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Copyright of Trans/Form/Ação is the property of Trans/Form/Acao and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Although Ernst Bloch is often understood as an abstract, aesthetic philosopher of hope, his doctrine of concrete utopia is underpinned by an idiosyncratic, vital materialist ontology. Against many of Bloch’s critics, this article explains and defends his materialism as compatible with Marx’s project. It first situates the early Marx’s materialism in the generally Left Hegelian and more specifically Feuerbachian context of articulating a concrete account of human agency and social emancipation within a naturalistic framework. Two subsequent sections offer Bloch’s “Left Aristotelian” approach to matter and the later Louis Althusser’s “aleatory” materialism, respectively, as radical and tactically different variations on this theme.

Copyright of Journal of International Social Research is the property of Journal of International Social Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (completed in August 1844), Marx takes two crucial steps in the formation of his worldview. The first relates to his rejection of all “old” materialism, including Feuerbach’s, and the adoption of his own version, which he called “communist,” “practical.” This view was later presented definitively in the first thesis on Feuerbach (spring of 1845) and elaborated in The German Ideology (1845-1846). The second step relates to Marx’s synthesising of the philosophical standpoint that he had developed up to this point (around the spring of 1844) with political economy. Up to this point, he had spoken of alienation in largely philosophical terms; now it is rooted in the process of production. On both counts Adam Smith was an important influence. This claim provides the focus of this paper. To make this point successfully, the author has found it necessary to trace briefly the development of Marx’s philosophical standpoint up to the writing of the Manuscripts, and to distinguish between the two methodologically distinct aspects of Adam Smith’s thought: the one that Marx accepted and the other that he rejected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sosyologca is the property of Sosyologca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this text, Alfred Schmidt updates his analysis of Marx's work originally written in his famous book, The Concept of Nature in Marx (first edition in German, 1962). By contextualizing his earlier study within more recent debates about "ecological consciousness," "limits to growth," "alternative civilization," "soft technique" or "ecological crisis," Schmidt reaffirms some of the arguments in the original text, such as his defense of Marx against the false accusation that the latter subscribed to the naive ideology of progress, typical of the 19th century. At the same time he relativizes, without annulling, the mode of thinking oriented to human praxis and history, by reemphasizing the generally underestimated influence of Feuerbach on Marx. Thus, for Schmidt, an ecological materialism adequate to contemporary conditions could take as its point of departure some of Feuerbach's ideas on the emancipation of the senses and a contemplative relationship with nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper concerns two names not commonly associated: Austin Farrer and Ludwig Feuerbach. For these two very different thinkers person-concepts offered a metaphysical vision. That vision represents a critical return to religious praxis. Philosophically, the closed categories of scholastic ontology are exchanged for a concrete theory of persons, one that predicates self-hood on social premises. This insight enabled Farrer and Feuerbach to overcome the dualism underpinning classical rationalism. Moreover, by realigning the terms of that dualism within a framework of human action, they returned metaphysics to its origins in the personal images needed to conceive God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Trans/Form/Ação is the property of Trans/Form/Acao and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The author attempts to retrieve materialism in the theory of recognition of professor Axel Honneth. He cites that in an earlier project, the professor tried to reconstruct historical materialism for the purpose of reactualisation by returning to the anthropological materialism. The theory of recognition as a continuation of the emancipatory project of German philosopher Karl Marx is tackled. Also provided is an example aimed at illustrating what critical theory could look like with the paradigmatic case of work.