our current normative system. Both adoptio and adrogatio allowed someone to artificially form part of the domus of the adopter under the potestas of a new paterfamilias with the purpose or social function of securing the cult of the manes gods. Progressively, adoption became widespread in social customs and became a tool to ascend the social ladder, acquire inheritance, evade certain exclusions imposed by legislation, exchange surplus children among different family groups, establish personal alliances, of kinship and of inter-familial dynastic solidarity, and of designating a political successor under the election of the optimus (chief emperors and emperors of the Roman nobilitas). During the Justinian reign, the family structure is transformed and the adoptio is subdivided into two modalities: adoptio plena and adoptio minus plena.

Patria potestas appears in the tradition in two aspects: as the father s right to put his son to death and as the right to dispose of the family property. AH examples concerning the murder of the son (or daughters) known to the Roman authors are from the time of the Roman Republic. The father's right to dispose of the property even when the son is an adult lasted until the Later Empire. In a detailed study W. V. Harris limited his discussion to ten examples of the son s murder and three of the daughter. They are mostly not qualified as the ius vitae ac necis by the Roman authors. It is important to stress: a) That these examples mainly illustrate the father s right in charge as the high magistrate. In putting their sons to death the fathers-magistrates did not use the vitae necisque potestas of the father but the authority of supreme state officers. The crimes of which the sons were accused belonged not to family affairs but to offences against the military discipline and State interests. b) The only condition in applying the vitae necisque potestas was a moral one, the existence of the iusta causa. Even then it was not unpunished, and in many cases the father went into exile. c) The father's power existed only over legally born children within a legal marriage. Legal marriage was the privilege of patricians until 444 BC. That means that the patria potestas was originally limited only to patrician families. Biological kinship was not a decisive factor in the restitution of the father - children connection. d) The main right of the pater in the family was not to kill its members, but to preserve his position in economic control and to dispose of the property which was once common and eventually to control the moral behavior of the family members.

La hipótesis de este artículo es que la patria potestad debería ser entendida hoy, después de la reforma de la Ley N° 19.585, de 1998, como una función tuitiva sobre la persona y bienes de los hijos. Para demostrar esta proposición, el artículo examina los antecedentes históricos y el desarrollo dogmático de la patria potestad en el Código Civil chileno. Luego, desde la perspectiva de las reformas más recientes al Derecho de familia, el artículo revisa el contenido de esta función, tanto en sus aspectos personales como patrimoniales. Desde la misma perspectiva, el trabajo termina examinando la evolución de esta institución en cuanto a sus sujetos activos y pasivos.The hypothesis of this article is that patria potestas should be understood today, even after reforms of Law 19 585, 1998, as a children's guardianship over person and property. This proposition is demonstrated in the article with resource to the historical background of the appropriate Titles of the Chilean Civil Code that provide rules to it, and with review of statutory development afterwards. Trom the point of view of the most recent developments in Tamily Law, the article reviews the contents of patria potestas, both in its personal and patrimonial aspects. It concludes that there is not much change in it. Change has come on the contrary from individuals entitled to exercise the function, most commonly the father, the mother of both of them jointly.