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The environmental impact assessment (EIA) system is currently located at the centre of China's environmental legal reform. The Chinese government has undertaken significant legal strategies to rectify past regulatory wrongs, close enforcement gaps, and improve public participation. However, ongoing administrative reform and prevailing policies optimizing the business environment have made the efficacy of EIA reform more complicated and uncertain. Through examining how EIA laws and regulations on accountability, compliance, and participation have changed, this article provides an analytical framework to evaluate current legal reform of EIA. It finds that the Chinese government is attempting to bring about genuinely functional EIA reform by improving the legitimacy and efficiency of EIA in delivering better environmental decisions. Yet, its efforts could be undermined by the unsettled conflict between legitimacy and efficiency. Furthermore, functional EIA reform could be constrained by peripheral challenges such as inconsistent institutional arrangements, the undefined role of the judiciary, and an underrepresented environmental public interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two industry lobbies can seek a laxer policy that would apply to both industries and loophole lobbying that provides benefits specific to one industry. We determine the properties of the lobbying equilibrium, including the resulting emissions level. In many cases, higher effectiveness of loophole lobbying is detrimental for industries and beneficial for environmental quality, as it exacerbates the free-rider problem in the provision of general lobbying by inducing industries to turn towards loophole lobbying. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]