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For over two decades, the FTC creatively employed its capacious statute to police against shoddy data practices. Although the FTC’s actions arguably were needed at the time to fill a gap in enforcement, there are reasons to believe that its current approach has outlived its usefulness and is in serious need of updating. In particular, our analysis shows that the FTC’s current approach to data security is unlikely to instill anything close to optimal incentives for data holders. These shortcomings cannot be fixed through changes to the FTC enforcement approach, as they are largely generated by a mismatch between the tools that Congress gave it over a century ago and what it needs to foster firms’ incentives to mimic socially optimal levels of care for the data they hold. Not only does the current framework likely suffer from informational deficiencies attendant to its focus on “reasonable” security that render liability standards uncertain, it also lacks the ability obtain the type of relief that will force firms to internalize the costs of their data security decisions. We examine the problem of data security enforcement through the lens of the economics of optimal precautions and identify several reasons why a strict liability regime administered by the FTC, under which firms pay for the expected harm from breaches they cause, is likely to be superior to the current framework that revolves around the concept of reasonableness. The benefits from strict liability flow from the likelihood that firms do not fully internalize the costs and benefits of their data security decisions and the relatively large informational burdens associated with measuring actual and optimal care under a negligence regime. We also show why in this informational environment strict liability is better than negligence for developing a vibrant market for cyber insurance, which will allow data security regulation to be de facto outsourced to insurers who will contract with firms for optimal levels of care. Because these private contracts will harness private information on costs and benefits from precautions, they are likely to incentivize more efficient behavior.

The extraordinary success of the digital sector of the domestic economy is indisputable. With this level of market success, growth, and influence, both economically and culturally, it is perhaps inevitable that these businesses are increasingly at the forefront of public policy discussions. Most relevant for our purposes are the now-common claims that these firms have systematically engaged in anticompetitive conduct, or are otherwise insulated from competitive forces, and that digital platforms’ exercise of monopoly power has remained unchecked at least in part due to gaps in our antitrust laws or lax enforcement of existing laws. This testimony provides insights on three important questions concerning the state of competition in the digital marketplace: (1) Are existing antitrust laws that prohibit monopolization and monopolistic conduct adequate for digital platforms?; (2) Are existing laws adequate to prohibit anticompetitive transactions including for vertical and conglomerate mergers, serial acquisitions, data acquisitions, or acquisitions of potential competitors?; and (3) Is the institutional structure of antitrust enforcement — including the current levels of appropriations to the antitrust agencies, existing agency authorities, congressional oversight of enforcement, and current statutes and case law — adequate to promote the robust enforcement of the antitrust laws?

Optimal remedies should be grounded in consumer harm. The caselaw interpreting the FTC's ability to obtain equitable monetary relief, however, has strayed far from this benchmark. Rather than requiring the FTC to show the marginal impact of deception, courts presume that everyone exposed to deception is harmed based on the fiction that the FTC has proven materiality. This approach is likely to overstate consumer harm in most circumstances involving a legitimate product, which will reduce the amount of beneficial marketplace information available to consumers. Several cases that challenge the FTC's legal authority to use 13(b) to obtain equitable monetary relief are awaiting certiorari determinations, which have led some to call for Congressional intervention to fix the statutory problem. Regardless of the outcome of this process, we see this turn of events as an opportunity for the FTC to recalibrate its consumer protection remedies to more closely mirror consumer harm. It should do so by focusing on the marginal impact of deception, a task that could be accomplished through Congressional action or on the FTC's own initiative. Regardless of the path, this marginal improvement would be an important one for consumers.

This brief explains amici’s understanding of the relevant economic analysis. It explains why basic economic principles underlying the analysis of multi-sided markets lead to the conclusion that a plaintiff should be required to demonstrate, at a minimum, that: (1) the allegedly unlawful restraint caused anticompetitive effects in the form of actual or probable restricted output market-wide—a showing that logically requires analyzing both sides of a two-sided market; and (2) the defendant had sufficient market power to restrict output in a properly defined market. These two requirements align with sound economics and would also provide clear guidance for courts in applying the rule of reason.

Every state has occupational licensing laws or regulations, which require individuals seeking to offer a certain service to the public first to obtain approval from the state. Occupational licensing requirements historically derive from a desire to protect unwitting consumers from bad actors. In recent years, however, the number of licensed professions in the United States has skyrocketed and licensing requirements have become increasingly onerous. When incumbents wield licensing requirements not as a defensive shield to protect consumers but as an offensive sword to exclude new entrants, serious concerns regarding the competitive implications of the licensing schemes arise. Self-interested incumbents have incentives that may differ from consumers, and these self-interested incumbents can—and sometimes do—impose requirements that do not enhance quality, but rather restrict output, increase prices, and hamper innovation. This Paper explores the competitive implications of state occupational licensing regimes. Part I analyzes the historical development and justification for occupational licensing. Part II reviews the empirical evidence regarding the effects of occupational licensing on factors such as quality, price, innovation, and availability. Part III summarizes how antitrust law, and particularly the state action doctrine, treats state board-enacted occupational licensing. Part IV explores the interplay of occupational licensing and antitrust laws in the United States, delving into a particularly striking case at the intersection of occupational licensing and innovation: Teladoc, Inc. v. Texas Medical Board. Part V provides some suggestions for agency engagement in monitoring the effective use of occupational licensing.

Consumer protection acts (CPAs) developed with the goal to protect American consumers from fraudulent, deceptive and unfair business practices. Initially, Congress, through the FTC Act, sought to define and deter conduct that the existing legal system largely failed to remedy. Subsequently, states localized and individualized these rights while maintaining a careful balance between protecting consumers and preventing the proliferation of lawsuits that harm both consumers and businesses. But in recent decades, this thoughtful balance has yielded to damaging legislative and judicial overcorrections at the state level with a common theoretical mistake: the assumption that more CPA litigation automatically yields more consumer protection. The result has been an explosion in consumer protection litigation, which serves no social function and for which consumers pay indirectly through higher prices and reduced innovation. Using data on state and federal CPA litigation from 2000-2013, we find substantial increases in CPA litigation in both, with federal litigation growing almost twice as fast in federal than state courts (a cumulative average growth rate of 6.1 percent vs. 3.4 percent). We also find that the financial crisis appears to have played a large role in the recent growth in CPA litigation — the financial services industry is the most common target for private CPA actions in a set of cases we sample, and a large proportion of these cases involve debt collection or federal lending or housing statutes. We conclude that although the entire suite of expansive provisions in CPAs — enhanced damages, class actions, attorneys fees, and eliminating the need to show harm — are responsible for the explosion in private CPA litigation, from a social standpoint, requiring consumers to show cognizable harm would be the most efficient reform.

After North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, it is clear that the antitrust laws have an important role to play in reforming occupational licensing, but the exact framework remains an open question. Under a rule of reason analysis, health and safety rationales are off limits. But if state board cannot draw on these types of consumer protection arguments to defend their actions, as a practical matter, can a state board ever win an antitrust suit? Some have suggested applying a modified rule of reason to incorporate non-competition justifications. But these approaches threaten to summon the ghost of Lochner and raise problems of subjectivity and predictability that are sure to arise when courts and enforcers are called on to weigh losses in competition against purported gains across other dimensions. Rather than expanding the rule of reason to accommodate non-competition concerns, there is a better path that draws from PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC. Given the vast empirical literature pointing to the harms from state regulation of professions, board actions that restrain competition should be treated as inherently suspect as a matter of law. As such, in an antitrust challenge, the burden of persuasion immediately should fall to the board to provide an efficiency rationale that is both cognizable and plausible. If the board cannot muster a story involving cognizable benefits to competition to justify the restraint, it should be condemned as per se illegal, and the authorizing law subject to preemption. If the board is able to offer a justification that sounds in competition, it still must provide a plausible reason why either the restraint offers procompetitive benefits or does not harm competition. If they cannot meet this burden, the restraint should be condemned summarily. If they do, courts will conduct a full-blown rule of reason in inquiry.

Economics at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) covers both the antitrust and consumer protection missions. In this year's essay, we focus mainly on the competi- tion-side of the agency. Drawing on a wealth of recent research, we provide descriptive and analytical information about the petroleum industry. Mergers, as always, were a major preoccupation of the FTC, and we discuss a few oil industry mergers as well as one lead- ing litigated case - Arch Coal's acquisition of Triton Coal. Finally, we review the empir- ical literature on the effects of vertical restraints, noting that the literature supporting an animus toward such restraints is surprisingly weak.

Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act gives the FTC an undefined mandate to prosecute ‘unfair methods of competition’. For nearly 100 years, the FTC has searched tirelessly for the meaning of this amorphous concept. Since 1992, the FTC has continued to define Section 5 through a series of consent decrees. Absent any external constraint, the FTC appears to have broad discretion to define the reach of Section 5 beyond the Sherman Act. This discretion causes uncertainty, which is likely to deter beneficial conduct. It also creates incentives to divert resources from productive to redistributional purposes. The recent FTC investigation of Google illustrates the FTC’s discretion to define the reach of Section 5. This article suggests several reforms, including making Section 5 coterminous with the Sherman Act, or having the FTC issue guidelines that limit Section 5 to conduct that clearly harms consumers through adverse effects on competition, and that would not otherwise fall under the antitrust laws.

Most professions in the United States are regulated by boards composed of industry practitioners, who in their official roles routinely engage in anticompetitive conduct. Until the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, many believed that such conduct was beyond the reach of antitrust enforcement as long as it was taken pursuant to state policy to displace competition — a standard met with relative ease. After North Carolina Dental, states now must additionally take ownership of the anticompetitive actions of these boards to avoid the full force of the antitrust laws. In this manner, North Carolina Dental has the potential to prompt a large-scale restructuring of the state regulatory apparatus. This article explores the potential for antitrust preemption to play a role in this restructuring. I argue that, to the extent that unsupervised boards’ anticompetitive conduct would be justified on non-competition concerns, they are rendered defenseless in any rule of reason inquiry, and hence are subject to a de facto per se standard. Rather than adjusting the rule of reason inquiry to allow courts to weigh non-competition concerns in these cases, the better alternative would be to preempt the laws altogether. This approach has several advantages. First, it would avoid a dissonance between antitrust and due process inquiries into the same conduct. Second, it would act as a penalty default for states, and like penalty defaults in contracts, such a rule would assign the regulatory decision to the low-cost information provider — the state, rather than the court. Finally, this approach vindicates federalism to a greater extent than a modified rule of reason. The only role for a federal court under a preemption approach would be to uphold or strike down the law granting the board authority to engage in the suspect conduct. This decision, moreover, would be based on an objective analysis of the board’s regulatory structure, rather than a subjective weighing of competition and non-competition concerns.

In recent years divergence between United States ("US") and European Union ("EU") competition policy has garnered a lot of attention. One particular area where these differences are evident is the treatment of vertical restraints. In the USA, an antitrust plaintiff must show that a vertical agreement is likely to harm competition - that is, reduce economic welfare. EU competition law, on the other hand, places a lower burden on the European Commission ("EC"). The EC recently has promulgated a block exemption regulation ("BER") that defines circumstances under which vertical arrangements are automatically exempted under Article ("Art.") 81(3); still, European competition law condemns many more vertical agreements than does US antitrust law. "Dominant" firms entering into vertical agreements receive even harsher treatment under EU competition law. Because the Guidelines to the BER explicitly exclude dominant firms from exemption under Art. 81(3), it appears that Art. 81 proscribes dominant firms from entering into vertical agreements that restrict the behavior of the contracting parties. Additionally, Art. 82 discourages dominant firms from entering into vertical agreements. This paper uses a Bayesian framework to analyze the disparate treatment of vertical arrangements in the USA and EU. The practice of antitrust is the problem of inferring the competitive consequences of various types of market conduct. We argue that an optimal enforcement estimator would minimize an expected social loss function, where the expectation is taken over the posterior probability that a given practice is anticompetitive, given evidence in a particular case. Empirical literature informs priors, whereas theory informs the likelihood. We show how differences in antitrust treatment of vertical practices can be explained by different loss functions, even when each jurisdiction shares the same beliefs regarding the theoretical and empirical effects of vertical restraints.