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Currently, many scientific fields such as psychology or biomedicine face a methodological crisis concerning the reproducibility, replicability, and validity of their research. In neuroimaging, similar methodological concerns have taken hold of the field, and researchers are working frantically toward finding solutions for the methodological problems specific to neuroimaging. This article examines some ethical and legal implications of this methodological crisis in neuroimaging. With respect to ethical challenges, the article discusses the impact of flawed methods in neuroimaging research in cognitive and clinical neuroscience, particularly with respect to faulty brain-based models of human cognition, behavior, and personality. Specifically examined is whether such faulty models, when they are applied to neurological or psychiatric diseases, could put patients at risk, and whether this places special obligations on researchers using neuroimaging. In the legal domain, the actual use of neuroimaging as evidence in United States courtrooms is surveyed, followed by an examination of ways that the methodological problems may create challenges for the criminal justice system. Finally, the article reviews and promotes some promising ideas and initiatives from within the neuroimaging community for addressing the methodological problems. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses aspects on the potential risk factors of heart disease among women in the U.S. It states that women in the U.S. have higher prevalence and mortality to cardiovascular disease (CVD) compared to men. It mentions that medical imaging plays an important role in the diagnosis and management of CVD. Moreover, sex differences play a crucial role in the pathophysiology of disease presentation of several CVD.

Background: Perfusion-cardiovascular magnetic resonance (CMR) is generally accepted as an alternative to SPECT to assess myocardial ischemia non-invasively. However its performance vs gated-SPECT and in sub-populations is not fully established. The goal was to compare in a multicenter setting the diagnostic performance of perfusion-CMR and gated-SPECT for the detection of CAD in various populations using conventional x-ray coronary angiography (CXA) as the standard of reference. Methods: In 33 centers (in US and Europe) 533 patients, eligible for CXA or SPECT, were enrolled in this multivendor trial. SPECT and CXA were performed within 4 weeks before or after CMR in all patients. Prevalence of CAD in the sample was 49% and 515 patients received MR contrast medium. Drop-out rates for CMR and SPECT were 5.6% and 3.7%, respectively (ns). The study was powered for the primary endpoint of non-inferiority of CMR vs SPECT for both, sensitivity and specificity for the detection of CAD (using a single-threshold reading), the results for the primary endpoint were reported elsewhere. In this article secondary endpoints are presented, i.e. the diagnostic performance of CMR versus SPECT in subpopulations such as multi-vessel disease (MVD), in men, in women, and in patients without prior myocardial infarction (MI). For diagnostic performance assessment the area under the receiver-operator-characteristics-curve (AUC) was calculated. Readers were blinded versus clinical data, CXA, and imaging results. Results: The diagnostic performance (= area under ROC = AUC) of CMR was superior to SPECT (p = 0.0004, n = 425) and to gated-SPECT (p = 0.018, n = 253). CMR performed better than SPECT in MVD (p = 0.003 vs all SPECT, p = 0.04 vs gated-SPECT), in men (p = 0.004, n = 313) and in women (p = 0.03, n = 112) as well as in the non-infarct patients (p = 0.005, n = 186 in 1-3 vessel disease and p = 0.015, n = 140 in MVD). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the admissibility of neuroimaging evidence in U.S. courts, recognizing various trends in decisions about such evidence. While courts have routinely admitted some neuroimages, such as CT scans and MRI, as proof of trauma and disease, they have been more circumspect about admitting the PET and SPECT scans and fMRI evidence. With the latter technologies, courts have often expressed reservations about what can be inferred from the images. Moreover, courts seem unwilling to find neuroimaging sufficient to prove either insanity or incompetency, but are relatively lenient about admitting neuroimages in death penalty hearings. Some claim that fMRI and “brain fingerprinting” are able to detect deception. Other scholars argue that brain fingerprinting is a dubious concept and that fMRI is not yet sufficiently reliable. Moreover, there are substantial concerns about privacy and the perils of mind reading implicit in such technology. Yet, there is a movement to try to make these new technologies “courtroom ready” in the near future, raising a host of legal, policy, and ethical questions to be answered. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]