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This paper retraces some of the contrast between Aquinas and Scotus with respect to the metaphysical foundations of morality in order to highlight how subtle differences pertaining to the relationship between the divine will and the divine intellect can tip a thinker toward either an unalloyed natural law theory (NLT) or something that at least starts to move in the direction of divine command theory (DCT). The paper opens with a brief consideration of three distinct elements in Aquinas&rsquo, s work that might tempt one to view him in a DCT light, namely: his discussion of the divine law in addition to the natural law, his position on the so-called immoralities of the patriarchs, and some of his assertions about the divine will in relation to justice. We then respond to each of those considerations. In the second and third of these cases, following Craig Boyd, we illustrate how Aquinas&rsquo, s conviction that the divine will follows the ordering of the divine intellect can help inform the interpretive disputes in question. We then turn our attention to Scotus&rsquo, s concern about the freedom of the divine will, before turning to his discussion of the natural law in relation to the Decalogue as a way of stressing how his two-source theory of the metaphysical foundations of morality represents a clear departure from Aquinas in the direction of DCT.

Following this discussion of making the proper choice, the ensuing visions rely upon a more biblically informed type of discourse to instruct Will. Scripture confirms a revealed truth that validates the human desire to seek an end that lies in another realm. The most concrete example of this reality is the Good Samaritan parable. As evinced by Samaritan’s actions, charity proves itself to be not only the motive of God’s communicating his goodness but is the very means that one can love in the way God loves. It elevates the natural loving capacity of the individual because its immediate object is divine goodness. Scotus notes that God can be loved above all not only by charity, but also by one’s natural endowments, at least in the state in which nature was instituted. For Scotus and Ockham, each person can freely choose to respond to the goodness extended by the divine. Although both thinkers assert that particular objects provide certain knowledge, neither one believes that this ability produces metaphysical skepticism; intellectual acumen does not supplant faith. This chapter then considers how the revealed truths of Scripture supplement the tenets of voluntarism and how a proper functioning will produces an ethic of mutuality whose moral goal is friendship with God.

This paper examines and finds wanting the arguments against van Fraassen’s voluntarism, the view that the only constraint of rationality is consistency. Foundationalists claim that if we have no grounds or rationale for a belief or rule, rationality demands that we suspend it. But that begs the question by assuming that there have to be grounds or a rationale. Instead of asking, why should we hold a basic belief or rule, the question has to be: why should not we be committed as we are? Within a system we can sometimes find internal reasons. But, short of assuming foundationalism from the outset, when it comes to our evolving system as a whole there are no grounds for abandoning the commitments that we experience so strongly. Along the way the paper develops a systematic way of talking about terms that cause confusion because of variation in usage: foundationalism, relativism, basic beliefs and rules, voluntarism, etc.

In this paper I look at three challenges to the very possibility of an ethics of belief and then show how they can be met. The first challenge, from Thomas Kelly, says that epistemic rationality is not (merely) a form of instrumental rationality. If this claim is true, then it will be difficult to develop an ethics of belief that does not run afoul of naturalism. The second challenge is the Non-Voluntarism Argument, which holds that because we cannot believe at will and because ought implies can, there can be no ethics of belief. The third challenge comes from Richard Feldman, who claims that there is no such thing as ought all-things-considered. He says, for example, that moral oughts can be weighed against other moral oughts and that epistemic oughts can be compared to each other, but that there is no way to weigh moral oughts against epistemic oughts. If this is true, then norms about what one ought to believe are not nearly as important as one might have hoped or as philosophers have traditionally thought. In answering these three challenges, I try to show how and why the project of developing epistemic norms might be a promising avenue of research, despite claims to the contrary.

A traditional view is that to be an empiricist is to hold a particular epistemological belief: something to the effect that knowledge must derive from experience. In his recent book The Empirical Stance, and in a number of other publications, Bas van Fraassen has disagreed, arguing that if empiricism is to be defensible it must instead be thought of as a stance: an attitude of mind or methodological orientation rather than a factual belief. In this article I will examine his arguments for this claim in detail. I will argue that they do not succeed and that empiricism is, contrary to van Fraassen's claim, better thought of as a truth-evaluable doctrine than as a stance.

In The empirical stance, Bas van Fraassen argues for a reconceptualization of empiricism, and a rejection of its traditional rival, speculative metaphysics, as part of a larger and provocative study in epistemology. Central to his account is the notion of voluntarism in epistemology, and a concomitant understanding of the nature of rationality. In this paper I give a critical assessment of these ideas, with the ultimate goal of clarifying the nature of debate between metaphysicians and empiricists, and more specifically, between scientific realists and empiricist antirealists. Despite van Fraassen’s assertion to the contrary, voluntarism leads to a form of epistemic relativism. Rather than stifling debate, however, this ‘stance’ relativism places precise constraints on possibilities for constructive engagement between metaphysicians and empiricists, and thus distinguishes, in broad terms, paths along which this debate may usefully proceed from routes which offer no hope of progress.

Etude de la theorie du droit naturel developpee par Guillaume d'Ockham dans ses «Dialogus» et autres ecrits philosophiques traitant du probleme de la volonte de Dieu et de la rationalite de l'action. L'A. tire les consequences d'une telle conception theiste du droit naturel du point de vue du volontarisme et du nominalisme d'Ockham

Near the turn of the century, younger psychologists like Kulpe, Titchener, and Ebbinghaus began to base their definition of psychology on the positivist philosophy of science represented by Mach and Avenarius, a development that was strongly opposed by Wundt. Psychology was redefined as a natural science concerned with phenomena in their dependence on a physical organism. Wundt's central concepts of voluntarism, value, and psychic causality were rejected as metaphysical. For psychological theory this resulted in a turn away from Wundt's emphasis on the dynamic and central nature of psychological processes toward sensationalism and processes anchored in the observable periphery of the organism. Behaviorism represents a logical development of this point of view.

T HE voluntarism which is so characteristic a part of Royce's mature philosophy had its beginnings in the very earliest stages of Royce's philosophical thinking. But whereas in the later stages it was called to do service to his absolutism, in the early stages it was made the basis of a relativistic, pragmatic philosophy. As such it colored all the various aspects of Royce's early philosophy and particularly his philosophy of religion. The religious consciousness, according to Royce, is primarily concerned with the problem of salvation. It is incumbent upon the philosopher of religion, therefore, to inquire into the nature and possibility of that salvation. Before the metaphysics of salvation can be adequately dealt with, however, it is necessary to enter into a discussion of the epistemological problem. In the year 1878, in his unpublished "Thought Diary," Royce wrote: Every man lives in a Present, and contemplates a Past and Future. In this consists his whole life. The Future.and Past are shadows both, the Present is the only real. Yet in the contemplation of the Shadows is the Real wholly occupied; and without the Shadows this Real has for us neither life nor value. No more universal fact of consciousness can be mentioned than this fact which therefore deserves a more honorable place in Philosophy than has been accorded to it.2

We saw in Chapter I that the principle of philosophy of history, for Berdyaev, is Christ, Godmanhood. We observed, too, that the free will of man figures importantly. By studying Berdyaev’s doctrine of Godmanhood and his voluntarism we will be able to understand his philosophy of history. The present chapter studies the metaphysical subject-matter of philosophy of history especially as it is divine or religious.