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The article analyses how the norm against mercenarism shapes the legitimate parameters of exchange in the market for military outsourcing. The dominant interpretation of this dynamic is that neoliberal states and private military companies (PMCs) have come to restrict their transactions to non-combat functions in order to circumvent contemporary articulations of this norm. The article, by contrast, contends that even within these narrowed parameters of exchange, neoliberal states and PMCs have been required to work through the norm against mercenarism. Using the ‘global security assemblages’ approach, and drawing upon new data relating to the UK case, it explores how the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and PMCs have sought to appropriate symbolic capital from a domestic private security licensing regime so as to distance their non-combat transactions from the norm against mercenarism. In so doing, it facilitates a reappraisal of the regulatory potential of this norm within today’s pluralised military landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Outsourcing military and security services to the private sector is an emerging trend under international law. The shift to using private military and security companies (PMSCS) in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan has brought attention to the role that these companies may play in fulfilling functions that are normally monopolised by States or international organisations. The reliance of the UN on PMSCS has increased considerably in recent years, leading to the question of the legality of their use in various UN operations. This paper focuses on two main aspects of the UN's use of such companies; (i) The engagement of PMSCS in peacekeeping operations, either when hired by the UN directly or when hired by a State and subsequently seconded to the UN; and (ii) The participation of PMSCS in peace enforcement measures adopted by the UN Security Council according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This paper argues that the use of PMSCS in peacekeeping operations is lawful under international law, while their use in peace enforcement operations is not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the state of South Sudan's security services and the operations of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in the country. Topics discussed include the tendency of PMSCs, like Blackwater, to commit human rights violations and the advantages of integrating PMSCs into the securty sector reform (SSR) process. Information is al presented on the threats to South Sudanese security and the state of SSR in the country.

The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies (Montreux Document) was adopted in 2008 by seventeen States to reaffirm and, as far as was necessary, clarify the existing obligations of States and other actors under international law, in particular under international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). It also aimed at identifying good practices and regulatory options to assist States in promoting respect for IHL and IHRL by private military and security companies (PMSCs). Today, fifty-one States and three international organizations have endorsed the Montreux Document. It contains twenty-seven “Statements” – sections recalling the main international legal obligations of States in regard to the operations of PMSCs during armed conflicts. Each statement is the reaffirmation of a general rule of IHL, IHRL or State responsibility formulated in a way that clarifies its applicability to PMSC operations. This article aims to detail the basis of each legal obligation mentioned in the first part of the Montreux Document (Part I). The article follows the structure of Part I, in order to better facilitate its comprehension. The second part of the Montreux Document, relating to good practices, is not covered in this article. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article argues that attempts to regulate the private military and security industry have been stymied by a tendency to be constantly ‘regulating the last war’ or responding to the challenges of a previous manifestation of private force rather than dealing with the current challenges. It argues that states ought to more clearly consider the direction of the industry rather than regulate in response to crises, an approach that has left regulation unequipped to deal with two fields of PSC growth: the use of PSCs against piracy, and to deliver and support humanitarian aid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of armed security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to widespread criticism of their insufficient control through international laws and conventions. This article suggests that one reason for this omission has been the (re)construction of actors who provide armed force for profit in international legal discourses. During most of the 20th century, armed persons who participated in foreign conflicts for monetary gain were identified as ‘mercenaries’. They were outlawed through international legal documents such as the United Nations (UN) Convention on Mercenarism and given restricted rights in the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Today, the same types of actors are increasingly defined as ‘private security contractors’, and new discourses and international agreements are emerging that attribute to them legality and legitimacy. The aim of this article is to examine the changing legal constructions of armed security providers since the 1970s and the consequences with respect to their control. The article argues that the (re)construction of actors who supply armed force for money in international legal discourses has been made possible by three main discursive strategies: the distinction between persons and corporations providing armed force for profit, the changing focus from the motivations of these actors to their relationship to a ‘responsible command’, and the shift from a concern about the actors to one about certain activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the need for increased accountability in relation to the actions of private military and security companies (PMSCs) with respect to human rights. It states that the use of PMSCs complicate any means of accountability for human rights violations. It highlights the reality of the use of PMSCs, and cites the history of international humanitarian and human rights law which is applicable on the use of PMSCs and mercenaries. It indicates that accountability can be attained by signing and ratifying the Convention Against Mercenaries by member States, and building and enforcing strong domestic regulation over PMSCs.