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The rate of organizations adopting Agile and DevOps methodologies has grown in recent years, with researchers observing the impact of leadership styles and methodology adoption, presenting challenges with sustaining and scaling change initiatives. Where organizations within the marketplace today reveal the significance of leadership in influencing change, while findings signal deficiencies with having leaders who are ready. The purpose of this quantitative correlational research examines the increased probability of failure organizations face when engaging in enterprise Agile and DevOps transformational change initiatives. Through investigating the relationship between transformational leadership behaviors, readiness for change, and organizational citizenship behavior exhibited by management and employees engaging in Agile and DevOps initiatives within regional financial services companies with a presence in the South Eastern United States. The resulting study surveyed 390 anonymous participants with varying backgrounds and organizational roles based upon predetermined quota constraints aligning with the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Census, and FDIC data. Utilizing three principal instruments to measure transformational leadership, change readiness, and organizational citizenship behavior; conducting statistical analysis for construct reliability, descriptive properties, and hypothesis testing, concluding the existence of influential correlation of change readiness and organizational citizenship behaviors having a relationship with transformational leadership. The research findings identify the association of organizational readiness and employee social citizenship responsibility with applicability to transformational leadership, bringing light to the significance of grooming and sustaining leaders at all levels of the organization.

Organisational agility is growing more prominent within the banking sector. Performance of self-managed teams is specified as a component critical to better organisational agility. The contributing factors, which make self-managed teams, perform so well, are still not clearly understood. The high rate of failures in organisational change, brought on by employee resistance to change can also deter the adoption of these teams. The main objective of this research was to determine whether fulfilling the intrinsic motivators of autonomy, competence and relatedness described in self-determination theory, increased the overall willingness to adopt change and a desire to be part of a selfmanaged team. To a lesser extent, this study sought to determine whether age, gender and ethnicity could alter the perceived fulfilment of these basic psychological needs. This research contributes to the academic understanding of self-managed teams and provides insight into future research in this field. Using quantitative data, a descriptive research design was followed, with the data collected through the use of a questionnaire administered in a survey format. The questionnaire was put to a sample of banking employees in the process of adopting selfmanaged teams within their organisation. The results revealed that the more a person perceives that a self-managed team fulfils his or her need for autonomy, competence and relatedness; the increased desire to be part of these teams exists, and more openness to adopt the change to a self-managed team. Further insight drawn from the research shows that age, gender and ethnicity have no significance to the adoption of self-managed teams. Overall this research demonstrates that leadership s consideration of the basic psychological needs can greatly increase chances for success in the change to an agile organisation. The practical implications of this study were demonstrated in the conclusion of this research.

The Army finds itself at a critical point in its implementation of a mission command culture. Recent post-conflict history demonstrates tendencies towards centralization. While there are some differences in context, the anticipated future environment for the Army bears many similarities to its recent post-conflict past. Army senior leaders experienced the difficult days of "zero defect" command climates, reductions in end strength, and reduced promotion rates. Conversely, based on their experiences in combat over the last decade, the Army's junior leaders have both mission command experience and an expectation of empowerment from their leadership. To increase the chances of successful implementation of a mission command culture, the Army should utilize Schein's cultural embedding mechanisms. Specific recommendations include: consistent senior leader focus on mission command, senior leader role modeling mission command, rewarding positive examples of mission command, and adjusting the Officer Evaluation Report to ensure the Army promotes the right leaders. The implementation of a mission command culture will only occur when senior leaders overtly embrace and participate in the process.

Mission command is the philosophy of command that Army commanders and leaders must use to lead Soldiers and units in the 21st Century. While first conceptually introduced in 1982 with the publication of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, the Army did not officially adopt the evolved doctrinal term and concept of mission command until 2003 with the publication of FM 6-0, Mission Command. While mission command has been integrated into its doctrine, the Army still has yet to institutionalize it. The Army has not yet fully integrated mission command into its culture, fostered unit climates that engender it, incorporated it into its training methodologies, developed personnel management systems that reward it, and employed it consistently in all environments. These challenges result from the Army's inability to create major change and transform over the past 11 years, as well as its rooted culture, organizational climates, tiered structure, bureaucratic processes, and dated training and personnel management systems. This paper describes this latest evolution of mission command, explains why challenges to its institutionalization exist, and proposes solutions to Army senior leaders as to what should be done to achieve institutionalization.

"As the United States (U.S.) continues its drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's clear that the coming decade is a vital period of transition for the U.S. Army. This transition is enabled by declining budgets, a shift in emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region, counterterrorism, and training of partners to shaping the strategic environment, preventing the outbreak of dangerous regional conflicts, and improving the army's readiness to respond in force to a range of complex contingencies worldwide. In order to meet the challenges of shaping a future volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) strategic environment, senior leaders must identify and develop agile, adaptive strategic leaders who are equipped to embrace and negotiate challenges that await them. This project examines how the U.S. Army, from 1972-2012, developed its organizations and training to prepare and develop agile, adaptive strategic leaders who manage a budget-strained, technologically-oriented Army. This project will also analyze how senior leaders learned from history, adapted to their current operational environment, and anticipated future requirements in order to adequately prepare strategic leaders to meet the challenges before them."--Abstract.

"Since 2004, The Department of the Army has been required to provide an annual report on sexual assault. The Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) office has been the lead agent for the report and program. Over the years, the SHARP office has gone through several organizational changes due to Department of Defense directed mandates and internal Army decisions. This paper examined the Army's SHARP program from 2004 to 2011 by using Kotter's eight-step process of creating major change in an organization. This examination of Army decisions and programs within each of the eight steps showed that the Army has made many significant improvements to address this issue and anchor these changes within its culture. In concluding, this paper provided recommendations in four areas related to formally developing a vision for the SHARP program and using additional ways to communicate the vision and programs to members of the active Army and more specifically to the Reserve Component."--Abstract.