Author: "Negretto, Gabriel L." / Topic: legislative bodies and presidents - Searchworks@Jio Institute Digital Library Search Results

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Start Over Author "Negretto, Gabriel L." Topic legislative bodies Topic presidents

Author: Colomer, Josep M. and Negretto, Gabriel L.
Subjects: *SEPARATION of powers, *LEGISLATIVE bodies, *PRESIDENTS, *CABINET system
Abstract: We discuss a new set of institutional formulas oriented to strenghtening the Congress with the aim of promoting good governance in a regime of separation of powers between the Congress and the President. We adopt the criterion that policy outcomes coinciding with the median voter’s preference can produce highest satisfaction or social utility. Proportional representation in Congress tends to establish a close correspondence between the median legislator’s and the median voter’s preferences. Cooperation between the median party in Congress and the President for both legislative decisions and Cabinet formation can reduce the ‘gridlock interval’ and favor socially efficient outcomes. A survey of some recent institutional reforms in democratic presidential regimes in Latin America shows that these formulas are gaining acceptance. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Published: 2002

Author: Negretto, Gabriel L.
Subjects: *EXECUTIVE power, *POLICY sciences, *LABOR policy, *LEGISLATIVE bodies, *VETO, *PRESIDENTS
Abstract: What is the effect of constitutional decree authority (CDA) on the policy-making process of a presidential regime? Despite recent efforts to answer this question, there is still much uncertainty in the literature about the extent to which decree powers may allow presidents to control the legislative process. This article argues that in a separation-of-powers system, the existence of CDA effectively enhances executives' ability to act as agenda setters. This capacity, however, is not uniform across all cases. Developing a simple spatial model of decree games, the author argues that the bargaining power of an executive to promote legal changes through decrees varies according to three interrelated factors: decree approval rules, the extent of the executive's partisan support in the legislature, and the strength of the presidential veto. These propositions are supported by a comparative analysis of the process of constitutional design and the implementation of decrees in Brazil and Argentina. two cases presenting significant variation in each of the independent variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Published: 2004
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