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Your search keyword '"Self-selectivity"' showing total 2 results
Start Over Descriptor "Self-selectivity" Topic manipulability
2 results on '"Self-selectivity"'

1. Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules.

Author

Diss, Mostapha

Subjects
*SOCIAL choice, *PROBABILITY theory, *MANIPULATIVE behavior, *VOTERS, *VOTING, *MATHEMATICAL models
Abstract

We provide exact relations giving the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation of three specific social choice functions (Borda rule, Copeland rule, Plurality rule) in three-alternative elections when the notion of self-selectivity is imposed. We use each type of tie-breaking rule in the case of three-candidate election in order to make the results more robust. Analyzing our probabilities, we can point out that the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation tend to vanish significantly when the notion of self-selectivity is imposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2015
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2. Strategic manipulability of self-­selective social choice rules

Author

Mostapha Diss, Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Dao, Taï, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)

Subjects
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Voting rules,Self-selectivity,Stability,Manipulability,Probability, Computer science, Stability (learning theory), General Decision Sciences, Management Science and Operations Research, Type (model theory), Manipulability, Order (exchange), 0502 economics and business, Economics, Point (geometry), Voting rules, Self-selectivity, 050207 economics, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, 050205 econometrics, Probability, 05 social sciences, Plurality rule, 16. Peace & justice, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, Borda rule, Stability Analysis, Theory of computation, 050206 economic theory, Mathematical economics, Social choice theory, Stability
Abstract

We provide exact relations giving the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation of three specific social choice functions (Borda rule, Copeland rule, Plurality rule) in three-alternative elections when the notion of self-selectivity is imposed. The results suggest that the Borda rule is more vulnerable to coalitional manipulation than the Copeland rule and the Plurality rule. However, Plurality rule seems to be more vulnerable to individual manipulability when the number of voters is greater than a certain threshold value. In addition, the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation tends to vanish significantly when the notion of selfs-electivity is imposed.

Published
2013
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