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A necessary element of electoral campaigns in mass democracies is money to fund candidate or party campaigns. This is especially true in the United States with its largely privately funded campaigns and primary elections, which determine party nominees. Campaigns expend these funds to persuade voters to turn out and vote for their preferred candidate. Factors such as competitiveness, electoral size, and type of election influence the importance and effectiveness of campaign spending. Since one marker of candidate viability is early fundraising efforts, called the “money primary,” candidates in privately funded systems must first persuade individuals and groups to contribute to their campaigns or spend independently on their behalf. What, if any, limits are placed on who and how much can be contributed to campaigns also play a large role in US elections. Since 2010, there has been a movement away from limiting what individuals and groups, including unions and corporations, can contribute and spend independently on races. These finances fund persuasion efforts, which have largely been on paid television advertising, but have increasingly been spent on database development for individual voter contacts and on social media. These persuasion efforts have changed in recent elections, as the Obama presidential campaigns made innovative use of email and social media, and the Trump campaign of 2016 expanded the use of Facebook and other social media compared to prior campaigns. In all cases, spending on electoral persuasion is used to mobilize or demobilize voters or motivate donors.

The scholarly literature provides mixed guidance on the question of whether DREs or optical scan systems inspire greater confidence. We bring new evidence to bear on the debate using a unique exit poll and a nationally representative survey, both of which examine a wide range of voting experiences. Having detailed information about voting experiences enables us to investigate both the direct effects of DRE/optical scan voting and the indirect effects through voting experiences. Doing so reveals new information about the relationships between voting technology, voting experiences, and voter confidence. Indeed, the type of machine one uses has very different direct and indirect effects on voter confidence—a finding that may help explain scholarly disagreement over voters’ reactions to different types of voting machines.

Writing mote than 20 years ago, W. P. Welch used a probit model to attempt to isolate the effect of campaign contributions on roll-call voting from other influences like the legislator's constituency, party, and ideology. The literature on the relationship between campaign contributions and legislative votes is extensive, with often-inconsistent findings. It is typically the case that contributions from interested groups are correlated with roll-call voting favorable to the contributor's interests. Studies that include a wider range of variables find that this relationship is not so simple. Interest groups contribute to members who are already often predisposed to support their position. If the group has a local presence, then members may be voting with the group because of constituency pressures. Party and ideology also must be factored into the analysis (Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Chin 2005; Roscoe and Jenkins 2005; Wawro 2001). Welch's (1982) article presents a conceptual framework in which to consider the exchange of campaign contributions from an interested group for votes by legislators on past or future legislation. Welch links this transaction to what he labels "exchange theory." His framework includes assumptions that were well grounded in the understanding of congressional elections and campaign finance at the time. His overall conclusion was that "although contributions are significant, they were the least important determinant of legislative voting" (Welch 1982, 493). What other determinants were more important? He finds that variables like dairy production (a measure of constituency interest), ideology, and party are all stronger predictors of the vote on milk price supports than campaign contributions. Welch's article is cited in sociology, economics, and political science journals. While this essay will explain its central argument about the relative influence of campaign contributions on roll-call votes and vice versa, it is also the case that Welch is frequently cited in studies of legislative behavior, interest groups (especially agricultural groups), and, more broadly, about campaign finance. Context of Welch's Article The conventional wisdom "that interest groups 'buy' influence by contributing to political campaigns" motivates Welch's analysis (Welch 1982,487). At the time of publication, the issue of campaign contributions from interest groups had become more salient because of the Watergate investigation of a botched burglary of the Democratic National Committee at the Watergate Complex in Washington, D.C. The investigation had uncovered large illegal contributions to the Committee to Reelect the President (CREP) during the 1972 election cycle (Corrado and Mann et al. 1997,283). Watergate galvanized Congress to reform the way federal elections are financed. New regulations in the form of a set of 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) imposed contribution and spending limitations, mandated disclosure, and established an enforcement agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), to over see the new regulations. Welch indirectly mentions FECA in his opening paragraph when he states that the public belief that interest groups buy influence is a reason "for Congress either publicly to finance congressional campaigns or to place a limit on the amount of monies that a candidate may receive from political action committees" (Welch 1982, 178). While Welch finds only modest independent effects for campaign contributions, in his words "not a major influence," he does find that those who received contributions in the 1974 election cycle were more likely to vote for higher milk-price supports in 1975. Similarly, those who voted with the milk producers in 1975 were more likely to receive contributions from the Dairy PAC during the 1976 election cycle. Consistent with what we know about legislative specialization and interest-group behavior, he finds that contributions to the Agriculture Committee members were higher, other things being equal. …

Proponents of direct legislation maintain that the initiative and popular referendum empower ordinary citizens to set the agenda of politics. Some argue it shifts “ultimate authority from representatives in state legislatures, city councils, and even Congress to the people themselves” (Schmidt 1989, vii). Such elections, so the argument goes, produce greater voter interest in elections and higher voter turnout. Those in favor of the process also contend that it is an important check on special interests which exert too much control over elected politicians (Magleby 1984, chap. 2; Cronin 1989).Critics of direct democracy raise concerns about the quality of deliberation voters give to issues. Voters can be confused by ballot question wording or respond negatively to the length of the ballots. Moreover, because voters lack the simplifying devices of partisanship and candidate appeal, they may be more susceptible to the manipulations of campaign consultants.How well do these longstanding arguments for and against direct legislation reflect our actual experience with the process in the 1990s? Arguments for direct democracy depend largely on how the process is conducted. If the process can be manipulated by special interests or relies on questionable tactics, then many of the advantages claimed for the process disappear. In this article, we argue that political consultants play a significant role in the conduct of direct democracy. These consultants normally work directly for organized interests without the constraints imposed by candidates or parties.

Recent scandals in Congress have once again focused the public's attention on the operation of the legislative branch of government. Public attitudes toward institutions of democratic governance are important predictors of their health and vigor. If the institutions are evaluated positively by the public, then the democracy is said to be stable (Lipset and Schneider 1983). This is particularly true of public attitudes toward Congress, which was designed to be the "people's branch," especially the House of Representatives. Public attitudes toward Congress have not been constant. Longand short-term forces have combined to raise or lower the institution's standing in the public eye. A long-term factor that hurts Congress is its inefficiency. Congress was not designed to act quickly; instead, it acts in a slow and seemingly confusing fashion. Power is fragmented in Congress. Such a process is often perceived to be sluggish and exceedingly contentious. The House and Senate blame each other, and members of both houses blame the rules, procedures, and committees for their inaction or incomplete action. Therefore, public support for the way Congress handles its job never reaches great heights, although it went as high as 56 percent in June of 1987 according to an ABC/ Washington Post poll. But most of the time, support for Congress hovers in the 27-35 percent approval range (see fig. 1). Short-term factors also affect the public's evaluation of Congress. Scandals that involve the day-to-day operation of the Congress or that include large numbers of members tarnish the standing of the institution (Garment 1991). Extensive, unfavorable publicity about the conduct of members may lead the public to hold Congress as a whole in

For almost a decade we have taken issue with the prevailing view of independent voters. We showed that Independents, as they were usually defined, had nothing in common, and in fact were more diverse than either Democrats or Republicans. Virtually no generalizations about Independents were correct, except by accident, because they comprise three very different kinds of people. Most Independents acknowledge that they are closer to one or the other party. The crux of our argument was that this ‘leaning’ should outweigh an initial claim of independence when deciding how to classify respondents. Our most striking finding was that leaners vote like outright partisans. We interpreted this as evidence that most professed Independents are not neutral between the parties, but are nearly as partisan as avowed Democrats and Republicans. This conclusion had major implications for both mainstream and revisionist views of American politics, all the more so because of the growing numbers of Independents, who accounted for 38 per cent of the adult population by 1978, thus matching the Democrats and leaving Republicans in a distant third place.

LECTIONS are typically conducted on a single day during specified hours. With few exceptions, voters wishing to exercise their franchise must vote on that day at specified polling places. Although different cities or states use different ballot formats and voting systems (Rusk 1970; Walker 1966), the reliance on a single election day with voting at neighborhood locations has been a given in American politics. A major exception to neighborhood election day voting is absentee voting. Provisions for absentee voting have been liberalized in some states so that voters may now request and return their ballot through the mail (Walrath-Riley 1984). In the past few years, local governments of varying sizes have experimented with a new idea conducting an entire election by mail.2 Mail ballot elections differ from recent changes in absentee voting in that all registered voters are mailed a ballot and a return envelope. Mail ballot elections have the potential to increase voting, but do they? Are those who participate in mail ballot elections more representative than the kinds of people who vote in polling place elections? This article examines these questions in light of the elections conducted through the mails.

The last decade has seen a resurgence in interest in three direct democracy devices—the initiative, the popular referendum and the recall. These processes reflect the Progressive Era reformers' aim of enlarging the role of citizens and voters as well as restricting or checking the power of intermediary institutions such as state and local legislatures, political parties, and elected executives. The focus of this article is to examine the increased use of the initiative and popular referendum at the state level as well as how the process actually works. The related processes of the recall and teledemocracy are addressed in other articles in this symposium.Statewide Provisions for Initiative, Popular Referendum and RecallThe initiative process permits petitioners to write and, if a sufficient number of valid signatures are gathered, place those proposals on the ballot. The initiative can be placed directly on the ballot (the direct initiative); or before the legislature. If the legislature does not enact the measure or otherwise satisfy the sponsors of the initiative, the sponsors can gather additional signatures and place their proposal on the ballot (the indirect initiative). Five times as many states have the direct initiative as the indirect and, in states that permit both, proponents typically prefer to go directly to the ballot.

Using ballot initiatives, voters in several states have recently voted to concentrate more power in their state governments at the expense of local autonomy and experimentation. Whether the issue is gay rights, rent control, regulation of hazardous waste facilities, zoning, or tax policy, initiative activists have frequently sought to reverse local government policies with a statewide initiative. Counter examples that have encouraged local government experimentation also exist in areas such as campaign-finance reform. The initiative is a powerful agenda-setting device, not only for the voters in the initiative states but also for other states and the federal government. Direct legislation has been used by activists to assert state prerogatives in policy areas long thought to be national in scope, for example, immigration and drug classification. Voters have also cast ballots to limit the terms of members of the Congress, actions later declared unconstitutional. The role of the courts in determining the constitutionality of initiatives is one of the most important manifestations of federalism in direct democracy. Copyright , Oxford University Press.