1. Finding a Nash equilibrium in spatial games is an NP-complete problem
- Author
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Jacques Durieu, Philippe Solal, Richard Baron, Hans Haller, Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint Etienne (CREUSET), Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM), Department of economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University [Blacksburg], Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne (CREUSET), and Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) more...
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TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS ,Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory ,Economics and Econometrics ,Correlated equilibrium ,Combinatorics ,symbols.namesake ,Bayesian game ,0502 economics and business ,050207 economics ,Folk theorem ,ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS ,Mathematics ,Traveler's dilemma ,jel:C72 ,05 social sciences ,Symmetric game ,Stochastic game ,ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING ,TheoryofComputation_GENERAL ,[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance ,spatial games ,NP-completeness ,graph K-colorability ,Nash equilibrium ,Best response ,symbols ,050206 economic theory ,Mathematical economics - Abstract
We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players. When each player has two strategies and the base game is an anti-coordination game, the problem is decidable in polynomial time. more...
- Published
- 2004
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