Search

Born in 1900–1901 with the publication of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations, phenomenology, as a critical method of reflection on consciousness and its cognitive achievements against its naturalisation in the natural sciences, has undergone many changes and developments. Critiques of both its methods and tasks have emerged, plus it has served as an inspiration for numerous thinkers, including Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Gabriel Marcel, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Luc Nancy, Michel Henry, Emmanuel Levinas, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur and Jacques Derrida, in their attempts to address the question of value, the meaning of being, existence, the lived body, the Other, life, art, history and language in original and fresh ways. The current paper reflects upon the question of what the fate of phenomenology in the twenty-first century could be by considering some of the recent work presented at the first conference of the South African Centre for Phenomenology held at the University of Johannesburg earlier this year.South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(4): 291–294

This article offers a new reading of Heidegger’s thesis of the animal in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Framing Heidegger’s text through a brief analysis of Protagoras’ genetic story of nature and of man’s nature in Plato’s eponymous dialogue, our reading brings out three key elements common to both texts: living nature as a normative rather than a physical order, the poverty of man’s world in relation to the animal, and the attempted redemption of the latter through the acquisition of Weltbildung. Staying with the way Heidegger brings out man’s poverty in world in the text allows us (i) to undo once for all the oft‐repeated charge of Heidegger’s anthropocentric interpretation of the animal, (ii) to stage the hypothesis that philosophy and the life sciences of his day draw upon a common basic experience of the autonomy of life in relation to everything human, all‐too‐human, and (iii) to demonstrate the normativity and poverty of life.

This essay presents a defence of the hermeneutical and existential standpoint of Being and Time against Cristina Lafont’s historicist and relativist reading. I show that there are substantive and textual difficulties with the Kantian reading of the understanding of being she endorses, which leads her to ignore the existential and hermeneutical aspects of Heidegger’s theory of meaning. The first section shows that the understanding of being is neither an unrevisable synthetic apriori nor a historically contingent conceptual scheme but that it originates from care and that its articulation depends on the disclosure of a world (meaning). The second section turns to Heidegger’s theory of meaning qua worldhood. In the first place, I demonstrate that the relativity of meaning to Dasein doesn’t entail the kind of relativism Lafont ascribes to Heidegger and, in the second, how it avoids the supposed tension Lafont identifies in Being and Time between the claim that Dasein constitutes the world and the claim that it depends on a historically and linguistically constituted world. I conclude with some remarks on what is novel about Heidegger’s existential and hermeneutical outlook on meaning. South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(2): 149–162