Search

Within the context of general relativity, the Heraclitus asymmetry property requires that no distinct pair of spacetime events have the same local structure Manchak and Barrett (2023). Here, we explore Heraclitus-maximal worlds – those which are "as large as they can be" with respect to the Heraclitus property. Using Zorn's lemma, we prove that such worlds exist and highlight a number of their properties. If attention is restricted to Heraclitus-maximal worlds, we show senses in which observers have the epistemic resources to know which world they inhabit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I first reconsider the personal links between Comenius and Leibniz, searching for how Comenian texts and ideas may have reached Leibniz. For that reason, I outline a constellation of thinkers within Central European Protestantism, since a vast majority of the important intellectuals with some noteworthy link both to Comenius and Leibniz were based there. Second, I investigate more closely one particular intellectual link between Comenius and Leibniz, namely their common combinatorial standpoint, because the striking parallels, connections and similarities between Comenius's and Leibniz's ideas on combinatorics, universal language and relational metaphysics have been largely overlooked thus far. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of this paper is a suite of Latin papers from 1685, some of which are still unpublished, in which Leibniz writes in the guise of a Catholic in order to defend Catholicism and counter Protestant objections, and this despite him being a lifelong Lutheran. After providing an overview of these writings (which I refer to as Leibniz's "Catholic" writings) and the grounds for dating them to May–June 1685, I consider their purpose, arguing against the claim that they were intended to support Church reunion and suggesting instead that they were apologetic in nature, intended as a reactivation or reimagining of Leibniz's earlier "Catholic Demonstrations" project. I identify the patron Leibniz had in mind for these writings as Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels and support this by a detailed comparison of the "Catholic" writings with the Leibniz-Landgrave correspondence and the Landgrave's still-unpublished essays. This reveals that the Protestant arguments Leibniz uses in the "Catholic" writings are the very ones that he himself used when writing to the Landgrave, and that the responses Leibniz gives to these arguments are the very ones that the Landgrave used. I also consider the context of the writings, suggesting they were crafted during a period of personal uncertainty for Leibniz and possibly aimed at securing a position under the Landgrave. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Wolff's rejection of Leibnizian monads is rooted in a disagreement concerning the general notion of substance. Briefly, whereas Leibniz defines substance in terms of activity, Wolff retains a broadly scholastic and Cartesian conception of substance as that which per se subsists and sustains accidents. One consequence of this difference is that it leads Wolff to interpret Leibniz's concept of a constantly striving force as denoting a feature of substance separate from its static powers, and not as their replacement. For Wolff, powers are essential possibilities of acting in subjects suited for independent existence. Force is a further ingredient that provides a reason for the contingent operation of powers. Unlike Leibniz, Wolff conceives force narrowly as a principle of actuality, which he calls the "nature" of substance, as distinct from its principle of possibility, or essence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay explores the possibility of a metaphysical concept of continuity, which seems to have an implicit though decisive presence in Deleuze's thought. It exposes a peculiar continuity that animates the indiscernibility of borders without making its constitutive elements homogenous or convergent, a zone of indiscernibility, wherein the borders vanish between the virtual and actual, expressed and expression, incorporeals and corporeals, sense in the proposition and event in states of affairs. Continuity conditions a fundamental indiscernibility but a heterogeneous one, a disjunctive synthesis that does not compromise or negotiate the heterogeneity of its terms. This divergent continuity is explored in Logic of Sense, through a dialogue with Leibniz's syncategorematic account of calculus and Dedekind cut. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most important aspects of our mental life, in terms of the quality and meaning of our existence, is emotions; Because emotions can guide our perceptions, thoughts, and actions in a certain direction. To explain this category, the differentiation of passions, rational tendencies, instincts, and the role of each in human actions should be investigated. Leibniz in his philosophy of mind highlights these different inclinations of the mind well and by focusing on dynamic forces, transforms the understanding of the human mind specially. He tries to explain how these types of emotions affect the body and mind based on the approach of psychophysical parallelism and the experience of states such as pleasure and pain based on his metaphysical background. Although Leibniz never wrote a separate treatise on passions like Descartes, he deeply cared about the appetent dimension of the human mind, and his ideas in this regard can be found in the work new essays on human understanding. In this article, an attempt is made to explain his approach to emotions and, more specifically, human passions by focusing on new essays on human understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main aim of this paper is to provide an account of Leibniz's engagement with the doctrine of cosmic dualism in his Theodicy, i.e., the view that there are two distinct fundamental principles that are responsible for the existence of the created world, one good and the other evil. Leibniz's discussion is primarily a response to arguments in favour of cosmic dualism that he finds in the writings of Pierre Bayle. However, in addition, he presents a genealogical argument that appears to be intended to provide reasons to reject the view. The paper also contains a critical discussion of Leibniz's case, and finishes by drawing attention to some issues which arise that are worthy of further consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout his correspondence and writings, Leibniz made a number of passing references to the religion of the Mohammadans (Islam) and to several Islamic commentators. Recent literature on these references has placed them in the context of Leibniz's political and historical interests that largely reflect his Eurocentric prejudices. The purpose of this paper is to extract a more detailed and systematic view of Leibniz's knowledge of and interest in the religion, through Leibniz's remarks on Islam in relation to Christian doctrines such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, through the commentary of Maimonides and the Christian Averroists, and through a (partly speculative) comparison of three types of theodicy. The paper concludes that while Leibniz knew very little about Islam's actual doctrines, and that he was subject to the prejudicial views of his time, he understood Islam, as he did Christianity, as largely in conformity with natural (rational) religion. At the same time, his interest in its specific doctrines was primarily instrumental, that is, as correctives to certain abusive practices and misunderstandings persisting within Christianity, which could then explain for him why Islam prevailed in the East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the 17th century philosophers, in general, was to show that, by taking as an example the success of the human mind embodied in science, definitive knowledge could be achieved in philosophy, just as in science. To this end, firstly, they described in detail the method to be followed in order to obtain the knowledge. In science, the efforts of scientists such as Kepler, Galileo, and Newton to explain the universe based on mathematics led mathematics to stand out as a way of thinking. In this period, while mathematical research methods enabled the examination of physical phenomena, philosophy, on the other hand, was seen as a model to reach exact knowledge. Rationalist philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz all agree that people should use their own minds, not authorities, and moving from this idea, mathematics is the method that will lead us to the truth. This paper aims to show how these three great philosophers applied mathematics to their own philosophies, based on their differences and similarities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Kant-Studien is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article contributes to philosophy of literature discussions about possible worlds by presenting "possible world fiction" as a unique sub-branch of fiction, distinct from science fiction. I argue that there are four main categories of possible world fiction--alternative histories, time travel fiction, multiverse fiction, and contradictory possible world fiction--and I uncover core philosophical themes from each category, including insights from the Ancient Greek atomists, Leibniz, and contemporary dialetheism. One of the virtues of possible world fiction is that it predisposes us to think productively about paradoxes and contradiction. I argue that although all four categories predispose us in this way, only the fourth category--contradictory possible world fiction--does this outright. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leibniz's metaphysics already justifies evil not only through the normative power of God, assuming that it is simultaneously the omnipotence of reason. For Kant, evil becomes definitively the sole problem of the rational being, human. While for Leibniz, the divine will had organized all practical relations of humans and movements of the physical world in such a way that the practical reason of all individuals is metaphysically constituted and evil is justified, Kant shifts the focus to the practical reason of humans as autonomous subjects. In this paradigm, God loses his metaphysical power, retaining only a moral role. Nietzsche and Musil build upon this context, yet surprisingly, they do not further advance this development. Instead, they reject the power of pure reason, which becomes absolute for Kant. Simultaneously, they draw on God's metaphysical power over evil to formulate their concept of the new evil that confronts us in the practical contexts of modern life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leibniz's famous proposition that God has created the best of all possible worlds holds a significant place in his philosophical system. However, the precise manner in which God determines which world is the best remains somewhat ambiguous. Leibniz suggests that a form of "Divine mathematics" is employed to construct and evaluate possible worlds. In this paper, I uncover the underlying mechanics of Divine mathematics by formally reconstructing it. I argue that Divine mathematics is a one-player combinatorial game, in which God's goal is to find the best combination among many possibilities. Drawing on the combinatorial theory, I provide new solutions to some puzzles of compossibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to show how the understanding of Leibniz's notion of toleration in matters of faith should be considered not merely as a pragmatic, but also as an epistemologically and metaphysically relevant concept. Following Maria Rosa Antognazza's account, I will argue that Leibniz's view on the belief of mysteries is 'above reason' and the relation between faith and experience plays an important role in his discussion of transubstantiation with Des Bosses, but also that Leibniz allows for presumptions based on faith to enter metaphysical discussions. Doing so, despite the fact that we cannot achieve certainty in these matters and have to accept a variety of different beliefs regarding the same objects, enriches our understanding of the world and of God—and also gives us reason to take seriously Leibniz's engagement with corporeal substances, albeit only as presumptions rather than as necessary consequences of his basic metaphysical system. Finally, I will illustrate this point by showing how it is also in play in Leibniz's response to Tournemine regarding the mind-body-union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leibniz's jurisprudence and theory of natural law, which began development as early as the 1660s, has implications for his mature theodicy. In this essay, it is shown that based on an analysis of a few key jurisprudential texts, the Nova Methodus (1666), the Elementa Juris Naturalis (1670–1671), and the Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus (1693), Leibniz developed the legal term 'obligatio' from Roman Law and the Spanish Jesuit traditions, but that his usage shifted at different stages of his life. Nevertheless, these views are compatible and provide a grounding for his philosophical optimism. It is further shown that Leibniz took the concept of obligatio to provide something like legal standing (locus standi or klagebefugnis) so that rational minds can undergo the theodicean project, that is, because God has obligations to substances, they can seek an explanation for their suffering from God. And because human reason is analogous to divine reason, according to Leibniz, God provides the explanation that the actual world is the best possible world. The goal, then, is to prove that we should take Leibniz's insights into jurisprudence more seriously, at least in part, because they help to explain his philosophical optimism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En el presente trabajo se publica la traducción de La ciencia perspectiva (1684-1686), de G.W. Leibniz. Entre 1679 y 1686, el pensador alemán escribe una serie de textos dedicados a la ciencia perspectiva. Esos escritos son los siguientes: La construcción y el uso de escalas en la perspectiva; Las asistencias del cálculo; El fundamento de la perspectiva; El origen de la regla del arte de la perspectiva; La relación de los puntos con el plano del espectador; La ciencia perspectiva. El último de ellos, que es también el más acabado formal y argumentativamente, es el que se traduce en este trabajo. En La ciencia perspectiva, Leibniz define la disciplina, presenta una metodología y descubre la regla de dicha ciencia. La ciencia perspectiva es, de acuerdo con él, el arte de exhibir en la Tabula la apariencia del objetivo y, en dicho arte, el análisis geométrico de la intersección resulta central para el descubrimiento de la regla universal de la representación. Antes de presentar la traducción, se puede encontrar un estudio introductorio del texto, cuyo objetivo es facilitar la comprensión del lector en relación con lo defendido por Leibniz en La ciencia perspectiva.

El objetivo de este artículo es intentar establecer una línea de continuidad entre Montaigne y Leibniz respecto del tema de las pasiones y la vida feliz, entendiendo como parte de ésta una adecuada gestión de las pasiones. Se sostiene que hay puntos de contacto entre Montaigne y Leibniz, que a menudo pasan por la intermediación de Descartes. Tras comparar las propuestas de estos tres autores por lo que respecta a las pasiones y la vida feliz, se concluye que el tratamiento moderno de las pasiones tiene su antecedente en Montaigne, y que llega hasta Leibniz por una consideración cada vez más “racionalista”. Se sugiere además que en los tres autores es posible considerar su filosofía como una forma de vida, y que más allá de que cada uno parta de posiciones metafísicas diferentes sus propuestas de vida feliz son similares.

En este trabajo analizaremos la concepción de Leibniz acerca de la aplicación de la matemática a la física entre los años 1677 y 1690. Reconstruiremos esta concepción fundamentalmente a partir de algunos conceptos relacionados, como son los de “atributos” o “cualidades acompañantes”. Veremos que, por aplicación de la matemática a la física, Leibniz entendió específicamente la posibilidad de dar explicaciones mecánicas que dan cuenta de la causa inmediata e inteligible por la cual tienen lugar las cualidades confusas, en un sentido que debe ser dilucidado. Estas explicaciones revelan, por lo tanto, la estructura a parte rei a partir de la que tienen lugar las sensaciones.

This paper aims to clarify the evolution of the notion of primary matter in Leibniz’s philosophy. The analysis takes the scholastic discussion on the reality of primary matter as a framework to explain the development of Leibniz’s ideas. It will be shown that Leibniz argued in his earlier writings for a conception of primary matter as some sort of being (similarly in line with some scholastic philosophers like Scoto, Ockam, and Suarez). In contrast, in his mature metaphysics, he deployed this primary matter of reality, approaching Aquinas’s position in a creative and novelty manner.

Abstract In the present paper, I intend to show the role in Leibniz’s overall philosophy of his definition of a complete notion as a concept that contains every predicate of a certain subject. I will try to argue that this definition consists in an exoteric and more intuitive or accessible device directed to those unfamiliar with the intricacies of his views on logic and also that it plays a pedagogical role in his writings. In addition, I intend to explain away the seeming mismatch between this definition and that of individual substance, as well as Leibniz’s definitions of truth and proposition based on the relation of concept containment. In doing so, I will try to show that the definition above of a complete notion provides an important argument for the existence of such notions based on our ordinary talk about individuals and also how my proposal deals with Donald Rutherford’s problem of this definition’s extensional correctness vis-a-vis accidents.

O presente texto tem por objetivo apresentar um dos assuntos mais controversos da modernidade, a saber: o princípio de individuação. Em ambos os autores, John Locke e G. W. Leibniz, a questão quanto a necessidade desse princípio diz respeito à moralidade: ações, justiça e Divindade. Contudo, nenhuma dessas construções filosóficas seriam possíveis sem a fundamentação do Cogito, por René Descartes, o eu. Portanto, este artigo inicia pela caracterização do Cogito cartesiano. Em seguida, apresentaremos a compreensão lockeana da consciência como constituidora da identidade pessoal ou moral para, posteriormente, elucidarmos as críticas depreendidas por Leibniz a tal exclusividade.

This essay investigates the way in which Wolff takes an interest in the hypothesis of an emendatio of the prima philosophia from Leibniz’s incitement in De primae philosophiae emendatione, et de notione substantiae (1694) to re-found metaphysics. This makes it possible, secondly, to examine the way in which Wolff takes Johannes Clauberg’s ontology as a model, even though it represents in his view only a failed attempt at that same emendatio. Through the analysis of the texts, this article considers the possibility of a new reading of the ‘failure’ attributed by Wolff to Clauberg, which would consist in his having ‘emended’ first philosophy by expelling it from the domain of ontology and finally identifying it with Cartesian prima philosophia.

The notion of force is at the heart of Leibniz's metaphysics. One of his central theses is that powers are to be reconceived as forces. Connectedly, he maintains that force is essential to the very account of substance. The paper contends that these claims have not been well understood due to an inadequate understanding of the notion of force itself. Against a common reading, I argue that Leibnizian force is not fundamentally dispositional, but an activity. Taking seriously this idea means reconsidering not only the nature and function of powers, but also the basic character of Leibniz's metaphysics—including his view of substances as soul-like and as causally independent. This paves the way for a novel interpretation of the unity of physical and metaphysical forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Conatus: Filosofia de Spinoza is the property of Revista Conatus: Filosofia de Spinoza and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper examines how a certain threshing machine was developed and improved by Jobst Heinrich Voigt and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz between 1699 and 1700. While this machine was based on various mechanical principles and instruments, including the pinned drum mechanism first noted by Georg Philipp Harsdörffer, it was later reconceptualized as a 'mathematical' machine. I claim that such a positioning was not unique to this machine, but part of a wider movement during the 18th century that considered various artisanal instruments as mathematical, as well as agricultural and artisanal knowledge as scientific. Examining the development and subsequent reception of this machine, I show that during the first decades of the 18th century these conceptions gave rise to a double image of this machine, and hence of agricultural knowledge in general: on the one hand, this machine was considered as more efficient and productive (while still in need of improvement); on the other hand, it was viewed, either implicitly or explicitly, as something that should be studied by mathematicians, thus reflecting a changing image of mathematics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tasavvur: Tekirdag Theology Journal / Tekirdag Ilahiyat Dergisi is the property of Namik Kemal University, Faculty of Theology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The status of continuity in Deleuze's metaphysics is a subject of debate. Deleuze calls the virtual, in Difference and Repetition, an Ideal continuum, and the differential relations that constitute the Ideal imply the continuity of this field. But, Deleuze does not hesitate to formulate the same field by the affirmation of divergence (incompossibility) that can be regarded as a form of discontinuity. It is, hence, unclear how these two ostensibly contradictory accounts might reconcile. This article attempts to reconstitute a Deleuzian theory of continuity through Leibniz, whose philosophy is equally subject to a tension between the law of continuity, prevalent in his mathematics and metaphysics, and the discontinuity or absolute individuality of monads. By reorienting The Fold around the motif of continuity a new conceptual space is opened for continuity qua heterogeneity-and-inseparability. Then, enfolding the conceptual personae of The Fold onto Difference and Repetition reveals the tacit though decisive presence of different types of continuity operational in Deleuze's metaphysics that will be called divergent, intensive, torsional, and tenorsional continuities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leibniz's metaphysics appears to go a long way towards monism: it supports a strong dependence of limited things on the absolute or God and understands this dependence not only as causal dependence but also as a pervasive ontological dependence which involves the communality of nature between absolute and limited. Yet, Leibniz stops short of affirming monism. Why? This paper takes a fresh look at Leibniz's reasons for opposing monism through the lens of a virtually unknown text of 1698 on the metaphysical foundations of the infinite. Against the backdrop of the present-day monistic proposals of Jonathan Schaffer and Michael Della Rocca, the paper identifies and evaluates four different types of monism: 1. Whole-Part Monism; 2. World-Animal Monism; 3. God-Nature Monism and 4. Eleatic Monism. It argues that Leibniz's opposition to Whole-Part Monism, World-Animal Monism, and God-Nature Monism, is due to his conceptions of the infinite and of what it is to be "an absolutely absolute Being". Furthermore, it argues that the only type of monism which could preserve Leibniz's demanding notions of real infinite and absolute is Eleatic Monism. The latter, however, is also rejected by Leibniz due to our first-hand experience of what it is to be a substance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In The Fold, Deleuze regards Raymond Ruyer as the most recent of Leibniz's great disciples. This claim is not self-evident, since Ruyer often criticises Leibniz and stresses the divergence of his theory from Leibniz's monadological metaphysics. Therefore, while Ruyer does not seem to regard himself as indebted to Leibniz, and as his psychobiology is not always reconcilable with Leibniz's philosophy, it is necessary to explore what is at stake in Deleuze's recognition of Ruyer as a Leibnizian thinker. This essay foregrounds the tacit intertwining between Leibniz and Ruyer, which can, on the one hand, contribute to Leibniz's scholarship and uncover the contemporaneity of his thought, and on the other hand, expose certain revealing Ruyerian moments in Deleuze's immanent philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cet article a pour but de faire une brève discussion sur les critiques de Leibniz à la philosophie de Descartes. Ayant ce but en vue, on va d’abord discuter l’attaque que Leibniz a déclenchée contre la méthodologie cartésienne. Ensuite, on présente les raisons qui ont aménées Leibniz à rejeter les notions fondamentales de la métaphysique cartésienne. Après cela, on arrive à l’analyse du vigoureux refus dont la physique de Descartes a été l’objet. Finalement, de ces discussions on pourra conclure que, Leibniz se voyait et agissait comme un penseur tout à fait anti-cartésien et qu’il a été l’un des plus agressifs opposants au système philosophique élaboré par Descartes.

El texto tiene como propósito la confección de la reseña con el fin de ofrecer a las personas lectoras una aproximación a la obra de Ensayos de Teodicea del filósofo G. W. Leibniz la cual contiene, análisis académicos profundos para hablar del tema de Dios de la forma más ordenada posible.

This article traces the conceptual origins of Newton's draft scholia to Propositions IV through IX of Book III of the Principia to a manuscript booklet of observational data. By coordinating passages marked by dog-eared pages in Newton's books with his correspondence and working papers, it is possible to date these references to a time when he was still actively working on the Principia itself. This provides the basis for a new interpretation of Newton's uses of Egyptian and Graeco-Roman antiquity to counter rival histories of astronomy and philosophy influenced by Descartes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the abstractionist account of quantity championed by Leibniz, especially in the 1680s. Leibniz introduced the notion of quantity in an indirect way, via an abstraction principle. In the first part of the paper, I identify the context in which this approach arose in light of Leibniz's criticism of his earlier dream of an 'alphabet of human thought'. Recognising the impossibility of such a project led him to realise that, when dealing with terms referring to abstract objects, we should always consider them within the true sentences in which they occur. In the second part, I describe this approach in detail. This allows us to look at some key concepts of Leibniz's theory of quantity. In particular, I raise the problem of the relationship between the two sides of the abstraction principle: how should we think of the relation between the claim that a and b are equal, and the claim that the quantity of a is identical to the quantity of b? I argue that we can find a positive answer to this problem in Leibniz. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía is the property of Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The way Leibniz applied his philosophy to mathematics has been the subject of longstanding debates. A key piece of evidence is his letter to Masson on bodies. We offer an interpretation of this often misunderstood text, dealing with the status of infinite divisibility in nature , rather than in mathematics. In line with this distinction, we offer a reading of the fictionality of infinitesimals. The letter has been claimed to support a reading of infinitesimals according to which they are logical fictions, contradictory in their definition, and thus absolutely impossible. The advocates of such a reading have lumped infinitesimals with infinite wholes, which are rejected by Leibniz as contradicting the part–whole principle. Far from supporting this reading, the letter is arguably consistent with the view that infinitesimals, as inassignable quantities, are mentis fictiones , i.e., (well-founded) fictions usable in mathematics, but possibly contrary to the Leibnizian principle of the harmony of things and not necessarily idealizing anything in rerum natura. Unlike infinite wholes, infinitesimals—as well as imaginary roots and other well-founded fictions—may involve accidental (as opposed to absolute) impossibilities, in accordance with the Leibnizian theories of knowledge and modality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]