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We study inequality in mortality in Finland using registry data that covers the whole population for years 1990-2018. We create municipality-level indexes of regional deprivation (poverty rate), and show how age-specifc mortality rates have evolved across regions and over time. The inequality in mortality has been remarkably low over the time period for most age groups. However, among young and prime-age males the mortality rates have been persistently higher in the poorer areas. For these age groups the leading causes of death are deaths of despair (alcohol and suicides) and accidents. For the cohorts that were young during the deep early-1990's recession, we also document higher inequality in middle-age mortality than for cohorts entering the labor market in recovery periods.

Workplace downsizing and closure have been considered natural experiments that strengthen causal inference when assessing the association between unemployment and health. Selection into unemployment plays a lesser role among those exposed to severe workplace downsizing. This study compared mortality for individuals unemployed from stable, downsized, and closed workplaces with a reference group unexposed to unemployment. We examined nationally representative register data of residents of Finland aged 25–63 years in 1990–2009 (n = 275,738). Compared with the control group, the hazard ratio for substance use–related mortality among men unemployed from stable workplaces was 2.43 (95% confidence interval (CI): 2.22, 2.67), from downsized workplaces 1.85 (CI: 1.65, 2.08), and from closed workplaces 2.16 (CI: 1.84, 2.53). Among women, the corresponding estimates were 3.01 (CI: 2.42, 3.74), 2.39 (CI: 1.75, 3.27), and 1.47 (CI: 1.09, 1.99). Unemployment from stable workplaces was associated with mortality from psychiatric and self-harm–related conditions. However, mortality due to ischemic heart disease and other somatic diseases decreased for those unemployed following closure. The results indicate that selection mechanisms partially explain the excess mortality among the unemployed. However, substance-use outcomes among men and women, and fatal accidents and violence among men, might be causally associated with unemployment.

Significance From 1990 to 2018, the Black–White American life expectancy gap fell 48.9% and mortality inequality decreased, although progress stalled after 2012 as life expectancy plateaued. Had improvements continued at the 1990 to 2012 rate, the racial gap in life expectancy would have closed by 2036. Despite decreasing mortality inequality, income-based life expectancy gaps remain starker in the United States than in European countries. At the same time, European mortality improved strongly and even those U.S. populations with the longest life spans–White Americans living in the highest-income areas–experience higher mortality at all ages than Europeans in high-income areas in 2018. Hence, mortality rates of both Black and White Americans could fall much further in both high-income and low-income areas., Although there is a large gap between Black and White American life expectancies, the gap fell 48.9% between 1990 and 2018, mainly due to mortality declines among Black Americans. We examine age-specific mortality trends and racial gaps in life expectancy in high- and low-income US areas and with reference to six European countries. Inequalities in life expectancy are starker in the United States than in Europe. In 1990, White Americans and Europeans in high-income areas had similar overall life expectancy, while life expectancy for White Americans in low-income areas was lower. However, since then, even high-income White Americans have lost ground relative to Europeans. Meanwhile, the gap in life expectancy between Black Americans and Europeans decreased by 8.3%. Black American life expectancy increased more than White American life expectancy in all US areas, but improvements in lower-income areas had the greatest impact on the racial life expectancy gap. The causes that contributed the most to Black Americans’ mortality reductions included cancer, homicide, HIV, and causes originating in the fetal or infant period. Life expectancy for both Black and White Americans plateaued or slightly declined after 2012, but this stalling was most evident among Black Americans even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. If improvements had continued at the 1990 to 2012 rate, the racial gap in life expectancy would have closed by 2036. European life expectancy also stalled after 2014. Still, the comparison with Europe suggests that mortality rates of both Black and White Americans could fall much further across all ages and in both high-income and low-income areas.

This paper analyses the effects of maternal school starting age and maternal age-at-birth on children’s short and long-term outcomes using Finnish register data. We exploit a school-starting-age rule for identification. Mothers who are born after the school entry cut-off give birth at higher age, but total fertility and earnings are unaffected. Being born after the cut-off reduces gestation and, hence, child birth weight. The effects on birth weight and gestation are rather small, however, suggesting that the long-run impacts are limited. Accordingly, we find no impacts on longer-term child outcomes, such as educational attainment and adolescent crime rates. Overall, we interpret this evidence as saying that there are no favorable effects of maternal age at birth on child outcomes.

This paper analyzes the effects of job displacement on fertility using Finnish longitudinal employer-employee data (FLEED) matched to birth records. We distinguish between male and female job losses. We focus on couples where one spouse has lost his/her job due to a plant closure or mass layoff and follow them for several years both before and following the job loss. As a comparison group we use similar couples that were not affected by job displacement. In order to examine the possible channels through which job loss affects fertility we examine also the effect on earnings, employment and divorce. The results show that a woman?s own job loss decreases fertility mainly for highly educated women. For every 100 displaced females there are approximately 4 less children born. A man?s job loss has no significant impact on completed fertility.

Low-wage subsidies are often proposed as a solution to the unemployment problem among the low skilled. Yet the empirical evidence on the effects of low-wage subsidies is surprisingly scarce. This paper examines the employment effects of a Finnish payroll tax subsidy scheme, which is targeted at the employers of older, full-time, low-wage workers. The system’s clear eligibility criteria open up an opportunity for a reliable estimation of the causal impacts of the subsidy, using a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach. Our results indicate that the subsidy system had no effects on the employment rate. However, it appears to have increased the probability of part-time workers obtaining full-time employment.