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Background Beginning in October 2016, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) issued expanded guidance requiring accrediting organizations and state survey agencies to report serious infection control breaches to relevant state health departments. This project sought to characterize and summarize The Joint Commission's early experiences and findings in applying this guidance to facilities accredited under the ambulatory and office-based surgery programs in 2017. Methods Surveyor notes were retrospectively reviewed to identify individual breaches, and then the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Infection Prevention Checklist for Outpatient Settings was used to categorize and code documented breaches. Results Of 845 ambulatory organizations, 39 (4.6%) had breaches observed during the survey process and reported to health departments. Within these organizations, surveyors documented 356 breaches, representing 52 different breach codes. Common breach domains were sterilization of reusable devices, device reprocessing observation, device reprocessing, disinfection of reusable devices, and infection control program and infrastructure. Eight of the 39 facilities (20.5%) were cited for not performing the minimum level of reprocessing based on the items' intended use, reusing single-use devices, and/or not using aseptic technique to prepare injections. Conclusion The CMS infection control breach reporting requirement has helped highlight some of the challenges faced by ambulatory facilities in providing a safe care environment for their patients. This analysis identified numerous opportunities for improved staff training and competencies as well as leadership oversight and investment in necessary resources. More systematic assessments of infection control practices, extending to both accredited and nonaccredited ambulatory facilities, are needed to inform oversight and prevention efforts.

A surgical heater-cooler unit has been implicated as the source for Mycobacterium chimaera infections among cardiac surgery patients in several countries. We isolated M. chimaera from heater-cooler units and patient infections in the United States. Whole-genome sequencing corroborated a risk for these units acting as a reservoir for this pathogen.

Context The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention awarded $85 million to health care-associated infection and antibiotic resistance (HAI/AR) programs in March 2015 as part of Infection Control Assessment and Response (ICAR) activities in the Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity cooperative agreement Domestic Ebola Supplement. Program One goal of this funding was to assess and improve program capacity to respond to potential health care outbreaks (eg, HAI clusters). All 55 funded programs (in 49 state and 6 local health departments) participated. Implementation The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention developed guidance and tools for HAI/AR programs to document relevant response capacities, assess policies, and measure progress. HAI/AR programs completed an interim assessment in 2016 and a final progress report in 2017. Evaluation During the project period, 78% (n = 43) of the programs developed new investigation tools, 85% (n = 47) trained staff on outbreak response, and 96% (n = 53) of the programs reported hiring staff to assist with outbreak response activities. Staffing and expertise to support HAI outbreak response increased substantially among awardees reporting staffing limitations on the interim assessment, including in domains such as on-site infection control assessment (n = 20; 83%), laboratory capacity (n = 20; 91%), and data management/analytics (n = 14; 67%). By 2017, reporting requirements in 100% of the programs addressed possible HAI/AR outbreaks; 93% (n = 51) also addressed sentinel events such as identification of novel AR threats. More than 90% (n = 50) of programs enhanced capacities for tracking response activities; in 2016, these systems captured 6665 events (range, 3-1379; median = 46). Health departments also reported wide-ranging efforts to engage regulatory, public health, and health care partners to improve HAI/AR outbreak reporting and investigation. Discussion Broad capacity for responding to HAI/AR outbreaks was enhanced using Ebola ICAR supplemental funding. As response activities expand, health department programs will be challenged to continue building expertise, reporting infrastructure, investigation resources, and effective relations with health care partners.

OBJECTIVES: Pharmacy-compounded sterile preparations (P-CSPs) are frequently relied upon in U.S. health care but are increasingly being linked to outbreaks of infections. We provide an updated overview of outbreak burden and characteristics, identify drivers of P-CSP demand, and discuss public health and patient safety lessons learned to help inform prevention. METHODS: Outbreaks of infections linked to contaminated P-CSPs that occurred between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2013, were identified from internal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports, Food and Drug Administration drug safety communications, and published literature. RESULTS: We identified 19 outbreaks linked to P-CSPs, resulting in at least 1000 cases, including deaths. Outbreaks were reported across two-thirds of states, with almost one-half (8/19) involving cases in more than 1 state. Almost one-half of outbreaks were linked to injectable steroids (5/19) and intraocular bevacizumab (3/19). Non-patient-specific compounding originating from nonsterile ingredients and repackaging of already sterile products were the most common practices associated with P-CSP contamination. Breaches in aseptic processing and deficiencies in sterilization procedures or in sterility/endotoxin testing were consistent findings. Hospital outsourcing, preference for variations of commercially available products, commercial drug shortages, and lower prices were drivers of P-CSP demand. CONCLUSIONS: Recognized outbreaks linked to P-CSPs have been most commonly associated with non-patient-specific repackaging and nonsterile to sterile compounding and linked to lack of adherence to sterile compounding standards. Recently enhanced regulatory oversight of compounding may improve adherence to such standards. Additional measures to limit and control these outbreaks include vigilance when outsourcing P-CSPs, scrutiny of drivers for P-CSP demand, as well as early recognition and notification of possible outbreaks. Language: en

Invasive nontuberculous mycobacteria (NTM) infections may result from a previously unrecognized source of transmission, heater-cooler devices (HCDs) used during cardiac surgery. In July 2015, the Pennsylvania Department of Health notified the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) about a cluster of NTM infections among cardiothoracic surgical patients at 1 hospital. We conducted a case-control study to identify exposures causing infection, examining 11 case-patients and 48 control-patients. Eight (73%) case-patients had a clinical specimen identified as Mycobacterium avium complex (MAC). HCD exposure was associated with increased odds of invasive NTM infection; laboratory testing identified patient isolates and HCD samples as closely related strains of M. chimaera, a MAC species. This investigation confirmed a large US outbreak of invasive MAC infections in a previously unaffected patient population and suggested transmission occurred by aerosolization from HCDs. Recommendations have been issued for enhanced surveillance to identify potential infections associated with HCDs and measures to mitigate transmission risk.

Background: Domestically, the integration of public health into healthcare-associated infection (HAI) and antibiotic resistance (AR) prevention activities represents a major development. We describe CDC Funding: of public health HAI/AR programs through the Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity (ELC) cooperative agreement to improve local capacity to prevent HAIs and detect and contain the spread of AR threats. Methods: We reviewed ELC budget reports and program documents to summarize the evolution of funded activities and programs from 2009 to 2018. Results: In 2009, 51 programs (49 states, 2 cities and territories) received US$35.8 million through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act for an initial 28-month period. These funds supported each jurisdiction to establish an HAI coordinator and a multidisciplinary HAI advisory group, coordinate and report HAI prevention efforts, conduct surveillance and report HAI data, and maintain an HAI plan; ~27 programs were also funded to coordinate multicenter HAI prevention collaboratives among acute-care hospitals. Through 2011, 188 state or local HAI/AR program positions were at least partially funded by the CDC. From 2011 to 2015, investments from the Affordable Care Act (~US$10–11 million annually) were used to maintain the HAI/AR programs, with some expansion of program goals related to non–acute-care settings and antibiotic stewardship. In 2015, following the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, supplemental ELC funds were awarded to 61 programs (50 states, 11 cities and territories) totaling US$85 million over 36 months. These awards marked an expansion of HAI/AR program activities to develop healthcare provider inventories, to conduct data-driven education and training, and to perform onsite infection control assessments in healthcare facilities. In 2016, through its AR Solutions Initiative, CDC invested US$57.3 million in Funding: to 57 programs (50 states, 7 cities and territories), expanding laboratory capacities for AR threat detection (via the AR Laboratory Network) and epidemiologic activities to rapidly contain novel and targeted multidrug-resistant organisms. As of 2018, >500 state or local HAI/AR program positions were at least partially funded by the CDC. Conclusions: State and local HAI/AR programs have grown substantially over the 10 years of their existence, as reflected in major increases in funding, staffing, scope, and partnerships. CDC investments and guidance have supported the development of HAI/AR epidemiology prevention and response capacity.Funding: NoneDisclosures: None

Background: Documented transmission of infectious agents involving dental care is uncommon. However, increasing attention to dental infection control, along with several recent outbreaks, have identified infection control gaps in dental settings. We describe CDC consultations involving outbreaks or infection control lapses occurring in dental settings to identify areas for prevention efforts. Methods: We reviewed internal CDC records from January 1, 2010, through October 1, 2019, to identify consultations involving investigations of potential or confirmed disease transmission and infection control lapses in dental settings. We determined yearly number of consultations, number of patients infected, how disease transmission or infection control breaches were identified, suspected mode of transmission, type of infection control breaches identified, and whether at-risk patients were notified. Results: We identified 41 consultations, among 27 states, involving investigation of possible disease transmission or infection control lapses in dental facilities. The number of consultations increased from 11 to 30 between the first half (2010–2014) and the second half (2015–2019) of the period and involved at least 113 infections confirmed or suspected to be associated with dental procedures. Most investigations (n = 29, 71%) began with identification of infection control breaches absent known patient infections; 8 (20%) investigations were initiated after identification of a single patient infection raised concerns for possible transmission associated with dental care (eg, single case of acute hepatitis B infection absent other risk factors). Moreover, 4 investigations involved >1 patient infection; 3 were outbreaks confirmed to be due to poor infection control practices. The most common infection control breaches were lapses in dental instrument reprocessing (n = 28, 78%), for example, failure to sterilize dental handpieces or failure to use biologic indicators. Of the 23 consultations where patient notification activities were discussed, 17 (74%) resulted in notification; >20,000 patients received information about their potential exposure, usually accompanied by advice on seeking screening tests. Conclusions: Dental-related consultations have increased in recent years, and they highlight the need for improved infection control training of dental healthcare personnel, especially related to dental instrument reprocessing. The CDC Division of Oral Health and the Organization for Safety, Asepsis, and Prevention offers tools, training, and other resources to help dental facilities improve infection control practices. Not all investigations resulted in notifying at-risk patients, but notification should be strongly considered, especially when serious breaches are identified, to promote transparency and help identify disease transmission that could otherwise go undetected.Funding: NoneDisclosures: None

Unsafe practices are an underestimated contributor to the disease burden of bloodborne viruses. Outbreaks associated with failures in basic infection prevention have been identified in nonhospital settings with increased frequency in the United States during the past 15 years, representing an alarming trend and indicating that the challenge of providing consistently safe care is not always met. As has been the case with most medical specialties, public health investigations by state and local health departments, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, have identified some instances of unsafe practices that have placed podiatric medical patients at risk for viral, bacterial, and fungal infections. All health-care providers, including podiatric physicians, must make infection prevention a priority in any setting in which care is delivered.

Objective: To summarize available information about outbreaks of infections stemming from drug diversion in US health care settings and describe recommended protocols and public health actions. Patients and Methods: We reviewed records at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention related to outbreaks of infections from drug diversion by health care personnel in US health care settings from January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2013. Searches of the medical literature published during the same period were also conducted using PubMed. Information compiled included health care setting(s), infection type(s), specialty of the implicated health care professional, implicated medication(s), mechanism(s) of diversion, number of infected patients, number of patients with potential exposure to bloodborne pathogens, and resolution of the investigation. Results: We identified 6 outbreaks over a 10-year period beginning in 2004; all occurred in hospital settings. Implicated health care professionals included 3 technicians and 3 nurses, one of whom was a nurse anesthetist. The mechanism by which infections were spread was tampering with injectable controlled substances. Two outbreaks involved tampering with opioids administered via patientcontrolled analgesia pumps and resulted in gram-negative bacteremia in 34 patients. The remaining 4 outbreaks involved tampering with syringes or vials containing fentanyl; hepatitis C virus infection was transmitted to 84 patients. In each of these outbreaks, the implicated health care professional was infected with hepatitis C virus and served as the source; nearly 30,000 patients were potentially exposed to bloodborne pathogens and targeted for notification advising testing. Conclusion: These outbreaks revealed gaps in prevention, detection, and response to drug diversion in US health care facilities. Drug diversion is best prevented by health care facilities having strong narcotics security measures and active monitoring systems. Appropriate response includes assessment of harm to patients, consultation with public health officials when tampering with injectable medication is suspected, and prompt reporting to enforcement agencies.

Background To inform development, targeting, and penetration of materials from a national injection safety campaign, an evaluation was conducted to assess provider knowledge, attitudes, and practices related to unsafe injection practices. Methods A panel of physicians (n = 370) and nurses (n = 320) were recruited from 8 states to complete an online survey. Questions, using 5-point Likert and Spector scales, addressed acceptability and frequency of unsafe practices (eg, reuse of a syringe on >1 patient). Results were stratified to identify differences among physician specialties and nurse practice locations. Results Unsafe injection practices were reported by both physicians and nurses across all surveyed physician specialties and nurse practice locations. Twelve percent (12.4%) of physicians and 3% of nurses indicated reuse of syringes for >1 patient occurs in their workplace; nearly 5% of physicians indicated this practice usually or always occurs. A higher proportion of oncologists reported unsafe practices occurring in their workplace. Conclusions There is a dangerous minority of providers violating basic standards of care; practice patterns may vary by provider group and specialty. More research is needed to understand how best to identify providers placing patients at risk of infection and modify their behaviors.

Reports of hepatitis B virus (HBV) and hepatitis C virus (HCV) transmission associated with unsafe medical practices have been increasing in the United States. However, the contribution of healthcare exposures to the burden of new infections is poorly understood outside of recognized outbreaks. We conducted a case-control study at three health departments that perform enhanced viral hepatitis surveillance in New York and Oregon. Reported cases of symptomatic acute hepatitis B and hepatitis C occurring in persons ≥55 years of age from 2006 to 2008 were enrolled. Controls were identified using telephone directories and matched to individual cases by age group (55-59, 60-69, and ≥70 years) and residential postal code. Data collection covered exposures within 6 months before symptom onset (cases) or date of interview (controls). Forty-eight (37 hepatitis B and 11 hepatitis C) case and 159 control patients were enrolled. Case patients were more likely than controls to report one or more behavioral risk exposures, including sexual or household contact with an HBV or HCV patient, >1 sex partner, illicit drug use, or incarceration (21% of cases versus 4% of controls exposed; matched odds ratio [mOR] = 7.1; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 2.1, 24.1). Case patients were more likely than controls to report hemodialysis (8% of cases; mOR = 13.0; 95% CI: 1.5, 115), injections in a healthcare setting (58%; mOR = 2.7; 95% CI: 1.3, 5.3), and surgery (33%; mOR = 2.3; 95% CI: 1.1, 4.7). In a multivariate model, behavioral risks (adjusted OR [aOR] = 5.4; 95% CI: 1.5, 19.0; 17% attributable risk), injections (aOR = 2.7; 95% CI: 1.3, 5.8; 37% attributable risk), and hemodialysis (aOR = 11.5; 95% CI: 1.2, 107; 8% attributable risk) were associated with case status. Conclusion: Healthcare exposures may represent an important source of new HBV and HCV infections among older adults. (HEPATOLOGY 2013)

Infections in 6 states were linked to persons traveling to undergo cosmetic surgical procedures., During 2013, the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene in Baltimore, MD, USA, received report of 2 Maryland residents whose surgical sites were infected with rapidly growing mycobacteria after cosmetic procedures at a clinic (clinic A) in the Dominican Republic. A multistate investigation was initiated; a probable case was defined as a surgical site infection unresponsive to therapy in a patient who had undergone cosmetic surgery in the Dominican Republic. We identified 21 case-patients in 6 states who had surgery in 1 of 5 Dominican Republic clinics; 13 (62%) had surgery at clinic A. Isolates from 12 (92%) of those patients were culture-positive for Mycobacterium abscessus complex. Of 9 clinic A case-patients with available data, all required therapeutic surgical intervention, 8 (92%) were hospitalized, and 7 (78%) required ≥3 months of antibacterial drug therapy. Healthcare providers should consider infection with rapidly growing mycobacteria in patients who have surgical site infections unresponsive to standard treatment.

Background Effective measures exist to prevent health care–associated hepatitis B virus (HBV) transmission, yet outbreaks continue to occur. In 2008, the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health identified an outbreak of HBV infections among psychiatric long-term care facility residents. Methods Residents underwent HBV serologic testing and were classified as acutely infected, chronically infected, susceptible, or immune. Persons residing in the facility during 2008 were enrolled in a retrospective cohort study to identify risk factors for acute HBV infection. We assessed infection control practices at the facility. Results Nine of 81 residents (11%) enrolled in the cohort study had acute HBV infection. Five of 15 residents (33%) undergoing podiatric care on a single day subsequently developed acute infection (rate ratio, 4.33; 95% confidence interval, 1.18-15.92). Infection control observations of the consulting podiatrist revealed opportunities for cross-contamination of instruments with blood. Other potential health care and behavioral modes of transmission were identified as well. Residents were offered HBV vaccination, and infection control recommendations were implemented by the podiatrist and facility. Conclusions Of the multiple potential transmission modes identified, exposure to HBV during podiatry was likely the dominant mode in this outbreak. Long-term care facilities should ensure compliance with infection control standards among staff and consulting health care providers.

Reports of health care--associated viral hepatitis transmission have been increasing in the United States. Transmission due to poor infection control practices during myocardial perfusion imaging (MPI) has not previously been reported. The aim of this study was to identify the source of incident hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection in a patient without identified risk factors who had undergone MPI 6 weeks before diagnosis. Practices at the cardiology clinic and nuclear pharmacy were evaluated, and HCV testing was performed in patients with shared potential exposures. Clinical and epidemiologic information was obtained for patients with HCV infection, and molecular testing was performed to assess viral relatedness. Evidence of HCV transmission among patients who had undergone MPI at the cardiology clinic on 2 separate dates was found, involving 2 potential source patients and a total of 5 newly infected patients. Molecular testing identified a high degree of genetic homology among viruses from patients with common procedure dates. The nuclear medicine technologist routinely drew up flush from multidose vials of saline solution using the same needle and syringe that had been used to administer radiopharmaceutical doses. Multipatient use of vials was not observed, but a review of purchasing invoices and interviews with staff members suggested that this had occurred. No evidence of transmission via contamination of radiopharmaceuticals at the nuclear pharmacy was found. In conclusion, transmission of HCV occurred because of unsafe injection practices during MPI. Cardiologists should carefully review their infection control practices and the practices of other staff members involved with these procedures.

Current understanding of viral hepatitis transmission in United States health care settings indicates progress over the past several decades with respect to the risks from transfusions or blood products. Likewise, risks to health care providers from sharps injuries and other blood and body fluid exposures have been reduced as a consequence of widespread hepatitis B vaccination and the adoption of safer work practices. Increasing recognition of outbreaks involving patient-to-patient spread of hepatitis B and hepatitis C virus infections, however, has uncovered a disturbing trend. This article highlights the importance of basic infection control and the need for increased awareness of safe injection practices.

OBJECTIVES: To establish the etiology for outbreaks of hepatitis B virus (HBV) infections at two assisted living facilities (ALFs) and devise appropriate control measures. DESIGN: Multisite outbreak investigations, retrospective cohort. SETTING: Two ALFs in Illinois. PARTICIPANTS: Facility A residents (n=120) and Facility B residents (n=105) and nursing staff (n=6). MEASUREMENTS: For Facility A, a retrospective cohort study to identify risk factors for HBV infection through serological testing of all residents and a medical record extraction. For Facility A and B, investigation of fingerstick blood glucose monitoring techniques. For Facility B, serological HBV testing of nurses and residents receiving fingerstick blood glucose monitoring. RESULTS: At Facility A, five confirmed acute, two probable acute, and one probable chronic HBV infections were identified in the 109 residents tested. All of the eight identified residents with HBV infection had diabetes mellitus. HBV deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequences from the chronic and acute cases were identical. Transmission of HBV was associated with fingerstick blood glucose monitoring (relative risk (RR)=28.5, 95% confidence interval (CI)=1.6–498; P

Objective.To characterize practices related to measuring influenza vaccination rates among healthcare personnel in US hospitals.Design.Descriptive survey.Setting.Nonfederal, short-stay hospitals that provide general medical and surgical services, identified by use of the 2004 American Hospital Association Annual Survey Database.Participants.Healthcare personnel from 996 randomly sampled US hospitals stratified by region and bed size.Methods.A self-administered questionnaire was distributed in 2006 to infection control coordinators to gather data on policies and practices related to the provision of the influenza vaccine and on the measurement and reporting of influenza vaccination rates. Descriptive statistics and associations were calculated, and logistic regression was conducted.Results.The response rate was 56% (ie, 555 of 996 US hospitals responded to the questionnaire). Weighting accounted for sampling design and nonresponse. Most hospitals provided the influenza vaccine to employees (100%), credentialed medical staff (ie, independent practitioners; 94%), volunteers (86%), and contract staff (83%); provision for students and residents was less frequent (58%). Only 69% of hospitals measured vaccination rates (mean coverage rate, 55%). Most hospitals that measured coverage included employees (98%) in the vaccination rates, whereas contract staff (53%), credentialed medical staff (56%), volunteers (56%), and students and residents (30%) were less commonly included. Among hospitals measuring coverage, 44% included persons for which vaccine was contraindicated, and 51% included persons who refused vaccination. After adjustment for region and size, hospitals with vaccination plans written into policy (odds ratio, 2.0 [95% confidence interval, 1.22–7.67]) or that addressed internally reporting coverage (odds ratio, 4.8 [95% confidence interval, 2.97–7.66]) were more likely to measure coverage than were hospitals without such plans.Conclusions.Hospitals vary in terms of the groups of individuals included in influenza vaccination coverage measurements. Standardized measures may improve comparability of hospital-reported vaccination rates. Measuring coverage in a manner that facilitates identification of occupational groups with low vaccination rates may inform development of targeted interventions.

Background: As part of routine diabetes care, capillary blood is typically sampled using a finger-stick device and then tested using a handheld blood glucose meter. In settings where multiple persons require assistance with blood glucose monitoring, opportunities for bloodborne pathogen transmission may exist. Methods: Reports of hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection outbreaks in the United States that have been attributed to blood glucose monitoring practices were reviewed and summarized. Results: Since 1990, state and local health departments investigated 18 HBV infection outbreaks, 15 (83%) in the past 10 years, that were associated with the improper use of blood glucose monitoring equipment. At least 147 persons acquired HBV infection during these outbreaks, 6 (4.1%) of whom died from complications of acute HBV infection. Outbreaks appear to have become more frequent in the past decade, primarily affecting long-term care residents with diabetes. Each outbreak was attributed to glucose monitoring practices that exposed HBV-susceptible persons to blood-contaminated equipment that was previously used on HBV-infected persons. The predominant unsafe practices were the use of spring-loaded finger-stick devices on multiple persons and the sharing of blood glucose testing meters without cleaning and disinfection between uses. Conclusion: Hepatitis B virus infection outbreaks associated with blood glucose monitoring have occurred with increasing regularity in the Unites States and may represent a growing but under-recognized problem. Advances in technology, such as the development of blood glucose testing meters that can withstand frequent disinfection and noninvasive glucose monitoring methods, will likely prove useful in improving patient safety.

Our experiences with health departments and health care facilities suggest that questions surrounding instrument reprocessing errors and other infection control breaches are becoming increasingly common. We describe an approach to management of these incidents that focuses on risk of bloodborne pathogen transmission and the role of public health and other stakeholders to inform patient notification and testing decisions.

OBJECTIVES. Hawaii implemented routine infant hepatitis B vaccination in 1992 and required it for school entry in 1997. Previously, in 1989, a serologic survey among Hawaii school children in grades 1 to 3 indicated that 1.6% had chronic hepatitis B virus infection, and 2.1% had resolved infection. We conducted a follow-up survey to examine changes in hepatitis B virus infection rates.PATIENTS AND METHODS. This study was performed in Oahu, Hawaii, during the 2001–2002 school year among children in grades 2 and 3. Consenting parents/guardians provided demographic information including place of birth. Participants were tested for serologic evidence of hepatitis B virus infection and their vaccination status was determined by reviewing school records. Rates of symptomatic acute hepatitis B among persons aged ≤19 years were calculated from cases reported from Hawaii to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention between 1990 and 2004.RESULTS. Completed hepatitis B vaccination series were documented for 83% of the 2469 participants by age 18 months and for 97% by age 5 years. Past or present hepatitis B virus infection was detected among 6 participants (0.24%), including 1 (0.04%) with chronic infection and 5 (0.20%) with resolved infections. Compared with the 1989 survey, these prevalences represent declines of 97% and 90% in chronic and resolved hepatitis B virus infections, respectively. The incidence of symptomatic acute hepatitis B in Hawaii children and adolescents aged ≤19 years decreased from 4.5 cases per 100000 in 1990 to 0.0 during 2002–2004. To date, the last reported case in a child aged CONCLUSIONS.. Hepatitis B virus infection has nearly been eliminated in Hawaii children born after universal infant hepatitis B vaccination was implemented. These findings suggest that hepatitis B prevention goals are being met through routine immunization and related prevention programs among US children.

Aim To identify risk factors for acute hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection among Wyoming methamphetamine injectors. Design A case–control study conducted in the setting of an outbreak. Setting A county in central Wyoming, United States. Participants Cases were identified through surveillance and contact tracing and were defined as Natrona County, Wyoming, residents who were either symptomatic or confirmed serologically to be acutely infected with HBV during January–August, 2003. Controls were susceptible to HBV infection. All participants identified themselves as methamphetamine injectors. Measurements Participants were administered a survey that inquired about risk factors for HBV infection, including drug use practices and sexual behaviors. Controls were also tested serologically for acute HBV infection. Findings Among the 18 case-patients and 49 controls who participated in the study, sharing water used to prepare injections and/or rinse syringes was associated with HBV infection (94% of case-participants versus 44% of controls; OR = 21.9, 95% CI: 2.7, 177.8), as was sharing cotton filters (89% of case-participants versus 52% of controls; OR = 7.4, 95% CI: 1.5, 35.6); sharing syringes was not statistically associated. In logistic regression models adjusted for age, sex, and interview site, sharing rinse water and sharing cotton remained statistically associated. Conclusions Methamphetamine use has become increasingly prevalent in the United States. Our findings highlight the need for awareness of risks associated with injection drug use and sharing behaviors. Enhanced hepatitis B vaccination programs and educational campaigns that target methamphetamine injectors specifically, including those living in rural areas, should be developed and implemented.

Objectives:To determine whether hepatitis B virus (HBV) transmission occurred among patients visiting a physician's office and to evaluate potential transmission mechanisms.Design:Serologic survey, retrospective cohort study, and observation of infection control practices.Setting:Private medical office.Patients:Those visiting the office between March 1 and December 26, 2001.Results:We identified 38 patients with acute HBV infection occurring between February 2000 and February 2002. The cohort study, limited to the 10 months before outbreak detection, included 91 patients with serologic test results and available charts representing 18 case-patients and 73 susceptible patients. Overall, 67 patients (74%) received at least one injection during the observation period. Case-patients received a median of 14 injections (range, 2-25) versus 2 injections (range, 0-17) for susceptible patients (P < .001). Acute infections occurred among 18 (27%) of 67 who received at least one injection versus none of 24 who received no injections (RR, 13.6; CI95, 2.4-undefined). Risk of infection increased 5.2-fold (CI95, 0.6-47.3) for those with 3 to 6 injections and 20.0-fold (CI95, 2.8-143.5) for those with more than 6 injections. Typically, injections consisted of doses of atropine, dexamethasone, vitamin B12, or a combination of these mixed in one syringe. HBV DNA genetic sequences of 24 patients with acute infection and 4 patients with chronic infection were identical in the 1,500-bp region examined. Medical staff were seronegative for HBV infection markers. The same surface was used for storing multidose vials, preparing injections, and dismantling used injection equipment.Conclusion:Administration of unnecessary injections combined with failure to separate clean from contaminated areas and follow safe injection practices likely resulted in patient-to-patient HBV transmission in a private physician's office.

This is a cohort study of pediatric outpatients receiving total parenteral nutrition (TPN) and follow-up care in a Tennessee hospital between January and June 1999. The study was conducted following an increase in the incidence of candidemia. Of 13 children receiving home TPN, five had candidemia; three were due to Candida parapsilosis. Case patients were more likely to have an underlying hematologic disease (P = 0.02) as well as previous history of fungemia (P = 0.02). Two case patients had successive candidemia episodes 3 months apart; karyotypes and RAPD profiles of each patient's successive C. parapsilosis isolates were similar. Candida spp. were frequently detected in hand cultures from cohort members (four of 10) and family member caregivers (nine of 11); C parapsilosis was isolated from five caregivers. Our findings underscore the challenges of maintaining stringent infection control practices in the home health care setting and suggest the need for more intensive follow-up and coordination of home TPN therapy among pediatric patients.

Background and Objective:In August 2002, the Oklahoma State Department of Health received a report of six patients with unexplained hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection treated in the same pain remediation clinic. We investigated the outbreak's extent and etiology.Design, Setting, and Participants:We conducted a retrospective cohort study of clinic patients, including a serologic survey, interviews of infected patients, and reviews of medical records and staff infection control practices. Patients received outpatient pain remediation treatments one afternoon a week in a clinic within a hospital. Cases were defined as HCV or hepatitis B virus (HBV) infections among patients who reported no prior diagnosis or risk factors for disease or reported previous risk factors but had evidence of acute infection.Results:Of 908 patients, 795 (87.6%) were tested, and 71 HCV-infected patients (8.9%) and 31 HBV-infected patients (3.9%) met the case definition. Multiple HCV genotypes were identified. Significantly higher HCV infection rates were found among individuals treated after an HCV-infected patient during the same visit (adjusted odds ratio [AOR], 6.2; 95% confidence interval [CI95], 2.4–15.8); a similar association was observed for HBV (AOR, 2.9; CI95, 1.3–6.5). Review of staff practices revealed the nurse anesthetist had been using the same syringe–needle to sequentially administer sedation medications to every treated patient each clinic day.Conclusions:Reuse of needles–syringes was the mechanism for patient-to-patient transmission of HCV and HBV in this large nosocomial outbreak. Further education and stricter oversight of infection control practices may prevent future outbreaks.

In the United States, transmission of viral hepatitis from health care-related exposures is uncommon and primarily recognized in the context of outbreaks. Transmission is typically associated with unsafe injection practices, as exemplified by several recent outbreaks that occurred in ambulatory health care settings. To prevent transmission of bloodborne pathogens, health care workers must adhere to standard precautions and follow fundamental infection-control principles, including safe injection practices and appropriate aseptic techniques. These principles and practices need to be made explicit in institutional policies and reinforced through in-service education for all personnel involved in direct patient care, including those in ambulatory care settings. The effectiveness of these measures should be monitored as part of the oversight process. In addition, prompt reporting of suspected health care-related cases coupled with appropriate investigation and improved monitoring of surveillance data are needed to accurately characterize and prevent health care-related transmission of viral hepatitis.

In response to the emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the United States established national surveillance using a sensitive case definition incorporating clinical, epidemiologic, and laboratory criteria. Of 1,460 unexplained respiratory illnesses reported by state and local health departments to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention from March 17 to July 30, 2003, a total of 398 (27%) met clinical and epidemiologic SARS case criteria. Of these, 72 (18%) were probable cases with radiographic evidence of pneumonia. Eight (2%) were laboratory-confirmed SARS-coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infections, 206 (52%) were SARS-CoV negative, and 184 (46%) had undetermined SARS-CoV status because of missing convalescent-phase serum specimens. Thirty-one percent (124/398) of case-patients were hospitalized; none died. Travel was the most common epidemiologic link (329/398, 83%), and mainland China was the affected area most commonly visited. One case of possible household transmission was reported, and no laboratory-confirmed infections occurred among healthcare workers. Successes and limitations of this emergency surveillance can guide preparations for future outbreaks of SARS or respiratory diseases of unknown etiology.

On May 24, 2016, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene notified CDC of two cases of Exophiala dermatitidis bloodstream infections among patients with malignancies who had received care from a single physician at an outpatient oncology facility (clinic A). Review of January 1-May 31, 2016 microbiology records identified E. dermatitidis bloodstream infections in two additional patients who also had received care at clinic A. All four patients had implanted vascular access ports and had received intravenous (IV) medications, including a compounded IV flush solution containing saline, heparin, vancomycin, and ceftazidime, compounded and administered at clinic A.

In the spring of 2015, investigators in Switzerland reported a cluster of six patients with invasive infection with Mycobacterium chimaera, a species of nontuberculous mycobacterium ubiquitous in soil and water. The infected patients had undergone open-heart surgery that used contaminated heater-cooler devices during extracorporeal circulation (1). In July 2015, a Pennsylvania hospital also identified a cluster of invasive nontuberculous mycobacterial infections among open-heart surgery patients. Similar to the Swiss report, a field investigation by the Pennsylvania Department of Health, with assistance from CDC, used both epidemiologic and laboratory evidence to identify an association between invasive Mycobacterium avium complex, including M. chimaera, infections and exposure to contaminated Stöckert 3T heater-cooler devices, all manufactured by LivaNova PLC (formerly Sorin Group Deutschland GmbH) (2). M. chimaera was described as a distinct species of M. avium complex in 2004 (3). The results of the field investigation prompted notification of approximately 1,300 potentially exposed patients.* Although heater-cooler devices are used to regulate patients' blood temperature during cardiopulmonary bypass through water circuits that are closed, these reports suggest that aerosolized M. chimaera from the devices resulted in the invasive infections (1,2). The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and CDC have issued alerts regarding the need to follow updated manufacturer's instructions for use of the devices, evaluate the devices for contamination, remain vigilant for new infections, and continue to monitor reports from the United States and overseas (2).

On November 19, 2001, a suspected case of inhalational anthrax in a 94-year-old woman was reported to the Connecticut Department of Public Health (CTDPH) (1–3). This was the first case of Bacilus anthracis infection reported to the CTDPH since 1968 and the eleventh inhalational anthrax case in the United States since October 4, 2001 (1–6). The patient’s symptoms of fever, fatigue, malaise, dry cough, and shortness of breath began 20 days after the last confirmed inhalational anthrax patient became ill and 36 days after the last known intentionally contaminated letters, addressed to U.S. Senators Thomas Daschle and Patrick Leahy, were postmarked in Trenton, New Jersey (1–4) (Figure 1).The patient in Connecticut was not in the known categories of intentionally contaminated letter recipients and was not a postal worker or a mailhandler (1,5). This report describes the epidemiologic and environmental investigation conducted to determine whether her case was related to the other bioterrorism-related cases; whether she was the only case in Connecticut or a sentinel of a larger outbreak; and the source, place, and time of her exposure. The clinical aspects of the case have been described (2,3). Figure 1 Bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax cases by week of symptom onset—United States, 2001.The first two cases of inhalational anthrax occurred in Florida. Though no direct exposure source was found, environmental samples of the media company ...

Public health activities to identify and monitor persons at risk for Ebola virus disease in the United States include directing persons at risk to assessment facilities that are prepared to safely evaluate for Ebola virus disease. Although it is unlikely that a person with Ebola virus disease will unexpectedly present to a nonemergency ambulatory care facility, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have provided guidance for this setting that can be summarized as identify, isolate, and inform.

Background In December 2016, bacterial contamination of an organ preservation solution (OPS) was reported by Transplant Center A in Iowa. Annually, >20,000 abdominal organs are transplanted in the United States; OPS is used for organ storage. We investigated the scope of OPS contamination and its association with adverse events in patients. Methods We assessed infection control practices related to OPS at Transplant Centers A and B in Iowa and the local organ procurement organization (OPO). We issued national notifications about OPS contamination and requested transplant centers to report product-related concerns or potential patient harm. Among transplant recipients at Center A, we compared adverse events (fever, bacteremia, surgical site infection, peritonitis, or pyelonephritis within 14 days of transplantation) during October–December 2015 with October–December 2016, the presumed window of exposure to contaminated OPS. Isolates from OPS were characterized. Results No infection control deficiencies were identified at Transplant Centers A, B, or the OPO. In January 2017, contaminated OPS from the same manufacturer was reported by Transplant Center C in Texas. Nationally, there were no reports of patient harm definitively linked to OPS. Post-transplant adverse events at Center A did not increase between fourth quarter 2015 (5/12 [42%]) and 2016 (2/15 [13%]). Organisms recovered from OPS included Pantoea agglomerans and Enterococcus gallinarum (Center A) and Pseudomonas koreensis (Center C). Five Pantoea isolates from ≥3 opened OPS bags were indistinguishable by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. The OPS distributor issued recalls and suspended production. The US Food and Drug Administration identified deficiencies in current good manufacturing practices at manufacturing and distribution facilities, including inadequate validation of OPS sterility. Conclusion Bacterial contamination of a nationally distributed product was identified by astute clinicians. The investigation found no illnesses were directly linked to the product. Prompt reporting of concerns about potentially contaminated healthcare products, which might put patients at risk, is critical for swift public health action. Disclosures All authors: No reported disclosures.

On September 30, 2015, the New Jersey Department of Health (NJDOH) was notified by an out-of-state health services company that an experienced nurse had reused syringes for multiple persons earlier that day. This occurred at an employee influenza vaccination clinic on the premises of a New Jersey business that had contracted with the health services company to provide influenza vaccinations to its employees. The employees were to receive vaccine from manufacturer-prefilled, single-dose syringes. However, the nurse contracted by the health services company brought three multiple-dose vials of vaccine that were intended for another event. The nurse reported using two syringes she found among her supplies to administer vaccine to 67 employees of the New Jersey business. She reported wiping the syringes with alcohol and using a new needle for each of the 67 persons. One of the vaccine recipients witnessed and questioned the syringe reuse, and brought it to the attention of managers at the business who, in turn, reported the practice to the health services company contracted to provide the influenza vaccinations.

Ease of administration, accuracy, and convenience are among the hallmark characteristics of insulin pens. These devices, which have gained popularity over the past 10 years, are designed to be used multiple times for a single person, using a new needle for each injection. Unfortunately, reports of the misuse of insulin pens also have been growing. Backflow of blood and other biologic material into the insulin cartridge or reservoir can occur after injection (1). For this reason, insulin pens, like other injection devices, must never be used by more than one person. Reports of insulin pen sharing have come from a variety of U.S. health care settings. Since 2011, there have been at least six separate incidents in which patients were contacted and given advice to test for bloodborne pathogens because individual insulin pen devices were …

BACKGROUND: Syringe reuse and other unsafe injection practices can expose patients to bloodborne pathogens (eg, hepatitis B and C viruses and human immunodeficiency virus). Evidence of such infection control lapses has resulted in patient notifications, but the scope and magnitude of these events have not been well characterized. OBJECTIVES: To summarize patient notification events resulting from unsafe injection practices in the US health care settings. METHODS: We examined records of events that involved communications to groups of patients, conducted during 2001–2011, advising bloodborne pathogen testing stemming from potential exposures to unsafe injection practices. RESULTS: We identified 35 patient notification events related to unsafe injection practices in at least 17 states, resulting in an estimated total of 130,198 patients notified. Among the identified notification events, 83% involved outpatient settings and 74% occurred since 2007, including the 4 largest events (> 5000 patients per event). The primary breach identified (≥ 16 events; 44%) was syringe reuse to access shared medications (eg, single-dose or multidose vials). Twenty-two (63%) notifications stemmed from the identification of viral hepatitis transmission, whereas 13 (37%) were prompted by the discovery of unsafe injection practices, absent evidence of bloodborne pathogen transmission. CONCLUSIONS: Unsafe injection practices represent a form of medical error that have manifested as large-scale adverse events, affecting thousands of patients in a wide variety of health care settings. Our findings suggest that increased oversight and attention to basic infection control are needed to maintain patient safety, along with research to identify best practices for triggering and managing patient notifications.

Three cases of genetically related hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection that were unattributable to infection control breaches were identified at a health care facility.To investigate HCV transmission from an HCV-infected health care worker to patients through drug diversion.Cluster and look-back investigations.Acute care hospital and affiliated multispecialty clinic.Inpatients and outpatients during the period of HCV transmission.Employee work and narcotic dispensing records, blood testing for HCV antibody and RNA, and sequencing of the NS5B gene and the hypervariable region 1 of the E2 gene.21 employees were recorded as being at work or as retrieving a narcotic from an automated dispensing cabinet in an area where a narcotic was administered to each of the 3 case patients; all employees provided blood samples for HCV testing. One employee was infected with HCV that had more than 95% NS5B sequence homology with the HCV strains of the 3 case patients. Quasi-species analysis showed close genetic relatedness with variants from each of the case patients and more than 97.9% nucleotide identity. The employee acknowledged parenteral opiate diversion. An investigation identified 6132 patients at risk for exposure to HCV because of the drug diversion. Of the 3929 living patients, 3444 (87.7%) were screened for infection. Two additional cases of genetically related HCV infection attributable to the employee were identified.Of the living patients at risk for HCV exposure, 12.3% were not tested.Five cases of HCV infection occurring over 3 to 4 years were attributed to drug diversion by an HCV-infected health care worker. Studies of drug diversion and assessments of strategies to prevent narcotics tampering in all health care settings are needed.None.

Ensuring the safety of personnel working in health care environments can be challenging and requires a multifaceted approach to target reductions in occupational exposures to blood-borne pathogens, such as hepatitis B or hepatitis C. This article reviews the epidemiology of occupational exposures to hepatitis B and hepatitis C in health care personnel in hospital settings. The nature and likelihood of risk to health care personnel are evaluated along with estimates of seroconversion risk. The review focuses on prevention programs and available surveillance programs to aid in monitoring and reducing occupational exposures to blood-borne pathogens.

Background. De novo hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection among transplant patients is rarely recognized but can have severe consequences.We investigated the scope, source, and mode of HCV transmission within a transplant center after incident HCV infection was identi¢ed in 2 patients who had liver transplantation in late 2006. Methods. Patients were interviewed, and transplant logs, medical records, and stai practices were reviewed to identify opportunities for HCV transmission. Infection via receipt of blood or organs was evaluated. Molecular epidemiology was used to determine the relatedness between persons with incident and chronic HCV infection. Results. HCV from infected blood or organ donors was ruled out. Among the 308 patients who underwent transplant in 2006, no additional incident HCV infections were identi¢ed. Eighty-¢ve (28%) had pre- transplant chronic HCV infection; 13 were considered possible HCV source patients based upon shared days on the inpatient unit, nursing assignment, or invasive procedures in common with incident HCV case-patients.V|ral isolates from 1 HCV source patient and 1 incident case-patient were found to be highly related by quasispecies analysis, con¢rming patient-to-patient HCV transmission. Possible modes of transmission identi¢ed were the improper use of multidose vials, sharing of blood-contaminated glucometers, and touch contamination. Conclusion. Sporadic transmission or endemic levels of HCV transmission might be overlooked in a setting with high HCV prevalence, such as liver transplant units, where multiple, repeated opportunities for patient-to-patient HCV transmission can occur. Surveillance through pre- and post-transplant screening is necessary to identify incident HCV infection in this setting. Constant, meticulous attention must be paid to maintaining aseptic technique and good infection control practices to eliminate HCV transmission opportunities.

Background.The medical needs of the approximately 1 million persons residing in assisted living facilities (ALFs) continually become more demanding. Moreover, the number of ALF residents is expected to double by 2030. ALFs are not subject to federal oversight; state regulations that govern ALF infection control are variable. In 2005, two outbreaks of acute hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection in ALFs in Virginia were associated with sharing fingerstick devices used in blood glucose monitoring.Objective.To characterize infection control practices, determine compliance with guidelines, and identify educational and policy needs in ALFs in Virginia.Methods.Following the outbreaks of HBV infection, educational packets were sent to ALFs in Virginia to inform them of infection control guidelines and recommendations regarding glucose monitoring. A follow-up survey consisting of on-site interviews was conducted in a random sample of ALFs. Differences among infection control practices, according to the size and ownership of the ALFs, were assessed.Results.Fifty of 155 ALFs in central Virginia were surveyed. Of the 45 ALFs that had used fingerstick devices, 7 (16%) had shared these devices (without cleaning) between residents. Sharing practices for glucose monitoring equipment did not differ by facility size or ownership. Of all 50 ALFs, 17 (34%) did not offer employees HBV vaccine. HBV vaccine was less frequently offered at ALFs that had fewer than 50 residents, compared with ALFs with at least 50 residents (P< .01), and HBV vaccine was less frequently offered at ALFs that were individually owned, compared with those that were not individually owned (P= .02).Conclusions.Despite outreach and long-standing recommendations, approximately 1 in 6 facilities shared fingerstick devices, and more than one-third of ALFs surveyed were considered noncompliant with federal guidelines (Occupational Safety and Health Administration Bloodborne Pathogens Standard). Public health and licensing agencies should work with ALFs to implement infection control measures and prevent disease transmission.

We identified 27 cases of hepatitis A among international adoptees (5 persons), their direct or indirect contacts (20 persons), and unvaccinated travelers to the adoptees' countries (2 persons). Most cases occurred among nontraveling contacts of adoptees, suggesting the need to extend prevention guidelines to include hepatitis A vaccination for at-risk nontravelers.

Laser-assisted in situ keratomileusis (LASIK) eye surgery is increasingly common, with approximately 600,000 procedures performed each year in the United States. LASIK eye surgery is typically performed in an outpatient setting and involves the use of a machine-guided laser to reshape the lens of the eye to correct vision irregularities. Clinic A is an ambulatory surgery center that performs this procedure on 1 day each month. On February 5, 2015, the Toledo-Lucas County Health Department (TLCHD) in Ohio was notified of eye infections in two of the six patients who had undergone LASIK procedures at clinic A on January 9, 2015. The two patients experienced eye pain after the procedures and received diagnoses of infection with Mycobacterium chelonae, an environmental organism found in soil and water.

Background/Aims End-stage liver disease accounts for one in forty deaths worldwide. Chronic infections with hepatitis B virus (HBV) and hepatitis C virus (HCV) are well-recognized risk factors for cirrhosis and liver cancer, but estimates of their contributions to worldwide disease burden have been lacking. Methods The prevalence of serologic markers of HBV and HCV infections among patients diagnosed with cirrhosis or hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) was obtained from representative samples of published reports. Attributable fractions of cirrhosis and HCC due to these infections were estimated for 11 WHO-based regions. Results Globally, 57% of cirrhosis was attributable to either HBV (30%) or HCV (27%) and 78% of HCC was attributable to HBV (53%) or HCV (25%). Regionally, these infections usually accounted for >50% of HCC and cirrhosis. Applied to 2002 worldwide mortality estimates, these fractions represent 929,000 deaths due to chronic HBV and HCV infections, including 446,000 cirrhosis deaths (HBV: n =235,000; HCV: n =211,000) and 483,000 liver cancer deaths (HBV: n =328,000; HCV: n =155,000). Conclusions HBV and HCV infections account for the majority of cirrhosis and primary liver cancer throughout most of the world, highlighting the need for programs to prevent new infections and provide medical management and treatment for those already infected.

Background Injection overuse and unsafe injection practices facilitate transmission of bloodborne pathogens such as hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Anecdotal reports of unsafe and unnecessary therapeutic injections and the high prevalence of HBV (8.0%), HCV (6.5%), and HIV (2.6%) infection in Cambodia have raised concern over injection safety. To estimate the magnitude and patterns of such practices, a rapid assessment of injection practices was conducted. Methods We surveyed a random sample of the general population in Takeo Province and convenience samples of prescribers and injection providers in Takeo Province and Phnom Penh city regarding injection-related knowledge, attitudes, and practices. Injection providers were observed administering injections. Data were collected using standardized methods adapted from the World Health Organization safe injection assessment guidelines. Results Among the general population sample (n = 500), the overall injection rate was 5.9 injections per person-year, with 40% of participants reporting receipt of ≥ 1 injection during the previous 6 months. Therapeutic injections, intravenous infusions, and immunizations accounted for 74%, 16% and 10% of injections, respectively. The majority (>85%) of injections were received in the private sector. All participants who recalled their last injection reported the injection was administered with a newly opened disposable syringe and needle. Prescribers (n = 60) reported that 47% of the total prescriptions they wrote included a therapeutic injection or infusion. Among injection providers (n = 60), 58% recapped the syringe after use and 13% did not dispose of the used needle and syringe appropriately. Over half (53%) of the providers reported a needlestick injury during the previous 12 months. Ninety percent of prescribers and injection providers were aware HBV, HCV, and HIV were transmitted through unsafe injection practices. Knowledge of HIV transmission through "dirty" syringes among the general population was also high (95%). Conclusion Our data suggest that Cambodia has one of the world's highest rates of overall injection usage, despite general awareness of associated infection risks. Although there was little evidence of reuse of needles and syringes, support is needed for interventions to address injection overuse, healthcare worker safety and appropriate waste disposal.

After inhalational anthrax was diagnosed in a Connecticut woman on November 20, 2001, postexposure prophylaxis was recommended for postal workers at the regional mail facility serving the patient’s area. Although environmental testing at the facility yielded negative results, subsequent testing confirmed the presence of Bacillus anthracis. We distributed questionnaires to 100 randomly selected postal workers within 20 days of initial prophylaxis. Ninety-four workers obtained antibiotics, 68 of whom started postexposure prophylaxis, and of these, 21 discontinued. Postal workers who never started or stopped taking prophylaxis cited as reasons disbelief regarding anthrax exposure, problems with adverse events, and initial reports of negative cultures. Postal workers with adverse events reported predominant symptoms of gastrointestinal distress and headache. The influence of these concerns on adherence suggests that communication about risks of acquiring anthrax, education about adverse events, and careful management of adverse events are essential elements in increasing adherence.

ContextOveruse of antibiotics has contributed to microbial resistance, compromising the treatment of bacterial infections. Very high levels (>50%) of antibiotic resistance among invasive Streptococcus pneumoniae have been documented in Knox County, Tennessee.ObjectiveTo determine the effectiveness of a community-wide intervention aimed at reducing inappropriate antibiotic use among children.Design, Setting, and ParticipantsThe Knox County Health Department led a multifaceted year-long campaign (May 1997 through April 1998) aimed at decreasing unnecessary antibiotic use among children. Tennessee's 3 other major urban counties (Shelby, Hamilton, and Davidson) did not conduct similar campaigns and served as controls. Evaluation included white and black children (aged

Importance Liposuction is one of the most common cosmetic surgery procedures in the United States. Tumescent liposuction, in which crystalloid fluids, lidocaine, and epinephrine are infused subcutaneously before cannula-assisted aspiration of fat, can be performed without intravenous or general anesthesia, often at outpatient facilities. However, some of these facilities are not subject to state or federal regulation and may not adhere to appropriate infection control practices. Objective To describe an outbreak of severe group A Streptococcus (GAS) infections among persons undergoing tumescent liposuction at 2 outpatient cosmetic surgery facilities not subject to state or federal regulation. Design Outbreak investigation (including cohort analysis of at-risk patients), interviews using a standardized questionnaire, medical record review, facility assessment, and laboratory analysis of GAS isolates. Setting and Participants Patients undergoing liposuction at 2 outpatient facilities, one in Maryland and the other in Pennsylvania, between July 1 and September 14, 2012. Main Outcomes and Measures Confirmed invasive GAS infections (isolation of GAS from a normally sterile site or wound of a patient with necrotizing fasciitis or streptococcal toxic shock syndrome), suspected GAS infections (inflamed surgical site and either purulent discharge or fever and chills in a patient with no alternative diagnosis), postsurgical symptoms and patient-reported experiences related to his or her procedure, and emm types, T-antigen types, and antimicrobial susceptibility of GAS isolates. Results We identified 4 confirmed cases and 9 suspected cases, including 1 death (overall attack rate, 20% [13 of 66]). One instance of likely secondary GAS transmission to a household member occurred. All confirmed case patients had necrotizing fasciitis and had undergone surgical debridement. Procedures linked to illness were performed by a single surgical team that traveled between the 2 locations; 2 team members (1 of whom reported recent cellulitis) were colonized with a GAS strain that was indistinguishable by laboratory analysis of the isolates from the case patients. Facility assessments and patient reports indicated substandard infection control, including errors in equipment sterilization and infection prevention training. Conclusions and Relevance This outbreak of severe GAS infections was likely caused by transmission from colonized health care workers to patients during liposuction procedures. Additional oversight of outpatient cosmetic surgery facilities is needed to assure that they maintain appropriate infection control practices and other patient protections.

To monitor disease incidence and antibiotic resistance, effective, practical surveillance strategies are needed at the local level for drug-resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae (DRSP). Knox County, Tennessee, participates in three forms of DRSP surveillance: an active system sponsored by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC; Atlanta, Georgia); a novel county-sponsored system; and conventional state-mandated reporting. Ascertainment of invasive S. pneumoniae infection cases by each system in 1998 was evaluated, and completeness of reporting, antibiotic resistance patterns, costs, and other attributes were compared. The county-sponsored system collects patient identifiers and drug susceptibility data directly from hospital laboratories, whereas the CDC-sponsored system performs medical chart abstractions and reference laboratory susceptibility testing. Similar numbers of invasive S. pneumoniae cases were detected by the county-sponsored (n = 127) and CDC-sponsored (n = 123) systems; these systems held >75% of all cases in common, and each system achieved >85% sensitivity. Conventional reporting contained 88% and 76% of the DRSP cases identified by the county- and CDC-sponsored systems, respectively, but did not capture infections produced by susceptible isolates. Both the county- and CDC-sponsored systems indicated that large proportions of isolates were resistant to penicillin and extended-spectrum cephalosporins. The county-sponsored DRSP surveillance system was inexpensive, simple to execute, and relevant to local needs.