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Abstract. Since its initial development, long-term contracts have been associated with the gas industry in all regions of the world. This was also the case in Europe where natural gas [...]

We cast models of the generation capacity expansion lype formally developed for the monopoly regime into equilibrium models belter adapted for a competitive environment. We focus on some of the [...]

We consider three models of investments in generation capacity in restructured electricity systems that differ with respect to their underlying economic assumptions. The first model assumes a perfect, competitive equilibrium. [...]

Different equilibrium concepts have been proposed by various authors (Schweppe et al., Hogan et al., Chao and Peck, Wu et al.) to analyse competitive electricity systems. We establish correspondences between [...]

A heuristic is formulated to solve the problem of the optimal dimensioning of a fluid, gas or water transmission network. This problem involves establishing the best diameter for each transmission pipe to reduce investment and operating costs. It is actually a two-stage problem, with the first stage involving the transmission company's decision regarding the investment in the network based on the investment cost and the future operating cost, while the second stage is the network operations problem. The bundle method for nonsmooth optimization is used to solve the two-stage problem. The validity of this method is examined by applying it on a problem involving the optimal design of a reinforcement of Belgium's gas network.

Numerical experiments using column generation techniques did not results in expected complaints of slow convergence and numerical instability. The numerical experiments were performed with large, multisectoral models having price-sensitive technical coefficients. The numerical results indicate that column generation is a reliable, efficient approach to price-dependent co-efficients and multisectoral economic models.

A study was conducted to analyze a model of a oligopoly supporting spatially dispersed generators and consumers, and multi-period demand. Producers were represented to behave in a Cournot manner with regulated transmission prices. An equilibrium of the model was then characterized as a set of generation output at which no generation will determine more profit during the unilateral modification of output from the set and a set of transmission prices promoting specific regulatory requirements. Moreover, the model was utilized to stimulate a long-run electricity market supporting regulated transmission prices. Results indicated that the removal of monopoly rights and regulation correlated with increases in market power.