1. Is the Committee of the Whole the House? Implications of Michel v. Anderson for District of Columbia Representation.
- Author
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Beth, Richard S. and Fauntroy, Michael K.
- Subjects
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LEGAL judgments , *LEGISLATION , *PRACTICAL politics ,UNITED States politics & government ,UNITED States Congressional voting - Abstract
In 1993 the House of Representatives adopted rules permitting Delegates to vote in Committee of the Whole. As a result of suit brought against those rules in Michel v. Anderson, Federal Courts in 1993 and 1994 permitted them to stand, but in a form that left Delegates’ votes with little real effect in the legislative process. This paper examines implications of these rulings both for the representation of non-State areas in Congress and for the constitutional status of the Committee of the Whole. We first sketch the history of representation of non-State areas, noting the limitations of the role of Delegates for this purpose. We then turn to the operation of the Committee of the Whole, focusing on ways in which its procedural actions and capacities may be viewed as identifying it with or distinguishing it from the House proper. We compare this analysis with ones adopted in opinions and supporting briefs in Michel v. Anderson, especially the opinion of the District Court. The opinions of both the District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals in effect "pierce the veil" of the Committee of the Whole, concluding that actions it takes must be considered those of the House proper, because they constitute an exercise of "legislative power" constitutionally reserved to the House and its Members. We argue, however, that the Courts’ analyses overlook key elements of the procedures relating the House and the Committee of the Whole, especially the operation of (1) the separate vote on amendments in the House and (2) the motion for the previous question. Our analysis supports distinguishing, rather than identifying, the Committee of the Whole and the House. While the Courts’ rationale may cast broad doubt on the constitutional propriety of the manner in which the Committee of the Whole functions, our alternative analysis avoids this consequence. Although our account is also broadly favorable to Delegate voting, reconciling it with accepted readings of the Constitution severely constrains the capacity of the office of Delegate to afford full representation for the District of Columbia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2002