Search

We design a laboratory experiment to test the importance of wealth as a channel for financial contagion across markets with unrelated fundamentals. In a sequential global game, we analyze the decisions of a group of investors that hold assets in two markets. We consider two treatments that vary the level of diversification of these assets across markets. In both treatments, we find evidence of financial contagion. When investors have completely diversified portfolios, we provide evidence of contagion due to a wealth effect: for certain ranges of fundamentals, we show that a decrease in wealth from the investment in the first market makes withdrawals more likely in the second, thereby increasing the probability of a crisis. When portfolio diversification is small, then social imitation is relevant in explaining contagion.

We consider the problem of a leader who can assign rewards for citizens for different anti-regime actions. Citizens face a coordination problem in which each citizen has a private, endogenous degree of optimism about the likelihood of regime change. Because more optimistic citizens are easier to motivate, the choice of optimal rewards entails optimal screening. This leads to a distribution of anti-regime actions. A key result is the emergence of a vanguard, consisting of citizens who engage in the endogenous, maximum level of action. Other citizens participate at varying degrees, with less optimistic citizens contributing less. We explore how the regime’s strength or the maximum reward available to the leader influences the distribution of actions. Moreover, we show that more heterogeneity (e.g., higher inequality) among potential revolutionaries reduces the likelihood of regime change. Our methodological contribution is that we deliver a sharp and novel marriage of screening and global games.

We derive a new cost of information in rational inattention problems, the neighborhood-based cost functions, starting from the observation that many settings involve exogenous states with a topological structure. These cost functions are uniformly posterior separable and capture notions of perceptual distance. This second property ensures that neighborhood-based costs, unlike mutual information, make accurate predictions about behavior in perceptual experiments. We compare the implications of our neighborhood-based cost functions with those of the mutual information in a series of applications: perceptual judgments, the general environment of binary choice, regime-change games, and linear-quadratic-Gaussian settings. (JEL C70, D11, D82, D83, D91)

We study experimentally how changes in the information structure affect behavior in coordination games with incomplete information (global games). We find two systematic departures from the theory: (1) the comparative statics of equilibrium thresholds and signal precision are reversed, and (2) as information becomes very precise subjects' behavior approximates the efficient equilibrium of the game, not the risk dominant one. We hypothesize that sentiments in the perception of strategic uncertainty could drive our results. To formalize this hypothesis we extend the standard model by introducing sentiments and we test this mechanism experimentally by eliciting beliefs. We find empirical support for our hypothesis: Subjects are over-optimistic about the actions of others when the signal precision is high and over-pessimistic when it is low. Thus, we show how changes in the information structure can give rise to sentiments that drastically affect outcomes in coordination games.

Popular protests and palace coups are the two domestic threats to dictators. We show that free media, which informs citizens about their rulers, is a double-edged sword that alleviates one threat, but exacerbates the other. Informed citizens may protest against a ruler, but they may also protest to restore her after a palace coup. We develop a model in which citizens engage in a regime-change global game, and media freedom is a ruler’s instrument for Bayesian persuasion, used to manage the competing risks of coups and protests. A coup switches the status quo from being in the ruler’s favor to being against her. This introduces convexities in the ruler’s Bayesian persuasion problem, causing her to benefit from an informed citizenry. Rulers tolerate freer press when citizens are pessimistic about them, or coups signal information about them to citizens.

This article studies the effect of liquidity crises in short-term debt markets in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Creditors (retail banks) receive imperfect signals regarding the profitability of borrowers (wholesale banks) and, based on these signals and their beliefs about other creditors’ actions, choose whether to roll over funding, or not. The unco-ordinated actions of creditors cause a suboptimal incidence of rollover, generating an illiquidity premium. Leverage magnifies this co-ordination inefficiency. Illiquidity shocks in credit markets result in sharp contractions in output. Policy responses are analysed.

Two main classes of channels are studied as informational sources of financial contagion. One is a fundamental channel that is based on real and financial links between economies, and the second is a social learning channel that arises when agents base their decisions on noisy observations about the actions of others in foreign markets. Using global games, I present a two‐country model of financial contagion in which both channels can operate and I test its predictions experimentally. The experimental results show that subjects do not extract information optimally, which leads to two systematic biases that affect these channels directly. Base‐rate neglect leads subjects to underweight their prior, and thus weakens the fundamental channel. An overreaction bias strengthens the social learning channel, since subjects rely on information about the behavior of others, even when this information is irrelevant. These results have significant welfare effects rooted in the specific way in which these biases alter behavior.

FIFA’s recent (rhetorical) embrace of human rights prominently includes commitments to address gender discrimination and promote gender equality both on and off the pitch. What promise does FIFA’s ‘first-ever global strategy for women’s football’ hold as a means of fulfilling such commitments? A feminist institutionalist approach to this question offers insights into the bounded model of change endorsed by the Women’s Football Strategy. It reveals that the Strategy’s three key objectives serve as ‘common carriers’ for both long-standing institutional interests (in power, profit, and prestige) and newer institutional interests (in women footballers, women’s football, and women in football governance). The assumption that these two sets of interests are mutually reinforcing is brought into question by exposing the ways in which FIFA’s mainline institutional priorities, combined with certain structural features of football governance, blunt the reformist potential of the Women’s Football Strategy. Bounded by old institutional features, the Strategy reflects a partial and incremental, rather than comprehensive and revolutionary, approach to addressing gender discrimination. FIFA’s commitment to human rights therefore remains unfulfilled vis-à-vis women in football.

Game Jams are game development marathons limited by time, usually lasting 48 hours. These events bring people together not only to make games in a short period of time but to connect beginners, amateurs and professionals. Although seen as a diverse environment, in Games – either as a technology culture or as a professional occupation – we can find prejudice and discrimination against LGBTQIA+. This paper is an exploratory study about diversity in game jams, specifically about the participation of LGBTQIA+ in some hubs at Global Game Jam 2021. We investigated the participation of LGBTQIA+ people at the Global Game Jam 2021, aiming to understand their perspectives and the potential challenges around any prejudice or discrimination they may face during the game jams. We combined quantitative and qualitative research methods. First, we used a survey to collect quantitative (closed-ended questions) and qualitative (open-ended questions) data. The second part consisted of online interviews with some of the respondents from the survey. After analyzing the collected data, we provided a set of recommendations for structure and organization, aiming at a more inclusive and welcoming environment to LGBTQIA+ participants, besides increasing the participation of this public. The recommendations are: Organize diversity-focused game jams and diversity-focused Global Game Jam hubs; make every participant aware of the code of conduct; foster collaboration over competition; introduce aspects that the LGBTQIA+ community can relate to; and promote learning activities.

Diplomacy always occurs in the shadow of domestic political competition. We develop a model of top-level diplomatic exchange between an incumbent and a foreign leader, embedded within a global game of regime change, and examine four mechanisms that induce a relationship between diplomatic visits and regime survival. First, the foreign leader chooses to visit incumbents who are ex ante more secure in office (a selection effect). Second, because the foreign leader’s decision is based partly on private information, the citizens update on the revelation of that information (a learning effect) and are discouraged from mounting a challenge. Third, the foreign leader can bolster the incumbent’s strength in office with a transfer of material support (a strengthening effect). The latter two effects are then amplified by the complementarities in the citizens’ strategies (a multiplier effect). Contrary to standard global games results, we show that increased precision in the public information transmitted strategically by the foreign power induces a unique equilibrium, as citizens coordinate on the foreign leader’s action. Our findings explain why leaders are so eager to receive state visits from major world powers.

Could a less conservative central bank, that is, one with a smaller aversion to inflation, be more likely to withstand pressure on its currency peg? Traditional currency-crisis models provide an unambiguous answer: No. We argue that this answer stems from the models' narrow focus on how a central bank's resistance to private-sector pressure affects output and inflation in the short run. The answer may reverse if pegging is a commitment device, serving to address domestic credibility issues in the long run by transferring the conduct of monetary policy abroad. As a less conservative central bank stands to benefit more from such a transfer, it should find a peg more valuable.

We study the potential role of correlated refinancing abilities among different countries for the disruption of government bond markets in a currency union. Following Morris and Shin (2004) we use a global games framework and model the simultaneous investment decision into two assets, which are subject to correlated fundamental states, as a coordination problem with correlated imperfect information. Based on this model we evaluate the role of information about one country for the coordination of creditors of another country. We find, however, that the contagious effects on the price of debt precipitated through correlation are modest. Hence, assuming that investors behave as modeled in the global game, we conclude that correlated fundamentals that precipitate informational spillovers appear to be unlikely to play a major role for e.g. the disruption of some Eurozone government bond markets in the aftermath of the recent financial and economic crisis.

Game jams are accelerated game creation events usually taking place over the course of a short time period. A variety of learning outcomes from game jamming has been discussed in previous research, with learning being a common motivation for attending game jams. Despite this, there has been little research into the psychological mechanisms driving learning and participation. In this article, the learning experiences of four first-time participants in the Global Game Jam are examined through self-determination theory. Results suggest that a wide spectrum of learning is experienced during a game jam, and game jams offer at least a temporary heightened sense of creativity and competence. Assessment remains an issue, however, and learning benefits may be contingent on the jam setting. All three basic psychological needs listed in self-determination theory are potentially fulfilled by game jam attendance, suggesting the relevance of self-determination theory in further jam research.

We study global games of regime change within networks of truthful communication. Agents can choose between attacking and not attacking a status quo, whose strength is unknown. Players share private signals of the state with their immediate neighbors. Communication with neighbors introduces local correlations in posterior beliefs, and also pools information. In order to isolate the latter effect, we provide sparseness conditions on networks that allow for asymptotic approximations that eliminate covariances from equilibrium strategies. We ask how changes in the distribution of connectivities in the population affect the type of coordination in equilibrium as well as the likelihood of successful rally. We find that, without public signals, strategic incentives align and the probability of success remains independent of the network. With a public signal, the distribution of degrees unambiguously affects the probability of success, although the direction of change is not monotone and depends on the cost of attacking.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, some goods suddenly became scarce due to panic purchases and stockpiling. The decision to hoard is influenced by higher-order beliefs. If an agent believes that other agents think that a good will become scarce, she concludes that these other agents will hoard, and thus tries to preempt them by hoarding herself. To capture such behaviour, we construct a model with a global game. Agents receive noisy information about some variable that influences supply or demand. They then form higher-order beliefs, and possibly panic and hoard the product. We analyze determinants of such panics. Endogenizing prices and quantities, we show that producers with market power set prices strategically to induce panics and thus boost demand. Absent market power, strong competition leads to low prices and thus little overproduction, also causing panics. We also consider firms who need the scarce good as an intermediate product in their production chain, and show that a regulator would require such firms to stockpile the product, thus increasing resilience.

This paper studies a coordination game with incomplete information and the option to delay. The delay option enables the agents to observe a binary signal depending on whether the early actions (e.g., investment) surpasses a threshold. The anticipation of information incentivizes agents to wait and free-ride on the information, whereas acting early can help to generate good news, and consequently induce more coordination. Relying on this trade-off, we find the unique monotone equilibrium, which features the inability of the delay option in facilitating coordination. If the waiting period is sufficiently short or the interest rate is sufficiently low, the delay option induces more inaction and makes coordination more difficult to achieve, as compared with the static case. We further discuss the theoretical implications for understanding the impact of monetary policy on economic recovery and how the accessibility of information affects financial stability.

During the Bretton Woods era, OECD countries grew at historically unprecedented rates. This Golden Age has many possible explanations, ranging from the return to liberal policies in international trade to a backlog of profitable growth opportunities after the neglect of the 1930s and war-time damage. Eichengreen (1996) has argued that the proximate cause of the rapid growth was high investment, and that this high investment was made possible by certain institutions that were particularly well suited to reconstruction and growth. On the domestic side, these institutions led to high investment rates and moderate wage claims. This paper interprets the interaction between unions and firms as a coordination game. The risk-dominant equilibrium is selected via a global game argument. Only small changes to the payoffs are necessary to explain a change in the selected equilibrium, and therefore, the growth slowdown.

Mobile game market is the fast-growing game market and accounted for more than a half of the global game market’s revenue. Because of the promising future many game developers develop monetization strategy to gain more profit from the mobile game market. Thus, by knowing what drivers that influence gamer’s purchase intention and loyalty expected to help game developer to expand their market share. Then, this study uses conclusive descriptive to gain insight by analyzing effect of perceived value toward game loyalty and in-app purchase intention. Moreover, this study also aims to investigate the effect of game loyalty toward user’s intention to make in-app purchase. This research used purposive sampling and involved 240 Mobile Legend gamers in Indonesia. Data is processed with SEM using LISREL software version 8.8. The result shows perceived playfulness, perceived connectedness, perceived good price, and perceived reward are significantly influence mobile game loyalty. While perceived connectedness and perceived good price significantly influence in-app purchase intention. In the other side, Mobile game loyalty also has significant influence on in-app purchase intention. In addition, the result also found that perceived connectedness and perceived reward significantly influence perceived good price.

Videogame production events, particularly the Global Game Jam (GGJ), is an activity par excellence aimed at the development of the world&rsquo, s largest games, enhancing the form of personal expression, critical thinking, and appropriation of new media through collaborative work. The general objective is to explore the development process within the context of the GGJ, calculating the correlation between level of education and source of inspiration, the correlation between level of education and purpose of the game to be designed in the Global Game Jam and the correlation between level of education and skills. The main source of inspiration is defined by game genre, game mechanics, or other video game, in addition the purpose of the game is mainly due to learning a technical skill, enjoy doing it, and generate satisfaction in the players. Finally, the skills that prevail are 2D Design, Programming, and 3D Design. People with a high level of knowledge have the same passion as those who have just started in the multidisciplinary field of the development of video games motivated by creating an original game that has a good script and provides them a life experience.

Banks hold large amounts of high-quality liquid assets while relying predominantly on deposit funding. The return on these assets is often lower than the cost of deposits. Why do banks engage in such a negative carry trade? Using a novel observation on global games, we build a tractable model where banks manage liquidity risk by adjusting the size of their short-term liabilities and of their liquid reserves consisting of safe, liquid government bonds. Banks are the natural buyers of government bonds because holding these assets enables them to "multiply liquidity'': using one unit of bonds to back more than one unit of short-term debt while keeping their liquidity risk unchanged. How much more is measured by the slope of an endogenous iso-risk curve. This liquidity multiplier is key to understand a bank's joint choice of leverage and liquid reserves and how these decisions connect to the pricing of liquid assets. In turn, this provides an explanation of the negative carry puzzle.

Online labor platforms provide freelancers the opportunity to work for clients on a project basis. However, like all projects, disputes can occur as a result of the platform users’ attempts to game the system or misunderstanding of objectives. Traditionally, the dispute would then have to be mediated by the platform's dispute team, which is often viewed to be unhelpful or biased. However, there are emerging platforms that promise to resolve the dispute with a novel tribunal system and relegate dispute resolution to individual platform users through a voting mechanism. We are interested in examining the dispute resolution models used by both the traditional online platforms (i.e., the centralized dispute system) and the emerging online platforms (i.e., the decentralized dispute system). Our results suggest that the decentralized dispute system outperforms the centralized dispute system when the freelancers’ skill level is sufficiently high, and when the task is associated with a lower degree of quality uncertainty. Thus, gig platforms should consider switching to the decentralized dispute system only if they are able to attest to the freelancers’ skill level, and the decentralized dispute system can better cater to standardized tasks rather than creative tasks. Moreover, the decentralized dispute system can be more appealing to policy makers because it induces a more socially optimal quality level of the freelancer. In addition, we also find that the platform should set a much lower dispute fee when switching to the decentralized dispute system, and can further improve its revenue under the decentralized dispute system by charging dispute fees to both the freelancer and the client when the freelancers’ skill level is moderate.

This paper studies the impacts of public information release in a class of models with strategic information acquisition. Due to the presence of strategic complementarity, multiple equilibria can arise, creating difficulty in analyzing comparative statics. We develop a methodology to apply global-game refinement in this setting and use it to study a model with a dynamic complementarity in information acquisition. The resulting unique equilibrium is shown to have a property that none of the underlying equilibria have: while in all the underlying equilibria public information always crowds out private information, in the global-game equilibrium public information can crowd in more private information acquisition. The crowding-in effect is more pronounced when fundamental uncertainty is high and reverts back to crowding out when uncertainty is low. Omitting this effect could lead the regulator to disclose too little public information especially in recessions, which are often associated with rising uncertainty.

In this paper we develop a theoretical model to investigate the effect on a bank's financial stability of having multiple contingent convertible bonds buffers (CoCos) on the same bank balance sheet, using cash-in-the-market pricing and global games methodologies. Contingent convertible bonds are meant to act as a bail-in mechanism for banks, where CoCo debt converts into equity when a bank needs it the most. We find that having CoCo buffers which trigger at different capitalisation levels can be detrimental for the CoCo bail-in capacity. Market-based triggers lead to premature conversion and fire-sales of equity. In contrast with existing literature, we show that book-based trigger CoCos yield an optimal outcome, as long as they incorporate expected credit losses.

This paper develops a micro-founded global games model of debt crises. I use this model to study which policies can help to prevent expectations-driven crises and how the desirability of such policies depends on market participants' expectations and the presence of economic policy uncertainty. I show that endogenous expectations amplify the effects of government policies, so that even a small policy adjustment can have significant effects. I find that policy uncertainty may increase the range of situations in which government policies can help prevent a crisis but decrease their overall impact. Finally, I apply these insights to study two policies that are often at the center of political discussions: austerity (an increase in taxes) and government stimulus. I show that under plausible conditions an increase in taxes is preferable to a government stimulus, and that policy uncertainty further increases the relative attractiveness of austerity.

This paper studies how a bank regulator’s aggregate and bank-specific information dis-closure policy affects social welfare. We apply global games to studying an economy where depositors, with strategic complementarities among them, face uncertainties about both aggregate and bank-specific information of a bank. Then we examine how disclosure policy of a bank regulator on the bank’s aggregate and bank-specific information affects welfare. With the assumption that bank depositors rely on the bank regulator to collect aggregate bank performance information but have precise private information about bank-specific in-formation, we find that more precise aggregate information disclosed by the bank regulator improves welfare when bank fundamentals are either extremely strong or weak, but tends to reduce welfare when the fundamentals are in the intermediate range where coordination plays a key role. In contrast, more precise bank-specific information disclosed by the regulator tends to increase welfare, even when the fundamentals are in the intermediate range.

We provide a model in which students must choose whether or not to cheat on a course exam. By assuming that the moral cost of acting dishonestly decreases as the number of other people who behave in the same way increases, our model explains one important channel by which unethical behavior of other individuals can influence observers’ behavior. Through the use of the Global Games approach of equilibrium selection, we build a framework that provides the micro-foundations of peer effects on academic dishonesty and shows how better student technology of cheating and higher disutility of effort make the cheating equilibrium more likely to be selected. By extending the model, we find that the peer effect strength is not affected by the level of homogeneity of the cohort, but decreases in the size of the class. Our approach may be seen as an important step towards reduced-form models of peer effects on dishonest behavior.

We study platform markets in which the information about users’ preferences is dispersed. First, we show how the dispersion of information introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty about participation decisions and how the latter shapes the elasticity of the demands and the equilibrium prices. We then study the effects on profits, consumer surplus, and welfare of platform design, blogs, forums, conferences, advertising campaigns, post-launch disclosures, and other information management policies affecting the agents’ ability to predict participation decisions on the other side of the market.

Postmodernity has seen the space of children’s play increasingly locked into local and global economies. This essay argues that the new Margaret Mahy Family Playground built in Christchurch, New Zealand after a series of destructive earthquakes has not only become an expensive market-driven commodity, but has also been expected to mediate between a virtually empty inner city and its anticipated recovery. While the original design by children sought to incorporate aspects of Mahy’s legacy, the eventual shape of the playground resembled other playgrounds elsewhere. Various interventions are examined which sought to minimize this ubiquitous quality, including the role played by local Maori tribe, Ngāi Tahu.

Traditional decision theory assumes that people respond to the exact features of the options available to them, but observed behavior seems much less precise. This review considers ways of introduc...

Brainstorming is an important part of creative design, related to exploring the associativity of different ideas and the combination of their parts. Previous work has investigated social interactions, productivity, techniques, and quality of brainstorming activities. The paper contributes to this body of work by studying the design affordances of brainstorming toolkits, and the relationship between idea associations and brainstorming. We examined 21 brainstorming toolkits designed for creative brainstorming within the context of game design, which led us to four tiers of design affordances that specify the supportive qualities of toolkits for brainstorming. To gain further insights into the use of tools, we surveyed game jams participants about their brainstorming activities and the use of tools at Global Game Jam 2017. We found a large number of participants using traditional stationery to aid brainstorming and a common usage of mind mapping and rearranging post-it notes. These findings inform our discussion of how idea creation is leveraged by a hybrid use of traditional and digital tools.

This paper presents and evaluates the first international game jam held at Ritsumeikan University, Shiga, Japan, in collaboration with the Rochester Institute of Technology, New York, USA. Game jams are events that bring together people with a common love of games to plan, design, and make original, functional physical or computer games within a set time limit. The number of jams has increased rapidly year after year since their conception, with over 48,000 people participating in the latest version of the Global Game Jam [6]. The RU-RIT game jam had several goals. For the committee the main goals were to introduce the concept of a game jam, and pass on the knowledge of how to successfully plan and execute these events to the host institution, Ritsumeikan University. For the participants the goals were (1) to enjoy a fun and playful way to create games in a low-anxiety, mixed language environment, (2) to give the participants the opportunity to make contacts from around the globe, and (3) to learn new skills both related specifically to making games and other practical skills. This paper will further discusses the importance of group making in international game jam situations and aims to provide the reader with a blueprint describing how to create and administer their own international game jam. The paper will conclude by highlighting some of the issues encountered during the game jam.

In this paper, we present the findings of a study on the motivations and experiences of exceptional game jam participants in Finland. These "superjammers" have had experience on jamming at over 20 game jam events online or with physical locations, such as Global Game Jam and Ludum Dare. The jammers in this study reported how game jams have been important platforms of learning for them: they have not only learned technical skills, but also reported improvements in their workflows and various specific issues. From the initial curiosity towards game jams as a challenge, these jammers have later discovered multiple benefits of the events ranging from general enjoyment of creating games to social factors and keeping up their competences as game developers. In this paper, the notion of "superjammers" as a short for exceptional game jam participants is further explored and the lessons of the study is used for planning the next steps of the research into exceptionality in game jam participation.

Popular protests and palace coups are the two domestic threats to dictators. We show that free media, which informs citizens about their rulers, is a double-edged sword that alleviates one threat, but exacerbates the other. Informed citizens may protest against a ruler, but they may also protest to restore him after a palace coup. In choosing media freedom, the leader trades off these conflicting effects. We develop a model in which citizens engage in a regime change global game, and media freedom is a ruler’s instrument for Bayesian persuasion, used to manage the competing risks of coups and protests. A coup switches the status quo from being in the ruler’s favor to being against him. This introduces convexities in the ruler’s Bayesian persuasion problem, causing him to benefit from an informed citizenry. Rulers tolerate freer press when citizens are pessimistic about them, or coups signal information about them to citizens.

Among the misunderstandings that are constantly fueling the debate on Europe, is its collective inability to shape the global game. And this at the moment when it faces American nationalism, Russian revisionism and China’s rise. To explain this lack of European reactivity there is a simple and common interpretation: European states are cruelly divided on all subjects and struggle to act collectively. But, this explanation confuses causes and consequences. The bottom line is that the European project born in 1957 was built against the idea of power. The whole question, is then to assess the capacity of Europe to reverse that trend and play power politics in taking into consideration the feeling of strategic loneliness in a less and less Kantian world (I) and the sense of danger in a more and more Hobbesian world (II).This is what we call a gaullian moment for Europe.

In this paper, we study a family of sales-based rebate mechanisms as an effective tool to implement price discrimination across a population of buyers with correlated heterogeneous valuations on indivisible goods and services. In order to implement such sales-based rebate mechanisms, the seller charges each buyer a fixed price at the time of purchase contingent on a rebate that is a function of the ex post sales volume to be realized at the end of the sales period. The seller declares both a price and a menu of rebates as a function of sales. We show that, when there is a common component of uncertainty in consumers’ valuations (to which we refer as the quality of the product), such rebates enable a seller to effectively induce different expected net prices at different valuations. Importantly, this effective price discrimination over valuations is achieved keeping both the base price and the rebate uniform across all buyers. This uniformity of price and rebate across buyers is a key advantage of our proposed rebate mechanism, thereby providing a new mechanism for price discrimination in crowd-based markets. We use tools and techniques from game theory and variational optimization to provide insight into the economics of such mechanisms. In particular, we identify two mechanisms that are monotone functions of the sales volume that are easy to implement in practice and perform well when compared with the much more complex optimal mechanism. We provide a rigorous analysis of the optimal mechanism and discuss practical limitations in implementing the globally optimal design, further demonstrating the efficacy of our proposed monotone mechanisms. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: This research was supported by a Vannevar Bush Fellowship from the Office of Secretary of State and Army Research Office [MURI Project W911NF-19-1-0217]. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4691 .

Since their inception at the Indie Game Jam1 in 2002, a significant\ud part of game jams has been knowledge sharing and showcasing\ud ideas and work to peers. While various licensing mechanisms have\ud been used for game jams throughout the years, there has never been\ud a licence uniquely designed for artifacts created during a game jam.\ud In this paper, we present to the community the Game Jam License\ud (GJL) which is designed to facilitate that sharing and knowledge\ud transfer, while making sure the original creators retain commercial\ud rights. The Global Game Jam2, since 2009, strives to formalise sharing\ud in a similar manner, by having jammers upload and license their\ud creations under Creative Commons3 Non Commercial Share Alike\ud 3.0 free license. However, the CC family of licenses is not well suited\ud for software. CC is not compatible with most other licenses, and\ud introduces a legal grey area with the division between commercial\ud and non-commercial use. Moreover, open source licences like GPL\ud are well suited for source code, but not for art and design content.\ud Instead the GJL presented in this paper, aims to uphold the original\ud ideas of game jams (sharing and knowledge transfer), while still\ud allowing the original team to hold on to all rights to their creation,\ud without any of the deficiencies of the CC family of licenses.

Workers from a source country consider whether or not to illegally migrate to a host country. This decision depends crucially on the proportion of workers who migrate and on whether or not the host country government decides to regularize them. When there is no uncertainty about economic conditions in the host country, there are multiple equilibria where workers may migrate or not and the government may regularize them or not. When uncertainty is introduced, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium where each state of the world gives rise to a unique outcome in terms of migration and regularization.

This paper provides the first unified explanation of behavior in coordinated attack games under both public and private information. It demonstrates that the main experimental results, such as threshold strategies, comparative statics, and the differences in behavior under public and private information, are robust predictions of limited depth of reasoning models. This is in contrast to equilibrium, which mispredicts the coordinating roles of public and private information. The analysis has implications for understanding macroeconomic phenomena, like currency attacks and debt crises, which are commonly modeled using incomplete information coordinated attack games.

Stock sales during takeover negotiations weaken the target board's ability to recommend against the takeover, i.e., to resist. Sophisticated shareholders therefore face a coordination problem when deciding whether to sell-out early; and their actions generate a feedback loop between trading volumes and takeover outcomes. Bidding firms, anticipating the pressurising effect of future share sales on the target board, may reduce their bids. We study these tensions theoretically. We find that increasing the influence of shareholders during the bidding process lowers equilibrium bids; elongates the bidding process; but raises the overall probability of bid acceptance; and raises expected premia for unsophisticated shareholders.

We propose a new approach to modeling the cost of information structures in rational inattention problems, the "neighborhood-based" cost functions. These cost functions have two properties that we view as desirable: they summarize the results of a sequential evidence accumulation problem, and they capture notions of "perceptual distance." The first of these properties is connected to an extensive literature in psychology and neuroscience, and the second ensures that neighborhood-based cost functions, unlike mutual information, make accurate predictions about behavior in perceptual experiments. We compare the implications of our neighborhood-based cost functions with those of a mutual-information cost function in a series of applications: security design, global games, modeling perceptual judgments, and a linear-quadratic-Gaussian tracking problem.

The significance of the Corinthians Football Club, founded in 1882, has been widely acknowledged by historians of football and by sports historians generally. As a ’super club’ comprising the best amateur talent available they were an important formative influence on football in Britain from the 1880s to the 1930s. As a touring club - they first travelled to South Africa in 1897 and made regular forays into Europe and also to Canada, the United States and Brazil - they were the self-proclaimed standard bearers for gentlemanly values in sport. Indeed for many years they were most famous football club in the world, drawing huge crowds and helping to ensure that the version of football emanating from the English public schools and universities in the mid-nineteenth century became a global game. Though their playing strength and influence waned after the First World War, they remained a significant force through to 1939, upholding ’true blue’ amateurism at a time when football was increasingly associated with professionalism and seen as a branch of commercial entertainment. Whilst much has been written about the Corinthians, mainly by club insiders, this is the first complete scholarly history to cover their activities both in England and in other parts of the world. It critically reassesses the club’s role in the development of football and fills a gap in existing literature on the relationship between the progress of the game in England and globally. Most crucially, the book re-examines the sporting ideology of gentlemanly amateurism within the context of late-nineteenth century and early-twentieth century society.

Game jamming is a valuable tool and process to connect game developers from a range of disciplines such as art, programming, audio engineering, or story-telling. The Global Game Jam® (GGJ) thus fundamentally supports the process of connecting people, and forms a basis for studying teamwork formation and -mechanics. It is an annual event, where participants (jammers) meet on physical locations to develop games together within a short time-span of 48 hours. People with similar interest but different skill-sets have the chance to meet and collaborate to create prototypes of games together, whether digital or analog. In this explorative study, data from the GGJ website across four years of game jams and their participants are analyzed, towards investigating group interaction and group forming behavior. The focus is on using social network analysis and social metrics to evaluate the influence of a) jammer skillset and b) jam locations, on social and communicative structures among game jammers in the GGJ environment. The findings suggest that different skill-sets support different forms of social structures and also setups in countries refer to different group sizes and different social structures.

In the global games framework, this paper studies bank runs in a financial system, in which there are many banks and they share a common asset market. Our model 1) endogenizes market liquidity, 2) demonstrates two-way feedback between market liquidity and creditor runs, and 3) shows the possibility of multiple equilibria in the system: even when the precision of creditors' private signals approaches infinity, multiple equilibria (i.e., a self-fulfilling systemic crisis) can still emerge. Our model helps explain amplification and multiplicity in financial crises.

This chapter uses textual analysis to contrast heroic androgyny in series like The Legend of Zelda and NiGHTS with the mixing of gendered signifiers to convey the otherness of particular NPCs in games like Resident Evil: Dead Aim, Fable 2, and The Witcher 2: Assassins of Kings. This chapter aims to problematize the global game industry’s acceptance of masculine-skewed androgyny as aesthetically pleasing and acceptable while portraying gender-variance as aesthetically displeasing and unacceptable. Ultimately, this chapter asks how we can interrogate the privileging of specific types of androgyny in queer games culture and criticism in response to its depiction in mainstream games culture.

This paper analyses the relationship between regular and irregular migration taking into account the migration network effect and the network creation mechanism. We assume that migrants can obtain a high payoff only if a critical mass of migrants is reached in the destination country. If candidates to migration receive biased signals about the economic situation of the destination country, the migrants’ decision problem can be analyzed as a standard global game. Tying the quota of regular migrants to the economic performance of countries might create large discontinuities in immigration flows, with some countries attracting the bulk of irregular migrants and the other being shunned by the migrants.

Small shareholders face coordination problems during takeovers. Without common knowledge of a bidder’s negotiation ability with an incumbent blockholder in support of a takeover, the probability of takeover success is uniquely determined if the private information available to small shareholders regarding the bidder’s negotiation ability is precise enough. An analysis of the unique equilibrium demonstrates that the earmarked freeze-out amount and the expected amount of abnormal returns affect the takeover’s outcome. Moreover, the effect of the blockholder’s size on the takeover’s outcome is determined by the relative size of the earmarked freeze-out amount and the expected amount of abnormal returns.

We establish purification results for Bayes–Nash equilibrium in a large class of Bayesian games with finite sets of pure actions. We allow for correlated types and interdependent payoffs and for type-dependent feasible action sets. The latter feature allows us to prove existence and purification results for pure Bayes–Nash equilibria in undominated strategies. We give applications to auctions, global games, and voting to illustrate the usefulness of our results.

This is the accepted and refereed manuscript to the article When crises potentially originate from coordination failures, does a deterioration in the quality of the information available to market participants contribute towards instability? We address this question in a general global game of regime change with a unique equilibrium and illustrate the implications in a debt rollover application. We show that a reduction in the quality of information increases the likelihood of regime change, thus reducing stability, when the net payo in the case of a successful attack is more sensitive to the fundamentals than the net payo in the case of status quo survival. We also discuss welfare implications. 2, Forfatterversjon

In the past decade mega-events have entered a new phase of global reach, as post-socialist countries in Eurasia, from Poland to Russia, have or will become host to some of the largest events on earth: the Olympic Games in Sochi (2014), the Football World Cup in Russia (2018), the Football European Championship in Poland and Ukraine (2012), Expo in Astana (2017), the Asian Winter Games in Almaty (2011) and the Universiade in Kazan (2013), as well as a series of high-level political summits including the APEC and the BRICS summits in Russia. Although these mega-events are global, the various institutional, economic and cultural constellations and recombinant forms of rule that have emerged in their post-socialist host countries have shaped fundamentally the planning and organisation of each mega-event in unique ways. In each case, mega-events in post-socialist countries have involved a strong role for the central state and neopatrimonial forms of resource allocation. The events are meant to demonstrate to the rest of the world that the cities and countries once behind the Iron Curtain have at long last arrived in global modernity. While the rhetoric of worldwide competition, nationalist pride and one-upmanship between event organisers may be global, policies, knowledge and ideas connected to the events tend not to move unchanged to the post-socialist world.