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Networks underlie notable cases of rapid development without democratic institutions, a phenomenon known as crony capitalism that has two distinctive features: (1) dispensation of selective privileges, and (2) social connections among beneficiaries. This paper advances a formal theory that explains how crony networks can induce large-scale effects that can both propagate risk of predation and incentivize private protection to withstand it. Dense networks that activate both relational mechanisms translate into aggregate outcomes wherein governments respect property rights for favored parties. From formal theory, I derive equilibrium predation conditions for a computational model that examines how variable network structures impact the number of protected privileges. A statistical analysis of computer simulations lends support for the posited relational mechanisms that scale up protection in successful cases of crony capitalism.

How do comparativists incorporate networks into their studies? What is the utility of network analysis to the subfield of comparative politics? These are timely questions, because the subfield of comparative politics has long recognized the importance of various relational phenomena but is only beginning to pay systematic attention to political networks proper. To answer these questions, this chapter reviews network-related approaches embedded in studies of collective action and contentious politics, political economy, and clientelism. It offers a prospective review of major themes in comparative politics that are essentially relational and hence ripe for network analysis. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of methodological challenges to enable comparative analysis across countries, which is an ultimate goal to bring a truly comparative dimension to relational perspectives on domestic politics.

This paper provides a working definition of polycentric orders as a governance system that allows overlapping jurisdictions and a certain degree of autonomy to consumers of public goods. The defini...