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We propose that a preference for favorable social feedback (i.e., self-enhancement) requires only that feedback be characterized as favorable or unfavorable but that a preference for self-confirming feedback (i.e., self-verification) is based on a more elaborate set of cognitive operations that requires both the characterization of feedback and a subsequent comparison of that feedback to a representation of self stored in memory. Study 1 set the stage for testing this hypothesis by showing that depriving people of processing resources interfered with their tendency to access their self-conceptions. In Studies 2 and 3, participants who were deprived of resources preferred the favorable, self-enhancing evaluator, whereas control participants displayed a preference for the self-verifying evaluator, even if that evaluator was relatively unfavorable.

We propose that people simplify their perceptions of their interactions by organizing them into discrete casual chunks. Once formed, these chunks presumably influence the extent to which people are aware of their influence on others, as well as their impressions of others. We anticipated that people would form self-causal chunks (e.g., my action causes my partner's action) when they possessed an offensive set and other-causal chunks when they possessed a defensive set. We also expected that a self-causal chunking strategy would make salient people's influence on their partners and thereby discourage them from concluding that their partner's behaviors reflected underlying dispositions. In contrast, we anticipated that an other-causal chunking strategy would obscure people's influence on their partners, thereby encouraging them to infer that their partners' behaviors reflected underlying dispositions. We tested these hypotheses by inducing participants to develop either a defensive or an offensive set prior to interacting with another person in a simulated arms race. After the interactions, we assessed the manner in which participants chunked their interactions, as well as their impressions of partners. The results supported our predictions. The implications of these findings for understanding conflict and misunderstanding in interpersonal relations are discussed.

This research tested the hypothesis that individuals who tend to form vivid visual images of others (vivid imagers) have more accurate social memories than those who form relatively nonvivid visual images of others (nonvivid imagers). In the first investigation, vivid imagers outperformed nonvivid imagers in remembering details concerning the attitudes, activities, and life history of a woman whom they observed being interviewed. Investigation 2 provided more definitive evidence for the link between visual imagery and social memory by demonstrating that vivid imagers had more accurate memories after seeing an interviewee answer questions, whereas seeing the interviewee had no impact on the memories of nonvivid imagers. The discussion considers the impact that imagery processes may have on a variety of social thought processes.