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Grandiose and vulnerable narcissism share some core features (e.g., entitlement, self-absorption) but differ in other important ways (e.g., self-esteem). To reconcile these differing characteristics, we predicted that differences in perceived agency mediate the association between narcissistic subtypes and differences in self-esteem. One hundred college students completed self-report measures of grandiose narcissism, vulnerable narcissism, explicit global self-esteem, and perceived agency. As predicted, grandiose narcissism was positively associated with agency and self-esteem, whereas vulnerable narcissism was negatively associated with agency and self-esteem. Perceived agency also mediated the associations between each narcissistic subtype and self-esteem. Furthermore, a partial correlation showed that when controlling for agency, the previously null correlation between measures of grandiose and vulnerable narcissism became significantly positive. These findings indicate that agency serves as a primary differentiator between the narcissistic subtypes.

The purpose of this research is to better illuminate a vulnerable narcissist's daily emotional life, targeting the experiences of shame, anger, and emotion regulation. Participants completed self-report questionnaires before writing an essay on their adjustment to college. After being randomly assigned to receive either satisfactory or unsatisfactory feedback, participants rated the quality of their own essay performance, reported their current emotions, and completed extra process measures to assess what they were thinking during the study. Feedback which disconfirmed vulnerable narcissists' self-reported performance ratings led to greater emotionality. Furthermore, vulnerable narcissists' intention to regulate their emotions, specifically their attempts to disqualify the importance of interpersonal feedback, ultimately led to greater shame. Conceptual and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

The present research examines how self-concept clarity moderates the impact of feedback about one's self-knowledge. A preliminary study shows that individuals with higher clarity expect the process of defining who they are to be easier than those with lower clarity. Two experiments then test the effect of self-concept clarity on the experience of self-elaboration under conditions of either doubt or confidence. The results suggest that people with higher self-concept clarity show greater differences in self-evaluations based on whether their experience of describing the self is nested within ease and confidence or difficulty and doubt. We suggest that this effect may be a result of the different expectations high- and low-clarity individuals have for the task of describing the self.

The prevalence of entertainment media in everyday life might offer unexpected social opportunities. The present paper examined whether cognitive overlap with the character and self-expansion occur as a result of exposure to fictional characters. Results of two studies indicated that transportation into a narrative leads to greater cognitive overlap with the character and perceived self-expansion. Providing a distinction between these two concepts, we found that cognitive overlap with the character increases to the extent the character represents one's actual self-guide; perceived self-expansion increases to the extent the character represents one's ideal self-guide. Together, these findings illustrate the nature of parasocial relationships and impact of entertainment media on the self.

People often look to others for guidance when selecting narrative entertainment. Previous work has demonstrated that this social guidance forms the basis of people’s expectations and subsequently affects people’s experience. The current work extends previous research by exploring the influence of peer evaluations of a story, on enjoyment of and psychological transportation in the written narrative. In two experiments, participants read peer evaluations prior to reading the story. Results of Experiment 1 revealed that social influence guides readers’ expectations, attention to elements in the narrative, reported enjoyment, and feelings of transportation in the narrative. This influence was particularly apparent when readers were given unfavorable reviews of the stimulus. In the second experiment, readers were given peer evaluations that were either confirmed or disconfirmed by other readers. Results indicated that valence of peer evaluations influenced both transportation and enjoyment. Additionally, inconsistent evaluations increased feelings of transportation, but consistency alone had no effect on reported enjoyment. Implications for social media experiences and future directions in research on entertainment media are discussed.

Typically, people rate enhancement needs as more important than security needs to their well-being. Two studies tested whether event valence and prior trauma moderate relative need importance. Traumatized (hurricane survivors) and non-traumatized (control) participants recalled the most “distressing” (security-relevant) or “satisfying” (enhancement-relevant) event they had recently experienced and rated the importance of 10 needs in defining the event. In both studies, event valence moderated relative need importance on explicit (salience) and implicit (affect) measures as enhancement needs were more important for enhancement-relevant (satisfying) events whereas security needs were more important for security-relevant (distressing) events. However, results also suggest that differences in traumatic experience across samples moderated the effect of event valence on relative need importance. Unlike non-traumatized (control) participants, traumatized (hurricane survivors) participants did not reassign greater importance to enhancement over security needs when event valence shifted to enhancement-relevant (satisfying) memories. We close by discussing implications for human motivation.

Regulatory focus theory [Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and prevention: Regulatory focus as a motivational principle. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 30, pp. 1–46). New York: Academic Press.] argues that concerns with growth and nurturance (i.e., a promotion focus) and concerns with safety and security (i.e., a prevention focus) produce different motives and perception. The current studies test whether regulatory focus also affects individuals’ strivings for self-evaluation. Specifically, we argue that a promotion or a prevention focus directs the self-evaluation process to self-esteem or self-certainty, respectively. Two studies supported this prediction by demonstrating that regulatory focus affects the strength of self-evaluation goals and individuals’ reactions to goal failure. In Study 1, we found that a promotion focus led to a stronger self-esteem goal (as measured by greater accessibility of esteem-related words), whereas a prevention focus led to a stronger self-certainty goal (as measured by greater accessibility of certainty-related words). In Study 2, a promotion failure led to lower self-esteem than a prevention failure, but a prevention failure led to lower self-certainty than a promotion failure. This research suggests an unrecognized role of nurturance and safety concerns in understanding the self-evaluation process.

Introduction and Overview. Part 1. Personal Security in Individual Contexts. Security and Uncertainty in Contemporary Delayed-Return Cultures: Coping with the Blockage of Personal Goals, K. van den Bos, I. McGregor, L. Martin. Being Threatened and Being a Threat Can Increase Reliance On Thoughts: A Self-Validation Approach, P. Brinol, K. G. DeMarree, R. E. Petty. Psychological Insecurity and Leadership Styles, C. Schoel, D. Stahlberg, C. Sedikides. The Psychology of Defensiveness: An Integrative Security System Model of Attachment, Self-esteem, and Worldviews, J. Hart. Part I Commentary, C. Holbrook, D. Fessler. Part 2. Personal Security in Interpersonal Contexts. Narcissism and Protection Against Social Threat, S.D. Freis, A.A. Brown, R.M. Arkin. Regulating Relationship Security of Chronically Insecure Partners, E. Lemay. An Attachment Perspective on Personal Security, M. Milkulincer, P.R. Shaver. Attachment Security and Prosociality: Dynamics, Underlying Mechanisms, and Implications, O. Gillath, G. Karantzas. A Goal Circumplex Model of Security Strivings in Social and Cultural Context, K. Tomczyk, B. Yu, X. Zhou. Ostracism Threatens Personal Security: A Temporal Need Threat Framework, E. D. Wesselmann, A. Hales, D. Ren, K. D. Williams. Part II Commentary, M. Clark, K. Von Culin, J. Hirsch. Part 3. Personal Security in Cultural and Health Contexts. Security Seeking in a Regulatory Focus Whodunit: The Case of the Relative Orientation in Behavioral Economics, G. Leonardelli, V. Bohns, J. Gu. Achieving Existential Security through Symbolically Fusing Secular and Religious Sources of Control and Order, A. Kay, S. Shepherd, R. Eibach. Responding to Psychological Threats with Deliberate Ignorance: Causes and Remedies, J. Shepperd, J. Howell. Uncertainty in Healthcare: A Multi-Level Approach, S. Andrews, K. Sweeny. Part III Commentary, A.J. Rothman, A. K. Farrell, L. Auster-Gussman. Part 4. Interdisciplinary Analyses of Personal Security. "Fear Appeals" and Security in American Foreign Relations, C. Fettweis. Terrorism, Personal Security, and Responsible Policy Making, J. Mueller, M.G. Stewart. Secure in Their Beliefs: Personal Security, the Quest for Personal Significance, and the Psychology of Extremism, A. Kruglanski, N. Schori-Eyal. Ecology and Evolution of Personal Security: Adaptive Interdependence of the Individual and the Collective, R. Sagarin. Part IV Commentary, T. Kolditz, J. Lovelace.

Self-report distributions of self-evaluations are proposed to convey information beyond unidimensional (e.g., Likert-type) measures. Two studies tested the hypothesis that the shape of a distribution-type measure of self-evaluation of intellectual ability, as well as the central tendency and variability, is a meaningful indicator of individual differences. Specifically, one correlational study showed that measures of central tendency, variability, and skew were uniquely associated with self-ratings of ability level, self-certainty, and implicit theories of intelligence, respectively. An experiment explored the finding that incremental theorists (Dweck, 1999) reported more negatively skewed distributions than entity theorists. Only incremental theorists who wrote essays about recent intellectual growth created negatively skewed distributions; entity theorists did not. Evidence supports the hypotheses that self-report distributions are multiply informative and idiographic measures of self-evaluation, that negative skew on intellectual ability distributions can represent perceptions of growth, and that incremental theorists typically take this perspective when evaluating their own intellectual ability.

Three studies tested the hypothesis that people may turn to materialism when they face uncertainties in modern life. Study 1 showed that anomie and self-doubt are significant predictors of materialistic orientations; other plausible antecedents have less predictive value. In Study 2, participants experiencing chronic self-doubt showed a higher level of materialism if they were primed to experience doubt and insecurity. In Study 3, participants with chronic perceptions of anomie showed a higher level of materialism if they were primed with the concept of normlessness. Together, these three studies show that some people turn to materialism when they experience uncertainty within the self (self-doubt) or perceive uncertainty relating to society (anomie). © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

The impact on self-esteem of activating self-doubt was investigated in three studies. Individuals with enduring high self-doubt were expected to be more threatened by an experimental induction of self-doubt (modeled on the ease of retrieval paradigm) than individuals low in enduring self-doubt, and their self-esteem was predicted to decline. The predictions were supported when self-esteem was measured postexperimentally (Experiment 1) and when it was measured both pre- and postexperimentally (Experiment 2). There was no comparable loss in self-esteem for individuals low in self-doubt. A third experiment explored the phenomenology of low-self-doubt individuals and replicated the finding that their level of self-esteem was unaffected by the induction designed to produce doubt.

Despite keen interest in the construct of narcissism, the field of personality and social psychology has lacked a comprehensive framework under which to fit together the relevant empirical bits and pieces. Morf and Rhodewalt's target article takes an admirable first step toward remedying this deficiency. Morf and Rhodewalt's (this issue) conceptualization of narcissism brings the construct to life. These authors have moved the empirical focus beyond the psychometric, trait-like properties of the construct and into its dynamic, regulatory utility. How do narcissists navigate the troubled waters of everyday life? How do narcissists regulate their psychological functioning at both the intrapersonal and interpersonal level? In the spirit of Morf and Rhodewalt's thinking, we approach the narcissistic self from a motivational perspective. We wonder about the motives that guide the evaluation of the narcissistic self. What do narcissists want to know about themselves, and what do they make of this knowledge? To what extent do they accept or reject feedback about themselves? If they reject feedback, why do they do so and at what cost? We argue that narcissists, compared to nonnarcissists, have both motivational surfeits and motivational deficits. Four motives have been identified and documented in the self-evaluation literature (Sedikides, 1993; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). These are self-enhancement (the motive to protect and elevate the positivity of the self), self-verification (the motive to validate cherished self-views), self-assessment (the motive to gain accurate knowledge about the self), and self-improvement (the motive to better aspects of the self). For the purposes of this commentary, we draw attention to how two of the above-mentioned motives bifurcate. First, the self-enhancement motive divides into an enhancement motive (striving to increase the positivity of the self-concept-an approach orientation) and a protection motive (striving to decrease the negativity of the self-concept-an avoidance orientation). Enhancement and protection may have distinct correlates and consequences, as recent research on self-esteem (Rhodewalt, Morf, Hazlett, & Fairfield, 1991; Tice, 1991) and achievement motivation (Elliot & Church, 1997) suggests. Second, self-verification divides into positive verification (confirming positive self-views) and negative verification (confirming negative self-views; Pemberton & Sedikides, 2001). Given that the enhancement motive is difficult to distinguish empirically from the positive-verification motive (what Morf and Rhodewalt call "self-affirmation"), we refer to them jointly as enhancement-positive verification. As Morf and Rhodewalt amply document (see also Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, Elliot, & Gregg, in press), narcissists have a seemingly unlimited supply of the enhancement-positive verification motive. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to state that this motive must subjectively feel like an internal geyser to the narcissist, welling up within them, to be released in practically all forms of intraand interpersonal regulation. Narcissists make no apologies for their claims of superiority. They adore their self-image, are hopelessly self-centered in their craving for attention and admiration, and feel deserving of unlimited praise. They regard themselves as preeminent persons, brilliant supernovas in a dark social universe populated by inferior peers. Others simply cannot match their celestial brilliance. A surfeit of the enhancement-positive verification motive is one way in which the motivational system of narcissists differs from that of nonnarcissists. Unfortunately for them, narcissists must also live in the real social world, a world that provides them with feedback that is not uniformly positive. Indeed, the feedback that narcissists receive follows a pattern of progressive disenchantment. In the initial interaction encounters, narcissists receive favorable feedback: They give off the impression of being confident, engaging, clever, and full of life. Alas, this impression evaporates rapidly. Before long (indeed, by the seventh weekly interaction; Paulhus, 1998), narcissists are perceived as shameless braggarts, conceited, uninteresting, and hostile. Such attributes do not boost anyone's bid for public office (Leary, Bednarski, Hammon, & Duncan, 1997). Perceivers smarten up, see through narcissists, and realize that narcissists are full of themselves rather than full of life. Initial attraction gives way to eventual repulsion. Narcissists start to reap the dire consequences of their own behavior: They receive increasingly unfavorable feedback. Perceivers are likely to express their dislike for narcissists in both indirect and direct ways. They cease to pay attention to them, become frugal with their expressions of admiration, start to avoid and distance themselves from narcissists (e.g., gaze aversion at professional meetings, noninclusion at social gatherings), spread unflattering gossip about them, and (if push comes to shove) openly tell the narcissists what they think of them. Inevitably, the narcissists must come face-to-face with recalcitrant real

A. E. Kelly's (2000) thesis that psychotherapy clients benefit from withholding negative information is considered in light of current social-psychological theory and research. Positive illusions about oneself are associated with indexes of mental health; this is consistent with treating therapy as positive identity development. Self-presentation can shape self-concept, even apart from the feedback that an audience might provide; the social construction of identity is a powerful process, suggesting that withholding negative and presenting only positive information is adaptive. However, evidence concerning the level of identification of one's actions suggests complexities in understanding ways clients might deal with disclosing negative information; the authors argue that the impact on self-concept is probably more complex than A. E. Kelly's characterization and that the implications are of a broader scope than indicated so far.

Although prior research has documented a pervasive egocentric bias in the self-perceptions, self-ascriptions, and behaviors of most people, shy individuals seem not to share this bias. This study examined whether the apparent absence of an egocentric bias among shy individuals is reflected in their excuse making following poor performance. It also examined whether anticipating a challenge to one's excuses would dissuade even nonshy individuals from making excuses. Shy and nonshy subjects received either success or failure feedback on an intelligence test and then were or were not told that they would be retested. Consistent with predictions, shy individuals refrained from making consistency-lowering excuses regardless of performance feedback and retest instructions. By contrast, nonshy subjects made consistency-lowering excuses after failure feedback, but only when they expected that their excuses would go unchallenged by a retest.

The regulation of affiliation patterns in everyday life has important implications for subjective well-being. For instance, Cheek & Buss (1981) distinguished approach (sociability) motivation from avoidance tendencies (shyness) and found that individuals high in both traits experienced the most stilted and uncomfortable interaction in comparison to any other trait combination among dyad members. In the present field study, participants were free to self-regulate their social interaction in any way. Meaningful patterns of initiation of encounters, perceptions of the encounter and objective features of the encounter emerged. The pattern of findings suggests that further research on the self-regulation of affective life, through affiliation patterns, would be productive.

College students high and low in test anxiety attributed their performance on each of four examinations in a course to ability, test difficulty, preparation, and luck. Individuals high and low in test anxiety typically evidence systematic predispositions to account for their achievement-related behavior in different terms. The present research substantially replicated these earlier (laboratory and Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Scale) findings in an actual achievement setting. In addition, however, the present findings differed from the earlier evidence in some important respects. Specifically, (a) high test-anxiety students' attributions for failure were far less self-deprecating than in the laboratory evidence, and (b) high test-anxiety students' attributions (for both success and failure) became more personally flattering, or comforting, as the semester progressed. Results were discussed in terms of the laboratory — field distinction and of the influence of a temporal, or time of measurement, factor, hitherto ignored in the causal attribution literature.

Factor analyses of Snyder's Self-Monitoring Scale were conducted with two samples of introduction, psychology, students obtained during consecutive rears. Four factors replicated across years for both males and females: theatric al acting ability, sociability/social anxiety, other-directedness, and speaking ability. The correlations of these factors with several personality instruments were examined to aid in interpreting the factors. The findings indicated that this scale is not unidimensional, raising the possibility that some of its factors, notably sociability/social anxiety,, mat, interact differentially with characteristics of experimental situations.

Reactions to interpersonal evaluation were investigated among subjects chronically low and high in social anxiety, or shyness. Both groups of subjects expressed more positive affect after receiving favorable than after receiving unfavorable evaluations, supporting a “self-esteem” prediction. However, support for a “self-consistency” viewpoint was also found. In particular, low social anxiety individuals expressed more negative affect (anger) following negative than following positive feedback, while high social anxiety individuals expressed more unpleasant affect (distress) following positive than following negative interpersonal feedback. Additionally, low social anxiety subjects were alone in derogating the accuracy of negative feedback; high social anxiety individuals were indiscriminate in rating the two types of feedback as equally accurate. The role of interpersonal evaluation in the maintenance of social anxiety was discussed briefly.

Research has shown that observers tend to attribute causality for an actor's behavior to dispositional characteristics of the actor rather than to external factors. Several authors have suggested that this phenomenon occurs because observers tend to focus attention on the actor. The present experiment was designed to determine whether dynamic qualities of the actor can, in part, account for observers' attentional and attributional behavior. Subjects were assigned the role of observers and were exposed to either a mildly dynamic or a stable actor. Subjects' attributions for the actor's behavior revealed that greater causality was attributed to the dynamic actor.

Several years ago a debate appeared in this journal concerning the utility of the “bogus pipeline” attitude measurement technique. Cherry, Byrne, and Mitchell ( Journal of Research in Personality , 1976, 10 , 69–75) found that the bogus pipeline technique was vulnerable to demand characteristics, especially among persons high in social desirability. However, Gaes, Quigley-Fernandez, and Tedeschi ( Journal of Research in Personality , 1978, 12 , 189–192) criticized this study on methodological grounds. The present conceptual replication failed entirely to produce the Cherry et al. finding; indeed, the present data show a tendency for responsiveness to demand characteristics only among subjects responding via “paper and pencil.” This finding is consistent with the traditional conceptualization of the bogus pipeline procedures and supports the meaningfulness of data obtained using the technique within the impression management literature. Interestingly, social desirability did not enter in any way into the effects; this fact raises some intriguing questions about the social desirability construct itself.

The influence of affect on causal attributions for success and failure was examined in this experiment. A positive, neurtral, or negative mood was induced in subjects who then learned they had either succeeded or failed an aptitude test taken previously. Relative to neutral mood control conditions, subjects in both positive and negative mood conditions showed a pronounced self-serving bias, particularly following success. The finding is interpreted as self-regulation of affective state. Specifically, causal attribution of success to internal factors can sustain or enhance positive affect; attribution of failure to external factors can diminish negative affect. Ancillary analyses corroborated this interpretation.

Research has shown that individuals' causal attributions are affected by the degree of public scrutiny of their behavior (Bradley, 1978). An experiment was conducted to test a self-presentational explanation of this finding. High and low self-monitors were or were not closely scrutinized (videotaped) during their performance of a task at which they either succeeded or failed. Low self-monitors were expected to provide an attributional baseline (little or no self-presentation) against which the self-presentational tendencies of high self-monitors could be assessed. It was found that high self-monitors assumed significantly greater responsibility for success than for failure when videotaped, but assumed only somewhat more responsibility for success than for failure when not taped. Surprisingly, low self-monitors' attributions were affected by the manipulation of evaluation intensity. Low self-monitors assumed more responsibility for success than for failure when they were not taped, but assumed no more responsibility for success than for failure when they were taped.

Samuel Clemens’s observation about the human condition is both insightful and amusing. Embarrassment is an all too familiar human emotion, and one that reveals a great deal about the nature of social relations. This chapter is not about embarrassment. Yet the fact that it exists, and can run so deep, does set the stage for the present analysis of the role of disapproval in social exchange.

Research on self-presentation and impression management has grown immensely in scope and sophistication during the past two decades. Standing on the shoulders of such astute observers of social behavior as Erving Goffman (e.g., 1959) and Edward E. Jones (e.g., 1964), social psychologists have begun sampling the panorama of fascinating and theoretically compelling behaviors that fall into this category of social influence tactic; one can hardly scan a journal in social psychology without seeing some insightful account or intriguing demonstration of the ways people behave to create impressions on others. Moreover, theory has not lagged behind. Taxonomies, models, and analyses of the motivational bases of self-presentation have been offered (e.g., Arkin, 1981; Arkin & Baumgardner, 1985; Baumeister, 1982; Hogan, 1982; Jones & Pittman, 1982) and lengthy reviews of the process and collections of perspectives on the problem have come fast and furious as well (e.g., Schlenker, 1982; Tedeschi, 1981).

Public self versus private self is a crucial issue in self-presentation, and one cannot be considered without at the same time considering the other. Equally important, behavior that seems to be self deceptive or self-handicapping in private, may in effect be a form of interpretive control designed to sustain feelings of self-efficacy. What may be genuine self-presentation first has impact, either directly or indirectly, on self-concept before being presented to foster inferences in the minds of the target audience. By articulating the boundaries between the public personas and the private selves considerable theoretical clarity is gained, which may in turn lead to enhanced potential for empirical research.