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Discourse comprehension relies on the construction of a mental model that represents the unfolding in time of the events described. In causal scenarios, where the action of one agent (the enabler) temporally precedes and enables the action of another agent (the causer), discourse may reflect the underlying event structure by describing the enabler's action first and then the causer's action (story order) or may describe the causer's action first (backward order). Studies in the literature have shown that adults consider causers to be more responsible than enablers in moral scenarios. Based on the assumption that story order favors the construction of a mental model of events, we conducted an experiment to test the prediction that preference for the causer over the enabler should be greater when events are presented in story order than in backward order. The participants in the experiment were 42 fifth-grade children, 42 adolescents, and 42 adults. The results of the experiment confirmed the prediction for all three groups of participants. We discuss the practical implications of these results for learning contexts, legal contexts, and the psychology of moral judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the assumptions of the mental model theory and its account of moral judgements, we argue for a main role of reasoning in moral judgements, especially in dealing with moral conflicts. In four experiments, we invited adult participants to evaluate scenarios describing moral or immoral actions. Our results confirm the predictions deriving from our assumptions: Given a moral or immoral scenario, the manipulation of the propositions which refer to norms and values results in a scenario eliciting a moral conflict (Experiment 1); when invited to create conflict versions from no-conflict versions of moral or immoral scenarios, individuals manipulate the propositions in the scenario which describe norms and values rather than emotional factors (Experiment 2); the evaluation of conflict scenarios takes longer than the evaluation of no-conflict scenarios (Experiment 3), and this is because conflict scenarios involve more deliberative reasoning (Experiment 4). We discuss our results in relation to competing theories of moral judgements. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Abstract: Communicative contexts may affect how the speaker proffers a discourse. In particular, we assumed that uni-directional (as compared with bi-directional) and audio (as compared with audio-visual) contexts induce the speaker to elaborate and then use an articulated mental model of the discourse because they do not allow the exploitation of all the communicative means. Uni-directional contexts do not allow recovery of communicative failures, and audio contexts do not allow access to extralinguistic communication. The results of an experiment involving 84 adult participants confirmed the predictions deriving from these assumptions: linguistic indices of the exploitation of an articulated mental model of the discourse are greater in uni-directional and audio contexts as compared with bi-directional and audio-visual contexts, respectively. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The mental model theory claims that the ability to falsify is at the core of human rationality. We assume that cognitive conflicts (CCs) and socio-cognitive conflicts (SCCs) induce falsification, and thus improve syllogistic reasoning performance. Our first study assesses adults’ ability to reason in two different conditions in a single experimental session. In both conditions the participants are presented with conclusions alternative to their own. In the CC condition they are told that these conclusions are casual, in the SCC condition they are told they have been produced by another individual. The second study is analogous to the first, with the exception that the participants deal with the two conditions in two different experimental sessions. The overall results reveal that falsification is enhanced by conflicts experienced at the cognitive level. The results also reveal that learning to reason occurs in adults, when tested in two distinct experimental periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I present a framework where possible relations between learning and mental models are explored. In particular, I’ll be concerned with non-symbolic gestures accompanying discourse and their role in inducing the construction of models and therefore deep comprehension and learning in the listener. Also, I’ll be concerned with cognitive and socio-cognitive conflicts and their roles in inducing construction of alternative models of a problem and therefore in learning to reason. Human ability to learn is of great importance for individuals interested in change. Indeed, to learn both declarative and procedural knowledge means to change, and in order to be able to intervene on change in a desired way it is necessary to have a theory of the mental representations and processes involved in learning and a theory of the communication and contexts that favour learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deontic assertions concern what people should and shouldn't do. One sort concern moral principles, such as: People should care for the environment ; and another sort concern social conventions, such as: People should knock before entering an office. The present research examined such deontic assertions and their corresponding factual assertions, such as: People care for the environment and People knock before entering an office. Experiment 1 showed a correlation between emotions and beliefs for both sorts of deontic assertion, but not for their factual counterparts in which the word "should" had been deleted (as in the preceding examples). Experiment 2 showed that changing the pleasantness of participants' emotions about social conventions changed their strength of belief in them. Experiment 3 showed conversely that changing the participants' strength of belief in social conventions changed the pleasantness of their emotions about them. These results corroborate the mental model theory of deontic assertions, which postulates that emotions and beliefs about deontics depend on parallel systems that interact with one another. • Our dual-process theory predicts that beliefs and emotions about deontic assertions are correlated and can affect one another. • The present study corroborated these predictions for assertions about social conventions. • Beliefs in such conventions correlate with their pleasantness; but no such correlation occurs for factual assertions. • A change in the emotional pleasantness of social conventions changes strength of belief in them. • A change in strength of belief in social conventions changes their emotional pleasantness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]