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The beginning of the paper is dedicated to Popper?s general understanding of the scientific method, in which the moment of refutation stands out. The second part of the paper presents the application of that model to the field of ethics and ?public policy,? in the form of a suggestion to be called later ?negative utilitarianism.?. Then, attention is focused on the objections addressed to negative utilitarianism, primarily when it comes to the ?repugnantconclusion? that brings it closer to promortalism and anti-natalism. In the final part, the author strives to defend what remains of the intuition that motivates negative utilitarianism by its reduction to a principle, and not to a complete theory or a comprehensive conception.

This paper outlines the performance of monkeys in the film and, more broadly, in western cultural tradition. The pattern of ambivalent reception of that liveform is detected: recognizing the closest relatives uncomfortable resemblance to a common origin. In principle, movie used to augment ape and make him irresistibly threatening (King Kong); to personalize and with paternalistic sentimentalism assimilate him to human (Tarzan?s Cheeta), to distort the whole relation of humans and apes and signalize political consequences of species domination (Planet of the Apes), and finally, to resolve an uncomfortable closeness - with complete approximation of humans and monkeys in common catastrophic accidents (12 Monkeys, Congo, Gorillas in the Mist). It is demonstrated that, in whatever version, it is more interesting now to reverse the famous Marx?s formulation -?the anatomy of man is the key to the anatomy of the ape?- and think it not only methodologically any more.

It could be said that, in general, Postmodernism represented a special inspiration for reaffirmation of the Enlightenment, and that the Enlightenment revised in response to this challenge. Defenders of the Enlightenment in the procedure used different strategies but, except for the occasional lump rejection and distorts, they all shared conviction that the theory of Postmodernism misrepresented itself. In their reconstruction of the position of Postmodernism, one shows that it comes to inherit the oldest traditions of the Counterenlightenment and the irresponsible relativist thinking. Another time it is emphasized the unfounded sheltering of the theory of Postmodernism behind the counterfeit principle of the Enlightenment or, even less based, boastfully as well as illusory breaking with Modernity. The third approach entered Postmodernism in the tradition of ?with itself quarreling Modernism? by the very effort to go beyond it; in the tradition of the Enlightenment and its relentless criticism as an integral part of the same endeavor. It is concluded that none of the apology of the Enlightenment, to its own detriment, succeded to consistently incorporate cutting edge of postmodern objections and, under duress to defend and profiled its own orthodox point of view, by its psychosocial neutralization violates the critical potential of the Enlightenment.

Средишње питање овог чланка је да ли је властити интерес, који је постао технички термин економије, само преименован и оправдан негдањи смртни грех похлепе, или је с њим наступило једно ново и другачије разумевање човека и пожељне организације друштва. У првом делу рада се излажу ар- гументи који су артикулисали прву тезу, а у другом они који је оспоравају. У закључном делу рада указује се на могућност интерпретација које усвајају кри- тику властитог интереса као наследника похлепе, али налазе начин да сачувају његову самосталност и оперативност, како унутар економске теорије, тако и унутар сугерисане друштвене праксе. The central question of the article is whether it is self-interest, which has become a technical term of economy, nothing but a renamed and justified quondam deadly sin of greed, or is it engender and announces a new and different understanding of man and the desirable organization of society. First part of the paper introduce the arguments that articulated the first thesis, and the second those that call it into question. Concluding part of the article points to the possibility of interpretations that adopts the criticism of self-interest as the successor of greed, but find a way to preserve its independence and operationality both within the economic theory and the suggested social practices.

First part of the paper presents and analyzes some of the main arguments, which support the popular belief that greed is to blame for the 2008 financial crisis. The second part lists the counter-arguments that challenge this position in two ways: one set of arguments claims that greed is either not the main and single factor, or that is not the culprit at all; the second set, on the other hand, states that the scope of its influence is undermined and underrepresented, as well as that it is not considered in its ?structural? but only individual dimension. The final part of the paper presents a specific socio-psychological approach that could elucidate the extent to which unregulated greed could cause economic breakdowns. In addition, this approach attempts to question and operationally thematise implicit laws of modern capitalism with regard to both the recurring ups and downs that characterize it and the contradictory understanding and reception of the concept of acquisition, upon which it tend to built society.

The subject of this research was to determine the status of moral values among participants in the area of physical culture, as well as, in a wider sense, the desirability of introducing an ethical dimension into their education. Some of the fundamental ethical theories have been put into the function of experimental verification of their reception and application on a sample of students from the University of Belgrade’s Faculty of Sport and Physical Education. The goal of this research was to determine the students’ moral attitudes. To that purpose a questionnaire has been constructed and a research has been conducted on a total sample of 516 respondents. Research results have shown that there are certain differences between the consideration shown towards the moral aspects of physical culture between male and female students.

The theme of this paper is the relationship to "others" – other civilizations and cultures in the history of Earth, and other species and different forms of life in science fiction. The analysis of Star Trek series and films shows that, despite considerable endeavor to adopt "multiculturalism" as a principle, and despite a conscious effort to respect and celebrate diversity, "colonial narrative" remains in force in the popular science fiction visions of the future. Fear and/or violence are typical reactions that (un)hiddenly repeats the pattern of our thinking of otherness and treatment of different ones whenever it comes to aliens, whether they are foreigners or extraterrestrials. Tema ovog teksta je odnos prema jednoj posebnoj klasi "drugih". Dok su u zemnoj istoriji u pitanju bile druge civilizacije i kulture, u nau!noj fantastici je po pravilu re! o drugim vrstama i druga!ijim oblicima života. Na primeru serija i filmova Zvezdanih staza pokazuje se da, uprkos zna!ajnom naporu da se "multukulturalizam" usvoji kao vlastito na!elo i uprkos svesnom nastojanju da se poštuje i slavi razli!itost, "kolonijalni narativ" ostaje na snazi i u vizijama budu"nosti popularne nau!ne fantastike. Strah i/ili nasilje su tipske reakcije koje manje ili više (ne)skriveno ponavljaju obrazac našeg mišljenja drugosti i postupanja prema druga!ijama kad god je re! o tu#inama, bilo da su oni stranci ili vanzemaljci.

This paper aims to question anew the popular and supposedly self-evident affirmation of education, in its modern incarnation as in its historical notion. The ‘‘naive’’ questions suggest that we have recently taken for granted that education ought to be for the masses, that it ought to be upbringing, and that it is better than ignorance. Drawing on the tradition that calls such an understanding of education into question, the author shows that the hidden costs of disregarding such reflection end up, camouflaged and smuggled, taxing the current debates regarding generally accepted education strategies. The characteristic feeling of the currently accepted model of education being in chronic crisis is less a testament to an absence of alternative approaches than to a lack of thorough self-reflection.

Analyzing its relationship to reason, tradition, social organization and other key moments of disagreement, the article exposes how the early post-revolutionary Conservatism criticizing the Enlightenment and, at the same time, articulate their own learning. Special attention is given to Burke's and Maistre's visions of violations of the Enlightenment philosophy on the historical and political mission that they believed their nations and humanity should meet. It is concluded that in this formative period, in relation to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the French Revolution, for which the former is held responsible, conservatism formed its own doctrine, Its counter-enlightenment and anti-modernist motives therefore remain distinctive marks of Conservativism to this day.

Over the Romantic reception of Kant, the author attempts to show a relationship between the Romanticism and the Enlightenment. First part of the paper reconstructs the social conditions that created the strange path of transformation of parts of Kant?s teachings in the romantic motifs. The second part follows the theoretical precomposition of Kant?s thought in Fichte and expressly deviation from it in Novalis and Schlegel. Third section presents the key moments of the Romantic critique of the Enlightenment mind, and fourth its ambiguous pracital-political effects. In conclusion, it is suggested that Romanticism tested and testified the transcending of limits of the very freedom for which Kant believed that man becomes worthy of only if it is used in a lawful and purposeful manner.

The author analyzes the key terms of Kant's definition of enlightenment: immaturity, guilt, humanity, laziness, cowardice, bravery, and others. The first part of the paper presents the criticisms that challenge every reasonable character of Kant's conception of enlightenment. After that, these critiques are confronted with the defenses of Kant's definition of enlightenment that points out, on the one hand, its self-reflectivity and, on the other, its everlasting actuality. Special attention is paid to the historical and textual reconstruction of the understanding of public as a condition of the possibilities for the effective engagement of the mind and the rational organization of society. It is concluded that the question of enlightenment remains open, to the extent that the danger of arbitrary use under a completely vague semantic rules threatening the very notion of enlightenment. Continuous reinterpretations of Kant's attempt to define it, however, are also testimonies of an unavoidable instance, with respect to which - by recognition of its relevance, its rearranging or rejection - different conceptions of enlightenment and its landmarks were tempted, articulated and established.

The article seeks to situate motivationally Camus' vision of 'corrected creation' in literary and ideological controversies of his time. Relying on systematically unrepresented but numerous and explicit reflections on the status of literary and the role of artistic practice, it also intends to point to the theoretical argumenation and aesthetic justification of such a vision. Conclusion is that the seemingly reluctant Camus' position is the product of a conscious decision - and its implementation - that the task of the artist is primarily to understand and, contrary to the subversive doctrines of the salvation, with his rebellious announcement of considerate revival in the name of justice and beauty, to creatively testify contradictions of his own time and advocate perhaps unconceivable comprehensive reconciliation.

This text gives a critical account of various, often conflicting interpretations of slash fiction - stories based on characters from popular TV show, The Star Trek, written (and read) by fans. What makes slash fiction, a subgenre of fan fiction, specific is a homoeroticization of characters that in the original narratives are either explicitly or implicitly heterosexual. Whether such “homoerotic pairing” has any foundation in the original Star Trek narrative, remains an open question. Answers to this question vary greatly. An affirmative answer, however, begs a further question: whether these narratives are “homosexual representations” in a strict gay/lesbian sense? The authors propose that slash represents a non-hegemonic narrative which transgresses borders (of the medium, genre, gender, sexuality etc.) set up in the original narrative - queering, reexamining thus both sex and gender. [Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 43007 i br. 41004]

This paper presents the two competing models of Enlightenment tolerance and testing their status and scope. In the first part of the paper the author points out the limits of moderate Enlightenment?s ?religious tolerance? as represented by Locke and Voltaire. That notion of tolerance to this day dominates in public and academic discourse. The second part of the paper, through figures of Spinoza, Bayle and Diderot, presents the radical Enlightenment?s concept of ?universal? or ?philosophical? tolerance. The conclusion is that, despite its theoretical superiority, the prospects of social implementation of the latter, fortunately or not, are still no bigger than they were in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The author is here seeking to expose his book Philosophical Animal zoographical persuasion to philosophy, to his own remorseless analysis - and that way defend the book from potential criticism by the others. On the other hand, the author believes that this will open up the space for discussion about the book and themes that book provokes. This discussion is not going to be mere neatly registered response and/or appropriate praise but a contribution inspired by the book, resonating back to it.

The inspiration or provocation for this paper came from the animal welfare theorists and environmental philosophers who have questioned the justification of our - real and symbolic - practice of eating meat, and from there challenged our meat-eating and generally devouring culture. The author is attempting to examine this motif - a motif of eating, swallowing devouring - its manifestation, display, findings or far-reaching thematisation that have been taking place more or less in passing in the texts of some pivotal thinkers of modern and contemporary philosophical tradition (Rousseau, Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud, Adorno, Lyotard, Derrida). It is suggested that grasping the procedure of devouring, perceived from the perspective of its imperceptible and in time almost ceremonial outgrowing into self-understandable gesture of a theory - and not only theory - is at least instructive and inspirational actual moment of consciousness for the entire (Western) thought, in other words, an aspect of its critical reconstruction and deconstruction.

The author, first of all, undertakes to perceive and analyze the role that the metaphor of 'root' plays, as well as the discourse connected with it - 'rooted', 'root out' and so on - in order to examine the functioning of botanical metaphors in modern political theory. Ideological duality is here shown as, in equal measure but in different ways, fixed to the idea of the root of human existence or of the well ordered society - and an image of a tree in blossom, if it has grown out of this condition - in which it is a privileged possession, giving the right to 'radical' actions. The difference is found where one group advocates unconditional nurturing of the given root and the other one urgent necessity of replacing it with new one. As a conclusion, it is suggested that the abandoning of the floral metaphor could not only open up space for reasonable dispute about the questions that it was believed to answer, but also that this kind of retreat from the fascination with root could really be - radical.

This paper tries to extricate philosophical education from the restrictions of social and school systems and to commend some independent and subversive views. This is to be accomplished through a conceptual dissection of the term 'education'. On the one hand, there is education seen as transmitter of the tradition, where to be educated is seen as being able to fit into an established community. There is also another education to which the authority of tradition is a permanent target of resistance, always trying to undermine any educational uniformity. This second history of education, genuinely philosophical, is radically opposed to the history of institutionalized mass-education. However, intention of this paper is not to proclaim this as an 'alternative' model, or to build it up as a new mythology. On the contrary, it is being written as a history of continuous subversion. Viewed from this vantage point, autonomous philosophical education is not a subsystem of a social system. This education has itself as a measurement, and always resists the wider community (the environment) that has accidentally befallen it. Its honor is exactly in this attitude of resistance, in being watchful against any conscription and integration. Understood in this manner, philosophical education is not a useful 'implemented' function of society, but is rather its dysfunction.

This paper is attempting to mark dilemmas, de-montage and pre-composition of philosophy that have been noticeable in its self-understanding, for the past few decades. As an answer to the cardinal question, three different and competing strands have been singled out - suggested and represented by Adorno, Habermas and Rorty - where the philosophy believes it could continue to appear. It has been detected, however, that the problem of survival and legitimisation of critique in modern philosophy has been, at first, identified with the question of survival of philosophy itself. Philosophy that has found itself on defense, but without loosing all illusions regarding its mission, it seems to see its last retreat and safe resort in the critical function of philosophy, traditionally understood as continual search for the truth. Nevertheless, politically situated, des-invested, even renouncing that enlightenment figure it seems that for the philosophical theory - more or less transformed - there is still place for autonomous action that is not without direct social consequences. .

Parallel analysis of children's literature on one hand, and the crime genre on the other, positing children's and serious construction of the world and ego, outlining homology of their narrative and reconstructing social construct that follows, assumes that light could be thrown at certain particularity that is a parasite on a host whom it would like to legitimate. Juxtaposition of the two worlds, or, often, the world whiten the world visualizes the image, an inward tension and perversion of the world for which the attraction of secret service with an aspiration to public action makes it particular. The established analogy directs the attention at two points that mark particularity of the world of secrets: the protocol of the concealment and secret action and to the motives for shifting, compounding and acquiring the identity that follows.

The intention of this paper is to revisit, once again the question asked by Adorno and Habermas and other contemporary thinkers under different headings few decades ago. The author is suggesting that nowadays philosophy requires a final departure from the idea of having single and perennial face, and that this would not only allow, but also enable philosophy to test its various faces freely, that is, without norm or limit set in advance. At the same time, by creating such ?liberal? climate philosophy would no longer be frightened by the possible answer, and hence would no longer dramatize the very question of ?why still??. Even if philosophy turns out to be far less than the mission it once bestowed upon itself.

Led by Adorno and Horkheimer’s understanding of the three conceptual orienteers - subject, reason and emancipation - this work attempts to sketch a status that they have attributed to the Enlightenment. Ulysses and Oedipus are here used not only in the way those two authors have done, not only to illustrate dialectical contradictions that this "project" falls into and is marked by, but also in a way that signalize possibilities of different interpretations that have relied upon them. Adorno and Horkheimer’s "to enlighten the enlightenment about itself" is thus displayed, extended and examined also in the fields of contemporary thought where they have, in different ways, inspired and provoked new generation of Critical theory, and on the other hand, the postmodern authors.

U tekstu se polazi od pitanja zbog čega se zamišljaju drugi svetovi. Pored motiva za zamišljanje, pažnja se posvećuje samom procesu zamišljanja, resursima i asocijativnim sklopovima koji su dostupni zamišljanju u izgradnji svetova koji se od našeg razlikuju. „Druge svetove“ određujemo i kao utopiju i kao prostor fantazije, rukovodeći se hipotezom da taj prostor nikada nije u potpunosti slobodan. Poseban naglasak stavljamo na prostor i vreme utopije, kao i na dimenziju novog. Tekst je podeljen u četiri celine, od kojih se prva bavi motivom za fantaziju; druga razmatra moć mašte i ograničenja zamišljanja; treća u svom središtu ima „cenu“ fantazije, potiranje složenosti postojećeg sveta. U četvrtom se delu razmatra značaj utopijskog mišljenja za društvenu teoriju. The main question of this article is why imagine other worlds. In addition to shedding light on the motivation, we also examine the imaginative processes, their resources and the associative arrangements available to imagination in the construction of new worlds. We see ‘other worlds’ as both utopian and as fantastic spaces, following the hypothesis that the space of fantasy is never entirely free. We place particular emphasis on the space and time of utopia, and on the aspect of the novelty. The paper is divided into four parts. The first takes into account the path to the other world, or the methodical problem of imagination. The second wants to portray the other world, or the limitations to imagining something entirely different and new. The third part inquires about the cost of utopian thinking: what is lost in the process, what is sacrificed to its flattening gestures? Finally, despite all these limitations, in the fourth part we consider the significance of utopian thought for social theory. Le point de départ de ce texte sont les raisons qui incitent l’homme à imaginer d’autres mondes. En plus de ces raisons, l’attention est portée au processus même de l’imagination, aux ressources et aux réseaux des associations d’idées accessibles à l’imagination dans la construction des mondes qui diffèrent du notre. Nous définissons les „autres mondes“ à la fois comme une utopie et comme un espace de fantaisie, partant de l’hypothèse que cet espace n’est jamais complètement libre. Un accent particulier est mis sur l’espace et le temps de l’utopie, ainsi que sur la dimension du nouveau. Le texte est divisé en quatre parties, dont la première traite les raisons d’imaginer; la deuxième analyse le pouvoir de l’imagination et les limites de cette dernière; la troisième est consacrée au „prix“ de l’imagination, à savoir l’annulation de la complexité du monde existant. Dans la quatrième est examinée l’importance de la pensée utopique pour la théorie sociale.

This article stems from the impression of being condemned to late and moralizing reactions in regard to advances in the life sciences. We suggest a return to a speculative and theoretical approach in posing the question(s) of the limit of possible thinking of the enhanced human. This return allows for the possibility to show, not just inductively, but “clearly and distinctly,” the specific justifications and lines of reasoning of anthropocentric prejudice or species narcissism. It also enables us to move freely and precisely along the limits of thinking the human/non-human. In this way, we hope to put forward a few markers or guideposts that would further the debate about notions of human enhancement.

U članku se tvrdi da rani romantizam, artikulišući vlastito stanovište, upućuje prosvećenosti jednu „estetičku“ primedbu i da se ta primedba može protegnuti do duboko u dvadeseti vek. Autor rada je, posle Šlegela i njegove škole, pronalazi ne samo u Veberovoj dijagnostici institucionalizovane racionalnosti zapadne civilizacije, te u Dijalektici prosvetiteljstva Horkhajmera i Adorna i kritici ciljno orijentisanog ili instrumentalnog uma savremenosti koja je usledila, već i, na drugačiji način, kod Fukoa, braće Beme, pa čak i u fi lozofi ji postmoderne i neopragmatizma. Zaključuje se da je svim tim orijentacijama zajednička detekcija manjka samoprosvećenosti prosvetiteljstva, izostanak njegove autoreferentne korekcije, neobračunavanje troškova ogrešenja o ono njegovo „drugo“, što onda bilo nepovratno ili ipak nekako još ispravljivo, potkopava njegov izvorni kritički i emancipatorski program. The article argues that early Romanticism, articulating its own view, addresses to the Enlightenment an “aesthetic” remark which be traced deep into the twentieth century. The author of the work found it, after Schlegel and his school, not only in Weber ‘s diagnosis of institutionalized rationality of Western civilization, and in the Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment and the critique of the goal-oriented or instrumental reason of modernity that followed, but in a different way, also in Foucault, Böhme brothers, and even in postmodern philosophy and neopragmatism. It is concluded that all these orientations share detection of the lack od self-enlightenment of the Enlightenment and, consequently, the lack of its self-referential correction. These unaccounted costs of violations the Enlightenment committed to its “other”, irreversibly or somehow still recoverable, undermines its original critical and emancipatory program.

This paper tries to extricate philosophical education from the restrictions of social and school systems and to commend some independent and subversive views. This is to be accomplished through a conceptual dissection of the term ?education?. On the one hand, there is education seen as transmitter of the tradition, where to be educated is seen as being able to fit into an established community. There is also another education to which the authority of tradition is a permanent target of resistance, always trying to undermine any educational uniformity. This second history of education, genuinely philosophical, is radically opposed to the history of institutionalized mass-education. However, intention of this paper is not to proclaim this as an "alternative" model, or to build it up as a new mythology. On the contrary, it is being written as a history of continuous subversion. Viewed from this vantage point, autonomous philosophical education is not a subsystem of a social system. This education has itself as a measurement, and always resists the wider community (the environment) that has accidentally befallen it. Its honor is exactly in this attitude of resistance, in being watchful against any conscription and integration. Understood in this manner, philosophical education is not a useful "implemented" function of society, but is rather its dysfunction.